ML19211C584
| ML19211C584 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1979 |
| From: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Berry G POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001140004 | |
| Download: ML19211C584 (4) | |
Text
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December 19, 1979 Docket No. 50-333 Mr. George T. Berry General Manager and Chief Engineer Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Berry:
By letter dated November 28, 1978 the staff requested all licensees of operating reactors to respond to generic concerns about containment purg-ing and venting during normal plant operation.
In response you submitted letters dated January 9, March 2, and August 15, 1979 which provided information regarding the applicable systems at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
Since our initial correspondence, problem resolution has been divided into short term interim activities and a long term effort. Our short term requirements were forwarded by letters in September and October of this year. By letter dated September 27, 1979 the staff forwarded guidelines for valve operability and requested your commitment to a valve qualifica-tion program within 30 days. By letter dated October 22, 1979 we forwarded the NRC containment purge interim position and requested your commitment within 45 days to operate in conformance with this position. The staff's review of the Power Authority's response to these letters will determine the acceptability of continued interim operation of the FitzPatrick Plant.
The enclosed request for additional information is forwarded as part of the long term FitzPatrick review. Your response within 30 days of receipt of this letter would be appreciated. Please note that additional written questions as well as a meeting in Bethesda are very likely.
Please advise if we can be of further assistance.
Sincerely, p
W8Mb Thomas K."Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Operating Reactors Enclosure and cc: See page 2 1744 044 800134g g g f
Mr. George T. Berry
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:
Mr. Vito Cassan Assistant General Counsel Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Mr. Peter W. Lyon Manager-Nuclear Operations Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Mr. J. D. Leonard, Jr.
Resident Manager James A. FitzPatrick Nucicar Power Plant P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Director, Technical Development Programs State of New York Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 George M. Wilverding, Licen::ir.g Supervisor Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Oswego County Office Building 46 E. Bridge Street Oswego, New York 13126 1744 045
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE CONTAINMENT PURGE AND VENT SYSTEM FOR JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 1.
With regard to the drywell vent and purge penetration cover grating, discuss the design basis of the grating.
In particular:
a.
Discuss the design basis for the sizing of the grating mesh pattern; b.
Discuss the ability of the grating to withstand dynamic LOCA forces; c.
Discuss the provisions taken to assure that the metal grating has been properly qualified (e.g., for seismic events); and d.
Describe what routine procedures you use to assure that partial blockage of the grating by debris du&g nomal operation does not affect the ability of the grating to remain in place and perform its function when subjected to LOCA forces.
2.
The copies of P & ID's attached to your submittal of August 15, 1979 were illegible. Please provide legible drawings as well as a sche-matic drawing of the purge system. Please include the isolation valves in this schematic.
3.
For the containment purge isolation valves, please specify the differential pressure across the valve for which the maximum leak rate occurs. Provide test results (e.g., from vendor tests of leakage rate versus valve differential pressure) which support your conclusion.
4.
Please provide operational justification for utilizing 2 supply and 2 exhaust purge lines for the drywell. Discuss the procedures
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governinf the use of the purge system (e.g., sequence of valve openings,etc.).
a 5.
The override of one type of safety actuation signal (e.g., radiation) must not cause the blocking of any other type of safety actuation signal (e.g., pressure) to isolation valves. Override of a system actuation signal composed of several types of actuation signals is not permitted.
It would appear from your August 15, 1979 response that multiple bypasses of safety actuation signals could be initiated by a single override action.
In this perspective, please provide drawings and/or sketches which show the point in valve closure logic where the override signal is introduced. Please provide a discussion of whether an override affects a single actuation signal or more than one actuatir.g signal.
(a) The following definition of an override is given for clarity: The signal is still present, and it is blocked in order to perform a function contrary to the signal.
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- 6.
Sufficient physical features (e.g., key lock switches) should be provided to facilitate adequate administrative controls.
Initiating or bypassing a safety function should necessitate a deliberate operator action; e.g.,
physical features such as switch protective covers or keylock switches would preclude inadvertent and operator action. Your August 16, 1979 letter did not address this concern. Please provide information regarding the subject physical features.
7.
The overriding or resetting of the isolation actuation signal should not cause the automatic reopening of any isolation or purge valve.
Please describe the manual isolation valve control switches and circuits. Of particular interest is switch type, e.g., spring return to neutral position or maintained contact switches.
8.
The overriding of redundant valves by initiating a single bypass is not permissible. Each valve should be provided with an independent switch which introduces a bypass or override into the separate control logic for each valve.
Based on your submittal, it is unclear whether a single switch can effect the operation of redundant components.
Please provide infomation regarding this concern as well as appropriate drawings and/or
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schematics.
9.
The staff is concerned about the possibility of inadvertent defeat of any isolation provision. These concerns are not limited to the question of containment ventilation isolation. Accordingly, please identify all other containment isolation valve circuits that have the same reset or bypass provisions as do the containment ventilation isolation (CVI) system and describe the bypass and reset features for all isolation valves that are different from the CVI system, 10.
The instrumentation and control systems provided to initiate CVI should be designed and qualified as safety grade equipment.
In this perspective, please discuss the qualifications of control systems including radiation monitoring channels. As a minimum, these compo,ents should be qualified for the worst case normal environment expected over the life of the plant as well as the worst case accident environment which occurs during that time post accident during which operability is required. Please include discussions on maximum and minimum temperatures, pressures, relative humidity, radiation _ dose rate, integrated radiation dose, vibration _
and seismology.
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