ML19210C897
| ML19210C897 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1979 |
| From: | Kiessel R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-03-05.A, TASK-3-5.A, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7911200276 | |
| Download: ML19210C897 (15) | |
Text
.
[pa arag UNITED STATES y
r, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5
E WASHINGTON, D, C. 20555 October 29, 1979
..o.
Docket No.:
50-155 MEMORANDUM FOR:
D. M. Crutchfield, Chief, Systematic Evaluation Program Branch, 00R FROM:
R. J. Kiessel, Systematic Evaluation Program Branch, D0R
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING WITH CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY ON HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT FOR BIG ROCK POINT (SEP TOPIC III-5.A)
Representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Consumers Power Company (CPCo) and NUTECH (consultant to CPCo) met in Bethesda to discuss the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topic III-5.A, " Effects of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems and Components Inside Containment", for Big Rock Point on July 11,1979. A list of attendees is provided in Attachment 1.
Following brief introductory discussions on the purpose of the meeting, NUTECH presented an overview of the plant and their approach to the resolution of this SEP Topic. Attachment 2 provides the highlights of this presentation.
In response to the proposed project criteria (Page 5 of Attachment 2), the SEP Staff made the following coments:
1.
Although the NRC Staff will not accept, a priori, a criterion which excludes breaks in small pipes, it it willing to consider generic arguments as to why certain sizes of piping need not be evaluated.
2.
Regulatory Guide 1.46 does not require consideration of cracks in moderate energy lines.
3.
Criteria which limits the effective range of a jet, such as that contained in the proposed ANS 58.2 ( ANSI N176) will be acceptable to the SEP Staff.
4.
Although the NRC Staff will not accept, a priori, a criteria which excludes slot breaks in seamless pipe, it is willing to consider generic arguments as to why it need not be evaluated in certain Cases.
1361 J16
{ 7 9112 00 G 82. N
D. M. Crutchfield October 29, 1979 5.
The NRC Staff will require breaks to be postulated in straight seamless pipe and at fittings with a low stress intensification factor if that is where the effects oriented approach says they should be postulated.
6.
Credit for operator action will be considered on a case by case basis once the scenarios have been developed.
7.
The NRC Staff agreed that the ultimate goal is to meet 10 CFR Part 100 criteria, but went on ta state that this is to be accomplished by meeting the following:
a.
Maintaining a coolable core geometry; b.
Maintaining the ability to shut the plant down safely and to keep it in that condition (the definition of a safe shutdown is defined in NRC safe shutdown reviews);
and c.
Maintaining containment integrity.
Additionally, the NRC Staff made the following comments with respect to the review of this topic:
1.
It is of the utmost importance that the NRC Staff fully understand the consequences of each pipe break before a decision can be made with respect to any proposed resolutions.
2.
Cascading effects must be avaluated. That is, the effects of breaks in a line caused by the pipe whip and jet impingement effects of the initial break must also be considered. When doing this, the criteria contained in B.2.b.(2) of BTP APCSB 3-1 may be used to determine the damage to the target pipe caused by a whipping pipe.
3.
The single failure criterion to be used by the NRC staff in their review will be that of ANS-51.7, Draft 4, Rev.1, November 1975, which states that the most limiting single failure will be taken in addition to the initiating break and its effects. The most limiting single failure can be taken either as a single active failure in the short-tem or a single active or passive failure in the long-tem. Short-tem, long-tem and7he nature of the passive failure are defined in the standard.
1361
]17
D. M. Crutchfield October 29, 1979 4.
General Design Criteria No.17 and BTP APCSB 3-1 (B.3.b.1) will be egloyed relating to loss of offsite power; however, on a plant-by-plant basis, operational experience will be considered.
5.
The acceptability of augmented inservice inspection has net been determined for use with the Systematic Evaluation Program. However, it was cautioned that current thinking would, at best, limit it to isolated cases as a last resort and only after the SEP Staff fully understood all of the effects of the break.
At the conclusion, CPCo stated that they should have a first draft of their evaluation by mid-October 1979 and suggested a meeting at that time.
chard J.
ibi Systematic Evaluation Program Branch Division of Operating Reactors
Attachment:
As stated 1361 018
AYTACHMENT 1 ATTENDEES MTG. 7/179 HELB - BIG ROCK POINT Philip A. CiBenedetto SEPb/ DOR Richard J. Kiessel SEPB/ DOR Howard Fields Consumers Power K. N. Jabbour NRC/ DOR /SEPB R. F. Petrokas NUTECH L. Bates NUTECH T. O. Brown NUTECH T. D. Martin NUTECH W. J. Beckius Consumers Power R. M. M6rusich Consumers Power R. E. Schaffstall KMC, Inc.
1361 319
ATTACHMENT 2 CPCo/NRC MEETING 0F JULY 11, 1979 BIG ROCK POINT EVALUATION FOR PIPE BREAK INSIDE CONTAIN-MENT, SEP TOPIC # III - 5.A.
TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION 1.
OVERVIEW 0F PLANT ARRANGEMENT II.
ITEMS KNOWN TO REQUIRE EVALUATION III.
GENERAL APPROACH TO PIPE BREAK EVALUATION IV.
PROPOSED PROJECT CRITERIA V.
POTENTIAL RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS i 361 020 RFP-1 7/11/79 nutech
I.
OVERVIEW 0F PLANT ARRANGEMENT
. NUTECH/CPCo WALK THROUGH JUNE 20 & 21, 1979
. MOST HIGH ENERGY LINES LOCATED WITHIN ENCLOSURE STRUCTURE INSIDE CONTAINMENT
. CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
---PROTECTED BY EQUIPMENT ENCLOSURE STRUCTURE
---MORE EVALUATION NEEDED IN TUNNEL ROOM CABLE TRAYS, A POTENTIAL CONCERN
---RECIRCULATION PUMP ROOM
---TUdNEL ROOM
', CURRENT AREAS OF CONCERN ARE LOCALIZED
---EMERGENCY CONDENSER AREA
---RECIRCULATION PUMP ROOM
---TUNNEL ROOM 1361 021 11 79 nutech
II.
ITEMS KNOWN TO REQUIRE EVALUATION
. ITEM - BREAKS IN CONTAINMENT TUNNEL ROOM EVALUATION REQUIRED:
CABLE TRAYS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE POWER SUPPLIES POST INCIDENT SYSTEli (P.I.S~.) PIPING CONTAINMENT PENETRATION AREA
. ITEM - BREAKS IN RECIRCULATION PUMP ROOM EVALUATION REQUIRED:
P.I.S. PIPING CRD PUMP SUPPLY LINE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENT LINES CABLE TRAYS
. ITEM - BREAKS IN EMERGENCY CONDENSER AREA EVALUATION REQUIRED:
RDS PIPING 1361 322 ENCLOSURE SPRAY LINES LIQUID POISON SYSTEM l-79 nutech
III.
GENERAL APPROACH TO PIPE BREAK EVALUATION IDENTIFY HIGH ENERGY LINES ELIMINATE HIGH ENERGY LINES BY INSPECTION
---SITE INSPECTION
---FURTHER STUDY EFFECTS-0.4IEiiTED
---STRUCTURES
---PIPliiG
---EQUIPMENT
---ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTATION ALTERNATE METHODS
---CRITERIA EVALUATION
---ISI
---STRESS ANALYSIS
---NEW IDEAS 1361 J23 RFP-4 7-11-79 nutech
3 IV.
PROPOSED PROJECT CRITERIA CONSIDERNOBikEAKSINSMALLPIPES ELIMINATE CONSIDERATION OF BREAKS IN MODERATE ENERGY LINES -
ONLY CONSIDER JET IMPINGEMENT A FINITE DISTANCE' FROM TiiE BREAK ELIMINATE SLOT BREAKS FROM CONSIDERATION IN SEAMLESS PIPE DO NOT CONSIDER BREAKS IN STRAIGHT SEAMLESS PIPE OR AT FITTINGS WITH A LOW SIF CREDIT WILL BE TAKEN FOR OPERATOR ACTION, WHEN JUSTIFIABLE 10 CFR 100 1361 J24 1-79 nutech
V.
POTENTIAL RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS CONSIDER PLANT CHANGES ONLY WHEN PROBLEMS CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY OTHER MEANS
---PHYSICAL PROTECTION
---SEPARATION
---REINFORCEMENT
---0PERATIONAL CHANGES 1361 J25 RFP-6 7-11-79 MM
S E
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6 1
R HIGH ENERGY LINES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED PLANT ORIENTATION VISIT SHOWED THAT AREAS OF CONCERN ARE LOCALIZED MAIN AREAS OF CONCERN ARE RECIRCULATION PUMP ROOM, TUNdEL ROOM, AND EMERGENCY CONDENSER AREA INITIAL STEP WILL BE EFFECTS-0RIENTED
---MULTILEVEL ANALYSES WILL BE USED FOR REMAINING EVALUATIONS
---PROJECT UNIQUE CRITERIA BEING CONSIDERED 1361 J26 1 79 nutech
BIG ROCK POINT HIGH ENERGY LINES Main feedwater system Main steam system piping from steam drum to first restraint outside containment Reactor cleanup system piping to containment isolation valve, check valve in line to control rod drive system and radwaste drain valve Emergency condenser system piping including valve (not including shell side)
Poison system piping including valves (piping from the reactor vessel to squib valves, including valvas in other poison system piping only to the extent that it will affect the squib valve or line to vessel)
Piping frem reactor vessel to isolation valve on the line to the shutdown heat exchangers Nuclear steam supply system piping (riser, downcomers, vent, and drain lines to the first closed valve)
Piping from nuclear steam supply system piping to first check valve on line to the control rod drive system Reactor depressurization system piping from steam drum to RDS isolation valve 1361 227 7-11-79 nutech
BIG ROCK POINT HIGH ENERGY LINES Continued Piping in the control rod drive system greater than one inch, (excluding scram dump tank header)
Core spray and redundant core spray system piping from nozzle to check valve Piping from steam drum to safety valves Instrument piping from reactor vessel to LE-RE09 and from steam drum to LE-RE06 Steam heating line to heat exchangers Piping in shutdown cooling system 1361 328 7-11-79 nutech
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o DISTRIBUTION FOR MEETING SUMMARIES Docket 50-155 M. I. Miller, Esquire NRC PDR
! sham, Lincoln & Beale Local PDR Suite 4200 Central Files One First National P1aza JRW Chicago, Illinois 60670 SEPB Reading NRR Reading Mr. Paul A. Perry, Segretary H. Denton Consumers Power Company E. Case 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 R. Vollmer W. Russell Judd L. Bacon, Esquire B. Grimes Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue
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Jackson, Michigan 49201 t
9 R. Reid G. Knighton Myron M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501 V. Noonan One IBM Plaza A. Schwencer D. Ziemann Chicago, Illinois 60611 D. Crutchfield G. Lainas Ms. Mary P. Sinclair J. Scinto, OELD Great Lakes Energy Alliance 5711 Summerset Drive Midland, Michigan 48640 Licensees - David Bixel, CPCo NRC Participants Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel D. guth,fsyall' KMC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission p
,f R. Kiessel Washington, D. C.
20555 P. DiBenedetto Dr. George C. Anderson Hw{dFields,CPC Department of Oceanography R. F. Petrokas, NUTECH University of Washington L. Bates, NUTECH Seattle, Washington 98195 T. O. Brown, NUTECH
- 1. D. Martin, NUTECH Dr. M. Stanley Livingston W. J. Beckius, CPCo 1005 Calle Largo R. M. Marusich, CPCo Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 1361 231 m e--
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