ML19210B661
| ML19210B661 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1970 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Hunnicutt D, Moseley N US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19210B650 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-70-02, 50-289-70-2, 50-320-70-02, 50-320-70-2, NUDOCS 7911110129 | |
| Download: ML19210B661 (10) | |
Text
a U. S. NiOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REGION I DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE Report of Inspection C0 Report Nos. 289/70-2 320/70-2 Licensee:
Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2)
License No. CPPR-40 and 66 Category A Date of Inspection:
March 30-31, 1970 Date of Previous Inspection:
January 13, 1970 (December 9, 1969)
Inspected by:
h M
8/2/ 70 F. S. Cantrell, Reactor [)lnspector (principal inspector)
'Date h
m'euM&"
Yb/h D. M.
nnicutt, Reactor Inspector
'Dafe
.L/1 A 2/ Q n
D. E. Whitesell, Reactor Inspector (Constrt.ction)
Date Reviewed by:
MC.- d[
//73 N. C. Moseley, Senior Rea gor Inspector Da t'e Proprietary Information:
NONE
SUMMARY
Met Ed has investigated and evaluated information obtained from Fort Calhoune abcut Pipeco pipe and their NDT program. Met Ed has concluded that the Pipeco pipe is acceptable for use in nuclear piping.(Paragraph III.B.2)
One design mix in each class is now used to manufacture concrete for both Unt: 1 and 2.
The change in concrete manufacturers was reviewed and found acceptabie.
The QC program for concrete was not changed.
(Paragraph III. A.2 and III.C.1)
Met Ed suspects that large stainless steel valves ( 10") are being furnace sen-sitizelf while curing stellite to the valve seat.
(Paragraph III.3.3)
F) b U
T91111 0p7
. NDT procedure qualifications for the containment liner we re not found at the site. Met Ed is initiating action to obtain the qualification.
(Paragraph III.E.1.c)
A crack was found in the weld prep area of a four inch stainless steel valve purchased from Alloyco for the rad waste system.
It was determined the valve was cracked during shipment, and was not representative of the whole order.
(Paragraph III.C.2)
Approximately 340 feet of 2 inch and 3 inch ASTM A-312 stainless steel pipe purchased for the rad waste system contained filler metal. The pipe has been rejected for use in nuclear systems.
(Paragraph III.B.1)
I.
Scope A routine announced inspection was made to the site of the pressurized water reactor being constructed on Three Mile Island near Middletown, Pennsylvania.
The purpose of the inspection was to audit records, observe the program of work and to transfer the primary inspection responsibility to Mr. D. M. Hunnicutt.
Mr. D. E. Whitesell, Reactor Inspector (Construction), Region I, accompanied :o observe work and review records associated with the containment building.
Mr.
D. Ross,. DRL, HQ, accompanied to f amiliarize himself with the program of work for both TMI-l and TMI-2.
II.
Persons Contacted A.
Met Ed Mr. George Bierman, Project Manager Mr. Gene Hreczuch, Construction Engineer Mr. Vern Stuebuer, Resident Engineer, Unit 1 Mr. Will Shepard, Resident Engineer, Unit 2 Mr. Earl Allen, Resident QA Engineer Mr. B. G. Avers, QA Manager, GPU B.
UE&C Mr. J. E. Fant, Site QC Manager Mr. H. A. Hardy, Assistant QC Supervisor III.
Details A.
Organization 1.
0A Manager Mr. Milo Prisuta, Site QC Manager for UE&C, resigned. UE&C t r ans -
ferred Mr. J. E. Fant from Indian Point 2 to Three Mile Island
- e=
1586 023
3-Mr. Prisuta.
Mr. Fant had been QA Manager for UE&C on the Irdian Point 2 project.
2 Concrete Manufacturer Met Ed sold the concrete batch plant on the site to National Mobile Incorporated and contracted to buy their concrete from them.
There has been no change in the testing and inspection requirements.
Con-crete is stiti manufactured on the site. UE&C and Pittsburgh Test-ing Lab perform the same inspections and tests as when UE&C was re-sponsible for the manufacture of concrete.* Met Ed pays the contract price for acceptable concrete and pays for only the materials used in " reject" concrete.
B.
Piping 1.
Stainless Steel Pipe, ASTM A-312**
The inspectors reviewed Met Ed's disposition of 2 inch and 3 incn pipe, ASTM A-312, suspected of incomplete fusion or the addition et filler metal.***
Samples were sent to three independent laboratories for evaluation; and a consultant was asked to evaluate the lab re-ports.
Based on differences in the chemical analysis of the weto metal and the parent metal, it was concluded that filler metal was added.
As reported previously, all of the pipe involved was rejected for nuclear service. Replacement pipe manufactured to ASTM A-358 or ASTM A-376 specifications has been specified as replacement for-the rejected pipe.
2.
Stainless Steel Pipe, ASTM A-358, Class I and II bv Grinnell Corn.****
The inspector asked about Met Ea interpretation of paragraph e.2.3 of ASTM A-358 concerning visual inspection of pipe welds, in par-ticular, the requirement for no valleys in the center line or at the edge of the weld.
Mr. Avers stated that he was aware of a prob-lem concerning Allegheny-Ludium pipe ordered for Grinnell. Grinnell
- C0 Report Nos. 289/69-2 and 289/69-4
- C0 Report No. 289/69-5, Paragraph III.4.a(3)
- n n
n
- Memo from J. P. O'Reilly, 2/4/70 concerning telephone inquiry from Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corporation q O jl I5ob' n
Ucr s
,, received the pipe from Allegheny-Ludlum through Youngstown Welding and Pipe Company. Radiographs showed a line down the center of the weld. Met Ed rejected the pipe as not meeting specification for A-358 pipe; and requested replacement or repair of the pipe. The pipe was returned to the vendor for repairs.
Mr. Avers stated that repairs have been made, and that Met Ed will read the radio-graphs before the pipe is accepted for fabrication by Grinnell.
Met Ed (using UE&C and MPR as well as their own inspectors) performs the vendor inspections for Grinnell on pipe ordered for Unit 1.
The original piping contract for Unit 1 did not specify vendor surveillance by Grinnell. According to Mr. Avers, Met Ed and Grinnell could not agree on the terms to rewrite the piping contract to include vendor inspections by Grinnell, however, an agreement was reached for Met Ed,to perform the inspections instead of Grinnell. According to Mr.
Avers, Met Ed reads all radiographs on nuclear pipe before it is accepted.
3.
Stainless Steel Pipe Supolied by Pipeco The inspectt_.aviewed vendor inspection reports made at Pipeco on September 26, 1969, October 1, 1969 and February 5, 1970. UE6C par-ticipated in all inspections. MPR was invloved in the September and February inspections. GPU (for Met Ed) took part in the Feb-ruary inspection.
After Met Ed learned of the Fort Calhoune evaluation of Pipeco*, a sample of the pipe supplied by Pipeco was sent to another t est ing laboratory for a separate evaluation. The following report was supplied:
"All results of the checks are within limits of ASTM A-376.
However, the results of the physical tests give reason to question Pipeco test.
Comparisons are listed below".
A-376 Independent Pipeco Specifications Test Tensile 89,610 75,000 L 33,419 Yield (0.2% offset) 50,350 30,000 82,811 Elongation 60%
357, min.
40%
Because of the above results, additional samples from three dif-ferent heats were sent to three other laboratories.
Results are shown below:
- Private conversation between Met Ed and Fort Calhoune.
Problem reportec in CO Report No. 285/69-6 1586 025
., Heat No.
Yield Tensile Elongation 7 Roc. "B" 80,694 Lehigh 42,780 83,500 60 84 42,860 85,190 59 85 Industrial 42,000 88,500 62 91 42,500 88,800 60.5 92 Coleman 46,846 92,247 56.5 92 Pipeco 50,350 89,610 69.0 (Mill Certs) 80,691 Lehigh 43,120 87,500 56 86 42,820 86,670 58 86 Industrial 42,200 93,800 57 94 44,600 93,200 58 95 Coleman 47,764 89,441 54.5 94 Pipeco 51,200 90,890 75 80,677 Lehigh 40,510 83,850 61 85 40,390 84,160 60 83 Industrial 43,200 93,800 58 91 44,600 93,200 60 92 Coleman 41,914 83,330 58 92 -
Pipeco 49,360 86,190 70 Met Ed has evaluated these results against the original analysis supplied by Pipeco and has concluded that the Pipeco pipe meets the specifications and is satisfactory for use as nuclear piping.
Mr. Avers stated that the Met Ed" inspections have indicated that Pipeco does perform the ultrasonic test required and that heat treat ment records are available.
The.-e records were reviewed by Met Ed and were satisfactory.
Mr. Avers stated that the certification supplied meet the code requirements for h.ydrostatic testing, however, Met Ed inten s to perform a system hydrostatic test that will also d
meet the cc, requirements.
4 Observation of Work UE&C are currently installing the river water secondary heat ex-1586 026
. changers for nuclear service. The inspector observed that the weld history records for each weld joint are being maintained.
Also 19 welds were observed to have beer rejected and red tagged.
Each red tag referenced Deficiency Report (DR) No. 0174 The in-spector reviewed this deficiency report and found that the rejected welds had been improperly marked by using high stress stamps. The report noted that new low stress stamps had been ordered. The cor-rective action relative to the removal of the high stress stamp markings was being routed for approval and initiation.
(5405.06 a3)
C.
Valves 1.
Potentially Sensitized Stainless Steel Valves Mr. Avers stated that Met Ed was evaluating possible furnace sensi-tization of large diameter stainless steel valves (>10") with stel-1_ce seats. Met Ed believes the valves are being heated several hours at 900 to 1100 F with the possibility the valves are being sensitized.
2.
Cracked Stainless Valve (4 ")
- Six four inch valves were received from Alloyco for use in the rad waste system. One valve was cracked in the machined weld prep area.
The other five valves wc a acceptable. The cracked valve was re-turned to Alloyco. According to Mr. Hreczuch, Met Ed and Alloyco investigated the inspection program and concluded that the valve was cracked during shipment. Met Ed has accepted Alloyco's evalu-ation that the cracked valve.was not representative of tne group of valves.
(Subsequent to the inspection, Mr. Avers informed the in-spector of two additional cracked valves received from Alloyco and that Met Ed had reopened their investigation).
D.
Concrete 1.
Review of QC Documents (4605.04) a.
Some problems have been generated by the fact that two A&Es, B&R and CAI, each have a separate design mix for each class of concrete, which had to be batched and transported with common facilities. To eliminate these problems a new mix was designed for ea:h class of concrete, which was acceptable to each A&E.
This eliminates the problems, and also the need for the second
- C0 Report No. 289/69-5, paragraph III.6.b i586 027
, batch plant as previously reported.* Trial mixes were pre-pared by Mester Builders Engineering Lab for each design for both Medusa and Allentown cements. The 28 day test results for the selected mixes had an average strength ranging from 130% to 1377. of the design strength.
(4605.04 bl and b2) b.
Since the source of the cement, aggregates and additives are the same, the specified ASTM tests for these materials were' audited on a previous inspection and were not audited during this inspection.**
2.
Followup Record Audit (4605.05) a.
PTL reports relative to verification test of the tensile and yield strengths of the rebars, concrete strength results and cadweld splice strength results were audited and no deficiencies were noted. The production concrete average strengths were ranging from 125% to 170% of the design strengths.
(4605.05 al) b.
The slump, air entrainment, concrete temperatures, sieve analysis etc are recorded on the pour records and were found to be within the limits stipulated in the specifications.
(4605.05 a2 and a3) c.
The sign-off records that are signed by the various craft super-visors, certifying that all embeddments, block outs, sleeves, inserts, etc are in place,and the area is ready for concrete, were audited, together with the pour record showing the design mix required and the batch tickets showing the design mix de-
' livered. No deficiencies were noted.
(4605.05 b7) 3.
Observation of Work (4605.06)
Due to inclement weather cadweld splices were not being made and the only concrete work in progress was pouring a wall in the auxil-iary building.
It was observed that adequate tremies were in place and there was an adequate work force available to handle the work.
(4605.06 a, b5 and 4605.04 h4)
E.
Prestressed Concrete (4700) 1.
Imolementation of QA Program (4705.03)
The test blocks for monitoring and testing tendons have been in-stalled. The test blocks contain six ducts, two open each end,
- C0 Report No. 289/69-2 sn
,, four sealed and capped at each end.
Two tests are being set up, one is for the tendons protected with Visconorust No. 2690 grease only, the second test is for an inner coat of FCR-AA with a wrap-ping to hold the innercoat in place, and an outer coat of ECP-BB over the wrapper. The temperature and humidity are monitored daily. As soon as the humidity and temperature stabilizes, the tendons will be button-headed and tensioned.
(4705.04) 2.
Followup scord Audit (4705.05)
The mill certificates for the anchor plates for both Unit 1 and 2 were audited. The plates for Unit I are ASTM A-36, no deficiencies were noted in the mill certificates. The mill certificates for the anchor plates in Unit 2 were to ASTM A-516, Grade 70, normalized to ASTM A-300 for fine grain (noted to be 7-8).
The normalizing temperature was shewn to be 16500 F, and the Charpy V notch results vete given.
The mi11 certificates for the tendon ducts. were also' audited. No deficiencies were noted.
(4705.05 al) 3.
Observation o f Work a.
The anchor plates on Unit I were observed to be installed per detailed on drawings. The sheaths are connected with Dressler couplings and are checked for electrical continuity and are pressure tested at 5 psig for seal.
(4705.04 ci) b.
Mr. Mason, Job Engineer, UE&C, informed the inspector that plugs or swabs were pulled through each sheath prior to pouring concrete, and again af ter the concrete is poured. Any joint that opens up during pouring, is dug out, repaired and recast.
(4705.06 a2) c.
The inspector observed the grounding cables being cadwelded to the sides of the anchor plates for Unit 2.
No base plates have been installed as yet in Unit 2.
F.
Containment Liner 1.
Review of QC Svstem (4805.04) a.
The inspector reviewed the system used by CB&I to identify the NDT procedure and NDT technician relative to the containment liner.
The system consists of two stretch-out drawings of the containment shell.
One from 0 to 180 and the other from 180 to 360. There is one set of drawings for each NDT examination made, eg, RT, MP, DP, e tc. The drawings show the seam numbers, the initials of the inspector making the examination, the date,
} )bU
.. the exact location on the seam, and whether it was made inside or outside the containment. All such examinations were found to be traceable to the work.
(4805.04 b4 and b5) b.
Mr. Avers informed the inspectors that Met Ed visually inspects 1007. of the work in order to ensure that all repairs are made prior to pouring concrete against the liner.
c.
The NDT procedures qualification documents were not found at the site.
In disucssing this with the licensee, the inspector was informed by Mr. Avers that they would have CB&I furnish them with a copy of the qualification documents whether or not it was a code requirement that such documents be available at the site.
IV.
Exit Interview An exit interview was held with Messrs. Hreczuch and Avers.
The inspector asked about the resolution of the questionable pipe from Pipeco.
Mr. Avers stated that Met Ed had evaluated the mill certification against test reports from three different laboratories and had concluded that the independent lab reports verify the Pipeco mill certifications. Met Ed has made three audits of the Pipeco shop and concluded that Pipeco is capable of meeting the specifications required. As a result, Met Ed has accepted the Pipeco pipe for use in nuclear systems.
The inspector stated that B&W had told the compliance inspector at Mt.
Vernon that the Met Ed reactor vessels did not have any sensitized safe-ends.
The inspector asked if Met Ed could verify that statement.
Mr. Avers stated that he would determine the status and advise Compliance.
The inspector reviewed the changes in concrete for Units 1 and 2 Mr.
Hreczuch stated that selling the batch plant and contracting to buy concrete did not change any of the inspections or test procedures, that UE&C and PTL still performed the same QC function. He stated that Met Ed had instructed Gilbert Associates and Burns and Roe to arrive at a design mix that was suit-able for both units. This was desirable to reduce cost and to minimize the chances for using the wrong cix.
He stated the necessary tests had been run on the new design mix and that all concerned groups had approved its use for 3000 psi class concrete. Tests are currently underway to approve a design mix for 3000 psi class concrete.
The inspector reviewed problems that had been encountered at other locations in using aluminut oipe to "trar. sport" concrete.* Mr. Hreczuch stated that Met-Ed had not used any aluminum for concrete and did not plan to use any aluminum pipe for that purpose.
- Memo from J. P. O'Reilly, dtd 2/2/70 1586 030
- The inspectors asked about procedures for handling the steam generators and the reactor vessel.
Mr. Avers stated that B&W had submitted preliminary procedures to Met Ed.
These procedures have been reviewed by UE&C, GAI and Met Ed.
Com-ments have been forwarded to B&W.
The inspector asked about the extent of carbon steel seal rings on the stain-less drain pipe from the fuel pit.
Mr. Hreczuch stated that the problem had been referred to GAI for resolution.
It was assumed that any leakage would be borated water. A review of construction program shows that no stainless steel pipe with carbon steel seal. rings have been buried in concrete.
The inspector asked about the qualification of the NDT procedures for the containment liner.
Mr. Avers stated that CB&I would be required to furnish the procedure qualification tagardless of the code requirements.
In response to questions, Mr. Hreczuch stated that the A-312 pipe that was fabricated with filler metal would be used only in non-nuclear services.
O 1586 03i