ML19209C084
| ML19209C084 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001100 |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1979 |
| From: | Crocker H, Roth J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19209C071 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1100-79-04, 70-1100-79-4, NUDOCS 7910110485 | |
| Download: ML19209C084 (15) | |
Text
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 70-1100/79-04 Docket No. 70-1100 License No. SNM 1067 Priority: 1 Category:
UR Licensee:
Combustion Engineering, Incorporated P.O. Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut Facility Name:
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing and Nuclear Laboratories Inspection at:
Windsor, Connecticut Inspection condu.ted:
June 5-8, 1979 Inspectors:
),
7 L/W
. Roth, Project Inspector d'a te' signed Approved by:
M br 8 Abt/
/
s H.
I. Crocker, Glief, Fuel Facility d' ate / signed Pr ects Section, FF&MS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on June 5-8, 1979 (Report No. 70-1100/79-04)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unanr.ounced inspection by a regional based inspector of the licensee's programs including:
10CFR Part 21; organ-ization; internal review and audit; safety committees; procedure con-trol; review of operation; nuclear criticality safety; confirmatory measurements - effluents (report only); routine use of packagings, licensee action on previous enforcement items; and follow-up on regional office circulars.
The inspection was initiated on the swing shift (4:00-12:00) on June 5, 1979 and involved 23 inspector hours onsite by one NRC regional based inspector.
Results:
Of the 10 areas inspected, co items of noncompliance were identified in 8 areas.
Three apparent items of noncompliance were identified in two areas (Infraction - two instances of failure to wear gloves or proper gloves when handling unclad uranium fuel (79-04-01) para. 3a(4)(a), 3a(4)(b); Infraction - three instances of failure to establish adequate radiological safety controls and/or instruc-tions for operations.
(79-04-02) para 3a(5), 3b, 3c; Infraction -
Failure of the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor to review and approve 23 of 25 examined safety related procedures (79-04-03) para 7b.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Nuclear Manufacturing
- F. J. Pianki, General Manager, Fuel Faorication
- G. Bakevich, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing and Safety T. B. Bowie, Manager, Nuclear Materials and Security Nuclear Laboratories P. R. Rosenthal, Manager, Health Physics J. Limbert, Radiological Engineer The inspector also interviewed 15 other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
They included operations personnel, health physics technicians, laboratory technicians, electronic technicians and general office personnel.
- denotes those present at the exit interview 2.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Enforcement Items (Closed) Deficiency (1100/78-09-02):
Failure to have certificate of compliance drawings and failure to follow the certificate of compliance for Model 927Al shipping containers.
The inspector verified that copies of Applied Design Company Drawing No. 927Al (modified) sheets 1, 2 and 3 had been obtained and were available to the licensee for reference purposes as needed.
In addition, it was verified that the licensee had submitted an amendment application to NRC-NMSS, dated November 30,1978, which requested approval to change the authorized procedure for securing the upper bundle bracket to the strongback.
Certificate of Compliance 6078, Revision 4, dated December 11, 1978, was subsequently issued by NRC-NMSS, which authorized the licensee to secure the upper bundle bracket to the strongback by means of either 10 hex head bolts or 2 bolts and 8 steel clevis pins.
Corrective actions on this item of noncompliance have been completed.
3.
Review of Operations The inspector examined all areas of the plant and the nuclear laboratories to observe operations and activities in progress, to inspect the nuclear safety aspects of the facilities and to examine the general state of cleanliness, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection rules.
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. a.
Nuclear Manufacturing Facilities (1) Off-Shift Examination The inspector initiated this inspection during the 4:00 p.m.
to midnight shift on June 5,1979.
An examination of the facility was immediately started upon arrival into the plant and no significant problems were identified.
It was noted that the Fluoroscope Area (Station III) was posted with a criticality safety sign which indicated a limit of "a four inch slab".
The inspector observed that a six inch deep rod box was located on a rack within this area and that the rod box was filled to less than a four inch depth.
However, the inspector questioned licensee representatives with respect to the available administrative controls to assure that the rod box would not be filled to greater than a four inch depth.
The inspector was informed that the operators were trained to observe the posted limit.
During subsequent discussions with licensee representatives, the inspector was informed that the Fluoroscope Area would be reposted to allow a "four inch slab" in the Fluoroscope Area and a full rod box to be placed on the rack in ques-tion.
Since a full rod box had previously been shown to be safe, this reposting would eliminate an adminis-trative control which could be easily violated.
The area was reposted with adequate limits prior to the end of this inspection.
No other questionable prac-tices were identified during this examination of the facil i ty.
(2)
Empty Shipping Containers The inspector observed that the " empty" signs had fallen off several of the 00T SP 6078 shipping containers stored on the north west side of the Bldg.17 yard.
The inspector commented that if significant numbers of empty signs were to fall off these empty containers, the unmarked containers would have to be stored "as if full" in accordance with Section 10.2 of the approved license application.
This was discussed at the exit interview and licensee representatives indicated that the empty signs would be replaced as needed and that alternative methods of identifying empty containers may be devised.
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. (3) Outside Trailer Storage of SNM The inspector examined the yard storage facility for low enriched fuel and determined that this material was properly stored in a locked and tamper-safe sealed trailer.
How-ever, it was noted that a tamper-safe seal located on a drum designated WRD 0412 had been broken apparently during the process of placing the drum into the trailer.
Upon discovery, the tamper-safe seal was replaced by the licensee according to internal procedures.
(4) Contamination Control (a) During observation of the Batch Make-Up operation, the inspector noted that, upon addition of the fuel bearing powder to e five-gallon container, the container is removed from the Batch Make-Up hood without first wiping down the outside of the container.
As a result of this observation, the inspector requested the accompanying licensee representative to take smear contamination surveys of two five-gallon containers, the one he had watched being filled with powder and one which was ready to be placed into the powder blending station lift.
Each smear covered an estimated 25 to 35 square centimeters.
The smears were analyzed at 3600 d/m and 4250 dpm, respectively.
(An estimated 10,300 to 14.400 dpm/100 sq. cm and 12,100 to 17,000 dpm/100 sq. cm, respectively.)
Shortly after the smears were taken, an operator was observed handling the second container described above while placing the container into the powder blending station lift.
The operator was not wearing gloves during this handling operation as required by Section 15.9 of the approved license application.
The operator did put on rubber gloves when requested to do so.
This was identified as an instance of r.oncompliance (79-04-01).
(b) The inspector also observed that an operator was working in the wet bowl of the centerless grinder feed rrechanism and handling wet fuel pellets while wearing only cloth gloves.
The inspector noted to the licensee representative that the use of cloth gloves during wet operations would not provide any protection from contamination.
The operator put on rubber gloves when requested to do so.
This was identified as another instance of noncompliance (79-04-01).
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. (5)
Powder Blending Operation The inspector reviewed the safety implications and requirements of the following operation sheet with an operator by observing the operation and questioning the operator about certain aspects of the operation. (0.S.1580
" Powder Preparation", Revision 4, dated May 24,1978.)
The inspcctor observed that when the operator turned on the air to the Station 1 blender for the predrying step, a " puff" of powder was observed coming out the top of the hood.
When this was pointed out to the operator, he lowered the air flow from 1600 cfph to 1300 cfph at which point the powder stopped coming out of the top of the hood.
Examination of the operation sheet indicated in step 4.2.1 that "predry air flow per engineering instruction".
The operator was not aware of any written engineering instruction.
However, he was told by the second shift foreman, when he worked on second shift, that the air flow in this step should be limited to about 1300 cfph.
Further discussion with the first shift foreman (this operator was working on fiist shift during this inspection) indicated that the first shift foreman was not aware as to the required air flow at this operation.
Discussion with engineering personnel indicated that the air flow should be at a maximum of 1800 cfph and that no written instruction had been issued to his knowledge as to what air flow should be used to reduce the possibility of powder being released from the blending enclosure.
The engineer stated that the puff of powder may have been due to improper seating of the caps on the ends of the blender.
Failure to issue written engineering instruction was identified as an instance of noncompliance.
(79-04-02) b.
Examination of Building 6 During examination of the Building 6 Liquid Waste tank storage facility, it was noted that although protective clothing (lab coats and shoe covers) were reqeired for entry, there was no posted requirement to survey hands and shoes for contamination when exiting the area.
In addition it was noted on June 7,1979, that there was no survey instrument available to conduct a personnel 111^
'?C Ie i-JJ contamination survey.
Licensee representatives indicated that there nonnally was an instrument avaliable; however, the instrument had been removed for use at a different location and had not been returned when available.
The licensee repre-sentative also stated that since the building was locked and under the control of the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Group, the instrument would be returned to the building at the time anyone requested to enter the building.
The instrument was not replaced in Building 6 at the time the inspector requested to go through the facility.
The inspector and a licensee repre-sentative went through the facilitv while wearing the proper protective clothing and upon exitirg the contaminated area, went directly to a personnel monitoring instrument located in Building 17.
At this time it was determined that the accompanying licensee representative had picked up about 200 cpm contamination on a hand while in the Building 6 contaminated area.
This was immediately washed off.
Failure to maintain a personnel survey instrument and instruction to use this instrument in Building 6 was identified as an instance of noncompliance (79-04-02).
c.
Nuclear Laboratories The inspector observed that there was no personnel contamination survey instrument available for use at the change line set up next to the emission spectrograph located in the Nuclear Laboratories on June 6, 1979.
A licensee representative indicated that the closest survey instrument was located down the hall near the entrance to the chemistry laboratory, a distance of about 75 feet away through a clean area of the facility and that there was no suitable instrument available for use at this loca-tion.
Failure to maintain a personnel survey instrument at the change line next to the emission spectrographic unit was identi-fied as an instance of noncompliance (79-04-02).
d.
Outside Waste Storage Pad The inspector determined that the outside waste storage pad, which is normally used to storage radioactive contaminated waste containers, was empty with the exception of 4-17H containers which were unlabeled.
The inspector surveyed the containers for radiation which showed that the containers contained little or no radioactive material.
Subsequently, prior to the end of this 1112 336
. inspection, these containers were identified as containing industrial waste from the cleanout of an old drain line.
These containers were movsd off this storage pad.
4.
Nuclear Criticality Safety a.
Nuclear Laboratory (1)
Nuclear Safety Postings Inspection of the laboratories disclosed no instances of lack of nuclear safety postings or failure to follow the posted limits.
The continuous logs for several of the stations were examined.
Each log showed the amount of uranium and U-235 present at the station and the enrichment of the uranium as required.
(2)
Criticality Monitors The inspector examined the meter panel for the nuclear criticality accident alarm system located at the main entrance to Building 5.
The alarm set points were set at 5 mr/hr and the sensing detectors appeared to be operating properly.
Examination of calibration records indicated that the criticality monitors were calibrated on a quarterly basis on June 7,1978, September 6,1978, December 5,1978, March 5,1979 and June 5,1979 and whenever repair work was accomplished on any of the sensing units.
It was noted that unit Rad 85 was renoved from the system and replaced by Rad 75 on July 25, 1978 and Rad 75 was calibrated on that date.
The records do not indicate when Rad 85 was reinstalled back into the system.
However, discussion with electronics technicians indicated that Rad 85 was reinstalled on the next calibration date September 6,1978, and the records were not changed to indicate this fact.
(3) Monthly Audits of the Nuclear Laboratories The inspector examined the records of five monthly audits of the Nuclear Laboratories by the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor for the time period January 31, 1979 through May 31, 1979.
The inspector noted that no problem areas were identified during the conduct of the monthly audits.
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. b.
Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing (1) Nuclear Safety Postings Inspection of Building 17 disclosed no instances of lack of proper nuclear safety postings or failure to follow posted limits.
(2) Criticality Monitors The inspector examined the nuclear criticality safety alann system radiation monitors located throughout the facility.
The alann set points were set at 5 mr/hr and the monitors appeared to be working.
Examination of calibration records indicated that the criticality monitors were calibrated on a quarterly basis on May 10, 1978, August 10, 1978, November 13, 1978, February 13, 1979 and May 11, 1979.
The records also indicated that all monitors which were repaired were calibrated prior to being returned to service.
(3) Audits (a)
Daily Audits Records of daily audits conducted by Health Physics technicians for the time period January 2,1979 through June 6, 1979 were examined by the inspector.
These audits examined signs, logs, radiation alanns and criticality safety compliance and items requiring correction were corrected immediately.
(b) Monthly Audits Documentation of monthly audits conducted by the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor, as required by Amendment 17, during the time period November 27, 1978 and May 30, 1979 were examined by the inspector.
A total of 6 items were identified which required correction in the 7 reports.
The inspector verified that appropriate corrective actions were taken or had been initiated by the licensee.
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. (4)
Nuclear Safety Evaluations The inspector reviewed the records of the review and approval of process, equipment or facility changes performed by the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor for criticality safety and radiological safety.
From November 7, 1978 through May 16, 1979, four requests for review and approval of equipment changes were made by Engineering and one request for review and approval was made by the Nuclear Laboratories.
The requests were reviewed and approved by the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor with conditions imposed as needed for criticality and radiological safety conditions.
Two of the four Engineering requests and the one Nuclear Laboratory request involved criticality safety conditions.
These requests were independently reviewed for criticality safety by a person designated by the Nuclear Safety Committee.
This designated person meets the qualifications for a Criticality Safety Specialist. This individual signed the approval fonns which documented the review and approval of these changes.
These changes are reviewed and approved as required by procedure, " Nuclear Licensing and Safety Review of Process / Equipment / Facility Changes Affecting Nuclear, Radiological or Industrial Safety", dated November 11, 1977.
5.
Safety Committee The Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing, Nuclear Safety Committee met on December 20, 1978 and also conducted an audit of the Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing facility on the same date.
The committee determined that "the facility and its operation are safe from the standpoints of criticality and health physics." During this meeting, the committee also reviewed the following items and were satisfied with the analyses obtained:
Possible accumulation of UO,, in ducts and other transport systems; Accumulation of U0 on filters; potential for a mix-up of enrichments in the producti$n line; examination of the criticality analysis of the batch make-up conveyor system; reviewed the evaluation documentation system; discussion on personnel exposures during the year; and, discussion on pending license amendment.
6.
IOCFR Part 21 Procedugs, The inspector verified that the licensee had posted the proper notices as required by IOCFR 21.6 and that procedures required by IOCFR 21.21 1112 339
. had been written.
The procedure: API-17, " Reporting of Safety Hazards Applicable to Requirements of 10CFR Part 21", Revision 2, dated January 23, 1979, is contained in the " Power Systems Group Administrative Manual" as an Administrative Policy Instruction and is available for any employee to use as required.
This procedure also contains a copy of a " Substantial Safety Hazard Report" form which is to be used to report the item to applicable management.
7.
Procedure Control a.
The licensee controls the issuance, revision and withdrawal of procedures by means of a system described in the facility Quality Assurance Manual.
Procedures controlled by this document include, but are not limited to, manufacturing orders or work orders, process outlines, shop travelers, operation sheets and engineering notices.
Documents are released or changed by the use of an Engineering Notice (E.N.) as indicated by two signature blocks, one for engineering and the second for quality control, each with a date space.
Manufacturing orders or work orders are used to authorize work to be done.
Process outlines list the basic manufacturing and/or inspection steps in outline form.
Shop travelers and operations sheets include, as applicable, instructions for fabricating testing, inspection, cleaning, packaging, shipping and quality control.
Special instructions for control, pre-servation and storage of materials and items are directed by the shop traveler or the related operation sheet.
As a temporary measure, a traveler or an operation sheet may have
" written in" instructions if these changes are accomplished by cognizant personnel, are signed and dated by the person making the change, are approved and countersigned by Quality Control Engineering.
These changes must be formalized within two weeks of the signed date.
Documents are controlled and issued by the Central Document Control Center as required by a properly executed Engineering Notice.
Upon receipt of an EN the CDC will enter the contained information into the document index file, and file the document if a new document; if an old document, CDC will remove, recall and destroy all obsolete documents and will maintain a historical file as necessary.
CDC issues documents on request and/or upon presentation of obsolete documents, maintains a master file of all documents and maintains a current document index.
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. b.
Procedure Review The inspector examined a sampling of 25 procedures (operation sheets) issued by the licensee including:
(1) 0S 185, Revision 9, dated 4/26/79, " Periodic Calibration of Fuel Pellet Trough" (2) OS 191, Revision 0, dated 4/27/71, " Helium Leak Rig Operation" (3) OS 272, Revision ll, dated 1/26/76, " Preparation of Loading table for Fuel Rod Loading" (4) OS 276, Revision 2, dated 8/21/78, " Preparation of Fuel Bundle for Placement into Container" (5) OS 281, Revision 4, dated 5/7/73, "0maha Fuel Bundle Loading Inspection" (6) 0S 284, Revision 3, dated 4/27/71, " Shipping Container Checkout" (7) OS 311, Revision 5, dated 9/5/74, "Detwist and Straighten Fuel Bundle" (8) '0S 389, Revision 38, dated 1/13/76, " Fuel Bundle Loading Inspection" (9) 0S 392, Revision 4, dated 11/22/71, " Shipping Container Checkout" (10) OS 494, Revision 0, dated 4/27/71, " Dry Pellets" (11) 0S 510, Revision 24, dated 4/4/79, " Load Fuel" (12) 05 536, Revision 1, dated 1/21/77, "Unpackaging Virgin Powder" (13) OS 666, Revision 0, dated 9/15/71, " Weigh Fuel Pellets" (14) OS 719, Revision 3, dated 7/28/76, " Preparation of Shipping Containers for Shipment" 1112 341
. (15) 0S 723, Revision 2, dated 2/8/73, " Alpha Smear-Fuel Bundle" (16) OS 812, Revision 8, dated 11/21/73, " Machine Fuel Rod" (17) OS 872, Revision 7, dated 9/1/76, " Fuel Rod Disassembly" (18) OS 910, Revision 54, dated 3/14/79, " Load Fuel Inspection" (19) OS 938, Revision 1, dated 7/16/73, " Fuel Bundle Container Rework" (20) 0S 992, Revision 19, dated 11/8/78, " Fuel Rod Assay" (21) 0S 1095, Revision 13, dated 1/21/77, " Chamfered Fuel Pellet Inspection" (22) OS 1306, Revision 1, dated 12/2/75, "Special Fuel Assembly Measurement" (23) OS 1447, Revision 1, dated 11/17/77, " Shipping Container Inspection" (24) OS 1462, Revision 0, dated 1/11/77, " Filter and U0 Liner 2
Handling Procedure" (25) 0S 1580, Revision 4, dated 5/24/78, " Powder Preparation" Of the 25 procedures examined,19 of 25 were not approved at all by the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor; 4 of the 25 (0S 510, OS 910, OS 992 and OS 1580) had specific revisions signed by the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor but not subsequent revisions (OS 510, 9 revisions; OS 910, 2 revisions; OS 992, 2 revisions and OS 1580, 4 revisions) and only 2 of the 25 were signed by the Nuclear Safety supervisor and were still on the approved revision.
Failure of the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Supervisor to review and approve procedures was identified as an item of noncompliance (79-04-03).
8.
Organization Section 8.1 of the approved license application states on page VIII-3, Revision 3, dated February 22, 1974, that the Radiation Safety Officer reports directly to the Director of the Nuclear Laboratories as shown in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1, Revision 4, dated September 16, 1974, shows that the Radiation Safety Officer (incumbent--P. R. Rosenthal) 1112 342 0
13 reports to the Vice President, Development.
In addition, the inspector, upon review of current organizational charts, deta mined that Mr. P. R. Rosenthal has been designated Manager, Health Physics and there is no indication that he has also been designated the Radiation Safety Officer.
These inconsistencies in the license application were pointed out to licensee representatives during the exit meeting and again during a telephone conversation on June 18,1979.
Licensee representatives indicated that an administrative change would be submitted to NRC-NMSS in order to clarify the language of the facility license application.
9.
Licensee Action on IE Circulars IE ::irculars are reviewed by the General Manager of Fuel Fabrication.
If action is deemed appropriate, the General Manager assigns the responsibility for completion of the action to a member or members of his staff.
In the case of the circular listed below, no actions were deemed necessary, and the circular was used for information purposes only.
The circular of concern was:
IE Circular No. 79-08, dated May 18,1979, " Attempted Extortion--Low Enriched Uranium".
The circular was also reviewed by the site manager, Nuclear Materials Control and Security, who indicated that the site security has been upgraded by the addition of more unscheduled tours and checks by a roving guard, by requiring that a guard accompany any delivery vehicle which arrives after hours and it was determined that the site security organization has been maintaining a program of cantinuous review of the facilities in order to upgrade the security aspects of the site.
10.
Routine Uses of Shipping Packages Procedures for the packaging of SNM containing materials were reviewed by the inspector and determined to be adequate.
Non-exempt shipments are accompanied by the following documents:
truck driver shipping instructions, truck driver reporting instructions, both to the shipper and the receiver, truck driver emergency procedures and special opening instructions if required.
Licensee records relating to the shipping of waste radioactive materials were examined during this inspection and these records elative to 32 containers sealed between May 1,1979 and May 16,19/9, documented 1112 343
. the results of radiation surveys, container inspection res ;lts, labeling, marking and placarding of vehicles and/or containers as required by license conditions, internal procedures or federal regulations.
11.
Confinnatory Measurements--Effluents A comparison of the licensee's measurements with those of the NRC for effluent samples split during a previous inspection are indicated that six measurements were in agreement under the test criteria used by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (Attachment 1) and one measurement (gross beta of a liquid effluent) was in di" creement.
The licensee's gross beta measurement was higher than Lat of the NRC and hence was conservative and would not result in the licensee exceeding any liquid release limits.
During future inspections, the NRC will continue to split liquid effluent samples in order to verify that the gross beta disagreement remains at a minimum, conservative in nature.
The results of the measurements comparisons are listed in Table 1.
No items of noncompliance were identified, 12.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph (1) at the conclusion of the inspection at 11:15 a.m. on June 8, 1979.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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TABLE I CE-VERIFICATION TEST RESULTS SAf1PLE IS0 TOPE NRC VALUE LICENSEE VALUE COMPARIS0N Fixed Air Nos.
RESULTS in dpm Nove.:ber 1,1978 224 A & B Gross alpha 8
6 Agreement 222, 224 C Gross beta 9
8 Agreement Stack Sample Nos.
November 1,1978 F-1 Gross alpha 6
8 Agreement F-2 Gross alpha 37 31 Agreement F-3 Gross alpha 12 20 Agreement Waste Tank No.
RESULTS in uCi/ml November 1, 1978
-7 A-3 Gross alpha 7.5 1 0.4E 1.05 1 0.4E Agreement Gross beta 4.8 1 0.3E-7 3.84 1 0.6E Disagreement ammet
(~
LT1
Attachmene jl Criteria for Comparing Analytical Measurements This attachment provides criteria for comparing results of capability tests and verification measurements.
The criteria are based on an empirical relationship which combines prior experience and the accuracy needs of this program.
In this criteria, the judgement limits are variable in relation to the comparison of the NRC Reference Laboratory's value to its associated uncertainty. As that ratio, referred to in this program as " Resolution",
increases the acceptability of a licensee's measurement should be more selective.
Conversely, poorer agreement must be considered acceptable as the resolution decreases.
LICENSEE VALUE RATIO = NRC REFERENCE VALUE Possible Possible Resolution Agreement Agreement A Agreement B
<3 0.4 - 2.5 0.3 - 3.0 No Comparison 4-7 0.5 - 2.0 0.4 - 2.5 0.3 - 3.0 8 - 15 0.6 - 1.66 0.5 - 2.0 0.4 - 2.5 16 - 50 0.75 - 1.33 0.6 - 1.66 0.5 - 2.0 51 - 200 0.80 - 1.25 0.75 - 1.33 0.6 - 1.66
>200 0.85 - 1.18 0.80 - 1.25 0.75 - 1.33 "A" criteria are applied to the following analyses:
Gamma Spectrometry where principal gamma energy used for identification is greater than 250 Kev.
Tritium analyses of liquid samples.
Iodine on absorbers "B" criteria are applied to the following analyses:
Gamma Snectrometry where principal gamma energy used for identification-is less than 250 Kev.
895r and 90Sr Determinations.
Gross Beta where samples are counted on the same date using the same reference nuclide.
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