Text

Evaluation of Interaction Between Nonsafety-Grade Sys & Safety-Grade Sys for Dresden & Quad-Cities Stations
	ML19209B961
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden, Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/05/1979
From:	; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML17174A055	List: ML17174A054; ML19209B955; ML19209B961;
References
	TASK-07-04, TASK-7-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7910110289
	Download: ML19209B961 (18)
	v • d • e

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ATTACHMENT 2 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY EVALUATION OF INTERACTION BETWEEN NON-SAFETY GRADE SYSTEMS AND SAFETY GRADE SYSTEMS FOR DRESDEN AND QUAD-CITIES STATIONS NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-10/237/249 AND 50-254/265 113115)

O e

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2-1 7910110 h

The assessment which was made by Commonwealth Edison Company jointly with General Electric Company and other BWR owners has not identified any significant impact on safety actions or analytical results.

With the exception of one highly unlikely event on Dresden Unit 1 which will be prevented procedurally, the assess ent has concluded that:

1) The previous analyses of calculated peak cladding tempera cure, peak containment pressure, peak suppression pool temperature, and radiological release remain bounding.

2) No previously identified safety actions would be negated by the failure of non-safety equipment due to environmental effects of high energy breaks (HEPBs),

i

3) No previously identified safety limits would be violated by the subject effects; and In addition, the following design considerations and previous evaluations provided a base from which the current evaluation was performed.

1) Evaluation of BWR plant safety as regards HEPBs have been conducted in recent years.

Comprehensive analyses were submitted to the NRC Staff and their approval was documented in individual plant SERs.

Reevaluation here for more severe criteria has confirmed the previous safety audit.

2) Th'e BWR design includes a number of inherent characteristics which are specifically important to this issue:

a.

Thorough evaluation of outside containment line breaks for radiological reasons has resulted in a set of comprehensive, sensitive leak detection and isolation sytems on BWRs; b.

The separation of protection systems from control systems has long been a rule relative to safety function reliability; c.

As previously noted, HEPB analyses have been performed and verified physically at BNR facilities.

t i

2-2 113i1SIAt

d.

The BWR has treated inter-system relationships in considerable detail in a standard SAR section, the Nuclear Safety Operational Analysis (NSOA).

This systematic evaluation of the BWR system has proven to be very valuable relative to environmental impacts effects analysis; e.

Transient and accident analyses of BWRs are con-servatively bounded in all hat two cases with respect to non-safety system performance.

These specific cases are discussed in the following evaluation.

In summary, this submittal is a reevaluation of the potential impact of non-sefety systems on safety functions.

The

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previously approved safety evaluations remain valid.

Appendix 1 provides the system-event interaction matrix considered in the evaluation for non-safety related systems whose failure could conceivably have an effect on safety actions or previous analyses.

Also included is a list of systems which could not conceivably have any effect.

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APPENDIX 1 The effects of Non-Safety Systems involved in high-energy pipe breaks have been studied and the environmental interaction of these systems is summarized in the attached tables.

In the attached tables:

1 = An environmental induced malfunction may provide adverse responce 2 = An environmental induced malfunction will not provide adverse response 3 = The system is qualified for adverse environment i

4 = The system will not experience an adverse environment 5 = No conceivable system failure can cause an adverse response Whenever an interaction is coded a "1" a note is provided to explain the item.

RB = Reactor Building TB = Turbine Building CR = Control Room AE = Auxiliary Electric Room DW = Dry Well i

t 2-4

Dresden Unit 1 Table of Environmental Interactions LOCA MAIN STEAM LINE FEED?!ATER fuside Breaks HPCI Inside Inside Turbine Turbine location-Small Large Bldg Inside Dldg.

SML LRG Outside RECIRC SYSTai Pumps RB 2

2 4

2 2

4 Valves & Operators RB 2

2 4

2 2

4 1.'CC TB/RB 1M IM 4

1M 4

1*

15 4

FEEL'!!ATER DELIVERY SYSTD.i Flow Elemente TD 4

4 2

4 4

4 Level RB 2

2 4

2 2

4 Pumps TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 Valves & Operators TB/RB 2

2 2

4 1.!CC TD/RB 2

2 2

4 Flow Control System CR 4

4 4

4 Fi!!! eating TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 Instrument Air TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 Control Inst. Transmitter RB/TB 2

2 2

4 TURBINE PRESSURE CONTROL Bypass Valves TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 Pressure Sensors TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 Control Systems CR 4

4 4

4 EliC TB 4

4 2

4 4

,4 NEUTRON Mot!ITORING SYSTEM LPRMs & Cables RB 2

2 4

2 2

4 APRMs & Cables RB 2

2 4

2 2

4 RPIS/R0d Block ).bnitor RB 2

2 4

2 2

4 REACTOR PROTECTIO!! SYSTEM Turbine Scram TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 1.!G Set TB 4

4 4

4 REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM RB/CR 2

2 4

2 2

4 RELIEF VALVES TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 RBCC'l SYSTD.!

[

RB 2

2 4

2 2

4 R?!CU

{l RB 2

2 4

2 2

4 XSEE NOTE 1 2-5 U7 W

6-

Dresden Unit 1 Table of Environmental Interactions (Con't)

MAIN STEAh! LINE FEEDWATER LOCA IIPCI Inside Inside Turbine Turbine CONTAINMENT Location Small Large Bldg.

Inside Bldg.

SML LRG Outside Temperature 1.bnitoring RB 2

2 4

4 Level tbnitoring RB 3

3 4

4 CIRCULATING WATER SYSTai (NON SAFETY)

TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 HVAC SYSTEt All 2

2 2

2 AC AUXILIARY ELECTRIC All 2

2 2

4 CONDDISATE TRANSFER

& STORAGE TB 4

4 4

4 2

4 4

4 MAIN TURBINE & CONTROLS TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 l

MAIN CONDEllSER & CONTROLS TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTai Compressors TB 4

4 2

4 4

4 Piping & Controls TB/RB 2

2 2

4 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTat TB/RB/CR 2

2 2

2 CRD HYDRAULIC SYSTEM (NON SCRAM)

RB/TB 2

2 2

4 PRIIWW SYSTEtt VENTS RB 2

2 4

2 1*

4

~

M GI

SEE NOTE 2 2-6 d

N 6i i

Drcsden Unit 1 Table of Environmental Interactions (con't)

Any High SYSTEM Energy Break Lighting 5

Communications 5

Service Air 5

Equipment Drain Piping 5

i Containment Temperature Monitoring 5

Under Vessel Manintenance Equipment 5

Process Computer 5

Area Radiation Monitoring 5

Process. Radiation Monitoring (Non Safety Part) 5 Sampling Systems 5

Maintenance Monorails 5

Environs Monitoring 5

Demineralized Water 5

Potable Water 5

Screen Wash 5

Hydrogen Cooling 5

Condenser Priming 5

TBCCW 5

Stator Cooling 5

Off Gas 5

Radwaste 5

))5j)Sq 2-2

DRESDEN UNIT 1 ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION NOTES FOR ITEMS THAT MAY PROVIDE ADVERSE EFFECTS NOTE 1:

The matter of concern here is that non environmentally qualified motor control centers inside the containment may fail and close valves assumed open in the LOCA analyses.

The only purpose of these valves is to pro-vide equipment isolation for maintenance purposes.

Valve closure will be prevented by procedural changes in plant operation or hardware modifications prior to unit startup.

NOTE 2:

The matter of concern here is that non-environmentally qualified motor control centers may fail and open the primary system vent valves after a LOCA.

This failure is expected to cause less than a 1% change in peak cldd temperature.

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Dresden Units 2 and 3 Table of Environmental Interactions LOCA INSIDE ISO.

MAIN STEAM LINE:

FEEDWATER BREAKS RWCU COND.

HPOI Loca-Inside Inside Reactor Turbine Reactor Turbine tion Small Large Bldg.

Bldg.

Inside Bldg.

Bldg.

Sml.

Lrg.

Outside Outside Outside RECIRC SYSTE.i

. Pumps DW 2

2 4

4 2

4 4

2 2

4 4

4

. Valves &

DW 3

3 4

4 3

4 4

3 3

4 4

4 Operators

.MG Sets TB/RB 4

4 4

4

.M:'C TB/RB 4

4 4

4

. Flow Control CR 4

4 4

4

. System

. Control Inst. RB 4

4 4

4 2

4 Transmitters FEEDWATER DEL-IVERY SYSTE.!

. Flow Elements TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4

. Level DW/RB 2

2 4

4 2

4 4

2 2

4 4

4

. Pumps TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4

. Valves &

TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 Operators

.MCC TB 4

4 4

4 2

4 4

4

.F1cw Control CR 4

4 4

4 System

.FW Heating TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4

. Instrument TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 4

4 Air

. Control Inst.

Transmitter RB/IB 4

4 2

2 4

2 2

4 4

4 TURBINE PRESSURE CONTROL

. Bypass Valves TB 4 [

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4

. Pressure TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 Sensors

. Control System CR

,,4 annat = 4 4

4 4

4 2-9 6

Dresden Units 2 and 3 Table of' Environmental Interactions (CONT. ) IDCA INSIDE 180 MAIN STEAM LINE:

FEEI%lATER BREAKS RWCU COND HPCI

~

Inca-Inside Inside Reactor Turbine Reactor Turbine tion Small large Bldg.

Bldg.

Inside Bldg.

Bldg.

Sal.

Lrg.

Outside Outside Outside NEUTR0!! M0!!I-TORING SYSTD.!

..LPRMs &

ALL 2

2 2

4 2

2 4

2 2

2 4

4 Cables

. APPL.ts &

ALL 2

2 2

4 2

2 4

2 2

2 4

4 Cables

.RPIS/Ro Block !.!onitor AIL 2

2 2

4 2

2 4

2 2

a 4

4

.TIP ALL 2

2 2

4 2

2 4

2 2

2 4

4 REACTOR PROTEC-TIO!! SYSTH.!

.Turbin Scram TB/ Cit 4-4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4

.MO Set TB 4

4 4

4 REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTD.! RB/CR 4

4 4

4 SRV SYSTD.i D'.7/RB 3

3 3

4 3

3 4

3 3

4 4

4

(!!Oli ADS)

RBCC"1 SYSTD,1 RB 4

4 4

2 2

4 R"!CU D'."/R B 3

3 2

4 3

2 4

3 3

2 2

2 SUPPRECSION TOOL

. Temperature l'oni toring RB/CR 4

4 4

2

. Level RB/ CR 4

4 4

2 Monitoring CIECUIATING INTAKE /TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 WATER SYSTD.!

(IIC:1 SAFETY)

]

HVAC SYSTD4 ALL 2 hj 2

2 2

NON IE TB 4 --

4 4

4 BATTERY SYST.

os AC AUXILIARY RB/TB-4 4

4 4

2 4

4 4

ELECTRIC 2-10 6

Dresden Units 2 and 3 Table of Environmental Interactions ( C0llT. )

IDCA INSIDE ISO.

MAI!1 STEN.! LIllE:

FEEDWATER BREAKS RWCU C0!!D.

HPCI Loca-Inside Inside Reactor Turbine Reactor Turbine N

tion Small Large Bldg.

Bldg.

Inside Bldg.

Bldg.

Sml.

Lrg.

Outside Outside Outsid C0!!DEllSATE TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 TR!dlSFER &

,; ST014GE i

EAIf1 TURBIf1E &

, C0::TROLS TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 f.!AIf! C0!!DE!!SER

& C0!! TROL TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 I!iSTRULEllT AIR SYSTB.!

. Compressors TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

2 2

2

. Piping &

l Controls TB/RB/D?)

2 2

2' 2

2 2

l FIRE PROTEC-TB/RB/CR 4

4 2

2 4

2 2

4 4

2 2

2 TIO!! SYSTD4 CPS HYDRAU-RB/TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 LIC SYSTD.!

(!!Cf! SCRM.!)

RV HEAD VE!JT DW 2

2 4

4 2

4 4

2 1*

4 4

4 SLC SYSTDJ D?l/RB 3

3 4

4 3

4 4

3 3

2 2

2

10 F maximum PCT increase See note 1 2-11 s.

Dresden Units 2 and 3 Tabic of Environmental Interactions (Cent.)

SYSTE'.t A!IY HIGH E?IEF.GY BREAK Lighting 5

Co: nunications 5

Service Air 5

Equip Dra in Piping 5

Dryviell Temp. ?.!cnitoring 5

Under Ves::e1 ?.'aintenance Equip.

5 Process Cc:puter 5

Area Radiation !.!cnitoring 5

Process Radiation ?/enitoring (?!C'l Safety Part) 5 Sag ling Systems 5

Maintenance ?.!onora11s 5

Environs ?.!cnitoring 5

Demineralized Vlater 5

Potalle Viater 5

Screen Vlach 5

Hydrogen Cooling 5

Condenser Priming 5

TBCC?l 5

Startor Cooling 5

OffGas 5

Radviaste 5

113i 16

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2-12

DRESDEN UNITS 2 AND 3 ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION NOTES FOR ITEMS THAT MAY PROVIDE ADVERSE EFFECT NOTE 1:

The item of concern is that the non-environmentally qualified reactor head vent valves may fail and open after a LOCA.

The reactor head vent line is a small (2") line with two air-operated valves which fail closed on loss of air.

The probability of a LOCA causing these series valves to both open is.very small.

The bounding case (the opening of both valves at ghe time of LOCA) would have a maximum effect of

+10 F on the peak clad temperature.

Thus, this event Is not a safety concern.

113i i6 5

1 2-13

Quad Citics Units 1 and 2 Table of Environmental Interactions LOCA IllSIDE MAlti STEN.! LIllE:

FEER'lATER BREAKS R'!!CU RCIC HPCI u

~

Inca

-Inside Inside Reactor Turbine Reactor Turbine tion Small Iarge Bldg.

Bldg.

Inside Bldg.

Bldg.

Sml.

Lrg.

Outside Outside Outside RECIRC SYSTB/

PC.'PS D.V 2

2 4

4 2

4 4

2 2

4 4

4 VALVES &-

CPERATCRS B7 3

3 4

4 3

4 4

3 3

4 4

4 i

f.G SETS TB/RB 4

4 4

1.:CC TB/RB 4

4 4

4 FLO"1 COIITROL CR 4

4 4

4 SYSTD.!

C0!ITROL II;ST RB 4

4 4

4 TRA!1SMITTERS FEEIX7ATER DEL-IVEEY SYSTD.!

FLO71 ELD.IEIITS TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 LEVEL D"!/RB 2

2 4

4 2

4 4

2 2

4 4

4 PE.iPS TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 VALVES &

OPERATORS TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 MCC TB 4

4 4

4 2

4 4

4 Fif21 C0!! TROL' SYSTD.!

CR 4

4 4

4 P!l liEATIllG TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 It'STRUI.iE!!T AIR TB 4

4 2

2 4

4 4

2 4

4 4

4 CONTROL IfIST Ui

~'

' IRA!!SMITTER RB/TB 4

4 2

2 4

2 2

4 4

4 TURBINE PRESSURE

[

C0!! TROL BYPASS VALVES TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 PRESSURE SEti3CRS TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 C0!iTROL SYS-TD!

CR 4

4 4

4 2

4 2-14 6-

Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 Table of Envirotunental Interactions (cont.)

LOCA INSIDE MAIfl STEN.i LINE:

FEEUNATER BREAKS R'#CU RCIC llPCI Loca-Inside lnside Reactor Turbine Reactor Turbine tion Small Large Bldg.

Bldg.

Inside Bldg.

Bldg.

Sml.

Lrg.

Outside Outside Outside

!!EUTRCN Il0NITORIllG SYSTS.i LPIBis &

All 2

2 2

4 2

2 4

2 2

2 4

4 CABLES APFl.G &

CABLES All 2

2 2

4 2

2 4

2 2

2 4

4 RPIS/ ROD BLCCK

?/.ONITCR All 2

2 2

4 2

2 4

2 2

-2 4

4 TIP 2

2 2

4 2

2 4

2 2

2 4

4 REACTOR PRO-TECTI 0ll SYSTH.!

r TURBINE SCRAf.i TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4

!/G SET AE 4

4 4

4 2

4 4

4 REACTOR MAN-UAL CONTROL SYSTD.i RB/CR 4

4 4

4

_m SRV SYSTD.i u

(NO:1 AIG)

DlI/RB 3-3 3

4 3

3 4

3 3

4 4

4 2

4 4

4 2

4 4

RBCCV! SYSTU(

RB 4

m RV!CU Ull/RB 3

3 2

4 3

2 4

3 3

2 2

2 2-15 g,

Quad Citics Units 1 and 2 Table of Environmental Interacticns (cent. )

LOCA I!GIDE MAIN STEAM LIllE:

FEEIMATH BREAKS PJCU RCIC HPCI Inca-Inside Inside Reactor Turbine Reactor Turbine tion Small Large Bldg.

Bldg.

Inside Bldg.

Bldg.

Sml.

Lrg.

Outside Outside Outsid SUPPRESSI0f!

POOL TUJPERATURE RB/CR/

MONITORI!!G Torus 4

4 4

2 LEVEL 1J0!11-RB/CR/

TORIrlG Torus 4

4 4

4 2

2 d CIRCUIATIllG WATER SYSTDJ Intake /

(!!ON SAFETY) TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4

IP/AC SYSTDJ All 2

2 2

2

!!0 ! IE BAT-TERY SYSTEJ TB 4

4 4

4 AC AUXILIARY ELECTRIC RB/TB 4

4 4

4 2

4 4

4 C0!!DP:3 ATE 1rtANSFER &

STORAGE TB 4

4 4

3 4

4 2

4 4

4

!!AIt! TURBIllE &

CCilTROIS TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 IJAIt! C0!!DE!!SER

& C0!; TROL TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4

l 2-16

(>

i-

Quad Cities Units 1 and 2

~

Table of Environmental Interactions (cont. )

LOCA INSIDE MAIN STEAM LINE:

FEEDWATER BREAKS R'#CU RCIC HFCI

I Loca-Inside Inside Reactor Turbine Reactor Turbine tion Small Iarge Bldg.

Bldg.

Inside Bldg.

Bldg.

Sml.

Lrg.

Outside Outside Outsidt 1 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTDA CC?.TR2.SSORS TB 4

4 4

2 4

4 2

4 4

4 PIPING &

TB/RB/

CONTROLS I'!!

2 2

FIRE PROTECT-

. RB/

ION

{4 4

2 2

4 2

2 4

4 2

2 2

' CRD HYDRAULIC r-SYSTB.i ( N0!?

]

SCRA!.!)

RB j 4 4

4 2

4 4

2 4

4 4

RV HEAD VDIT D3 2

2 4

4 2

4 4

2 1*

4 4

4 SLC-SYSTBA.

DJ/RB 3

3 4

4 3

4 4

3 3

2 2

2

100F maximum PCT increase See Note 1 e---.4 L-1 i

2-17 Ch M

... _. _ ~. -

6-

L

. = '

t I

I e

Ii I

Quad Citiec Units 1 and 2

'/

Table of Environmental Interactions ( Cent. )

MifDJ Any High Energy Break LIGHTING 5

CG.0/UNICATIONS 5

l SERVICE AIR 5

i EQUIP ERAI!! PIPIliG 5

DRT!IELL TDIP.1.iONITCRI!!G 5

UNDER VESSEL 1.!AINTENANCE EQUIP.

5 PROCESS CCI.TUTER 5

4 AREA RADIATIO!! ?.!CNITCRING 5

PRCCESS RADIATION.MONITCRING (NON SAFETY PART) 5 SAMPLING SYSTD/S 5

MAINTENANCE MONCRAIIS 5

ENVIRONS !!ONITCRING 5

DalINERALIZED UATER ~

5 POTABLE VIATER 5

SCREEN UASH 5

}

HYDRCGEN CCOLING 5

CCliDENSER PRDlING 5

TBCCU 5

l~

STATOR COOLING 5

II OFFGAS 5

l, RADl!ASTE 5

2-18 n,..

QUAD-CITIES UNITS 1 AND 2 ENVIRON 2iENTAL INTERACTION NOTES FOR ITEMS THAT MAY PROVIDE ADVERSE EFFECT NOTE 1:

The item of concern is that the non-environmentally qualified reactor head vent valves may fail and open after a LOCA.

The reactor head vent line is a small (2") line with two air-operated valves which fail closed on loss of air.

The probability of a LOCA causing these series valves to both open is very small.

The bounding case (the opening of both valves ag the time of LOCA) would have a maximum effect of +10 F on the peak clad temeprature.

Thus this event is not a safety concern.

~

1131 1

m I

2-19 L

ML19209B961

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