ML19209B054

Final Rept,Task Force on NRC Safeguards Policy

ML19209B054
Person / Time
Issue date:	03/12/1979
From:	Burnett R, Howard E, John Miller NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19209B042	List: ML19209B041 ML19209B046 ML19209B051 ML19209B054
References
SECY-79-188, NUDOCS 7910090048
Download: ML19209B054 (23)

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4 FINAL REPORT TASK FORCE ON NRC SAFEGUARDS POLICY l

i March 12, 1979 1

i Prepared for the NRC Executive Director for Oberations by:

Robert F. Burnett, NMSS - Chair:ran James R. Miller, NRR i

E. Morris Howard, IE i

Karl R. Goller, SD William C. Parler, ELD i

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TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS h

The Task Force report contains the follcwing reccamendations en NRC I

safeguards policy:

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Definition of Safeguards Adecuacy i

l Define safeguards adequacy in teraslof the safeguards mandate t

l contained in the Atemic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, i.e.,

nuclear safeguards and safety systems-artr adequate if they assure that licinsed activities are conducted without being I

inimical to the ccmmon defense and sehurity and without.

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constituting an unreasonable risk +4 the health and safety of the public.

II. Methods Used to Determine Safeguards Adequac/

IE, NMSS, and NRR should work together to develop. safeguards l

t specifications describing. licensee reauiraments in a way that will permit their use tn determining J1e adequacy of safeguards systems at fuel cycle facilities possassing formula quantities of SSNM and r.t nuclear pcwer plants. This ' recommendation is intended to ensure censistency in the development and maintenance of evaluation systems for all NRC safeguards activities.

III. Meaning the Use of Terms Such as " Reasonable" versus "High" Assurance Eliminate the term "high assurance" frem 10 CFR Part 73.55(a) and the preposed Part 73.20(a).

Substitute words that express the intent of those used in the NRC Memorandum and Order (January 21,1977) concerning the dispcsition of the Natural Resources'Def6nse Council (NRDC)

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petition for emergency safeguards measures, i.e., "will pro-vide reasonable assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the comen defense and I

security, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety."

IV.

Levels of Design Threats against Which Safeguards Must Protect Specify the safeguards general perfomance requirements in 10 CFR Part 73 in terms of malevolent acts to be thwarted (sabotage and theft or diversion) rather than types if facil-ities to be protected (reactors, fuel cycle facilities and associated transportation involving formula quantit.ies of SSNti).

Characterize the sabotage threat as it is now characterized in Part 73.55(a) but expand section 1(iv) of the threat to include I

" facility, transporter, or container integrity or features, of the safeguards system."

Characterize the theft or diversion threat as it is now charac-terized in the propcsed dart 73.20(a), but expand section 1(iv) of the threat to include " reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity" and section 3(i) to specifically include

" nuclear reactors."

V.

Need for Revised or Additional Rules Include the characterization of the sabotage d theft or diversion threats in 10 CFR Part 73.1(a).

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Delete the design basis threats now contained in Part 73.55(a) and the proposed Part 73.20(a).

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'V.

Need for Revised of Additional Rules i

Include the characteri::ation of the sabotace and. theft or diversion i

i-threats in 10 CFR Part 73.1(a)

Delete the design basis ~ threats now. contained in Part 73.55(a) f and the proposed Part 73.20(a) i Include a referenc'e ~to 'the.new Part 73.1(a) in the general i

performance requirements contained in Part 73.55(a) and the croposed'Part'73.20(a)~

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Delete the clauses containing "high assurance" frca Part 73.55(a) and the proposed Part 73.20(a). and substitute in their place the words cited above frca the Ccmmission-l Memorandi.m and Order disposing cf'the NRDC petition I

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DEFINITION ~0F SAFEGUARDS ADE00ACY Under the Atomi'c Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Secticn 57c.(2)), the Commission is prohibited from licensing any activity involving special

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nuclear material that "would be inimical to the ecmmon defense and i

security or would eanstitute an unreasonab!e risk to the health and t

safety of the public." The Act also states.(Section 182) that "utiliza-tion or production of special nuclear material will be in accord with i

she cc =en defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the hea' ch and safety of the public."

Therefore, based upon provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as t

amended, nuclear safeguards and safety systems are adequate if they i

l assure that licensed activities are conducted without being inimical' l

to the common defense and security.and without constituting.an unrea-sonable risk to the health and safety of the public.

Sections II and i

III belcw discuss methods used to determine safeguards adequacy and levels of assurance.

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l IIl METHODS-USED TO DETERMINE SAFEGUARDS ~ADEOUACY

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A.. General J

- The NRC assesses safeguards acequacy primarily through 1-icense.

t reviews and site visits.

Fuel cycle facilities involving formula

.. quantities of strategic spec'al nuclear. material (SSNM) have. also been subject to special comprehensive safeguards evaluations.-

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... Implementation of licensee safeguards plans is determined through inspections By NRC's Regicnal Offices.

License reviews consist of NRC evaluation af physical security plans, contingency plans,* guardtraining plans 3 ** and mater.fa:k con.rol.and t

,--- accounting plans submitted by the licensee.3.The: NRC. s;af,# evaluates -

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. these submittals against N.RC regulations. and-me.re deta:iled,- p.r.e-

- determined, and publicly. available guidance: deyeloped- #ye-the-sta.ff 1

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..to. make an. initial adequacy assessment.. The reviews: may.al. p.in.clude s

i c.n-site evaluations. by th.e l icensing s;a.f.fe. :. Aft..r t.he: p.1an.is; fcund e

1. a_cceptab. e, which usually occurs only after some interaction between l

3 the applicant and the NRC staff and resulting modifications, the plan is approved and beccmes the ifcensee's official security, cen-tingency, guard. training, er material centrol and accounting plan.

• NRC's contingency planning rule, which became-effective 'in June 1978, requires that fuel cycle, transportation, and power plant liceasees

. develop and submit to NRC a centingency plan for responding co threats, theft, and sabotage.

All fuel cycle and transportatien centingency plans have been received and reviewed; final approval is pencing.

Pcwer pl, ant plans cre not due until March 1979.

• • NRC's guard training rule, which became effective in Oc cber 1978, requires that fuel cycle, trans;crtatien, and pcwer plant licensees develop and submit to NRC a gua. d training and qualificatien plan.

r All fuei cycle ;1ans have been received and are beine reviewed; no transportation plans have been received; pcwer p1 nt plans are net due until August 1979.

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3-Inspection and Enforcement (IE) personnel develop an inspecticn i

procedure based on these plans and conduct periodic inspections to 4

determine whether the licensee is adhering to these plans.

IE personnel at times may note deficiencies at the site which are l

reported to the licensing staff for possible revisions to the plans.

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" Comprehensive safeguards evaluations" have been conducted at fuel i

cycle ' facilities possessing formula quantities of strategic special l

nuclear material. These evaluations are conducted by special teams of headquarters sta'ff and regional inspectors to assess the safeguards I

capability of a facility to protect against the design basis threat.

Revisic.1s to the licensee plans may occur as a result of a comprehen-sive evaluation.

NRC is continuing efforts to ensure consistency in the development I

and. maintenance of evaluation systems for all NRC safeguards activi-ties.

(See B(2), B(3), and D(2) below.)

8.

Fuel Cycle Facilities 1.

Licensing Reviews As part of the licensing process, NRC examines the physical security and material control and accounting measures proposed by the licensee in terns of each facility's materials-related activities and NRC's regulations. The bases for this evaluation are:

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analysis of the facility': physical protection and funda-mental nuclear material control plans,

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analysis of pertinent process and operating details reflected i

i in the. license application documentation, l

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an on-site evaluation of site-specific factors influencing j

safeguards adequacy, and reviews of prior material accounting perfomance (.if anyl.

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Implementation of existing safeguards regulations at fuel cycle facilities is based upon the specific requirements contained in i

i 10 CFR Parts 70 and 73, as modified by site-specific license I

condi tions.

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Inscections -

I Safeguards inspections are conducted by safeguards ~ inspectors I

i from the NRC Regional Offices.

These inspections focus on the licensee's ccmpliance with NRC regulations and the licensee's i

implementation:of approved plans:- In addition:to perfoming I

i compliance-type inspections, inspectors also.~ evalcate:the-effectiveness of licensee-implemented safeguards systems.

NMSS and IE will work to develop safeguards specifications describ-

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ing licensee requirements that will permit their use in determin-ing the adequacy of safeguards systems at fuel cycle facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM,.

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Comorehensive Evaluations Comprehensive evaluations of fuel cycle facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM have been conducted by special tea,ms 1114 272

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i of headquarters staff and regional inspectors. These evalua-tions were specifically intended to assess the capability of licensee safeguards to protect against the design basis threat.

For each licensee, evaluation teams looked for weaknesses that a

woQld render a facility vulnerable to the oesign basis threat.

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The ecmprehensive evaluation is essentially a two-step process.

The first step is an on-site evaluation during which each team determines whether the facility has any emergency safeguards i

deficiencies

• that would make the facility so vulnerable to the design basis threat that continued operation of the facility with i

I these deficiencies would be iminical to the common defense and security or pose unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.

Upon completion of the on-site assessments, the second step of the process occurs.

During this step, members of the field l

teams and NRC management synthesi::e all available information I

concerning the licensee's capability to protect nuclear material, i

the state of safeguards system maintenance, and other safeguards-i related factors.

The overall capability of the fuel cycle facility is then judged using a fcur-tiered, relative rating scheme equating to three levels of adequacy and one of inadequacy.

• Such emergency safeguards deficiencies would be prcmptly reported by the teams to NRC management who would take immediate action to have the deficiencies corrected, employing whatever measures might be necessary and which are legally available.

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Included in the highest level of adequacy are facilities whose safeguards are judged to possess the fully desired level of safeguards capability.

Facilities judged to provide the,next l

two levels of adequate protection do not provide the fully l

i desirr.o level of safeguards capability, but may centinue in operation providing that ('1) upgrading actions are instituted in a timely manner and (2) the observed deficiencies do not f

pose unreasonable risk to the public health and safety er common defense and security during the short term reqaired for their i

correctien. These two levels of adequacy represent accep' table t

l interim levels of protection against theft or diversion pending l

correction of temporary departures frca full impl~emen'tation of l

approved security plans.

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l If a facility's safeguards are judged inadequate by NRC manage-ment, corrective actions are instituted in a. timely fra'nner employ-

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ing whatever legall available measures might be necess'ary, l

including shut-down.

A cceplete rcund of comprehensive evaluations at fuel cycle facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM has been ecm-pleted.

It is not expected that cceprehensive evalua.tiens will.

be conducted as a matter of routine in the future; they may be conducted, hcwever, if a previcus assessment is pctentially invalidated by a rule change, redefinitien of the design basis threat, detection of significant licensee weakness thrcugh an NRC inspection, er other similar circumstance.

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l NMSS intends to modify the way it conducts future ccmprehensive evaluations and will work with NRR and IE to ensure censistency 1

among any new evaluation systems being developed.

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Transcortatien Activities l

NRC regulatory responsibilities for transportation include all domestic shipments and the domestic segments of import and export shipments (including all storage ~ and transfer points) for formula l

quantities of SSNM.

Shipments of gcvernment-cwned SSNM using COE i

couriers are a COE responsibility and are not regulated by NRC.

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Each licensec's plan for physical protection of SSNM in transit is l

reviewed and approved by NRC's licensing staff based en criteria in 10 CFR Parts 73.30 through 7.3.36 and 73.70(g).

i NRC's program for evaluating SSNM transportation safeguards also I

includes vulnerability analyses of transport routes and surveys to i

determine response capabilities of local law enforcement agencies along each route.

NRC inspec:crs follcw and monitor each shipment of formula quantities of SSNM during the entire period it is in transit.

Inspection activi-ties cover material control and acccunting, physical protection, and health and safety.

The inspecticn activity seeks tc assure that the licersee is making the ' shipment in full compliance with NRC reguia-tiens, license conditions, and the NRC-approved security plan.

Trans-portation activities that are concucted in this manner are judged to provide adequate ;r.blic prc:ac:icn.

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Nuclear Reactors e

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Licensinc Reviews j

l As part of its licensing precess, NRC ccmpares the physical i

security measures propcsed by the license applicant with the t

requirements _of.10 CER 73.55 in terms of each reacter's vulner-

. ability, inherent protective features, and site characteristics.

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j The bases for this evaluation are:

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10 CFR 73.55, " Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Pcwer-Reactors against Industrial Sabotage,"

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analysis,of the facility's security plan,.

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analysis of pertinent design and cperating details in the Final Facility Description and Safety. Analysis Report (FSAR),

and d.

an on-site. evaluation of site-specific, factors influencing safeguards adequacy.

I For pcwer reactors, this precess includes an overall evaluation t

of a facility's physical security provisiens against the design.

basis threat identified in 10 CFR Part 73.55.

(Per.the.recem mendation contained in Section IV cf this repert, the. design:

basis threat would be centained in 10 CFR Part 73.1(a)4)- -

This initial evaluation is performed by a team of licensing staff and regional inspectors and incluces a visit er visits to the reacter sites.

NRC summari:es the conclusiens of the overall licensing evaluatien for each reacter site in a Security Plan Evaluaticn Re;cn (SFER), the security plan approval cocument.

l In reviewing non-power reactors' physical security plans,10 CFR I

Parts 50.34(c) and 73.40 and interim guidance sent to licensees i

in 1974 are used. This process also includes an overall evalua-l tion of a facility's physical security measures against.the pro-i visions of the preposed 10 CFR Part 73.47.

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Insoections Safeguards inspections are conducted by safeguards inspectors frem the NRC Regicnal Offices. These inspeitions focus on the licensee'.s compliance with NRC regulations and the licensee's implementation of approved security plans.

In addition to per-i i

forming compliance-type inspections, inspectors also evaluate 1

l the effectiveness of licensee-implemented safeguards systems.

NRR and IE are working to develop safeguards specifications t

describing licensee requirements that will permit their use in determining the adequacy of safeguards. systems at nuclear i

power plants.

NRR and IE reccgnize that developing such a system of specifications for nuclear power plants is a difficult and ccmplex undertaking that will require seme time to finalize; however, the basic framework is scheduled to be ccepleted for trial use in the near future. After licensees' physical security programs have been in operation for a period of time and IE has gained seme experi-ence in inspecting these programs, further coordination between 1114 2/7

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NRR and IE will be effected.

NRR will work with. NMSS and IE to ensure censistency among any new evaluation systems being developed, I

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.i III.

MEANING AND USE OF TERMS SUCH AS " REASONABLE" VERSUS~"HIGH" ASSURANCE l

I The term "high assurance" is net defined in NRC policy dccuments, regulations, or the applicable statutes.

In a December 23, 1976

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memorandum pertaining to the Upgrade Rule (Chilk to Gossick, CONFI-i I

DENTIAL), the Ccmmission directed that the ultimate goal of the safeguard upgrade program was to " pro' ride protection of SSNM with

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high assurance..." As a result of this guidance, the term "high assurance" appears in the preposed physical security Upgrade Rule as a goal. The ter "high assurance" also appears in the require-ments for physical prctection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors (10 CFR 73.55). At this time, "high assurance" is not used in other licensing activities outside.of safeguards.

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The term " reasonable assurance" is 'also not defined in NRC regulations; however, nuclear reactor health and safety programs have been using I

l this term for many years to describe the level of certainty required l

in safety performance to operate without undue risk to the health and I

safety of the public.

t The term " reasonable assurance" dees two things.

First, it establishes a standard for staff evaluation of varicus aspects of a reactor appli-i cation [e.g., see 10 CFR 50.34 (a)(3)(iii), 50.35(a), 50.35(c), 50.40(a),

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50.57(a)(3)].

Second, it denotes the standard for a conclusion drawni by the Cermissien, Scard, or staff in a particular licensing preceeding that a facility may be operated withcut endangering the health and safety of the public [10 CFR 2.104(c)(3)].

The standard has been judicially accepted as adequate in executing the licensing provisiens 1114 2/9

.of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended [ Power Reactor comoany vs.

l Electrical Union, 367 U.S. 396 (1961)].

" Reasonable assurance" applied I

to safety matters in licensing can be referenced to the language in l

Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy Act requiring " adequate protection"

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for the health and safety of the public.

No'similar reference cccurs irt the Act applicable to protection. of the ce=en d,efense and security; however, the Act, read as a whole, does not appear to distinguish between the level of protection required for the public. health and i

safety and the ecmon defense and security.

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In its Memorandum and Order dated January 21, 1977 concerning thd' j

disposition of the Natural Resources Defensa Council, Inc.~ ($d5C) pe.tition for emergency safeguards measures,'the Ccmissien cEncluded

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"that existing safdguards prograds....'afd 'adiquate' tic 'picvidd a 5

reasonable assurance that the3 current.55tN.acti vi ties.of: NRC;1f cens ee<

areinot inimical to-the.ccmmen. defense.and security, and do. cot....

constitute an unreasonable risk,to the ;:ublic health and safegy.,".,

Thus, the use of the te-m " reasonable assurance in nfeguards matters has;an established precedent.

Three facters argue in favor.of using the. term."reasenable. assurance":

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"Reascnable assurance" already has received < judicial. approval in connection with health and safety requirementst,

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"Reasenable assurance" for safeguards concerns. bas.a..,

precedent through its use in the Ccmission Mercrandum.

and Order disposing of the NRDC petition; and 3)

Ccnsistency would be achieved by using cne term and cne standard for all aspects of NRC recuirements.

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l There seems,to be no justification for replacing "high assurance" and " reasonable assurance" with a third alternative.

This is I

particularly so'in the case of " reasonable assurance" -- a term that has both regulatory and judicial acceptance and a core of common understanding.

I For the reasons mentioned above, it is recommended that the term "high assurance" be eliminated and that words expressing the intent 1

j of those used in the NRC Memorandum and Order concerning the f

disposition of the NRCC petiticn be substituted, i.e., "... Will I

provide reasonable assurance that activities involving special i

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nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security, and dd not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and l

safety." The phrase " reasonable assurance" where now used in 10 CFR Parts 2 and 50 would not be' changed.

It should be understood that the two terms are intended to connote the same level of safeguards protection against risks to the public I

for reactors and SSNM.

It is emphasized that replacing "high" with i

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" reasonable" in 10 CFR 73.55 and in the proposed Upgrade Rule should not be construed to mean a reducticn in safeguards protection at any facility and shculd not be interpreted as a cc= premise to ensure timely implementation of 10 CFR 73.55.

It is important to note that the above re:ccmendatien should not affect

.he. Commissien's judgments of what regulatory requirements are necessary to assure previsien cf adequate safeguards against sabetage, theft, or

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Regardless of which modifier is used, the Cor: mission is still obliged by law to assure tFtat licensed activities.de not pose an unreasonable risk to the health and safety-of the public and are not 1

inimical to the ccanon defense and security.-

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LEVELS OF DESIGN THREATS AGAINST WHICH SAFEGUARDS MUST PROTECT 1

It is recommended that safeguards general performance requirements in i

1 10 CFR Part 73 be specified in terms of malevolent acts to be thwarted I

(sabotage and theft or diversion) rather than types of facilities to be protected (reactors, ' fuel cycle facilities and associated transportation i

j involving formula quantities of SSNM).

For purposes of safeguards system j

design, these malevolent acts should be characterized as follows:

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Sabotace (1) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions of several persons with the folicwing attributes, assistance and i

equipment: (i) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, [ii) inside essistance, which may include a kncwledgeable individual who attemots to participate in both a passive role (e.g., provide information) and an active role (e.g, facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and cc municatir r, participate in I

i violent attack), (iii) suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapcns, equipped with silencers and having effective 1cng-4 range accuracy, (iv) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating

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T-ith the exceptien of section 1 (iv), this characteri:atien of sabotage W

is the same as that contained in 10 CFR 73.55(a). Section 1 (iv) has been expanded to include " facility, transporter, or centainer integrity l

or features of the safeguards system."

2In January 1979, the Ccm.ission directed the staff to conduct a study of the potential insider th.reat to the licensed nuclear industry. The st'udy report is due to the Ccmmission by December 1979.

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. agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or otherwise destroyinc reactor, facility, transporter', or container integrity or features of the safeguards system, and (2) An internal threat of an insider, includ-ing an employee (in any position).

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1,2 Theft or Diversion of Formula Guantities of SSNM f

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(1) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or.deceo-tive actions, by a small group with the following attributes, assistance I

i and equipment:

(i) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (ii) inside assistance which may include a

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4 knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in both a passive i

role (e.g., provide informatien) and an active role ( e.g...' facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and cermunications, participate in violenE attack), (iii) suitable weapcns, up to and" including. hand-held auicmitic weapons, equipped with sile6cers and having effective long l

rande accuracy, (iv) hand-carried equipment, including incacacitati6g agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or otherwise desdroying i

react 5h, facility, transpohter or container integrity or fe[tures'of the safeguards system, and (v) the ability to operate as two or more teah.s, t

(2) An individual, including an employee (in any.pesition), and (3) A conspiracy between individuals in any cesiticn who may have:

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(i) access to and detailed knowledge of the facilities referred to in 73.20(a), including nuclear reactors, of the creccsed Uagrade.

hlith the exceptien of sections 1(iv) and 3(i), this characterizatien of theft or diversion is the same as that centained in the oreccsed' Upgrade Rule (10 CFR 73.20('a)).

Section 1(iv) has been ex;anded to inclufe " reactor, facility, transporter or container integrity; section 3(i) has been ex;anded to scecifically include " nuclear reactors."

2 n January 1979, the Ccmmission directed tne staff tc ccnduct a study Icf the catential insider threat to the licensed nuclear industry.

The study report is due to the Cc= mission, by December 1979.

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l Rule, or (ii) items that could facilitate theft of special nuclear 1

material (e.g., small tools, substitute material, false documents, i

etc. ), or both.

1 The folicwing rule revisions are recommended:

1) Delete the design basis threats new contained in 10 CFR Parts 73.55(a) and 73.20(a) of the proposed Upgrade Rule; I

'2)

Include the above characterization of malevolent acts in 10 CFR Part 73.1(a);

3) Reference the new characterization of the sabotage and theft or diversion threats as appropriate in the general performance t

requirements contained in Part 73.55(a) and in Part 73.20(a) 2 i

of the pn.::csed Upgrade Rule.

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NEED FOR REVISED OR ADDITIONAL RULES l

No additional rules are needed at this time.

As noted.in Sections i

III:and IV, however, some revisions will be needed in 10 CFR Parts 73.1(a), 73.55(a), and the proposed 73.20(a).

The revisions are i

j as follows:

1)

Include the characterization of malevolent acts (see Section IV above) in 10 CFR Part 73.1(a);

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2) Delete the design basis threats new centained in

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Part 73.55(a) and proposed Part 73.20(a);

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Include a reference to the new Part 73.1(a) ~in i

the general performance requirenknts contained fn

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j Part 73.55(a) and the proposed Part 73.20(a); and 4)

Delete the clause that begins with "...will provide.

protection with high assurance..." frem Part 73.55(a-);

I delete the clause that begins with "...will prevent

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with high assurance..." frem Part 73.20(a) in the i

1 proposed Upgrade Rule; and replace both with the clause "will provide reasenable assurance that activi-ties involving special nuclear material are not inimical

" Sections 203 and 204 respectively of che Energy Recrganizatien Act of 1974 require the Directers of Nuclear Reactor. Regulation and Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards to review the safeguards of facilities, materials, and activities over which they have principal licensing and regulatory respcnsibility.

This is a centinuing responsibility.

Although the Cc..mssion dces nc perceive an actual threat to its licensees at this time, such may net be wholly discounted.

Therefore, prudence dictates that cur safeguards policy be subject to close and continuing review.

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j to the common defense and security, and do not contitute l

an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety."

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