ML19209A595
| ML19209A595 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1979 |
| From: | Kaplan D SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910050034 | |
| Download: ML19209A595 (31) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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.%.:.j In the Matter of:
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
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Docket No. 50-312
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Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station )
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RESPONSE OF SACRAMENTO MUNICIPI.L UTILITY DISTRICT TO CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONERS GARY HURSH AND RICHARD CASTRO For the convenience of the Board, we shall restate each of petitioners' contentions and then set forth our position with respect to such contention.
Before doing so, we shall out-line our understanding of. the function of a " contention" under the Commission's rules of practice.
It is of course accepted that a hearing participant "must be specific as to the focus of the desired hearing" (BPI v. Atomic Energy Commission, C.A.D.C.,
1974, 502 F.2d 424, 429) and that cententions serve the purpose of defining the " concrete issues which are appropriate for adjudication-in the proceeding."
Northern States Power Co. 6 AEC 188, 191, affirmed, 6 AEC 241 (1973).
In In the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company, 6 NRC 760, 771 (1977) the Appeal Board set forth, with approval, the following statement of the licensing board in that proceeding.
"Such notations, standing alone, were thought by the Board not to provide
'a fair opportunity to other parties to know precisely what the limited issues (are], exactly what proof, evidence or testimony is required to meet that issue and exactly what support the State intends to adduce for its allegations."
7 1108 327 so O
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one test we may apply, then, and it is a three-pronged test, is to ask whether a proposed contention pro-vides to other parties a f air opportunity to know Cal pre-cisely what issue the petitioner seeks to raise, (b) exactly what proof, evidence or testimony is required to meet that issue, and (c) exactly what support the petitioner intends to adduce for its allegations.
We now proceed to petitioners' contentions, Contention No. 1 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, is unusually sensitive to off-normal transient con-ditions originating in the secondary system, and therefore it is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's position on Contention No. 1 We do not believe proposed Contention No. 1 gives SMUD a fair opportunity to know precisely what issue petitioners seek to raise.
It is, of course, well known to all participants in this proceeding, and, indeed, to all members of the public who have followed the media reports on Three Mile Island, that the Babcock and Wilcox system, with its once through steam generator, has a snaller volume of water in the secondary loop than the systems of other manufacturers.
One obvious result is that in the event of a turbine and reactor trip the second-ary loop is less effective as a heat sink than it would be if it contained a larger volume of water.
But the Commission's 1108 328 I
May 7 Order directed that certain specific actions be taken to compensate for this condition.
And the Commission's June 21 Order provides, in substance, that the subject to be con-sidered at this hearing shall be whether those actions are sufficient.
It is not clear from Contention No. I whether petitioners are contending that even after the actions directed by the May 7 Order have been taken Rancho Seco will continue to be unsafe solely because it has a once through steam generator.
If that is what petitioners are contending, they s hould specifically so allege, and they should support that conclusionary allegation with factual allegations explaining why they believe the actions directed by the May 7 Order are insufficient.
As it stands, proposed Contention No.1 is fac less specific than any of the three broad, general " subjects" set forth in the Commission's June 21 Order, whereas, at least if we understand the Board's orders correctly, what we are now attempting to accomplish is to develop precise contentions which will frame narrow issues within the scope of those general " subjects".
The bottom line in all this is that proposed Contention No. 1 does not give SMUD "a fair opportunity... to know pre-cisely what the limited issue [is that petitioners seek to 1108 329 9
raise and] exactly what proof, evidence or testimony is required to meet that issue."
In the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company, 6 NRC 760, 771 (1977).
Therefore SMUD will not stipulate that proposed Contention No. 1 is a proper contention.
Contention No. 2 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, is designed with a steam generator which operates with relatively small liquid volume in the secondary side and therefore is un-safe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's position on Contention No. 2 Proposed contention No. 2 appears to be virtually identical to proposed Contention No. 1, and SMUD's position on proposed Contention No, 2 is therefore identical to its position on proposed Contention No. 1.
Contention No. 3
- Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a lack of direct initiation of reactor trip upon the occur-rence of off-normal conditions in the feedwater systems, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioner, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's position on Contention No. 3 Item (c) in the Commission's May 7 Order required SMUD to
" implement a hard-wired control-grade reactor trip that would be activated on loss of main feedwater and/or turbine trip."
1108 330 The staf f's safety evaluation dated June 19, 1979, shows, on page 14, that such a trip has been installed.
There-fore we do not know whether proposed Contention No. 3 is the result of a misunderstanding on the part of petitioners or whether petitioners are contending that the staff has erred and that the trip has not been properly installed.
If petitioners are asserting that the trip has not been properly installed, their contention is defective because it does not specifically so allege.
Because of these matters, we will not s tipulate that proposed Contention No. 3 is a proper contention.
Contention No. 4 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a reliance on integrated control system to auto-matically regulate feedwater flow, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, cons tituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's cosition on Contention No. 4 We believe this cor"3ntion is virtually identical to proposed Contention No. 16, and our position on this con-tention is therefore identical to o ir position on proposed Contention No. 16.
If petitioners believe the analysis of the integrated control system that has been submitted to the NRC on behalf of SMUD is inadequate, they should se t for th, wi th specifici ty, the f acts that lead them to that conclusion.
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Contention No. 5 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has an actuation before reactor trip of a pilot operated relief valve on the primary system pressurizer which, if the valve sticks open, can aggravate an accident, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's cosition on Contention No. 5 The staff 's scfety evaluation dated June 19, 1979, states, on page 13, that the setpoint of the pressurizer power operated relief valve has been changed from 2255 psi to 2450 psi and that the high pressure reactor trip setpoint has been changed from 2355 psi to 2300 psi.
Thus the power operated relief valve would not actuate before reactor trip in the event of an initial pressure increase.
We do not know whether petitioners are asserting Contention No. 5 because they are unaware that these setpoints have been changed or for some other reason.
If petitioners are assert-ing that the power operated relief valve will trip before the reactor even though it now has a higher setpoint, their con-tention is defective because it does not explain how this could occur.
Because of these matters, we will not stipulate that proposed Contention No. 5 is a proper contention.
J l108 332 s
Contention No. 6 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a low steam generator elevation, relative to the reactor vessel, which provides a smaller driving head for natural circulation, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Peti-tioners and the public.
SMUD's position on Contention No. 6 We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board jurisdiction to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
As we read the Commission's May 7 Order, it does not extend to the elevation of the steam generator.
The May 7 Order dealt with the ability of the facility to respond safely to feedwater transients,and problems associated with the elevation of the steam generator could only arise if the facility failed to respond safely to feedwater transients.
Therefore we will not stipulate that proposed Contention No.
6 is within the jurisdiction of this Board.
However, if the Board should rule that it does have jurisdiction, we are pre-pared to show that natural circulation can be maintained in the primary system with the steam generator in its present elevation.
1108 333 s
Contention No. 7 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has insufficient timeliness and reliability of the emergency feedwater system, and therefore is unsafe and en-dangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's position on Contention No. 7 Item (a) in the Commission's May 7 Order required SMUD to
" Upgrade the timeliness and reliability of delivery from the Auxiliary Feedwater System by carrying out actions as iden-tified in Enclosure 1 of the licensee's letter of April 27, 1979."
The staff's safety evaluation dated June 19, 1979, on pages 1 through 12, reviews the actions taken by SMUD in response to this directive and concludes, on page 12, that the timeliness and reliability of delivery from the auxiliary feedwater systems have been properly upgraded.
We do not know whether petitioners are unaware of this upgrading or whether they are asserting that the upgrading is inadequate.
If petitioners are asserting that the measures taken by SMUD to upgrade the timeliness and reliability of delivery from the auxiliary feedwater system are inadequate, they should so allege and they should set forth the facts on which their allegation is based.
Because proposed Contention No. 7 does not contain such allegations, we will not stipulate that it is a proper contention.
1108 334
Contention No. 8 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reacto r, does not have operating procedures for initiating and controlling the emergency feedwater system independent of the integrated control system control, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the Public.
SMUD's oosition on Contention No. 8 Item (b) in the Commission's May 7 Order required SMUD to
" Develop and implement operating procedures for initiating and controlling auxiliary feedwater independent of Integrated Control System (ICS ) control."
The s taff's safety evaluation da ted June 19, 1979, states, on page 13:
"We have reviewed the revised procedures for the AFW system to assure that there is suf ficient guidance for the operator to actuate the system if the automatic initiation failed, and to con-trol steam generator levels at the required values.
The review of the procedures focused on verifying that the operator is directed to observe the proper instruments and that the operator is directed to maintain specific values of parameters by manual control, such as s team generator levels.
The review also determined that the operator should confirm the validity of the instrument readings of certain key para-me ters, such as steam generator levels.
The necessary modifications to the procedures to satisfy these requirements were presented to the licensee, and the NRC staff has verified that the modifications have been incorporated in the procedures.
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"During the visit to the site, the NRC staff walked through the AFW procedures with the operators to evaluate whether the procedures were functionally adequate.
In addition, the NRC staff audited a sample of Rancho Seco oper-ators to determine if they were f amiliar with the revised procedures and could implement them correctly.
Based on the NRC staff audit, we conclude that the revised procedures and oper-ator training are satisfactory and therefore, the licensee is in compliance with Item (b) of the order."
We do not know whether petitioners are asserting Contention No. 8 because they are unaware that SMUD has developed procedures for initiating and controlling auxiliary feedwater independent of the integrated control system or whether they are contendj n; that the staff has erred and that the procedures that have been developed are inadequate.
If petitioners are con-tending that the procedures. that have been developed to control auxiliary feedwater independent of the integrated central system are inadequate, their contention is defective because it does not specifically so allege.
Because of these matters, we will not stipulate that proposed Contention No. 8 is a proper contention.
Contention No. 9 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has not installed adequate hard-wire control grade reactor trip on loss of main feedwater and/or on turbine trip, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's oosition on Contention No. 9 Proposed Conten tion No. 9 appears to be virtually identical to proposed Contention No.
3, and our position on Proposed Contention No. 9 is therefore identical to our position on proposed Contention No.
3.
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Contention No. 10 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reacto r, has not completed an adequate analysis for potential small breaks in a loss of coolant accident nor developed and implemented operating instructions to define operator action in such event, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's position on Contention No. 10 Item (d) in the Commission's May 7 Order required SMUD to
" Complete analysis for po tential small breaks and develop and im-plement operating instructions to define operator action. "
The staff's safety evaluation dated June 19, 1979, on pcges 16 through 24, reviews the steps SMUD has taken in response to this directive and concludes that the directive has been complied with.
We do not know whether petitioners are unaware of these matters or whether they are asserting that the staff has erred and that the steps SMUD has taken in response to the Commission's directive are inadequate.
If petitioners are asserting that the steps SMUD has taken are inadequate, their contention is defective because it does not allege facts supporting this assertion.
Because of these matters, we will not stipulate that proposed Con-tention No. 10 is a proper contention.
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Contention No. 11 SMUD the licensee, has not upgraded emergency plans to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.101 with special attention to action level criteria based on plant perimeters, and there-fore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the Public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 11 We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board juri'sdiction to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
In contrast, the Commission's August 9th Order relating to Three Mile Island 1 specifically provided that one of the suggestions to be considered at the hearing on the re-opening of that plant should be whether emergency plans had been upgraded to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.101.
We believe the difference in language between the Commission's order re-lating to Three Mile Island 1 and its June 21st order providing for this proceeding shows that the Commission did not intend to delegate to this Board jurisdiction to consider emergency plans to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.101.
Contention No. 12 SMUD, the licensee, has not established an emergency operation. center for federal, state and local officials and designed'a location and an alternate location and provided communications to the plant, and therefore Rancho Seco is un-safe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, 1108 338 s
constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's position on Contention No. 12 We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board jurisdiction to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
The Commission's August 9 Order on Three Mile Island 1 specifically provides that the subject of an emergency operations center may be considered, whereas the Commission's June 21 Order providing for this hearing does not refer to that subject.
We think this shows that the Commission did not in-tend to delegate to this Board jurisdiction to consider the subject of an emergency operations center.
Contention No. 13 SMUD, the licensee, has not sufficiently upgraded off-site radiation monitoring capability, including additional thermoluminescent dosimeters or the equivalent, and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioner, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 13 We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board jurisdiction to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
The Commission's August 9 order relating to Three Mile Island 1 specifically provides that one of the subj ects to be considered is the subject of off-site monitoring capability.
The Commission's June 21 Order providing for this hearing does i108 339 not refer to that subject.
We think this shows that the Commission did not intend to delegate to this Board juris-diction to consider the subject of off-site monitoring capability.
Contention No. 14 SMUD, the licensee, has not assessed the relation-ship of state / local plans to the licensee plans so as to assure the capability to take emergency actions, and there-fore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 14 We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board jurisdiction to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
The Commission's August 9 order relating to Three Mile Island 1 specifically provides that one of the subject to be considered is the relationship of state / local plans to the licensee plans for emergency actions.
The Com-mission's June 21 Order providing for this hearing does not refer to that subject.
We think this shows that the Commission did not intend to delegate to this Board jurisdiction to con-sider the relationship of state / local plans to the licensee plans for emergency actions.
Contention No. 15 SMUD, the licensee, has inadequate waste management capabilities, including storage and processing for solid, 1108 340 liquid and gaseous wastes in the event of a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Peti-tioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 15 We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board jurisdiction to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
The Commission's August 9 order relating to Three Mile Island 1 specifically provides that one of the subjects to be considered is waste management capabilities.
The Commission's June 21 Order providing for this hearing does not refer to that subject.
We think this shows that the Commission did not intend to delegate to this Board jurisdiction to consider the subject of waste management capability.
Contention No. 16 SMUD, the licensee, has done insufficient analysis of the failure mode and effects analysis of the integrated control system and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 16 The Commission's May 7 Order directed that "The licensee will submit a failure mode and effects analysis of the Inte-grated Control System to the NRC staff as soon as practicable.
The licensee 1108 341 s
stated that this analysis is now under way with high priority by B&W."
In a letter dated July 26, 1979, to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, SMUD stated
" Integrated Control Systems Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.
The District is currently reviewing a draft report of the failure modes and effects analysis.
The review will be complete by July 27, 1979 and returned to Babcock and Wilcox.
Bab-cock and Wilcox expects to submit the final report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff during the week of July 30, 1979."
Our information is that Babcock and Wilcox has sub-mitted the final report to the Commission's staff.
If petitioners are asserting that the report which Babcock and Wilcox has submitted is inadequate, they should set forth, with specificity, the facts which lead them to this conclusion.
Because we believe proposed Contention No.
16 is insufficiently specific, we will not stipulate that it is a proper contention.
Contention No. 17 SMUD, the licensee, has not modified emergency plans to address changing capabilities of plant instrumentation, and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's resconse to Contention No. 17 We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board jurisdiction 1108 342 to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
The Commission's August 9 order relating to Three Mile Island 1 specifically provides that one of the subjects to be considered is the subject of modifying emer-gency plans to address changing capabilities of plant instru-mentation.
The Commission's June 21 Order providing for this hearing does not refer to that subject.
We think this shows that the Commission did not intend to delegate to this Board jurisdiction to consider the subject of modifying emergency plans to address changing capabilities of plant instrumentation.
Contention No. 18 SMUD, the licensee, has not extended the capability to take appropriate emergency actions for the population around the plant site to a distance of ten miles, and there-fore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention Nc. 18 We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board jurisdiction to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
The Commission's August 9 order relating to Three Mile Island 1 specifically provides that one of the subjects to be considered is extending the capability to take appropriate emergency actions to a distance of ten miles from the plant site.
The Commission's June 21 Order providing for this hearing does not refe. to that subject.
We think this shows that the Commission 1108 343 did not intend to delegate to this Board jurisdiction to consider the subject of extending the capability to take appropriate emergency actions to a distance of 10 miles.
Contention No. 19 SMUD, the licensee, has not developed and imple-mented adequate evacuation plans and procedures which would be necessary in the event of an accident caused by a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constit sats of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 19 This proposed contention appears to be virtually identical to petitioners' proposed Contention 18 and our position on this contention is the same as our position on Contention No. 18.
Contention No. 20 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, does not have a hydrogen recombiner which may be necessary in the event of an accident caused by a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of 2eti-tieners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 20 We believe this contention is outside the scope of the Board's jurisdiction.
We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this 1108 344 Board jurisdiction to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
The Commission's May 7 Order dealt with matters related to the ability of the facility to operate'without accidents that would cause damage to the reactor core.
A recombiner would not help to prevent damage to the reactor core.
A recambiner would be used only to miti-gate the consequences of such an accident.
Therefore, we will not stipulate that proposed Contention No. 20 is within the jurisdiction of the Board.
Contention No. 21 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has a pressurizer tank and quench tank which are of inadequate size to accommodate the volume of gas or liquid that may be required to be stored in the evert of a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 21 We will stipulate that this is a proper contention.
We are prepared to show that the facility can be operated safely with.its present pressurizer and quench tank.
Contention No. 22 Rancho Sefco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, does not provide control room operators with sufficient data on the water level in the pressurizer and vessel because the operators must interpret information on temperature and i108 345
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pressure in the primary loop and extrapolate water level, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety-of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public, SMUDs response to Contention No. 22 We will stipulate that this is a proper contention.
We are prepared to show that the facility can be operated safely with its present instrumentation.
s Contention No. 23 SMUD, the licensee, has inadequate notification pro-cedures for informing local authorities in the event of a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 23 We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board jurisdiction to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
The Commission's May 7 Order does not deal with the subject of, procedures for informing local authorities of problems at the facility.
That subject is similar to the subject of emergency preparedness, which is referred to in the Commission's August 9 Order on Three Mile Island 1 but is not referred to in the Commission's June 21 Order providing for this proceeding.
For these reasons, we believe that proposed Con-tention No. 23 deals with a subject that is cutside the juris-diction of this Board.
Contention No. 24 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Nilcox designed reactor, is unable to avoid or control bubble formation in the primary system which may occur subsequent to a loss of feedwater accident, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Peti-tioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 24 We believe this contention is outside the scope of the Board's jurisdiction.
We believe a proper interpretation of the Commission's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board jurisdiction to consider only matters reasonably related to the Commission's May 7 Order.
As we read the Commission's May 7 Order, it does not extend to the subject of bubble forma-tion.
The May 7 Order dealt with the ability of the system to respond safely to feedwater transients, and problems associated with bubble formation could arise only if the facility failed to respond safely to feedwater transients.
Therefore, we will not stipulate that proposed Contention No. 24 is within the jurisdiction of the Board.
However, if the Board should rule that it does have jurisdiction, we are ready to show that the plant's operators are prepared to deal with the possibility of bubble, formation.
Contention No. 25 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, does not have control room instrumentation which 1108 347
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would indicate if the auxiliary feedwater or pressurizer relief valves are open or closed or the instrumentation to open or close such valves automatically, and therefore is unsafe and andangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention 25 We believe that the larger part of proposed Conten-tion No. 25 results from a misunderstanding on the part of petitioners.
The staff's safety evaluation dated June 19, 1979, shows, on page 8, that modifications in the plant have been made which provide for verification in the control room of auxiliary feedwater flow to each steam generator, NUREG-0560 shows, on page 2-18, that Rancho Seco has always had automatic initiation of its a.uxiliary feedwater systems.
NUREG-0560 also shows, on page 1-27, that the power operated relief valves in Babcock and Wilcox plants can be operated either manually or automatically.
Because we believe that the larger part of proposed Contention No. 25 results from a misunderstanding on the part of petitioners, we will not stipulate that it is a proper contention in its present form.
However, the contention appears to be appropriate insofar as it alleges that Rancho Seco does not have control room instru-mentation that indicates whether the power operated relief valve is open or closed.
I108 348 Contention No. 26 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Filcox designed reactor, has a once through steam generator which makes the plant more susceptible and sensitive to a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 26 Proposed Contention No. 26 appears to be virtually identical to proposed Contention Nos. 1 and 2, and'SMUD's position on proposed Contention No. 25 is therefore identical to its position on proposed Contentions 1 and 2.
Contention No. 27 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, cannot be adequately operated so that the feedwater system and the auxiliary system can be controlled and operated separately, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and
'the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 27 We do not unders tand this contention and believe it results from a misunderstanding on the part of petitioners.
The staff safety evaluation dated June 19, 1979, describes, on pages 2 through 12, the measures tha t have been taken to upgrade the timeliness and reliability of delivery from the 1108 349 auxiliary feedwater system.
The evaluation further describes, on page 13, the operating procedures that have been developed for initiating and controlling auxiliary feedwater independ-ent of the integrated control system.
The evaluation states specifically, on page 13, that revised procedures have been developed to provide guidance for the operator to activate the system if automatic initiation fails.
If petitioners believe the revised system and procedures described in the safety evaluation are inadequate, they should so allege, and they should set forth the f acts on which their allegation is based.
Because we believe that proposed Contention No. 27 results from a misunderstanding on 6.he part of petitioners, and because the contention is unclear and lacks specificity, we will not stipulate that it is a proper contention.
Contention No_.
28 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reac to r, does not have sufficient or reliable of f-site power in the event of a loss of feedwater transient causing a re-actor trip, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's resconse to Contention No. 28 We believe this contention is outside the scope of the Board's jur.sdiction.
We believe a proper interpretation of the Commissioa's June 21 Order is that it delegated to this Board jurisdiction to consider only matters reasonably related 1108 350
to the Commission's May 7 Order.
As we read the Commission's May 7 Order, it does not extent to the subject of off-site power.
Therefore, we will not stipulate that the proposed Contention No. 28 is a proper contention.
However, if the Board should rule that it does have jurisdiction, we are prepared to show that the facility's off-site power supply is adequate and reliable.
Contention No. 29 Rarcho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, hac insufficient instrumentation and capab'ility to immediately retrieve necessary information or data during a loss of feedwater transient and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constitncats of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD 's resconse to Contention No. 29 We are uncertain whether the ins trumentation to which petitioners refer in this contention is identical to, or different from, the instrumentation referred to in pro-posed Contention No. 25.
If petitioners are referring to o ther instrumentation, as they may be, we believe they should set forth the type of instrumentation which they contend is lacking at Rancho Seco.
Because we believe proposed Conten-tion No. 29 is not sufficiently specific, we will not stipulate that*it is a proper contention.
1108 351 Contention No. 30 SMUD, the licensee, has conducted insufficient analysis of what operations of the facility should be re-quired to be automated or hard equipment responsibilities -
and what can be conducted manue.lly or by plant personnel, and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, cons tituen ts o f Pe ti tioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 30 We do not believe this contention is suf(iciently specific.
We believe petitioners should be required to set forth the " operations" to which they refer.
As presently worded, the contention does not provide SMUD with a " fair opportunity to know precisely what the limited issue [is that petitioners seek to raise and) exactly what proof, evidence or testimony is required to meet that issue. "
In the Matter of Gulf S tates Utilities Company., 6 NRC 7 7 0, 771 (1977).
Because we believe proposed Contention No. 30 is insufficiently specific, we will not stipulate that it is a proper contention.
Contention No.31 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor,' has a control room configuration which is poorly e
and inadequately designed for plant operators to avoid a loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
I108 352 s
SMUD's response to Contention No. 31 Our position on this proposed contention is identical to our position on proposed Contention No. 30.
We believe petitioners should be required to set forth, with specificity, the respects in which they believe the control room configuration is inadequate.
Contention No. 32 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reacto r, is operated by personnel and management whose com-petence has not been adequately tested and evaluated, namely testing has not been conducted as to whether such employees can act responsibly and appropriately to make judgment de-cisions during a loss of feedwater transient, personnel interviews have not been conducted to properly evaluate the test results with such employees and some employees have never been tested because of grandfathering, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, cons tituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's response to Contention No. 32 This proposed contention appears to deal with both management competence and control and the adequacy of the training which operators have been given to enable them to respond correctly to feedwater transients.
We regard these as two separate subjects.
As to management competence.and control, the discussion at the public meeting of the Com-1108 353 mission on July 11 shows that the Commission did not intend to preclude the Board from considering. this issue.
- However, the discussion also shows that there is nothing presently before the Commission to indicate that management competence and control is a problem at Rancho Seco.
Under the circum-stances, we believe that petitioners should be required to identify the particular members of SMUD management whom they believe to be insufficiently competent and to set forth, with specificity, the facts upon which they base their allega-tions of lack of competence.
We point out that in a letter to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation da ted July 30, 1979, SMUD set forth, in de tail, the training and experience of its management team.
We will stipulate that a contention that SMUD's operators have not been properly trained to respond to feed-water transients is a proper contention.
We are prepared to show that they have been properly trained.
Contention No. 33 SMUD, the licensee, cannot be assured of necessary assistance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the event of a loss of feedwater transient because of the Nuclear Regult. tory Commission's failure to act quickly and decisively during the TMI-2 accident, and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, cons tituents of Petitioners and the public.
I108 354 SMUD's response to Contention No. 33 We believe this proposed contention is unrelated to the Commission's May 7 Order and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of this Board.
We will not stipulate that it is a proper contention.
Contention No. 34 Rancho Seco, being a Babcock and Wilcox designed reactor, has not adequately trained unlicensed operators to respond to orders necessary for action which would be required in the event of loss of feedwater transient, and therefore is unsafe and endangers the health and safety of Petitioners, constituents of Petitioners and the public.
SMUD's resconse to Contention No. 34.
As we have already stated, we will stipulate that a contention that SMUD's operators have not been properly trained to respond to feedwater transients is a proper contention.
Dated: August 20, 1979 Very respectfully submitted, DAVID S. KAPLAN JAN E. SCEORI By f
~ m Dkvid S.
Ka an
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Attorneys for cramento Municipal Utility District PsO Box 15830 Sacramento CA 95813 Telephone (916) 452-3211 '
's UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the MaC_er of
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY
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DISTRICT
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Docket No. 50-312 Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating )
S tation
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of 'the following document:
Response of Sacramento Municipal Utility District to Contentions of. Petitioners Gary Hursh afid Richard' Cas tro,
in the above captioned proceeding have been served on the follow-ing by deposit in the United States mail, first class, on this 21st day of August 19 79 Michael L.
Glaser, Esq., Chairman Mr. Mark Vandervelden 115 0 17th S treet, N.W.
Ms. Joan Reiss Washington DC 20036 Mr. Robert Chris topherson Friends of,the Earth Dr. Richard F.
Cole California Legislative Office Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 717 K Street, 4208 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Sacrmmento CA 95 814 Washington DC 20555 Reed, Samuel & Remy Mr. Frederick J. Shon 717 K S treet, Suite 4 05 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Sacramento CA 95814 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 Ms. Dian Greuneich California Energy Ccmmission Timo thy V.. A.
Dillon, Esq.
1111 Howe Avenue 185 0 K S tree t N.W., Suite 380 Sacramento CA 95825 Washington DC 20006 Gary Hursh, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 520 Capitol Mall, Suite 700 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Sacramento CA 95814 Washington DC 20555 Mr. Richard D.
Cas tro Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 2231 K S treet Panel Sacramento CA 95816 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 205 55 1108 356
Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Lawrence Brenner Counsel for NRC Staff U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Director Washington DC 20555 Mr. Stephen H. Lewis Counsel for NRC Staff U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Director Washington DC 20555 I..d i I Dpvid S.
Kapl Counsel for S CRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTI ITY DISTRICT
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