ML19209A386
| ML19209A386 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1979 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Baijal M PAINESVILLE, OH |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19209A387 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910030773 | |
| Download: ML19209A386 (2) | |
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/ 1979 Mr. Mike Baijal Painesville City Council 7 Richmond Street Painesville, Ohio 44077
Dear Mr. Baijal:
Your letter of June 5,1979, to the President, enclosing a resolution by the Painesville City Council, has been referred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Among the safety issues you listed is:
" Containment of the building to prevent radiation leakage."
Some early plants, including Three Mile Island Unit No. 2, provided automatic containment isolation demand on high contain-ment pressure only (approximately 2 to 5 psig).
For small rates of loss of coolant, there would be little pressure increase in the containment, and automatic containment isolation may be delayed or may possibly not be achieved.
The loss of coolant at Three Mile Island Unit No. 2, which produced a small pressure rise in the containment, was accompanied by substantial core damage and a large release of radionuclides into the containment building.
Containment isolation was not achieved until ap-proximately 4-1/2 hours after the start of the event.
Although this apparently did not lead directly to release of fission products outside containment, it clearly indicated an unacceptable possibility that it could occur. This matter has been investigated by the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and recommendations are being made to ensure that effective containment isolation is acconplished and maintained at all nuclear power plants.
Another issue you listed is:
" Redesigning of the cooling system to prevent core melt-down."
In the Three Mile Island accident, there was no " core melt-down," but there was extensive fuel damage.
The Director of the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement has stated:
"The design of the plant, the equipment that was installed, the various accident and transient analyses, and the emergency procedures were adequate to have prevented the serious consequences of the accident, if they had been permitted to function or be carried out as planned.
For example, had the operators allowed the emergency core cooling system to perform :ts intended function, damage to the core would most likely have been preventeJ.." As regards equipment, the need for an emergency feedwater system of high reliaoility is a clear lesson learned from the Three Mile Island accident.
One recommendation is to provide automatic initiz tion of all auxiliary feedwater systems, designed in such a manner that a single failure will not result in the loss of the function.
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t'r. iif ke Baijal.
You also mentioned:
" Rigorous operators' training to react to a faulty Recommendations are being made in the NRC to data situation quickly."
improve operator qualifications, training, and licensing; technical qualifi-cations of overall reactor operations organizations; display and system diagnostic equipment; and operations procedures and preparations for accident conditions.
You further mentioned:
"Possible mechanisms for evacuation of our citizens in the vicinity of the ten-mile radiation envelope zone of the Perry Nuclear Plant. - This, as I understand, is the responsibility of the State and Local Governments." You may be interested in the " Lake County Radiological Emergency Plan," which was written for the Perry Nuclear Plant and its surrounding environments.
It is part of t.he " State of Ohio Plan for Response to P,adiation Emergencies at Licensed Nuclear Facilities" dated May 1979. A recent report by a. Task Force on Emergency Planning of the Nuclear.
Regulatory Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency recommended among others things that an Emergency Planning Zone for the plume exposure pathway of about ten miles in radius be established around light water nuclear power plants.
The Task Force recommendations are now before the Commission and the EPA Administrator.
Finally, you listed:
"vfest disposal of nuclear waste." The NRC must be assured that radioactive vastes generated by licensed power reactors can be safely handled and storu. r they are generated.
As part of the licensing process for an individual peer reactor facility, the NRC does rev'ew the facility in questi S. c. der to assure that the design provides for safe methods for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. We can be reasonably confident that permanent disposal (as distinguished from continued storage under surveillance) can be accomplished safely when it is likely to be Reasonable progress towards the development of permanent dis-necessary.
posal facilities is presently being occomplished.
The NRC has issued Bulletins and Orders to utilities operating nuclear power plants to deal with immediate actions required as a result of t.ie Three Mile Island accident.
It also has task forces making short-term and long-term recommendations to ensure the public health and safety for plants that are operating or under construction.
Sincerely, hf e ~.-
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Reg"lation 1086 qnl tu'