ML19208B176
| ML19208B176 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1979 |
| From: | Faust C, Frederick E, Scheimann F, Zewe B Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190190 | |
| Download: ML19208B176 (60) | |
Text
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c UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION I
l 1
In the Matter of:
2{
IE TMI INVESTICATION INTERVIEW 31 of Group Interview i
4' 5111 Iwe. Shift Supervisor y
Fred Scheimann, Sh!ft Foreman
' Si Ed Frederick, Contrel Room Operator Craig Faust, Control Room Operator Si 7V S!
Trailer #203 91 NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10l Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
June 23, 1979 12:
(Date of interview) 13; July 17,1979 (Date Transcript Typeo) 14!
319 15!
(Tape Numcer(s))
16!
17:
18!
19i 20r 2h.!
NRC PERSCNNEL:
22!
Bob Marsh Clay Jackson
'23.
Dale Donaldson
'24l
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25, 000 22_1 I
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lj MARSH: The date is June 28th.
The :ime is 9:28 a.m.
And this is Bob 2l Marsh.
I'm an investigator with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cesnission, f
assigned to the Region III office in Chicago, Illinois.
Tnis morning we're 3
4 at trailer 203, at Three Mile Island for the purpose of conducting an 3j interview with Mr. Craig Faust, Ed Frederick Fred Scheimann, and Bill Zewe.
6 At this time I would like the other individuals in the room to identify 7
themselves, and state their position. And I'd also like to do the same 8
thing with Met Ed, so the girls transcribing this can begin to recognize Voices.
g 10f JACKSON:
Clay L. Jackson.
I'm a Radiation Specialist from Region III.
g 12' 00NALDSON: Dale E. Donaldson.
Radiation Specialist, Region I.
13!
i 141 ZEWE:
Sill Zewe, Shift Supervisor, Metropolitan Edison Company.
16; SCHEIMANN:
Fred Scheimann, Shift Foreman, Metropolitan Edison Company.
IS(
[pEDERICK:
Ed Frederick, Control Room Operator, Met Ed.
19i 20t FAUST:
Craig Faust, Control Room Operator, Met Ed.
21l 22l MARSH:
Thank you.
In the past, we've discussed this two page memo, so I 231 am not going to go into it in any detail.
I'm just going to read those 24 four questions, and if I could get you people to respor.d once again to 25:
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2 v'
if those questions, that are on that memo.
First question reads, do you understand the above, making reference to the two page memo.
2, 31 4j ZEWE:
I do.
Si 6
SCHEIMANN:
I do.
7!
es.
81 9i FAUST:
Yes.
lot 11!
MARSH:
And do we have your permission to tape this interview?
131 ZEWE:
Yes.
14:
15i SCHEIMANN:
Yes.
16i 17:
FREDERICK:
Yes.
18; 191 FAUST:
Yes.
20!
21; MARSH:
And finally, would you like a copy of the tape, and a transcript?
22' 23!
ZEWE:
Ye.1.
24!
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li SCHEIMANN: Yes.
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FRECERICK: Yes.
4!
h FAUST:
Yes.
Si 7j MARSH:
The question is not printed at the back of... which we have discussed e re s, would you like someone frem t.5e company present at this time?
8 9I 10l a
s time.
I 11l SCHEIMANN:
No.
131 FREDERICK:
No.
14' 15i FAUST:
No.
16 17!
MARSH:
At this time I'll turn over to Larry Jackson, believe you've got 18t some questions.
191 20!
JACKSON:
I'm not going to address my questions directly to anybody, except 21l maybe later on I might, once we get the discussion rolling.
22' But what I'd like to do, is just ask you a general question, and if anybody feels like 23i they could pick it up, we'll go frcm there.
I want to trace the meaning of 241' the makeup tank, and I'd like to establish when the problems first started 25i c.
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lj with the makeup tank, from the standpnint of trying to pin down when we 2
might have had relief valve problems with the letdown system, this type of l
31 thing, and lead up to the occurrence on Friday morning of... which would i
f have been the 30th of March, of the relief valve on the makeup tank, and g
that VMUV 13 being opened for a considerable period of time, and causing 6
the 1,200 mR/ hour reading, which precipitated, I guess, some of the evacua-
{
tion action.
So, does anybody have a feel for when the pressure in the 7
makeup tank first started being a problem?
9I ZEWE: As far as I'm concerned, as I remember, it became a problem on the previous day. We began to get an increase in pressure in the makeup tank 11:
f from degassing the reactor coolant system to letdown path into the makeup tank, so that we began to vent off the pressure in the maekup tank to the 131 vent header through the normal mode, but we noticed that each time that we did this, that we had a release, as indicated by our off going monitors.
Every time we would open up the vent, MEUV 13 would be a release would ensue about 15 or 20 minutes later from the Auxiliary Building.
So, we 17!
continued to try to relieve this pressure periodically into the morning of the 30th--er--I should say, the 29th, rather, we had a program set up where we would just cycle the vent open unitl we had just an open red light and 201 would reshut it again.
Meanwhile, we would have the auxiliary operator at 21:
the radwaste panel running a waste gas compressor, so that we would just 22!
burp the makeup tank, so to speak, and then have the aux operator run the 23) compressor and suck back down and head it.
And typically, we would vent 241 the header would be about 2 or 3 pounds with a...
open up the vent and shut 25i n-
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it right away and the pressure would go up to the neighborhood of 11 to 1!
2 pounds in the vent header.
And he would bring it back down to about 2 or 3 3}
pounds again and revent.
We continued to do this until we reduced the h
pressure sufficiently where we were.
Trying to keep the pressure low certainly helped to keep our letdown flow going.
S And then this got to the 1
6l p int where we started to degas more and more and more.
And it was harder 7j to have an operator dressed in time to go in there to keep on operating g
waste gas compressors in this fashion.
So, we elected sometime later on the 29th, and early on the 30th, to allow the pressure to come up to a g
10!
higher value before we vented.
And typically, at this point, we were
]
allowing the pressure to get up to somewhere around the 58 pound ra about 70 pounds, and then having an operator go in, and then venting i
]
back to about 55 or 60 pounds.
And then letting it build up again over a period of time, and then sending the operator in, and we. continued to do this.
15i 16.
JACKSON:
When you were venting from these higher pressures, what kind of pressures were you going to then in the vent header?
191 ZEWE:
We were still doing the same thing.
Just opening up that vent.
201 Just open and then shut, and then operating the gas compressors 21:
it down.
It just took progressively longer and longer, and more and more 22l t
23l vents in order to accomplish the pressure reduction.
24l 25l I
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_ FAUST:
~
What did we time it one time..
11 seconds, or something like that?
2; 3l ZEWE:
.E We did at the beginning, but where we're at here now, all that we i
did was shootimg for a red light... as soon as we had the red light 4
Sj again, so it was just the cycle time of the valve, and that takes, I don't I
Gj know, maybe three or four seconds, maybe.
I'm not sure of the actual cycle 7f time of the MEUV-13, but it was just until we had a red light I
, and then go el se it immediately and that was enough to bring up the header to 8;
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pounds or so.
And then suck it down, and we continued to do this.
Early 10l e m rning n e
n Oth then, we got to the point to where h began to be a problem to send an operator in so frequently to operate the ga
]
om-pressors.
And right before the period where the relief valve blew, we had an operator that was still getting dressed and was going into the radwast panel to accomplish this function whenever we reached 80 or 84 pound 141 so, and the release letacwn intcck.
16'
_ JACKSON:
17{
Did you have any indication that the compressors were not w 18!
properly during any of this time?
191 ZEWE:
Not that I can recall, no.
20!
21!
JACKSON:
- 0. K.
22l I know that things like the 30th, late on the 30th, there
?
23f was compressor problems developed and I was wondering if how early 24l might have developed.
The compressors were only going half of their rated ounce, and also, the pressure in the tanks quit going up, so..
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FAUST: This thing where did that come from?
l 2!
JACKSON:
I was there on the night of the 30th, in the Control Room, and I 3
i 4l was picking this up from the people there, that were working with radwaste.
5!
ZEWE:
I believe that that is true.
I don't think that we knew the extent 6
7 of which the compressors were not up to full capability. We did suspect j
that they were not operating to a very large degree, but just how inefficient g
they were, or what the problem was at this point, we didn't~ know exactly g
where the leak was in the vent header.
And that we knew that the comp essors 10 h
really didn't... were not pressurizing the gas tanks like they had been before.
12l So there was a problem, but we thought that C,is was probably because of the leak that we had into the building, chat there was some opening to where the compressors were not compressing the waste gas tanks themselves.
So we didn't know that the compressors had any severe problem at this point, other than later on, those amp readings, I do recall, those too, that they were considerably lower than what they had been before, indicating they weren't up to par.
18t 19l JACKSON: Just to pursue that just a little bit further, Bill,... these--
20' er--compressors, I believe, are NASH water sealed compressors.
Have you 21l all, to your recollection, had any problem with these compressors before, 22l with controlling the water level in the compressor, or losses of water 23!
level in the compressors that might have caused problems with them?
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lj ZEWE:
No, not that I'm aware of.
They are basically the very same compres-2 sors we had in Unit 1.
And operationally I cannot remember a specific 3j problem with maintaining water level in the seals in those compressors
[
either.
They are NASH compressors.
They are very similar.
si g!
FAU_Q: Something we didn't know at that time too, I don't believe, is we didn't suspect that we had flooded out the vent header.You know that gj thing isn't designed to take a solid pipe of water into the s
There's g;
a lot of an excessive amount of water.
I don't exactly what effect definitely it has on it, but a...
11!
JACKSON:
Do you suspect you flooded out the vent header?
FAUST:
Later on, yeah.
14'
~
15:
JACKSON:
When you say later on, what is later?
f 171 FAUST: Months.
It's good we started talking about sources of how stuff got out of the building.
201 ZEWE:
He means that in retropect, we believed that we did then 21:
, but he didn't know it at the time until sometime '.ater.
22 1
23l
_ FAUST:
And it of, you know, definitely, probably had an effect on those 24i compressors.
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y JACKSON: Where would the water have come from?
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3j FAUST: The RC drain tank.
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Si JACKSON:
- 0. K.
That's what I suspected, you were going to say about it.
What about the... since you brought that up, what about the possibility of 6
f water getting into that system from the reactor coolant bleed tanks, say, 8
i 9f ZEWE:
It definitely did on the 30th, because we over pressurized the... at n:
least the B and the C RC bleed tanks, and they relieve to the vent header.
(
12l And the vent header ties in there, so I'm sure that the vent header got considerable water in it, at least that day.
131 14!
FAUST:
I wouldn't say it came from the bleed tanks so much, as it came from the SWST.
Because when that relief on the makeup tanks lifted, that's where it dumps... right into the piping... the loop seal piping on the RC bleed tanks, and it just backs up into... and can back up into it.
18i 19i ZEWE:
At this point, most of the water resolved, just about the same 20\\
there, except the water that was ccming from the... BWST wasn't contaminated, 21,'
But the water that was in the bleed tank already had been.
And I'm true.
22 sure they all mixed together then.
23l So that it would be hard to say exactly l
where it came from, because...
241 25!
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I 10 I don't think it would have bicwn the loop seal before it pushed it up into 1
that vent header, too much.
3f 4j ZEWE:
I think that most of it probably went into the RC drain tank itself, 5
because it did overflow the RC drain tanks.
So, we put it into there, and then frem there it went into the header, and I'm sure that some of it in Si g
coming over from the relief valve went straight to the header also.
8 JACXSON:
The reactor coolant bleed tanks... did you notice any pressure problems, or level problem with them prior to the 30th?
The pressure 11::
gauge reads to 30 pounds, voich... and I assume that probably the relief valve lifts somewhere before that.
They're 20 pound tanks and T don't have the relief valve pressure, but did they get close to that relief valve pressure any time prior to the 30th?
151 ZEWE:
The only time that I remembar u., really dealing with the bleed 16 tanks, prior to the 30th, which is still after the accident, was on the 29th, when I came in at about 3 o' clock on the 29th, in the morning, I 18!
noticed that the bleed tanks levels were less than what they had been the 191 previous day, the 28th.
And myself and Ed Frederick were discussing on why 201 the bleed tank levels were less.
21!
And then we felt that we had lost some seal water to the bleed tanks, and that these pumps were leaking out their 22l seals into the Aux Building.
23l So, we investigated that possibility-why the bleed tanks were less than that.
24l But other then the level increase on the relief valve opening on the 30th, and the high pressure that we had on the 25i 7 3' A
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lj bleed tanks as a result of the relief valve lifting, I don't recall any 2
ther pressure that was ever in the tank, or any concern with the levels in i
the tanks.
3 41 JACKSON:
g So, now this loop seal is supposed to allow these tanks to flsw from one to another, Joe or Bill, is that true?
i 7)
ZEWE:
I would allow that, yes.
81 9!
They tie into each other.
But depending on.
I'm not sure of it right now, whether that taps in physically to the relief valve.
I know the ll; makeup tank taps into that, but it would have a tendency to push it...
l overflow it to the... I would imagine to the least resitance, right, which 131 to me would be the atmosphere, because you had a pressure on the bleed 14i tanks.
So it had a tendency to push towards the vent header side.
1C; f
ZEWE:
But no knowing at this point the vent header was...
17l 18t No, it had a tendency to push to the floor.
19t 20l ZEWE:
From where?
21; 22l l
It wouldn't go to the vent header, it would push the other way.
That thing 23!
dumps right to the floor.
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i If JACXSON:
When you say the vent header, you're talking about the relief valve vent header.
Right? The one that relieves straight to the stack?
Si i
4l ZEWE:
No.
The vent header is on the bleed tanks, too.
The relief from 5
the bleed tanks goes to the relief valve vent header.
Correct.
Which 5
6j comes in down the stream in the waste gas filter, and down stream of the f
waste gas tanks, too.
7 8!
JACKSON: And straight up the stack.
g, 101 i
11':
ZEWE: And straight up the stack. Monitored by 219 and 1480.
12 JACKSON:
And this tank also, I guess, floats on the waste gas system?
e 14l ZEWE:
Bleed tanks?
15 16; JACXSON:
Right.
ISf ZEWE:
Yes.
Normally the waste gas tanks are the RC bleed tanks, pardon me, float on a waste gas header, and also the RC drain tanks floats on that 201 same header that goes to the bleed tanks.
22 JACXSON:
- 0. K.
So, you've go a path to them, the vent header that's going 23!
into the waste gas system, which is in the system that's leaking, but in 2 41 addition, you also got a path to the vent stack, which, if, you lifted 25i those relief valves, on the packs.
True?
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ZEWE:
Yes.
I 2;
3 FAUST:
The letdown relief does the same thing--we know then that,
)
right?
4 5
ZEWE:
Yeah, well at release, it comes in right here.
Right.
Then the 6
7 relief valves on the tanks here, they should go into... right into here, 8
which come in and right out again.
So, I'm not sure if we got a high i
g enough pressure to lift a release on the bleed tanks.
We definitely were 10 high en ugh to lift the valve for the makeup tank, and transfer it to tht header... going to the b'. sed tank.
i 12!
Where are you going to put all that water?
13l 14!
ZEWE:
That's where we did put it, into the bleed tanks.
16i I thought we got it out on the floor somewhere?
17' i
18!
ZEWE:
We did get some more to the floor.
And a lot of that, I feel, just came from the vent header itself.
201 Not only from the relief line that goes out the stack, but from the water that was in the vent header itself.
We overpressurized it.
23 l
JACXSON: Would the water in the vent header you talking about draining out 24) through these NASH drain pots, or whatever they are?
25!
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lj ZEWE:
Yeah.
There's header drain pots. _
2I 3
JACKSON:
Right.
41 3;
ZEWE:
On all the headers, plus waste gas tanks themselves have an auto 6
drain to go back to the off going sump tank.
And that was already overflowed 7
that we know of.
And also some of the seal water from the gas compressors l
also dumps back. So, I'm not sure what the mechanism was.
I just feel 8
reasonably sure that we did add some water to the Aux Building, that they g
rm reHe r m some points on d e vent header.
10t i
11.'
JACKSON:
Then, you say you know that the waste gas decay tanks overflowed back to the sump tanks?
131 14i ZEWE:
No, I said it... the: maintain a certain level, the wasta gas tanks themselves, water level that is.
And they go back to the Aux Building sometime.
17!
18t JACKSON:
Right.
19t 20I ZEWE:
And if they got an appreciable amount of water in them, they should 21!
have sent that water back to the Aux Building sometimes.
22l
[
2 31 JACKSON:
Are you saying, you know that happened.
241 2Si 9 'J.
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ZEWE:
I do not know that happened.
But I think by putting so much water to the vent header, that it conceivably goes back into the s 2
ump through one of those mechanisms we just mentioned.
3 4l JACKSON:
How do you know you had the water in the vent header?
)
Gi 7
EUST: How do we know.
aj g,
ZEWE:
I just assumed that we do.
That we did.
Because for one, if the 10j bleed tanks relieved, they were relieved because we were overfilli ng the bleed tanks.
And we were overflowing with water.
After release blew, there would be a certain amount of water that would go thr ough to the y
relief header, at least.
14I FAUST:
Couldn't the makeup system release the pressurizer bleed tan s
16r 17l
_ZEWE:
I'm sorry, what?
l 18i S)I ST:
Couldn't the makeup system release that brought in the releas
- 1Si, tanks, couldn't they have pressurized the bleed tanks?
20l 21!
ZEWE:
Oh, they did.
The bleed tank pressure we very high.
22!
If I'm not mistaken, and I don't remember the upper range of the pressure in 23l cation 24j in the Control Rocm on the bleed tanks, it was just th t i 25l if I remember, the morning of the 30th.
t was off scale, a
They havt pressure and level in the bleed tanks.
q 't j
I 16 JACKSON:
Yes, I looked at those the othe day, and they read to 30 pounds, gj is as high as they read. And the design specifications on the tank is 20 3
pounds.
I was speculating that probably the release lifted.
You know, at 4
30 pounds, that's one and a half times your designed pressure there.
So 5
surely, the release wouldn't have been set higher than that.
Si FAUST: Why is there a... I keep remembering something I must have been 7
8i 1
king at the wrong pipe.
I keep thinking of something that went directly to the flocr in there.
10i ZEWE:
Either one bleed tanks tie together with a loop overflow that goes directly to the Aux Building sump.
Maybe you're confused with that.
But y
there isn't a path here that goes directly to the floor.
Over there there y
is a large loop seal on all the overflows. Where they o.verflow to each other first, and then they overflow to the floor after they fill up a little loop seal.
l'Il FAUST:
I guess that what's bad working on the two units.
19)
JACKSON:
- 0. K.
We'll get back to working our way up to Friday morning.
According to the strip chart, the makeup tank relief valve probably lifted 21.
around 4:30, on Friday morning, March the 30th, and stayed open until a 22l l
little after 7.
All during this trace, and I have it traced with me, if 23{
anybody wants to look at it, but the trace shows the level in the makeup 2 41 tank essentially zero.
Just dropped straight down.
And at about 7:10 in h
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17 the morning, the decision
_ I guess the decision had been made by then--to vent that tank, and that's about 7:10, according to the log that's 2
when the tank MUV-13 was opened, and shortly thereafter, the pressure or 3
the level in the makeup tank started to come back up.
4 I believe, Bill, you Sj were there part of that time in on the decision of opening that valve with.
6l Greg Hitz.
7h h
ZEWE:
Yes.
9l yh JACXSON:
Could you tell a little bit about what you and Greg discussed from that... and the decision making process... or deciding that valve g
h needed to be opened?
13!
ZEWE:
- 0. K.
Just to back up a little bit.
I remember the blowdown at the makeup tank to be a little later than 4:30, but it that's what the chart says, that's probably what it was.
But I went off for an interview same-where around a quarter to six or so, and I believe that Craig Faust went 17' off before I did, because I went after he came back.
,8f 1
Anyway, the relief had lifted before I had left. And we had lost makeup tank level.
And we didn't knew at the time why we should have lost the level at first. And then we were still trying to determine this, and Craig had to relieve me and I came back about 5 to 7, or so.
And then they were still trjing to 22l cope w.
the problem.
23l We did not have the makeup tank level, so I came l
back in at this point, and then looked and the bleed tanks were at a lot 241 higher level than they were before, and the SWST had lost a couple foot of 25i
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l 1j level since I had left.
So, between Craig Faust and Greg Hitz, and myself, 2
we knew that one, that we were going from the BWST through to the makeup 3;
system, I had to relieve them into the RC bleed tanks.
And that we had to 4
stop this process and get back to where we had DHD SA closed from the BWST, Sj and open up 12, the outlet from the makeup tank, and go into a normal i
6l configuration for the makeup system.
In order to do this, we would have to
{
y t level in the tank and reduce the pressure, because at this point we 7
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were also had just about complete loss of letdown flow because of the high gl pressure in the makeup tank and the reduced flow that we had to begin with 10 fr m the letdown system because of blockage in the lines.
We had lost our letdown flow.
So, that we made a decision then to try to feed from the RC bleed tanks using the transfer pumps to try to get level back into the i
makeup tank.
131 And we were unable to overcome the present high pressure that was in the makeup tank with the transfer pump.
So then I elected to put on two demin water transfer pumps, which put out about 150-160 pounds, and feed the makeup tank with demin water. We tried to get some level back, so 16 that we could change back to the makeup tank.
So, it wes at this time that 17l we did this, we put on two demin water transfer pumps, ted water to the makeup tank and opened up the vent to reduce pressure, so that we could 191 indeed get some level back.
So, as soon as we did this, well, as soon as 20!
we decided to do this, Greg Hit: called the Unit 1 Control Room, ECS, to 21; inform them that we, indeed, were going to open up the makeup tank vent, 22l and that we would have a release, and to enusure that the monitoring teams 231 were out.
And that the helicoper was in the air to monitor the release 24j that we would have expected to occur in about 15 or 20 minutes later.
25i o
9
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Because that happened about the lag time opening up the vent.
So mean-whilc then, we had fed water into the makeup tank and got about 10 or 12 2'
l 31 inches back, opened up the vent.
Then we opened up MUV 12 and shut DHP 5 4
alpha.
And our original plr s were to reshut the vent once we got down to 5l about 60 pounds to ensure that tha* relief valve had sealed. When we got 6
to that point, we decided then to just leave the valve open and continue to
/l blowdown, since we were monitoring the releases that we had, and we could I
g shut it at any time if the releases got excessive.
So, then we just continued then to leave the vent open and just close the makeup tank down to essentially g
10l zero pressure, and try to regain our normal makeup system configuration.
l 11, We would of had to vent the makeup system or the makeup tank specifically in puffs anyway, so we elected as long as the radiation wasn't excessive I
from the venting, that we would continue to do this.
And that is in fact, what we ended up doing.
14b 15:
JACKSON:
When you decided to open this vent, was your initial decision that you were going to open it and leave it open for awhile?
Or was this 17!
I just like going to be like any other vent?
ISt 191 ZEWE:
Right.
20i Our discussion was that I wanted to open it up and then blowdown to approximately 60 pounds, where I was sure that the relief valve 21!
would stay seated.
And we could continue to control the venting procedure 22!
as we had, because the operator was getting... well, there was one in 23i there at this point of time, too, to operate the waste gas compressor.
But l
Craig was talking to me, and Craig came out with let's just take credit for 2Si
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20 t
y leaving it open, and then once we got down to that point of about 60 pounds, we did agree that that was the best course of action, because we had lost 2
3l all letdown flow at this point, which I remember.
And we were monitoring the release, and we didn't feel that it was very excessive at this point.
4 Sj S
that we were going to continue to do that until we seen the necessity to 6
shut the vent.
7l FAUST:
Bill's covering all the points that went into this thing, but the considerations were that we were when that relief opened prior to that, we g
kept running into a situation where our tank pressure kept getting ahead of 10 us, it was actually.
Although we were reducing pressure like he said, it g
was like in a band, and it kept working its way up in the tank.
- 0. K.
And once it opened, we were in a situation where we just kept cycling and losing our source of water which was a BWST, at that time, if something 141 15:
else happened in the plant. We had dropped a couple of feet in that tank already, just cycling it through that relief.
We no longer had any letdown flow, and we couldn't shut 5, with port open fall pack up, because we didn't want the level in the makeup tank less.
So, essentially, we lost volume control in the system at that point. We were losing our source of 20;.
water, ailowing us to go on, and the next alternative was to take a suction on a building, which I don't think anybody wanted to do at that point.
So, these were some of the considerations in opening that... getting the 221 pressure bled down to zero, and just go with minimum release and the zero 231 pressure on the tank and leave it off.
24!
25l i
e c,q
i I
{
21 i
1l ZEWE:
Also, the high pressure that was in the bleed tank was lifting their 2j release. We were sure that, in our own minds, and the release path was still open, that we were venting through the bleed tanks, straight up to 3
4; the stack anyway. And the release into the Auxiliary Building by 13, we Sj c uld control that at anytime, very quickly by shutting the valve.
But 6
controlling the pressure of where the relief valve lifts, it's a lot harder 7f to do, and it isn't a direct funtion, either.
So we knew that if we didn't 81 reduce the pressure, that it would just accalerate and it would just continue g,
to bicw the release in a more uncontrolled manner.
Where here, at least we had one valve to control, the 13 valve that we could operate directly from 10 y
a control arm. And it had been operated several times, and we did have fairly well... we did have positive control of the valve.
So, that played an important part, too, saying that we have a release that we knew that we g
were going to have, at least we could control it directly from the control arm.
16!
JACKSON:
So, when your man, this was a controlled release... Friday morning, right?
.dl 1Sf ZEWE:
Yes, well, yes and no.
The yes part is that we can control it as long as we could control the pressure with the vent.
But, if we elected to shut the vent, the pressure would have came back up, and then, it would have become uncontrolled.
23l So, if you understand what I'm referring to.
t 24!
25l Q {\\./
f 22
/
JACKSON:
Bill, were you in the Control R m when 1,200 mR/ hour reading 2
came in over the radio?
\\
31 4j ZEWE:
Certainly were.
That was from the helicopter, and it was directly 5{
over the stack.
t 6i JACKSON:
Do you recall what you reaction was? And any discussions you I
gj might have had with any... say Greg Hit:: or any other supervisory personnel gj or NRC personnel there at that time?
I 10!
ZEWE: Yes.
Greg was monitoring the channels and also talking to Unit 1.
And then I said, "Greg, would you make sure that we know the location of y
that helicoptar." 8ecause I heard the transmission itself from the helicop-ter.
But I really didn't know exactly where he was, because he was really 14 i l
communicating to Unit 1, ECS.
And I heard the reading, and I could hear it 15 was from a helicopter.
And I asked him to confirm where that was, and to confirm the plume to see how far it was.
And if it was just localized 17!
directly over the stack, or just where it was, which he proceeded to do, 19!
through the ECS, through the on site and off site teams, and the other helicopter that was in the air at the time.
201 21l
.1ACKSON:
Were there any NRC people in the Control Room where you were, the 22l Unit 2 Control Room?
23l 24i 25i A
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g.9'-
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23 I
j ZEWE:
Yes, there was.
l l
2; l
JACKSON: Were they involved in this in any way to your knowledge?
3 4!
ZEWE:
I did not specifically go to one and say, this is exactly what I was 5
g doing, alright. We were reacting with what we had.
They were there to 7
observe what we were doing, but I did not, you know, specifically say, 8:
here's what we're doing, here's wnat we did.
All of that was after the fact, while we were into it. Al right.
Then they were made aware of it g;
p n an, so to say.
10 i
11!y MARSH:
Had the NRC voiced a requirement to be informed?
13)
ZEWE: Well, before that, they had said that they did want to be involved in anything that happened. As long as there was time to plan it, they wanted to be in on it, or informed of actions that we were taking.
And I l
felt that we did that.
At the point where I decided to see demin water in 17l to tne makeup tank, I did voice out loud in the Control Room, if anyone had 18f objections to me feeding straight demin water into the makeup system to try 191 to get a level back.
And there was totally no response from anyone else.
So, I went ahead with it.
But, I did announce it to the Control Room at 21; that point that I was going to do that. And everything else was... there 22; were several people in the Control Room, and I'm not sure of the numbers.
23 But there were quite a few people there and I was sure that everyone was 24) l involved in trying to determine what the best course of action was.
25i q I.g I c.
'- 1 l
24 i
JACKSON:
Do you know what notifications transpired... when you got that 2
1,200 mR/ hour reading, were there any notifications of State or made Civil 3
Defense... this type of thing... from the Unit 2 Control Room?
4!
5j ZEWE: At that point, Gary Miller came in. We were still in a general 6
emergency, so all our stations were all manned.
And Greg Hit:: was assigned p
by Gary to make some... to notifications, and I was assigned by Mr. Miller 8
to continue to operate the plant... and have control of the plant.
So g
Gregg was on the phone at least talking to ECS.
Who else he called, I'm not sure of.
I haVe learned later that several Calls were made, but I'm not sure of the exact party... if it was Greg, or frem ECS directly to the g,
TRH or whoever, I'm not sure.
That was all in accordance with our TMI 131 Emergency Procedures, so I am not aware of who made what call, at what i
exact time, no.
14{
15:
JACKSON:
Do you know if Jim Floyd was involved in these calls?
,6 1T ZEWE:
I could only say from thct point, that I believe that he was frem ISt just party of the second part, so to speak.
I had heard that Jim had made some comments that... that he had made some calls to the Civil Deferse, I 201 believe, and he has mentioned to me himself that he has made some calls, 21!
22!
but I do not know the details of those calls, or exactly who he was in touch with at the time.
23 24 25i qL>
0 C.
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l 25 l
yj JACKSON:
- 0. K.
And you wouldn't know what times?
2{
l ZEWE:
I do not because, this is all after the fact.
During the fact, I am 3
f not aware of who made any calls.
The reference records to which Jim Floyd 4
5 said or what I heard he said was all later on.
Not at that time.
It was t
g days to weeks later.
I 7
JACKSON:
g; Craig, were you the operator that opened the valve?
i 9!
l FAUST:
Yes, I was the operator that opened the valve.
10 I
11i JACKSON:
12!
What were your instructions when you were told to open the valve?
131 i
14!
FAUST:
I was supposed to cycle the valve, to bring the pressure down...
trying to bring it; down to step.
And it's essentially what we did.
We were trying to initially get an operator into the building to open it in the beginning, right, I'm getting out of sequence again? That's when it 18f all added up to.
I think I just turned over to Ed, in fact, for 19i my interview I just got a transcript of... that er...
20j 21!
JACKSON:
I turned it over to you, didn't I?
22!
i 23!
FAUST:
You turned it over to me?
i 24l 25f i,
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26 1
ZEWE: Craig, I think we're losing your.
I think at this point when I 2f made a decision to open it up at this point of 1,200 mR readings, and 3j everything else.
Right? What word he had from me is what your asking now.
4j Right?
l St h
JACKSON:
What I was going to do, was just establish...'I had been told in 7j a previous interview that Craig was told to open the valve, and leave it i
pen.
And Craig...
81 9!
FAUST:
10 We're getting out of sequence.
11' JACXSON:
I made that statement, And what I was going to do, I was just 13!
going to stand Ge set fact, and then follow it to see if I could find out if and when that valve might have been reclosed that morning.
141 15 ZEWE:
As far as I can remember, I don't think that we did close it, as of 17!
the time that I left which was sometime into the afternoo.1, I don't believe it was.
18f 19I FAUST:
20(
That's one of the things we insisted on, you know, at least, a lot of us were, we wanted that valve to stay open, not to be ever shut again 21l 22l now, as far as we were concerned at that time, because of what it was doing 4
to us.
23!
24i 25i d
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s1 27 1]
ZEWE:
I believe that we did later on sometime, either later that day, or i
2 the next day, we did have word that we would shut it, and then we had word 1
3l that we would leave it open. And then we had word that we would have it j
s 4
shut, depending on... on the command decision, so to speak, on trying to c.
control the reieases. And at certain times we did have it shut that we I
were rdered to leave it shut for certain periods.of time. And at other 6{
/
times, we were told just to leave it open, after the event.
But at this g
point in time, it is true that I told Craig to open it up and to leave it i
open. And Hitz and I had a discussion of reclosing it at 60.
But we never g
l did order it to be reshut at 60, which was much in agreement with what Mr.
10[
Faust, also at the time.
11!
12l FAUST:
I was giving him... you know, if you were looking for what wc:were all thinking, you know myself, it was one of the things before that we 141 wanted to... we thought we should get that tank pressure down, because of what we stated before, and once we get the pressure bled down, releases 1 61 went to a minimum.
It was part of after that.
We got volume control back, and we had a lot of source left that we could draw on if we needed it.
18f 19!
JACKSON:
- 0. K.
20!
i 21!
l FAUST:
It meant quite a bit to get that pressure off that tank.
22l i
23t JACKSON: Well, the reason I was pursuing that question was, there's a log 24!
entry about 9 o' clock, of a little after, that says, " feeding makeup}" g 25i cu' c
I
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s,
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28 y
tank," and I discussed tn h with Greg and oleman that morning and we never did resolve exactly whether that was the plant status or a new opera-i 2
N i
\\q tion.
41 i
, -[ g:
It was probably the plant status.
Because Denny...
Atu Si
.'21W2:
.t I was here until long after 9 a.m., and to my knowledge we never did
/
- w sh'ut it.
8l 91 4
FAUST:
'dhen we got down to 60, there was about 53 pounds in the tank.
1 01 I
was gettinr; relieved at that time, and even at that point, we had started reestablishi1g letdown flow, you know.
As we were getting it back we had t
- l31 got a level t*ack in the tanks, and we knew where it was.
And one of thera guys was telling... you know I turned it over to Denny was that the valve was still opened, and don't let anybody talk you out of it.
And getting them to leave that, bleed that pressure all the way off.
16;,
I would imagine
... apparently...
181 MARSj:
At this point I'm going to break for a minute, and turn this tape 19t Tua time being 10:12, reading 700 on the 11eter.
over.
20!
~
21:
MARSH:
This. time being 10:13; reading is 700 on the meter.
22!
Larry, I i
think you were still on some questions.
23i 24!
25i T
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s, s
I
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i, 29 h
1 JACKSON:
I think we'll terminate the questioning on the makeup tank.
We 2
don't seem to be coming up with anything new.
And now, I would like to ask
~
a couple of questions about the eneration of the Auxiliary Building ventila-3 g
tion system and the Fuel Handling Building ventilation system.
A low gl background and the arialysis fo: the charcoal absorbers taken out on, I believe, April 12th, showed that the Fuel Handling Building had seen a lot 6
more of the iodine, than the Auxiliary Building.
And I'm working en trying l
to establishing relief paths, and why the Fuel Handling Building ws...
g showed greater levels of iodine than the Auxiliary Building.
Does anyone g
recall, in general terms, the nature of the operation of those Ventilation systems, say on the 28th, or the 29th? Were they on and off, or on most of the time, or off most... I'm sure they weren't off most of the time, but
... can anybody address that
...?
14!
FAUST: Just as we were going around that ventilation.
Isn't it normally a draft that runs form the Auxiliary Building to the Fuel Handlirg Building through the door.
18t ZEWE:
Right.
191 Normally, just from a standpoint of how it should be.
The Fuel Handling Building should be a less pressure than the Auxiliary Eufiding.
20l So that the flow equal... the philosphy is that you always have the air 21:
flow toward the highest intensely contaminated area, which would be the i
22t Spent Fuel Building, because of storage of spent fuel assemblies, which potentially could offer the greatest airborne potential of cctivity.
So, 24!
you had it such that if there is any air flow between buildings, it's 25i 7b;
i I
30 1;
always into the Fuel Haandling Building.
So the inches of water pressure is always less in the Fuel Handling Building.
So it would tend to have any 2
f activity go to that building.
But, in reference to that day, we did have 3
the ventilation system on and off at various points.
4 For the most part, we had the ventilatian system off in the Fuel Handling Building and Auxiliary 3
f Building on the 28th, as I remember, because we wanted to limit the activity 7j going out the stack.
And we did have directions that day to keep the A
8 an u g c ose a m n mum, an u
e ea sort of g
diffuse out of the building.
And this led to a lot of the problems that we "9 # ***
101 being off in the Fuel Handling and Auxiliary Building, we had an awful lot of the activity in the air.
You know, just come in from the Auxiliary 12!
Building into the Service Building and into the control tower and up into 13j the Control Room.
Also, the ventilation from the Control Room, we got some of the activity that came into the Control Room by way of the Turbine 15i Building from the plume that was out, coming to the Turbine Building, and everytime she would open up the doors between the Control Room and the 17!
Turbine Building, you had some of the activity coming in that way.
19!
JACKSON:
20l I have some strip charts that I have been trying to decipt ' on 21!
the middle exit systems and it looked like on the Fuel Handling Build 1:
that there was substantial flow, most of the day, except for the supply.
22l Now the supply dropped off which puts the building under much more negative 23!
l pressure, I assume.
But, I haven't been able to completely decipher the 24i strip cnarts that I've got for the Auxiliary Building.
The Auxiliary 25i qG, d
t L)
l I
l i
I 31 lj Building is more of an up and down.
If,bdeed,thestripchartI'vegot 2
is actually the exhaust flow, the flow indicates it will be up for a while 3l
... and I say up, I guess 40,000 cfm, and then it drops straight down, and 4;
run along for 45 minutes, and then back up.
Si FAUST:
6 I think you'll find that chart that the driver is defective.
It doesn't drive the paper, so that you know the time isn't right.
Except 8j that the chart would just stop moving for a certain amount of time and just start moving again.
It's not because the motor, because the paper doesn't g
stay fixed down. And we always have to go back there.
If somebody notices they would put it on.
It would have driven for a while and it would have stopped.
Somebody else would have fixed it.
You may have a lot more time in it, than you think.
131 i
14 JACKSON:
- 0. K.
So, then to the best of your recollection then, the Auxiliary Building flow was off a good deal,f the time on the 28th.
Is that...
16; l
17l FAUST: Well, the radiation monitors were on.
It could have shut itself 18(
down, which it did.
And then we turncd it back on.
19i 20!
JACKSON:
- 0. K.
Tae radiation monitors were later... the Auxiliary Building 21; monitors set up... you're supposed to have three lines of defense, the way 22l I read the system descriptiva.
The HPR 222 is supposed to shut down the 23[
supply to the Auxiliary Building.
No, correction, it's supposed
- .o close 24i the bypass, which is blanked off permanently, anyway.
25i oc
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i a
f a
{
32 l
{
FAUST:
(Talking while Jackson was still talking--unintelligible) on the 2:
filter system.
31 i
JACXSON:
Right.
I haven't determined whether or not that interlock is 4l Sj still active.
Although I do know that the bypasses are blanked off, so it doesn't matter. The one downstream of the filters, would be HPR 228.
And 6
that one when it sees a high alar.3, it's supposed to shut off the supply et I
8i tanks, create a more negative pressure in the Auxiliary Building.
And if it gets high enough going up the stack, HPR 219 is supposed to shut the g
whole thing down.
So, uo you know if it indeed functioned that way?
11; I
FAUST:
I didn't run around and verify it myself.
I know I didn't leavo 12!
f the panel when we were on On the 28th seem like everybody was out of town.
14!
15i JACKSON:
So, you don't know of any other means of establishing what flows we had in the Auxiliary Building other than those?
18!
Well, the way the to find out if it functioned, is somebody would have to 19t have had turn it back on.
It should have been logged by that time.
I 20!
mean, if somebody wanted to start, somebody went around there, yeah never 21!
cleared that.
You'u reavs to defeat the interlock on there; that would have 2 21 been a log increase.
You'd have to go in to clear 8 219 interlock, the 23i line to start the fan.
2 41 25i e
m fgo ctw o
i f
33 d
We were very conscious afterwards... I don't think it happened on the 2j 28th.
Let's put it that way.
It was deenergized again, when we had 3
people there, and we were finally taking logs and everything.
Especially 4j defeating the interlock 219.
Si JACKSON:
- 0. K.
Well, I think I've exhausted my questions.
I'll turn it 6
7; ove-to Oale Donaldson.
l 8!
g; MARSH: While we were waiting, Mr. Zewe was called to the phone.
And while a e wa ng eg a quesdon I can cover d.5 t.5e Wee inMuals 10!
that are here.
11:
We've talked in and about it, but I would like eacn of you 12l from your recollection to, let me know, what hours you actually worked that 4
13; first day. You all started 11:00 p.m., the night before, on the 27th.
14' Anywhere from 10:30 t'.T 11:00 o' clock.
16; MARSH: And can you give me what hours you worked during the day of the 28th?
ISI 19!
SCHETMANN:
I think I left about 5:30 in the evening.
21!
MARSH:
On the 28th?
22' l
23!
SCHEIMANN:
Yes.
24j 25i l
h 6
.a f
f I
{
34 MARSH: And when did you come back?
1.
l 2:
f SCHEIMANN: Well, I had a little bit of mixup, as to when I was expected 3
back.
I was told to come back in at 3.
Mcwever, I wasn't aware that was 4
c; 3 o' clock in the morning, well, Thursday morning.
I thought it was 3
' clock Thursday afternoon. So, I called in 3:30... or about 2 o' clock 6
7{
Thursday afternoon, and I said, " Hey, are you sure you want me in here at 3 r 7."
8 And he said, " Hell no, you're supposed to be tomorrow morning 11 to 7 shift."
g So, I would come in my normal 11 to 7 shift Friday night. Well, actually Thurday night for Friday.
11!
MARSH:
So, you worked from 10:30 on the 27th, through 5:30 on the 28th?
12l f
131 SCHEIMANN:
Right.
14i 15.
MARSH:
And then...
16; 17!
SCHEIPANN: And then Thursday night until about 10:30.
18!
19i MARSH:
Ed, how about you?
20i 21!
FREDERICX:
I got there on the 27th, somewhere between 10:40 and 11:00 22:
o' clock that night, and I left at 4:00 p.m. on the 28th.
231
^
i 24l 25i I
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I
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35 l
7 MARSH:
- 0. K.
And how about into the 29th When did you...
2!
FREDERICK:
I came back in a little before 11:00 p.m., on the 2Sth.
No, 11 31 4
p.m., on the 28th.
51 MARSH:
6i So, you were off till 4:00 p.m. on the 28th, and'came back in at 7j 11:00 p.m., on the 28th for the next shift.
I 8{
FREDERICX:
Yes, and I think around 7 or 8 o' clock.
I don't really remember.
9f 10l MARSH:
a.m.?
11!
12l FREDERICX:
Yes.
l'Il 14!
MARSH:
Faust, how about you?
16i FAUST:
17!
I came in on 20 to 7 there around 20 ot was it 2245, I guess some-where along those lines.
I think I left around... I left when Ed left.
191 FREDERICK:
No, he left after me.
20j 21l FAUST: We went home at the same time, didn't we? Clocked out... I don't i
know..
4:00 o' clock.
23!
24}
25:
g.
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36 i
g MARSH: Approximately 4:00 o' clock on the 28th. What about the 29th?
2 Bill, what I asked...
31
)
FAUST:
I came in...
4 Si MARSH:
6i
...the people to do, is just go over their actual hours that they 7;
worked that first day or two.
So you would have come on at approximately i
at 11:00 o' clock on the 27th, and what time did you actually get out on the i
81 28th?
g 101 FREDERICX: We were supposed to ccme in at 2230.
i 12!
ZEWE:
And then we left together at about 5:30 or 6:00 o' clock.
131 14l MARSH:
And when did you come back in then, Bill?
15!
16:
ZEWE:
A quarter after 3 in the morning, on the 29th.
ISI MARSH:
And worked through what time?
191 20!
ZEWE:
Oh, about 2 o' clock in the afternoon, or so.
21l 22j MARSH:
- 0. K.
Now, that Zewe is back, Mr. Donaldson.
23!
24i 25i t
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37 l
r 1
1l DONALDSON:
Bill, my questions are primardy for you. And what we want to gf do is clarify the declaration of the site general emergency, and some 3
attendant points with that.
So why don't we just start with the declaration 4f of the site emergency at 6:50.
Was that made by yourself?
1 Si ZEWE: Yes, i' was.
Si 7l DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
Did you direct George Kunder to carry it out, or did you actually follow it through?
There is'some confusion as to whether George g,
declared it, or whether you declared it, or the two of you together declared
~
1 12:
ZLad:
Right at this period of time when the radiation monitor system showed that we had a very serious problem, I went immediately over to the range phone.
And then, Georqe was looking at the same indications as I And I said, " George, I'm going to declare this a site emergency."
was.
He shook his head and I declared it then.
I made the announcement, and we 171 sounded the radiation alarm.
18f 19' 00NALDSON:
- 0. K.
In looking back over the sequence of events, some questions 201 21!
came up regarding the possibility that certain indications were evidenced earlier, that may have indicated that you may have even started thinking 22l about the emergency plan for one reason or another till you had the situation
[
23\\
l under control.
24!
For example, the criterion for site emergency, specific one 25f relating to loss of primary coolant pressure coincident with high reactor x
') G k
I
(
38 l
1 building pressure and/or high reactor bui ing sump level.
From looking 2:
back through strip charts and other records, you get the indication that by i
about 4: 15, the reactor system pressure... primary system pressure had 3;
4 decreased to about 1,275 psig.
That there had been a high Reactor Building 5!
sump alarm, and the Reactor Building pressure was about 1.5 psig.
Did any Si f these indications click in, or did you evaluate any of these, and perhaps decide not to declare any kind of an event? Or how did you preceive these I
indicators?
81 Si ZEWE:
- 0. K.
You're referring to what 4... about 4...
11!
DONALDSON: About 4:15.
12l 131 ZEWE:
I was unaware of the sump high level, until around 20 to 5... I'm aware of the sump level.
That's when the auxiliary operator called and reported that those sump pumps were all under... it was greater than 6 16:
feet.
So, that I wasn't aware of at that point.
And I really did not feel that we had a loss of pressure, anyway.
Loss of pressure to me, at this 18f point in time, we had a rather stable pressure configuration, even though 19f it was low. We did not have a continuing loss of pressure.
21!
DONALDSON:
You had a rapid drop md then it stabilized?
C 231 ZEWE:
Exactly.
It was not a loss... we were already stable before I 241 learned that we had the sump level high.
So, based on that, I did not 25i m
l r
l 39 y
declare the site emergency.
Building pressure was at this point, I'm not 2,
sure, but I believe we were less than cound at this point.
3!
FAUST: We were thinking along the lines of steam generator.
Possible gj steam generator leak.
Si ZEWE:
Not this early yet.
y 8!
FAUST:
If you look at the diagnostic chart for determining whether you g
have a steam leak, or a primary leak, there is only one difference.
And that is the radiation level. And whether or not your going to fall into a low procedure or a steam generator leak procedure is determined by whether or not you have a direct radiation alarm.
That's how the procedure reads.
131 There was no radiation alarm, we were not in the icw procedure.
That's how it is.
15:
16; DONALDSON: Which alarm are you talking about? The Reactor Building...
17l 18:
ZEWE:
The Reactor Building 227 monitor.
191 20' 00NALDSON:
- 0. K.
Then what you're saying is if you had these symptems 21:l accompanied by a 227 alarm, you might...
22j 23l l
ZEWE:
It would have indicated that we did have a leak from the primary, or 24i at least radioactive water from the make up system, or somewhere that links to the reactor to coolant system.
s
l I
lj DONALDSON:
Where did you surmise that the increase in Reactor Building 23 pressure came from?
3!
[
ZEWE:
Well, we didn't know like after we had looked at the RC drain tank
[.
indications, which and I'm not sure what time this was., Somewhere greater 6j than 30 minutes after we were into the event.
I suspected that we had a problem with the drain tank, because it was a high temperature, with 0
,,0 g
pressure and of f-scale level.
But we didn't know what.
And then we certainly did not think that it was itinuing vent.
We knew that the relief valves 9
under pressuri::er had lifted and that the drain tank should be at a higher 10I i
temperature than what it was before, because you isolate the cooling water 12:
system that cools the water that circulates to the RC drain tank.
So, I felt at the tim 13; that I really can't remember that clearly, but I did suspect that maybe we did have something leaking on the RC drain tank.
But 15; I did not suspect that we were continuing to fill the RC drain tank.
Because we did have low pressure, and we did have off-scale low on the indications of the level.
i 18(
19I DONALDSON:
The high sump alarm mentioned that an auxiliary operator had i
mentioned it to you.
There is not a readout of that in the Control Room, 21!
or an alarm?
22l i
23!
FAUST: You havt to punch it out on the computer.
By the time you get a 24l level.
25!
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cd' e
f
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41 lj DONALDSON: That would be, you have to inquire to get that level.
It's not 2
something that appears on the supervisory panel?
s 3l ZEWE:
4; What does come up on the computer alarm, is it prints out when the gj sump pumps come on.
I 6i DONALDSON: You were probably having the computer printing out a lot of y
things about this time?
g; 9f ZEWE:
Oh, yes. The sump pumps, I believe, on record shows that they came 10,;
i on about... like 8 minutes after the event, which is... we're already back loggtd a considerable period of time.
12!
t 131 DONALDSON:
Let me ask you this question then.
This criterion for declara-t#cn of a site emergency, where it talks about high Reactor Building sump level, is it reasonable to assume that the type of event that this criterion is designed to describe, that is a loss of coolant, that you'd be readily able to detect this high Reactor Building sump level?
Is it an adequate 18!
action level? Let me ask you from your standpoint?
1 20!
ZEWE:
I believe that the indication that we have available to us directly 21 in t!.e. ;ontrol Room is insufficient to determine that.
22!
23l l
DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
Now with the conditions that we just talked about, had 24!
you been trained or do you perceive this criterion to be primarily for the 25i s) 1
i l
i 42 l
doubleendedtypepipebreak,orisita1Edesignedtobeapplicablefor 1
2:
the so called small break loca, sample ifne shearing and things of that i
3 nature? Would you expect to see these kinds of action levels in a small 4;
break loca?
Si 6j FAUST:
They're designed for... those indications are designed for largely i
p some...
8 DONALDSON:
Is there an action level you're aware of for a small break g,
1 1 ca?
u:
ZEWE:
,y Yes, we have a procedure that's part of the loca procedure for small break response.
There's really two different things when you talk about small breaks.
g Small break to us, and small break in reference to pipe line h
breaks is much different from tha safety analysis.
They consider something 1,
like anything less the.s square feet, or smaller, a small break.
Anything g^i larger than that is a large break.
Anything for us, is a small break if we can continue to makeup that leak rate and still maintain makeup tank and pressurizer level above their low alarm setpoints, which is really not a tremendous leak.
But it would still fall into the small breaks size pint in reference to the safety analyses.
So, our small break procedure... it 21l cnly goes into the aspects of to where we have a coincidence of loss of off-site power and we lose the diesel or we lose the capability of one of 2 31 the makeup pumps or one of the makeup legs, to where we have to take manual action by a designated Control Room acerator, and a designated auxiliary 9b' l
e f
1
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43 I
operator to take action within a specified 10 minute period to reestablish 1!
2' fl ws using the one available makeup pump.
31 4
00NALDSON:
- 0. K.
So, then I guess what apparently you say that the emergency 5;
plan... at least the criteria for declaring the various classes of emergen-cies, there really is nothing directly from an operational standpoint that 6
p gives you action levels related to the small break load.
You would rely 8j pri arily n any indications of high radiation levels?
9!'
9 10; DONALDSON:
Whereas for the large break you have some operational parameters.
2 i
Sort of, I guess, prequessed that certain other problems will come down the 131 line and allow you to declare the emergency early.
15l ZEWE: Well, wait now.
The loca emergency procedure is completely separate 16 from the site emergency procedure.
So the emergency is just certain criteria when you enter the TNI action plan.
19t DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
20!
That's what I'm trying to establish.
In other words, if I read this criterion, loss of primary coolant pressure, coincident with 21i high Reactor Building pressure, and/or high Reactor Building sump level, 22l and that is a criterion for declaring a site emergency.
And I go back and 231 look at reactimeter data and I look at strip chart, and I find that at 4:15 24 in the morning, that this criterion appears to have been met.
So, what I'm 25i
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lj trying to establish is, in your mind, do you see this criterion as bei applicable cnly to the designed basis large loss of coolant?
2 3!
M:
Those symptoms are not specifically indicative of a loss of coolett 5l accident.
There are several plant conditions which will result in those i
Si symptoms.
Further investigation by the operator, is necessary, before he can determine whether or not his coolant or steam or emis 7
8l DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
In terms of your training, for declaring a particular loi
' E' * * *
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- b" G"'" ' * * Y* " ' "' Y "
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certain parameters determining whether or not you should implement the emergency plan?
13!
g ZEWE:
That is not well defined right there, like loss of pressure.What range of pressure are we saying... did we say that this did get down to 1,000 16, ounds, or does it get down to 500?
That really is not a finite detail, saying when you reach this, no matter what you know you ha ve.
So here it was just my interpretation of it that we had not lost pressure 18!
f That we were maintaining pressure.
19n 201 DONALDSON:
You felt this primarilly an operational situation over which 21l you had control.
And that these indicators, in your mind, were not beyond 22l limits that would indicate a more serious problem, and therefore nec 23i ae 24i the implementation of the emergency plan?
25i
'o u e
4
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45 i.
lj ZEWE:
Exactly.
Because reall; when you think about the emergency plan, it l
1s designed, y)u know, to warr and protect the public, mainly off site, 2
3j right. We had absolutely no indications of any radiation problems or any effect it may involve i.ne site itself, or off site.
There was no indications 4!
at all, at this point.
i Si j
DONALDSON: What has been your training or the information you've been l
g given for the purpose of this particular criterion? Since it doesn't really discuss any radiation levels, it merely discusses operational 9i parameters. What is the significance of that criterion?
11:
FAUST:
I think you'd have to when all this is being put together, like 13!
what was actually available, or when Bill got the information was initial pressure drop.
Right. Which then stabilized out.
The next thing he heard 14' was later on, was that possible Reactor Building high.
You know, it wasn't like all at one time that he was getting the information in.
And then the Reactor Building pressure was even later on, when we were really looking at the generator for leaks.
The key point, is that there is no radiation 18l information.
19i 201 DONALDSON: But the action level...
21, 22l FAUST:
23!
But those three things didn't all c::me at once to the supervisor to determine... I got all these things now.
24, 25i c) p >
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f 46 DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
What... again, let meI. I understand exactly what you're saying, but I'm trying to get is the thought process here.
2 31, 4j FAUST:
That's what I'm *.ying. We thought we already had pressure stabilized i
51 h
DONALDSON:
In your mind then what you're saying is you did not have a loss of primary coolant pressure?
l 81 gj FAUST: Right. We weran't thinking along those lines.
101 00NALOSON:
Although the pressure decreased rapidly.
I 12l f
FAUST:
Initially.
And then we were stable.
Later comes along this yeah, we got a high sump level, and I think right around that time, we were 15I starting to think... somewhere in there we were starting to... we were.
lo,,
really into possible generator steam leak.
And I myself at the time was thinking, you know, I heard we had high sump level.
I was thinking, well 18t something.
19!
That's how we were dumping the feedwater into it.
Somebody mentioned that those instruments... what are those things called?
20!
I 21l DONALDSON:
22l So you are preceiving that those action levels... the loss of 23!
a primary coolant and a high Reactor Building pressure, or a high Reactor Building sump level would have to occur... like boom, boom, boom.
2 41 For this plan to be applicable?
25i n
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47 i
FAUST:
No,I'mnotsayingtobeapplicabIe.
I'm saying that's the way 2j least I myself was under influence of... that's the way I took it in my 3
training.
4l ZEWE:
I took it that way too.
Because if you look at any loca training 5
Si that we've ever had, if you have any size at all, sump or pressure in the 7;
building, and also the Reactor coolant system pressure, they're within seconds of each other.
g 9t DONALDSON:
0 But and again, when I support the large... you know the design basis...
11 12' ZEWE: No. sir.
You don't need to have a double ended cold leg with rupture.
You can have you know, the half a square foot area... and you 14t got it right now.
Because like a half a square foot, you know, leaks at like 2,500 gallons a minute.
You've got one heck of a leak.
And the pressure's gone and the system's building pressure back right away.
And 17:
I the sumps up.
18 19!
00NALDSON:
So, in your mind at 4:15, although these indications were 20!
there, they weren't known to you.
21 22{
i ZEWE:
They were there.
They weren't known to us.
23!
2 41 25 r; I\\
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1 lj DONALDSON:
Because of stab 112ation of the pressure by the time you became 2!
aware of the fact that the building sump level was up, the two were not 3
sort of put together and...
3; FAUST:
They still would have been because of the steam level.
Si DONALDSON:
I'm not disputing that.
I'm just saying 8f FAUST:
g We thought we had a steam leak in the steam generator.
10I y
ZEWE:
I was fully aware of the criteria in a site emergency.
And it did
... and the criteria did enter my mind.
But I did not declare it for those reasons.
131 14i DONALDSON:
That's really what I wanted to establish.
That you did go through that thought process.
17!
ZEWE:
But it was not at 4:12.
It was later when I... and I'm not sure of 18t the time frame that I first thought about... that I do have, you know, the criteria for that portion.
It was sometime later that I decided, yes we 20i have a sump, and, yes, we do have a low pressure, and, yes, we do have 21:
pressure in the building.
I did think about that, that day.
But I did not 22!
declare it for those reasons.
23l 24!
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lj DONALDSON: Another criterion, which is really for a local emergency, is a f
condition that states that more than one radiation monitor in a single 2
3 building reaches the alarm setpoint.
I guess what you're understanding, or 4{
what has been your training, in the interpretation of that particular gl.
criterion? Would you consider the Containment Reactor Building to be one 6
f the buildings covered by this?
71 FAUST:
8 In the interpretation I've been hit with is if /cu have two radiation g
monitors in the same building, go up at the same time, and vou are fairly sure that it's on the same cause, rather the same source of radiation as caused the above alarm.
Then you could have two different alarms in the 11!
same building on a routine operationdue to two different maintenance i
12'.
procedures, or something like that. And you wouldn't call it a site emergency.
14 15; DONALDSON:
You would verify the alarms, thus to ascertain where they came 15i from.
Is that correct?
17!
18t FAUST:
Sure.
19i 20i ZEWE:
First of all what two alarms did we have?
21; 22l t
DONALDSON:
Well, I want to try to get your perception of building.
23l Whether or not... you've ever perceived the reactor contairment to be the t
24i building under that criteria.
25!
,, 4.
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ll 50 1;
ZEWE:
True.
But the reactor... or the neral emergency... that uses 2]
the area monitors for the building... the area... that's the gamma monitors in the building.
4l h
DONALDSON:
Again, the criterion just states radiation monitors.
It doesn't mention where that is... the process radiation monitors or area 6
7 radiation monitors.
i al ZEkE:
That's what we use--the area radiation monitors.
g 10; 00NALDSON:
- 0. K.
You, then in declaring all the classes of emergency, 11:
where it says radiation monitor you're talking area monitor?
I 13\\
ZEWE:
I'm talking here just for a general emergency...
15l 00NALDSON:
I'm not talking general...
17!
ZEWE:
Local, I'm sorry.
19!
DONALDSON:
20l 0.K. so for a local then, there is only--how many area monitors are there in a reactor containment?
There is really only one area monitor, 21:
isn't there, in the containment?
23\\
FAUST:
No.
You've got one on each of the bridges.
24i You've got some...
- hotel, 25l 9
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i 51 l
lj DONALDSON:
0.K.
So, it's the area monitors that...
So, then, the fact 2
at 5:18, you had the reactor containment air sample particulate monitor, 3j 227, go into alarm, would not have been one of the alarms you would have 4
keyed on for a declaration of any kind? You would looked at the area monitor.
Correct?
g Si ZEWE:
7 I would for a local emergency, yeah.
l 8!
CONALDSON:
0.K.
And the same thing would apply to g
10l ZEWE: The local emergency deals with a locali:ed problem.
And my main concarns there, is the concern of the people who are involved in the area
... to evacuate the people from the area.
That's the main concern there, 131 and to limit whatever caused it, if it's a spill or what have you.
14 15.
DONALDSON:
At five point, the area cooling water radiation monitors, ICR 1091 and 1092 alarm.
And we heard that this is sometimes a normal condition, and after a trip of this sort they are caused by a crud burst?
191 ZEWE:
Well, those two monitors normally reacted to bacground, but I've 201 never seen them higher then the alert range, not the alarm range prior to 21l this time.
But knowing very well, that we did go through a severe transient, 22 it's probably the longest hike... power period that we've ever had in Unit 23l j
2 for any length of time. We would have had a pretty severe crud bu st to 24l the system.
So that's what I did attribute that to.
But, normally, I 25j n1 g,,s o
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52 don't believe that we've have had a crud burst before that it showed up 11 much of an increase as determined by those two monitors.
2 3I i
4j DONALDSON:
You did attend to these two alarms and evaluate that they p ssibly had been caused by high background from a crud burst through the 5
6 system?
7i ZEWE:
I did look at them, and see that they were in.
g And I, in my own g
mind, that is how I handled it.
I said they are very low setpoints, and I myself had submitted a change to reevaluate those about a month earlier.
So.I was very aware of the problem with the increased background.
11:
And the alert setcoints only like 300, and the alarms only 600.
12:
And we had been 13i running between thos; points.
141 DONALDSON:
300 and 600 what?
li 16; ZEWE:
17!
Pounds per minute on the monitors.
ISI DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
19t 201' Z_QE:
They're very close.
It wouldn't take a magnitude of 2 would not be 21:
an abnormal type.
22!
i 23!
DONALDSON:
According to the alarm procedure, the alarm setpoint is 1000 2 41' counts per minute at the alert, and 5000 at the high alarm.
25i right?
Is that
~
/
}
l
(
l 53 i
lj ZEWE:
I remember it less than that.
But, you could be correct.
I thought 2j that it was lower than that..
300 or 600, but you could be right, if that 3
what the procedtre says.
That could very well be right.
4
.c.l DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
Then with these monitors in alarm... you mentioned that
(
y u knew the background wu high.
Had you associated the location of the Si detectors for these monitors? And possibly evaluated the cause of that l
elevated background, thinking maybe it was due to background and not due to g
a crud burst at alI?
gj 101 ZEWE: Well, 12' DONALDSON: The detector is located next to the sump.
14i ZEWE:
Right beside the sump.
Right around the other side from the incores, too... and, yes, we knew at this point that we had put some water into the sump. We suspected that we had had a problem with the RC drain tank, and drained some of that water into the sump along with a suspected leak in the BC generator sefJndary side, WhiCh wouldn't have Contributed to that reading.
But I thought that yes we did have a higher level than normal in the sump, 20i as far as the activity goes, because it came from the drain tank, we sus-21; pected.
But we did not <now that it was a continuing one.
22!
23 DONALDSON:
So, at... did the thought cross your mind, or did you all take 241' all the 227 alarm, the 1091, 1092 and any of the other indicators and kind 25 i
e,
(
4
B i
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54
[
of try to relate them together to see if
- ere was a potential for a more 2
serious situation developing, at all?
31 ZEWE:
No, I didn't.
The 1091 and 1092 were the only ones that I recall 41 5
pr1 r to the large increase around a quarter to 7.
From the point of 1091 and 1092 up until that point, I seen very, very little change of anything 6
g on any automatic, I didn't consider first.
81 DONALDSON:
g Then at 6:50, when you had the Christmas tree go off, was there any particular monitor that you keyed on for the declaration of the site emergency, or cid you just base it on tha announciators from a number of t
the alarms reds on the panel?
12!
13!
ZEWE:
Well, they all began to alert and alarm together,. so that by itself was a aething in my cwn mind.
But I did specifically notice a very large 15r increase in 219, which is the overall vent monitor.
And from 7 or 7:48 the off gas monitor came into high alarm.
So, ihose were the two keys.
I 171 did go over and look at some of the other ones, and they were all coming uo 18t the Aux Building, the Fuel Handling Building.
The ones in the Reactor 191 Building were coming up.
20!
But those two were my keys, because both of those release directly to the outside.
21',
22!
i MARSH:
I'd like to ask a question here.
You mentioned 748.
231 i
24!
25s f
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lj ZEWE: Yes.
l 2
3{
MARSH: Did you say 748 was coming up at 6:50?
4!
Sj ZEWE: Yes, sir. When all the other alarms came in, it came up with it 6
very rapidly. Because we had just got done on isolating the feed side of 7;
the B steam generator.
And it was... and then we finally started the 23 coolant pump, and it was shortly thereafter that everything came in.
And I g
knew that we had just unisolated that B generator.
10(
i d'
y MARSH:
Our chronology shows that our operations people chronology shows that to be about...
12!
131 ZEWE: After 7 sometime.
14!
15l MARSH: Yeah, I think so.
17\\
ZEWE:
My own recollection was that we unisolated the B steam generator and started that pump, before the emergency.
After the emergency, somewnere 191 around 20 after 7, or 7:30, we attempted to start another coolant pump.
20!
21!
MARSH:
- 0. K.
I may be wrong on that.
Maybe it's 6:56.
22!
23j DONALDSON:
The coolant pump was started before you began to get the high 24i alarms?
25!
l q' ;
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56 i
lj ZEWE: Yes.
I remember.
2:
3 OONALDSON:
Shortly cefore.
4:
c!
ZEWE:
Yes.
That is true.
And what conflicts is this, that... that 6:50 9
i Si number, came from somebody who wrote it on the emergency'staz board.
That p
could have been plus or minus 15 minutes, as far as I'm concerned.
And the 8
1 gging either one, I believe said, 6:55.
Depending on who's... what you g,
looked at, and everything else tnat could have been a little flexible, but am car ain n my wn min,
at
.e unisolating t.5e 8 generator and lot starting of the pump all ensued befor? I declared the emergency.
As a gj matter of fact, I'm 100% sure in my own mind.
r 13i DONALDSON:
That would see: true consistent with the scenario to move it thru,h the...
, m.
16i JIEWF:
Exactly.
17(
7~
~3 1??.
'j :
D_0NALDSON:
Stir it up and you get it into the sample line.
1
~ :f-20f FdS]T: When you say unisolste the B generator, we had a (a cough).
I mean 21i I just unisolated the B, I didn't unisolate-steam or anything.
22!
I 23[
ZEWE:
That is correct. * '
2 41 25j
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57 1l Wedidn'topenitupagain-whidn'tgetintoit... increasing FREDERICK:
2 the levels.
3!
00NALDSON:
- 0. K.
Then at about 7:24 is wnen the general emergency was declared. Gary Miller declared tnat.
a 6i 7l ZEWE:,The general emergency?
8l DONALDSON:
Yeah.
10l i
ZEWE:
I believe he did.
I was not involved in that declaration.
I was 11:
involved in the plant operations.
I would be emergency director up until Mr. Miller arrived about 7 o' clock.
Then at that point, we completely 13l separated operations of the plant from the emergency plan itself.
And he handled that and he gave Mike Ross direction of the plant with me, and he assigned the normal group of people to handle the TMI Unit emergency planning.
We had some interface with them only in relationship to us letting him know 17!
where we were, and him directing what he wanted.
But other than that, the 18t calls and everything and all the emergency planning procedures were completely 19i separate from the other operations in the Control Room at that point.
20i 21:
10NALDSON:
- 0. K.
In talking to seme of the maintenance people, repair 22j prty tea.n type functions, the indications that what they determined as a 231 preliminary repair party was formed sometime prior to the declaration of i
24i' the site emergency, say between 5:50 and 6:50.
Do you recall contacting 25i s.
'Nb \\
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58 i
themaintenanceforemanonshift,IthinkSisnameisLawrence,andhaving 2j him gather together.
i 31 i
4l ZEWE:
I believe that it was Leakway 5l DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
Leakway?
6 i
71 aj ZEWE: Murray Leakway.
9!
I CONALDSON:
- 0. K.
101 11!
ZEWE:
j You're saying Lawrence... Gordy Lawrence is an I&C foreman in Unit 1.
I'm not sure if he was on site at the time. We had several maintenance 131 foremen on site that night. We had one, an electrician,.Mac Beare, and so 14' forth, and I think Gordy Lawrence may have been here in Unit 1.
But he Shift Maintenance Foreman that's normally on shift at this time was Murray Leakway?
l 1S{
DONALDSON:
Did you contact Leakway and have him sort of get a preliminary repair party together?
20!
21; ZEWE:
I did not.
I didn't have any indication to know that we would need 22l a repair party of any size, other than for routine maintenance that he was 23l already pursuing.
24i 2Si
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59 i
DONALDSON: They weren't sure exactly who t was that called them, but they 1
2; had gotten some request to pull a preliminary repair party together.
I 3j think by that time you have a number of other people on site. You had 4l Ge rge Kunder and several others, so it could have been someone other than gj that.
Si ZEWE:
It may have been.
I'm unaware of it.
y 81 FAUST:
Did they request a repair party, or did they just say get a couple 91 of guys together i
11l 00NALDSON: Well, they used the term preliminary repair party. They said get a repair party together.
I 14!
FAUST:
It might have been fed in later on, you knew.
16i
(
MARSH: At this time, I going to break the tape.
The time is 10:56.
17!
i Reading is at 1363 on the meter.
I going to pause here, and put a new tape 18l on.
191 20!
21l 22l 231 2Si
.