ML19208B172
| ML19208B172 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1979 |
| From: | Donaldson D, Kalenevitch B, Shackleton O Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region I), NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region IV) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190182 | |
| Download: ML19208B172 (28) | |
Text
,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION l
f 1!
In the Matter of:
2 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
31 of i
41 Barry R. Kalenevitch i
Foreman in Maintenance 5i i
6i T
i ai Trailer #203 9!
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 101 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
June 26, 1979 12l (Date of Interview) 13i July 17, 1979 (0 ate Transcr1pt Typea) 317 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
16l 17' 18i 191 20) 21i NRC PERSONNEL:
22!
Owen C. Shackleton 23i Dale E. Donaldson 24j
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7909190 /
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l lij SHACXLETON:
This is Shackleton speaking. This is a continuation of 2
the interview of Mr. Barry R. Kalenevitch.
Time is now 2:09 p.m.
3!
Eastern Daylight Time June 25, 1979.
The tape went off the reel on our 4i first recording at 2:05 p.m.
And will now, Barry, if you would please "d;
j continue your comments.
Si I
7 KALENEVITCH:
I did not recollect any fereman there in the health 8l physics point when I did arrive at 10:15 in the morning...
91
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10l DONALDSON:
Ok, you mentioned that you'd seen Joe DeMan.
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12 KALENEVITCH:
This was after maybe around 7:00 o' clock he may have 13l arrived at that point, ok.
He may have arrived back at the health 14!
physics station or shortly thereafter.
He was not there for the onset 15:
that I had remembered as far as, you know, while I was mustering my 16!
- people, 17' i
18!
DONALDSON:
Ok, let me just ask another question about the organizational 19!
figuration.
I'm going to show you a diagram of the Three Mile Island 20]
Emergency organization.
I've re-drawn this to make it less crowded.
21)
This is generally sucn copy of the diagram extracted from the emergency 22!
procedures and you note where the repair team falls in the hierarchy I
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I there.
And the block under which the repair team is located is the 2
radiation protection, or the supervisor of radiation protection.
Is 3
that consistent with your understanding of...?
4 5!
KALENEVITCH:
Yes.
i 6f i
71 00NALDSON:
Ncw, you would not then normally expect a request or a I
8!
direction for some action to come from or through the person in charge 9l of the EC5.
It would come from, say, around him and then you would go 10 to him and coordinate?
11l 12;!
KALENEVITCH:
- Yes, this is more or less what I was stating before that 13{
we went blatantly we went to an area until we knew....
I 14 15l SHACXLETON :
I want to establish the formal way that you are requested 16 to do something in repair team. The reques~t you would not expect to 17l come from...
18!
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KALENEVITCH:
other than the health physics or radiatio protection 20!
supervisor.
21!
22l SHACXLETON:
It would not come from him?
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KALENEVITCH:
It would.
It would coma through him. Ok.
And the fact 2
that.. say we have a problem in this area and...
31 4
SHACKLETON:
If it didn't come from him you would coordinate with c
f whoever was in charge?
Si 7!
KALENEVITCH:
Yes, most definitely would double check.
I 81 9!
DONALDSON: Ok, then is this a fairly accurate representation of the 10l way you thought things were set up initially?
11!
12!
KALENEVITCH: Yes.
l 131 14 DONALDSON:
Ok, you mentioned that the first project that the repair 15; party team picked up essentially was to close the large roll-up door 16' between Unit 1 and Unit 2, I believe, the designation of that door is 17!
the model room door.
ISr 19l KALENEVITCH :
That's correct.
20l 21; DONALDSON:
Were you briefed on you say you were the radiation levels 22 before you began.
By whom?
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I KALENEVITCH :
I'll say that, as far as the briefing went, by the 2
personnel that we're on station.
Ok, as I stated I don' t... it came from I believe just in passing was the fact that there were a lot of 3
M people running around involved with the health physics personnel that "i
were there.
There were a lot of people running around not in panic, 6i but doing their job and scoping out where the release was coming from, 7
pin pointing it, and as far as what could be done to control it.
At 8!
that point there was...I cannot say formal conversation or formal 9I numbers shown to me on paper, it was just the fact that it was given to 10l me verbally that its around 400 mr...in the aux building.
11!
12l DONALDSON:
Ok, I think you mentioned that Janouski ran by and I think i
131 your briefing consisted of the levels are damn high.
14i 15 KALENEVITCH:
Yea. yea.
16:
17 00NALDSON:
Did that give you any kind of what damn high is you 181 heard 400, you thought.
19!
20j KALENEVITCH:
Yeah. Yeah.
400. Whether that came from Janouski 21; at that point I don't know.
i 22 23; DONALDSON:
Did you ask what the airborne levels were and they said i
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they hadn't had time to...
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KALENEVITCH:
to set up their...right.
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f DONALDSON:
Ok, at that point I think you said you then had your...you 3
4 directed your team to dress out.
And they then got themselves out in Si protective clothing.
Cloth coveralls. What type of respiratory protection 6i was there available?
i 71 S!
KALENEVITCH:
Respiratory protection available I believe were Scott 9!
full face particulate with just particulate cartridges on.
10i i
11 DONALDSON:
So you didn't know the airborne levels, if any, 12 1
13 KALENEVITCH: As far as iodine? No.
141 l
15i DONALDSON:
You had pariculate.
Did you discuss that with anyone? Or 16; did it cross your mind or did you coordinatt with anyone further?
17l 18(
KALENEVITCH:
At that point, no.
I had no input from anyone on that.
191 20!
DONALDSON:
Did it appear that there was anyone in charge of the ECS in 2
an HP capacity with whom you could coordinate and receive direction?
22l f
23j KALENEVITCH:
No, sir.
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DONALDSON: Back to this diagram again, there is a another bit.ck down 2
here which is called repair party monitor, and I believe that repair 3
party monitor is assigned by the individual in charge of the ECS and I
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from there is to many up with your team.
Did anyone ever marry up with 5
you and act as the repair party monito F Si i
7 KALENEVITCH: No, no we had a very...in my eyes we had a very loose 8!
representation of this structure that you' re showing...
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DONALDSON: You did not have a monitor, is that correct?
12!
KALENEVITCH:
No, sir.
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14' DONALDSON: O k.
Then you mentioned that you took an Rf1 14.
Why did i
15' you happen to grab an RM 14? Was that the only meter available or...?
16<
17 KALENEVITCH: That's what was available sitting on the table, yes.
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l 19l DONALOSON:
Ok, it was sitting on the table where is that at the normal 20!
frisking station, coming out, as a backup.
Are there other meters 21j available in that immediate area?
22l 23 KALENEVITCH:
Yes, there probably were inside the doors.
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Do you know for a fact if there are or aren't?
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KALENEVITCH: At that point, no I can't say that I did.
4!
5 DONALDSON: Ok, are you aware that there is a cabinet inside that room 6i that says for emergency use and there are two instruments stored in 7t there.
One an RM 14 and the other was, is was a Beta Gamma.
I 8!
9!
KALENEVITCH:
Beta Gamma.
Yes, I remember seeing the door in there 10 that says emergency, for emergency equipment only.
However, I did not.
11:
12!
DONALDSON:
Did all members of your repair party and yourself have i
131 personnel dosimetry with them?
141
'lSi KALENEVITCH:
Yes, they did.
16' 17l DONALDSON:
Ok, your badges as I assume were located on the rack processing 18f center.
19i 20; KALENEVITCH:
That's correct.
21l 22 00NALDSON:
Did you have pocket chambers available?
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XALEHEVITCH:
Self-reading dosimeters? Yes.
And we also had the thermo-t 2'
i luminescent dosimeters on us.
31 4!
DONALDSON: Now back to the fact that you grabbed the....R.914; did you "i
c have any comments you made to yourself about the adequacy of that t
6 instrument when you grabbed it? Well, let met put it this way, you 7f mentioned that you opened the door and the meter deflected fullscale.
8l 9
XALENEVITCH: Well, it deflected fullscale on the Rx1, as I was walking 10{
back the hall.
11:
l 12l DONALDSON:
Did you have any feel for what that would represent in 13 terms of exposure rate?
14!
~ 15; KALENEVITCH:
No, that's why I did not feel it was, giving the...any 16:
adequate feedback as to what radiation levels were other than that the 17l counts per minute were very high.
18!
1 19i DONALDSON: Ok, so you solicited two volunteers and yourself were 20j going to go in and close the door. Ultimately one individual, I forget 21!
what you said nis name was...
22 23l KALENEVITCH:
Don Nebinger.
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DONALDSON: Ok, Don Nebinger, was familiar with the area so he went in.
2 Did Don carry a meter with him?
31 l
N KALENEVITCH:
Yes, he took the RM 14 with him.
Si I
6 DONALDSON:
Did the meter peg again?
7 81 KALENEVITCH:
I don't know at that point.
I assumed it did.
The 9{
man...
10!
11 DONALDSON: What value would that meter be to someone going into a 12!
radiation area?
13l 141 XALENEVITCH:
I don't feel it would be any value, other than that it 15 would give them adequate warning that the radiation level is high and 16l.
to get out but it isn't going to give you a direct read out as far as 17 millirems per hour or rems per hour and anything in a direct conversion.
18f 19i DONALDSON:
Did you at all try to find anybody to see if you could scme 201 other instumentation or whether or not there was...
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i 22; XALENEVITCH:
It was not needed at that point after we had come out of I
23l the room...
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I)f DONALDSON:
Prior to making that entry you didn't know what the levels 2l l
were or you thought you knew what they were.
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KALENEVITCH: No, only in my brief... conversation...
Si i
DONALDSON:
Did you try to find someone to monitor, or was there anyone available?
Si 9
KALENEVITCH:
As far as what?
10!
11!
DONALDSON:
Before Nebinger made the entry to close that door.
12!
i 131 KALENEVITCH:
Yes, I could say that we did have health physics people 14 in and out at that point.
'15; 16; DONALDSON:
But no one assigned and said this is a repair party monitor 17 and briefed you on the... stay times, or any kind of information.
18f 191 KALENEVITCH: At one point I don't recollect as I stated earlier, 20!
someone said the level is as high as 900 mR going prior to us going 21{
into that.
It was just prior to the time going in there.
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1 DONALDSON: You mentioned that the common sump for the drain tank had 2
j overflowed and that was the source of the release. Did you surmise that 3j yourself or someone said that?
4l 5
KALENEVITCH: That was input from some of the operations people that 6
had come in.
7l 8
DONALDSON: What all dumps into this common sump?
9i 10I KALENEVITCH: To the best of my knowledge, obviously the reactor building 11 sump at a high level.
It's pumped over and the aux building sump pumps 12!
into that tank.
131 1.
DONALDSON:
Ok, again about this...the operation closing monitoring 15l door and you mentioned you requested volunteers.
In any of your training 16 regarding repair party functions, did that training at all cover the 17{
emergency risk exposures?
18i 191 KALENEVITCH:
Surely, that's primary interest.
20h 21l DONALDSON:
What are those levels just off hand?
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23 KALENEVITCH:
The levels... qualify your statement.
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DONALDSON: What exposure is, under emergency condition, acceptable, 2l let's say, for an emergency repair function to save equipment?
3I 4!
KALENEVITCH:
To save equipment.
I would say 125 mR based on a long "I
term exposure cf maybe an hour or so but I cannot say that I recollect 6
any definition into that or any definite input.
7 8!
DONALDSON: You mean you can't recall that anyone had ever discussed i
9 those...
10l l
11l KALENEVITCH:
....as far as saving equipment.
Most of the scenarios 12!
involved an individual injured inside a radiation area and the fact of I
13!
primary interest was removal of the individual at least exposure to 141 you, now, whether that was a field of 5 r per hour or 20 r per hour.
l 154 That was more or less to be discussed and monitored in a nice neat 16!
storybook situation with a health physics technician along with you and 17!
two and half hours to discuss the scenario so you knew what they expect.
I ISr You know, that situation just did not exist on the morning of the 28th.
19l And I got to reiterate.
I'm not saying there was panic or anything 20:
like that, there was people doing their job to the best of their ability.
21l The fact that we didn't even come off with a twisted ankle, you know, 22 speaks for itself.
23l 24l 25f n
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l' DONALDSON: You also mentioned that you later found out that one of the 2;
reasons you thought that the RM 14 pegged is because the sample lines i
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were essentially overhead and no one had... told you...
41 c:
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KALENEVITCH: At which point we were not aware of.
At the moment we 6l were standing at the double doors looking across.
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DONALDSON:
So that would have been after the emergency had been declared.
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KALENEVITCH: I would probably say that we were not made aware of that 11 until about... I was not made aware of that until about 1400 that afternoon... I 12{
take that back... approximately 12 o' clock.
13!
14!
00NAi.0 SON:
I believe you also mentioned that Joe DeMan had given...esssential ly 15; given some instruction to Mr. Nebinger when he said, make it quick.
16; 17!
KALENEVITCH: Yeah, at that point was, that's where the 900 mR because 18f he had just exited the auxiliary building and that's where the 900 19!
mR... level come from.
20!
21j DONALDSON:
So then the repair party function that you were involved in 22l on that morning consisted of closing the model room door, the health 23 physics coverage or discussion involved the readings are damn high, 24l about 400 mR per hour and make it quick.
So that's it, ok.
So you had 25i to use your best judgement...
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14 KALENEVITCH: Many judgement calls that morning.
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DONALDSON: You mentioned that when you came out you were contaminated.
4 Do you recall any of the count rates on the meters and meter that was 5
used.
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7 KALENEVITCH: Here again, we're standing with RM 14.
81, 9!
DONALDSON:
Ok.
And do you remember what scale, it was on, did you 10f happen to notice what scale it was on and how high the contamination 11!
was?
12l 13 KALENEVITCH:
No, I did not.
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DONALDSON:
Ok. Peg Pelen then directed you to shower?
16, i
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KALENEVITCH:
That's correct.
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191 DONALDSON: Were you frisked after the shower.
20!
l 21l KALENEVITCH: Yes, we were and we were down to about background, ok, 22 background at that point was in around 120 mR, if I remember.
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1 DONALDSON:
Background was 120 mR?
21 KALENEVITCH:
Right, because of the primary sample lab at that point had rising levels.
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6i DONALDSON:
So, if background was 125 mR, how did they determine how I
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high your exposure was above background?
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9!
KALENEVITCH: Ok, we also checked ourself reading dosimeters at that 10f point coming out of there.
I do not recollect what Mr. Nebinger's self 11 reader was at that point.
12!
13l DONALDSON: Were you frisked after you showered? Or did they recheck 14!
you?
15, 16i KALENEVITCH: Yeah, they did.
They did, I mean whatever they said was 17!
acceptable at that point, we must have been at background, they didn't 18{
see any increase, significant increase over background.
191 20i DONALDSON: Was that Peg Pelen who did the after showering first...
21f 22l KALENEVITCH:
I don't remember at that point, I can't recollect.
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l 16 DONALDSON:
I believe you also mentioned that you had called the Control 2
Room and asked whether helicopters had been requested and a couple of the operators asked you what to do and you told them to work on offsite 4!
teams or something?
Si 6i KALENEVITCH: That's correct.
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.00NALDSON:
Ok, now I get the impression from hearing that you were 9
directing the activities in the ECS at this time is that...did you feel 10i at that time it was necessary because people didn't seem to be headed 1
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in the right direction or did you just answer the question because they 12!
asked you?
13f 14l XALENEVITCH:
I would say I reacted to the question that was asked me.
15 16i DONALDSON:
You didn't say don't ask me ask so and so, he's in charge.
17l 18(
XALENEVITCH: At that point, this was all happening within a short 1$!
period of time, the offsite monitoring people had arrived at ECS, ok.
20j And they knew what they had to do and I wouldn't say that they were 21l there long enough to feel that they were spinning their wheels or doing 22l anything like that.
That were there long enough to assess what the 23j situation was and were willing to respond.
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17 DONALDSON:
Did you have any contact with any of the survey teams over 2
the radio subsequent to that?
31 4
XALENEVITCH: Ok, at that point I can say that no, Earl Hemmila, was c
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the man that I put on that.
O k.
He's the operator...the Control Room 6i operator from Unit 2 and he manning the offsite monitoring team radio and writing down the levels he was involved.
8!
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DONALDSON: Who was telling Earl what to tell the teams?
i 10l 11!
KALENEVITCH: Ok, at that point health physics personnel were directly 12l involved.
13i 14l DONALDSON:
How many?
15, 16 XALENEVITCH: Well, at that point, I would say, you know, Tom Mulleavy 1Y' had arrived..and Pete Velez had arrived on the scene, ok, and I'm 18!
pretty sure after noon it was Tom Mulleavy.
O k.
19i 20!
DONALDSON:
I believe it's the job board as they call it on the wall 2.}!
down in the ECS.
22!
i 23i KALENEVITCH:
That's correct.
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00NALDSON:
Did anyone fill out that job board?
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3 KALENEVITCH: Yes, the operator who was manning the phones with the 4!
grease pencil, was filling it out.
They also started to plot wind 5l j
direction which is where I saw it was blowir.g dead west into Goldsboro.
6 At that point I don't recollect the wind velocity...five miles per hour 7!
seems to stick in my mind.
8 9
00NALDSON: You mantioned that Weaver came down and you sort of decided 10l it would be a good idea to split the repair party team.
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KALENEVITCH: Yes, who was outside HP patrol point.
14l DONALDSON:
That woUld have been the daylight people?
15 16i KALENEVITCH:
No, here again it consisted of yes, there was at that 17!
point daylight people who remained on station.
i 181 19t DONALDSON:
Did an HP technician go with the two teams, at this point?
20f 2 11 KALENEVITCH: Yes.
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DONALDSON: One went with each team?
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31 4!
DONALDSON: You had an escort from Unit 1 to Unit 2.
Si 6f KALENEVITCH: That's ccrrect :)ecause of certain conditions that had i
,7j developed in Unit 2 up to the Control Room.
8; 9f DONALOSON: When you split where were the two locations when the teams 10 ended up?
11!
12!
KALENEVITCH: As I stated I stayed with the team...my team remained I
13l outside ECS, directly outside the door leading into Unit 1 health 14 physics control station. And the other team went up to, directly to 15; the room off of Unit 2 Control Room and remained there.
16j ll{
DONALDSON:
How long did you remain in that location...
18, 19t KALENEVITCH: Okay.
As I stated appre.imately around 'til 9, 9:30 and 20' then we all went up to Unit 2 Control Room.
21:
1 2d; CONALDSON:
Okay, did you recall seeing Mr. Shovlin up there at that 23 time?
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XALENEVITCH: Yes, sir.
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DONALDSON:
Did you turn over command essentially, or did you discuss 4!
anything with him?
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Gi KALENEVITCH: Well, c1 I stated, it was heavily involved and I did walk' 7
over to Dan, and Doug and I both did, ok, and he said ok everybody 8!
remain here then.
So more or less he was aware that we were all there 9l and at that point.
10I 11!
DONALDSON: Okay, that would be about nine o' clock or so.
12!
l 13l KALENEVITCH:
I'd say probably about 9:30, it would be more accurate.
- 141,
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15i DONALDSON: On the morning of the 28th after 9:30 but before noon did 76i Oan Shovlin, or did anyone else, either request or direct that any kind 17f of entry or repair function or assessment function be conducted by any 18!
of tne repair people?
191 20!
KALENEVITCH:
Could you be a little more specific on that?
21!
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I]I DONALDSON: Did anybody ask you to do anything else that morning, make 2f an entry into the Aux Building, is there anything to check gauges, 3[
twist valves?
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5 KALENEVITCH:
No, sir.
Si 7
DONALDSON:
No.' Did you see anyone else do anything like that?
81 1
91 XALENEVITCH:
No, sir.
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00NALC 50N:
So there were no repair functions at all.
If there were to 12!
be valve turnings, ju.cper leads lifted, things of that nature would 131 you expect that t, hat would be a repair party function?
141 15!
XALENEVITCH:
Yes, sir.
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.zg; 17 DONALDSON: O k.
So on the morning of'the 2Sth you do not remember any s
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' work being done on running lines, from, say, the makeup tank to the
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191 reactor building or' from the reactor coolant bleed tank to the reactor
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building?
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22l XALENEVITCH:
On the morning of the 28th?
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DONALDSON:
Right.
Dan Shovlin seemed to remember that there was...that
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was either going on prior to the incident or that morning?
2 31 4;
KALENEVITCH:
I don't seem to recollect that.
5 6!
DONALDSON:
Do you recollect anything like that at all occurring?
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KALENEVITCH:
I tell you what I was not directly involved.
More inter-9!
estingly involved with a function Doug Weaver had going on and that was 10f monitoring the incore thermocouples. Ok.
and also the reactor coolant i
11!.
temperatures.
if that had been directed by Mr. Shovlin I don't recollect 12!
it.
I 131 14f DONALDSON: As far as the entry into the auxiliary building....
1si 163 KALENEVITCH:
I made none, and I was not involved in any of those l'/l activities if they were going on.
18f 19!
00NALGSON:
Did you make any entries or any repair functions on any 201 time during the 28th or the Y:
other than closing the model room 21l door?
22!
i 23l KALENEVITCH:
Yes.
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Ilt DONALDSON: When was the next...
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i XALENEVITCH: Ok, I was later on involved with the...it was approximately 4!
1400 that afternoon.
They had lost power to the RMS panel, the radiation l
j monitorir.g system for the area monitors that were monitoring the reactor 6i building. We had lost complete control power to that panel to all the indication functions had gone dead and I had a man, Jim Harsh, who 8!
happened to be over in Unit 2.
He's daylight...he's a daylight worker, 9) instrument control technician, troubleshoot that problem, and he found 10 out that one of the main power fuses had blown to shorted detector in i
11!
the control building, and he isolated that, and restored power.
12!
13 DONALDSON:
He did not have to make an entry into the Aux Building...
14!
15i KALENEVITCH:
No, sir.
One of the other functions was the door what I 16i would call the aircraft door between Units 1 and Unit 2.
This is 17 outside now; the outside passageway would be the East passageway along 18{
Unit 1 and Unit 2 theres a door that leads into Unit l's auxiliary 191 building.
The door was closed and sealed, however, they wanted to 2bf establish power to it, ok, in the event they would have to open it, and 2dJ I remember turning that problem over to a electrician foreman.
I'm not 22 sure at that point whether that was Gene Light or Hillary Mitchell, ok.
23 But I remember that problem being discussed with me.
Also a...it was i
24{
more or less an anticipatory thing that we might run into was to, in 25i yo o
cj
l 24 l
7i
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the event that we got pressure lower, of course there was a lot of [ha, ha] positive people around at that time that we had gotten reactor 31 coolant pressure reversed, pressure in the reactor coolant system below 400 pounds per square inch that we would initiate decay heat which is "l"
normally closed, failed cicsed above 320 psi.
But they felt if we got k
it down to 350 psi that we could bypass that trip function and open it 50 pounds sooner.
i 81 i
9 SHACXLETON: We'll have to change the tape now.
The time is 2:27 p.m.
101
!lli SHACXLETON: This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. Barry R.
12 Kalenevitch. Time is now 2:40 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
Please 13l continue.
14!
15j KALENEVITCH:
In anticipation that the reactor coolant pressure could 16 be dropped that low, I was directed to research the interlock or the 17l bypass for that interlock on decay heat valves controlling the proper 18f lineup for the decay heat cooling system once we drop below 350 psi.
I 191 remember at that point Doug Weaver had left the island and was over at 20J the Observation Center so I gave Doug a call for that.
Mr. Shovlin was 21!
still on the island, in the Control Room at that point.
Ok, I had i
22!
discussed with hin first and then we went out and I called Doug and 23' discussed with him what I had wanted to do or what they had directed me 24j to do.
I remember having question on it frcm the standpoint that the 25!
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a
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25 l
i l
decay heat system is designed...to suction, piping... designed for no 2
j greater than 400 psi and this is why I called him to discuss it and he 3l said yes, that is correct and go back to the Control Room and get 41 l
verification of what they wanted to do, which I did, and they said ci
~
~
j verify it again that this coulc not...would not be instituted at pres-Sj sures greater than 350 psi.
I said fine, and I called Doug again and 7
Doug gave me the proper diagrams and everything off the top of his head 8l where to find this information.
And he also directed me to Ivan Porter, 9
who was the engineer, who I didn't realize was onsite at that time.
10 However, I contacted Ivan and we went through the prints and came up 11!
with the proper bypass terminals and got the numbers for the people in i
12 the event that the bypass of decay heat would be instituted.
13!
I 14l DONALDSON:
You didn't make any...you didn't in terms of any repair 15' functions either direct or you were not involved in any entries into 16!
any areas during the 28th through the 30th, midnight.
17l 18)
KALENEVITCH:
hu, other than initial moments down in the Unit 1 auxiliary 19i building.
20!
21{
DONALDSON:
Ok, let me just back up and discuss the emergency plan 22' training for a minute.
Do you recall whether or not you did attend the f
23l formal training class in 1978 regarding your responsibilities under the 24 emergency plan?
6 25l
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26
]i l
KALENEVITCH:
In 1978, formal....I do not recollect that as such.
I 2'
j recollect going to an organizational meeting with the outside vendor i
31 l
that was going to run a scenario...
41 l
DONALDSON: You went to a pre-drill briefing?
6}
7 KALENEVITCH: Yes.
81 9
DONALDSON:
But you did not attend a class where they discussed such 1
10!
things as exposure controls, relationship with health physics, duties, 11{
responsibilities during an emergency?
12!
13 KALENEVITCH:
In 1978, do you have a date...I don't know.
14l 15 DONALDSON:
Did you conduct any kind of training like that for any of 16i the people under you?
17I I.
IS{
KALENEVITCH:
For what was given to me in writing is what I conveyed to 19) my people.
20 21; 00NALDSON,:
Ok, and what was given to you in writing was the earlier 22l procedure you had talked about that had to do with where you were to 23 report, and the revision of the procedures.
24l 25!
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27 I
l XALENEVITCH: That's correct.
2 '
I DONALDSON:
And that constitutes all you...all the training tnat you I
remember?
Si i
Gi XALENEVITCH: To the point, yes.
What was given to me is what I passed 7'
on.
i 81 DONALDSON: Ok, I don't have any more questions.
If you any general 10l comments you'd like to make feel free to do so regarding your responsi-t 11{
blities during the event.
12!
l 13 KALENEVITCH:
No, other than the fact that what we did have as emergency 141 as this incident had pointed out, as everybody felt was very fortunate 151 that it was not beyond the training we had had.
However, as I stated ldi we were going on the premise that what we were given was all that was l')
needed, you know, and we did see the deficiencies in this as the day 18t progressed.
ISI 20!
SHACKEETON: Well, gentlemen, if there are no further comments we'll i
21l bring this interview to a close.
In behalf of the Commission I'd like 22j to thank Barry for the time he's given us and his comments and we'll 231 bring this interview to a close at this time.
The time is now 2:46 2d!
p.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
25!
i!
- 1. V
I