ML19208B154
| ML19208B154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1979 |
| From: | Croneberger D, Marsh R GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190146 | |
| Download: ML19208B154 (24) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION I
In the Matter of:
2I IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 2l of E
Con K. Croneberger Manager, [.gineering and Cesign Si 6i 71 8!
Trailer #203 91 NRC Investigation Site 10!.
TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
loam 1.
1070 121 (Date of Interview) 1N!
.Julv 6. lo70 (Date Transcript Typec) 141 1o?
ISi (Tape Numcer(s))
16i 17' 18i 19i 20i 21!
NRC PERSONNEL:
22!
Robert Marsh, Investigator 231 Anthony N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist 24 r,i::O. v,,n 25 ;,
7 9 0 919 0 / y6 1
.t l
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l MARSH:
The date is June 1, 1979.
The time is 9:37 a.m.
This is Bob 2l l
Marsh and I am an Investigator with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 31 l
assigned to Region III at Chicago, Illinois.
This morning we are at 41 j
the facilities of GPU Service Corporate Headquarters it 260 Cherryhill
- l c
Road in Moentain Lakes, New Jersey, for the purpose
/ conducting 6
interviews and we have with us at this time Mr. Don K. Croneberger, who I have as Manager, Engineering and Designs, is that correct, Mr. Croneberger.
Si CRONEBERGER:
That's correct.
10!
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MARSH:
At this time to begin I would like the other individuals in the 12 room to identify themselves, spell their last name and indicate their 13 position.
14!
15; FASANO: Anthony N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist at NRC out of Region 16i I,
1;,
18f MARSH:
Don, if you would just go ahead with spelling of your name and 191 your position.
20t 21:
CRONEBERGER:
My name is Donald K. Croneberger, Manager, Engineering 22l and Design, Generation Division, GPU Service Corporation.
23 24f 25i 385315
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li HOBER: John Hober, Manager, Generation Division Support.
25 i
31 MARSH: Thank you very much. This is a correction on the middle initial 4l from C to K with Mr. Croneberger.
Mr. Croneberger, before we started Si we discussed briefly this two page memo which I have in front of me.
T Gi am not going to go into any detail on it but I will indicate that it 7I' covers the purpose of NRC.,'s investigation, its authority and the scope 8
of the investigation as well as the rights of the person being interviewed.
9 On the second page there appears several questions which I would like 10!
to review at this time and just make them a matter of record on the 11 tape as well as on the written docum e t.
The first question reads - Do you understand the above, making reference to the two page memo?
131 14' CRONEBERGER: Yes.
151 16i MARSH:
Secondly, do we have your permission to tape this interview?
17l 18:
CRONESERGER:
Yes.
191 20!
MARSH:
And thirdly, would you like a copy of the tape and/or the t
21!
transcript?
22l 23 CRONEBERGER:
Yes.
24l 25j b85316
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MARSH: They will be provided. There is a fourth question that is not 2l t
called out specifically on the second page but is covered in the body 3!
and that addresses your right if you so desire to have a company 4!
representative present during the interview and as my understanding ej
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that is Mr. Hober's position.
Si 7i CRONEBERGER: Yes.
81
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MARSH: With us at this time.
Good. To begin Mr. Croneberger, I 10!
would appreciate it if you would give us a brief resume of your background, your experience in the nuclear industry and your duties with GPU Service.
13i 14' CRONEBERGER:
Okay. I have been with GPU Service since April of 1978 15 !
in the position initially as Manager of Design, subsequently Manager 16; of Engineering and Design.
In this position I have responsibility for 17:
various engineering disciplines including mechanical systems and IS' components, electrical power and instrumentation, engineering mechanics 19' and a design directing group.
Prior to being with GPU Service I was 20!
Manager of Structural Engineer for Gilbert Associates having been with 21{
that company from 1963 through 1978. My involvement in the nuclear 22!
industry commenced in 1965.
i 23l 24 MARSH:
Thank you.
Tony you have some questions.
25f 385317 i
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j FASANO: What I would like to do is to get your involvement with the 2
i March 28, 1979 event of, that is when you were notified of the event, 31 what part you played in it, who you communicated with, any decisions f
41 that you might have made, any suggestions and in general your involvement 51 with the event of March 29, 1979 at TMI, March 28, excuse me.
Si 7f' CRONEBERGER:
I became aware of the incident at TMI 2 after having 8
arrived at work here on that morning approximately 8:30 to 9:00 a.m.
9t My first involvement was to participate in a meeting of a small group 10l of engineers at which time we were acquainted with the facts as known 11
at that time. These facts were those that were given to Mr. J. P.
12l Moore by R. F. Wilson first thing that morning.
The immediate discuss:on 13f was what engineering support we coula provide.
The results of that 14' meeting were selections of specific engineering personnel which could E
be sent immediately to the site to provide support to the staff.
E After having taken that action a group of five engineers sent to the 17!
site.
The balance of the day, commencing sc,etime after 12:00 noon 18(
involved participation with meetings with R. :. Wilson initially and 19 subsequently with R. C. Arnold as additional information was conveyed 20!
to us; from the plant site and either directly or through the solicitation 21!
of support from engineering department personnel; providing some 22{
understanding as to the system designs; why certain findings or data 23l that was being received; what it might have meant and simply providing 24 general support to those two managers.
25i 88b318
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I, 1:
FASANO:
Going back to your meeting you had been given facts.
About 2!
l what time was this meeting in the morning.
3t 4l CRONEBERGER: Between 9:00 and 9:30 is my recollection.
5!
6l FASANO:
j And do you recall what facts you had available to you so that you could make some analyses or decisions.
81 9 !
CRONEBERGER: The facts as I recall them that were availaole was the 10f fact we did have a turbine trip and a reactor trip. We did not know specifics on the transients but we did know it was necessary that one of our engineers who was familiar with transients that might occur 13!
with tha turbine or reactor trip should be made available to acquire 141 additional data.
We did know there was a problem with the instrument 15' air system. We did know that the problem, the initial reactor trip 16i occurreo as a result of the condensate pump trip, consequently we 17!
wanted some engineer to be made available who understood the secondary 18f plant systems. We were aware at that time that the reactor coolant 19!
pumps had tripped.
To my knowledge we did not know, at that time, any 20!
information relative to radiological consequences.
21!
22f FASANO:
Based on the inform & tion then you had someone look at the 2 31 instrument air system or how did that involvement.
24i 25l 385319
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li CRONEBERGER:
The first decision that was made was that two of the 2!
j engineers who were sent to the ;ite, I think you got their names, one 3!
was James P. Moore, the other one was George Lehman.
Both of those 4r l
engineers we're cognizant of secondary plant systems, including instrument c;
l air system, condensate feedwiter system.
Their selection to begin to
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6; go to the site was as a result of our knowledge there was a problem in f
7 that area.
si 91 FASANO:
Okay, you got...you decided to send five of your, five engineers 10j were sent to the site.
11:
,m CRONEBERGER:
That's correct.
i 13 l 14 FASANO:
Do you recall what time they were sent.
15:
16' CRONEBERGER: My recollection was that they all five left immediately 17!
after our meeting broke up and I would anticipate that occurred somewhere 18' between 10:30 to 11:30 a.m.
19:
20!
FASANO:
Once they arrived on the site were they able to give you 21:
further information for your group here to continue to participate or 22f were they then participating on their own at the site.
23!
24l CRONE 9ERGER:
I do not recall on the 28th of March having received any 2$!
telephone calls from any of those personnel.
To my knowledge all of 8853'd0
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1:
the communications that I was aware of that were occurring with the 2
plant were those which were occurring via Mr. R. C. Arnold.
Again 31 that is my recollection, I do not recall having received any telephone 4l1 communication.
Si Si FASANO:
Okay.
You mentioned that they were get some meaning from the lI 7
data as related to systems. What was the result of this involvement?
8 Were you kept notified or were you,... was it Mr. Wilson, Mr. Arnold.
9J 10 CRONEBERGER: Mr. Wilson and Mr. Arnold were those who were directly 11 rec dving indications and I was aware of those communications simply 12{
by being present in the offices while those communications occurred.
131 14f FASAM:
Okay, so then your participation was mainly being informed, 151 attanding a meeting, selecting your knowledgeable individuals and then 16i Paving these people sent to the site.
17,'
t 18i CRONEBERGER:
Up through that day, that was essentially it, yes.
19!
201 FASANO:
Following... what was your involvement.
21l l
22l CRONESERGER:
The involvement after noon was in st.pport of R. F.
23 dilson or R. C. Arnold in being able to provide them an enderstanding 2 41 of the system designs so that they might more fully be able to assess 25i or transmit information to the plant.
What the meaning of so...e of the S8b321
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8 i
Il data which was being conveyed via phone later that day.
Specific 2!
examples later that day, we were aware of releases in the Auxiliary 31 Building area and this did involve a review of the flow diagrams to i
41 l
gain understanding as to how waters might have been conveyed from the Si containment sump out to the Auxiliary Building.
That was one specific Gi example I do recall having both directly as well as with support from 7l an engineer within the group having investigated.
8; 9l FASANO:
Could you relate the results of this? I guess started with 1
101 your sump pumps.
lli E
CRONE 3ERGER:
Yes, that's correct.
13l 14i FASANO: And then I think the sump pumps were turned off but still you E
were getting activity.
Did you come up with any conclusions?
16i 17!
CRONEBERGER:
The only initial conclusion that we came up with was the 18!
fact the sump'pumos should be shut off.
I do not recall that day 19' being aware that releases were continuing after tne pumps were shut 20l off.
I don't recall it.
21:
2 FASANO: Okay.
How late did you stay here that night?
23l 24l CRONEBERGER: My recollection is it was 3:30 to 9:00 p.m. that evening 25!
when the general support group in Mr. Arnold's office broke uo.
We S85322 i
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had stayed around until the plant had initiated action to start up the 2l reactor coolant pumps and after it appeared that temperatures were 3!
reducing in the primary coolant syscem, that group tended to break up.
i 4i That was I believe 8:30 to 9:00 p.m.
Si
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i Si FASANO:
You did mention that you were knowledgeable of reactor coolant 7I, pump situation? They had shut down earlier.
Did your people get further data to evaluate why they were turned off?
9i 10l' CRONEBERGER:
We did not as I recall get data as to why they were 11 turned off. We did investigate what would be the startup time to full 12f speed of the pumps which would give them some indication as to whether...as to what they should expect when they started...when they tried to 14:
restart the pumps.
So our main concern really was giving guidance as 15' to what to anticipate in pump restart and it did not include investigation 16i as to why the pumps were tripped.
17!
18i FASANO:
On the restart can you fix a time when you were giving technical 19' advice in this area? Was it late in the afternoon?
20i 2$
CRONEBERGER:
I would escimate it was late in the afternoon but I 22' don't have a clear recollection.
23 25!
FASANO:
So you remained in contact throughout the afternoon ano your 25i involvement did indeed involve some input for actions?
SS3323
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f 10 1l CRONEBERGER:
It did involve input but a great deal of my involvement, 2l j
such as the question on the pumps, more directly involved soliciting 3!
technical information frem people who had been directly involved in 41 the Three Mile Island 2 engineering such as one of the mechanical c:
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components engineers, who was familiar with the pumps, provided direct 6i technical input on what to anticipate on a pump start.
So I did 7f j
provide technical input but I also was primarily to... providing 8
support through the other specialists within the group to provide 9!
guidance to Mr. Arnold and Mr. Wilson.
101 i
11 FASANO: Who would be the individual specialist on the pump?
12:
D CRONE 3ERGER:
The pump specialist we had was Robert Spragg.
14!
E FASANO:
He's here?
16i 17l CRONEBERGER:
Yes.
18) 19i FASANO:
Were you knowledgeable af the emergency feedwater situation 20i or the block valves? ! guess the 12A and 12B were closed?
21!
22l CRONE 3ERGER:
I was aware on the 28tn that those valves were closed.
2bl I do not recall when on the 23th that information was conveyed to me.
24l 25!
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11 lv FASANO:
Do you have people who are knowledgeable in that system? In 2
that particular feedwater system?
31 4:
CRONEBERGER: Yes. One of the engineers whose name you've been given
- n as M. P. Morrell, one of Mike's contributions that day was to p-ovide Si background on the design of the emergency feedwater system.
7 FASANO: And also the steam generator consequences?
I think there was 9I some talk that there might have been some damage to the B steam generator?
10 Do you recall if that was talked about?
11!
12I CRONEBERGER: We knew that there was a question of a leak on the B i
13!
steam generator. As to the specifics of that I do not recall knowing c
14!
anything.
One of the engineers who was sent to the site was Mr.
15' Julian Nabramovich and one of the reasons for his being sent to the 16; site was to provide assistance in understanding what might have happened 17!
to that steam generator.
I do not recall any fc.rther activities after 18l that group left in the morning relative to stan generator leak.
19!
20!
FASANO:
So you did have information that led you to believe that this 21!
would be a concern?
i 22t 23 CRONEBERGER:
That's correct.
And that was why that one individual 2 41 was selected to go.
25i
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FASANO: Were you made knowledgeable of the boron sampling that was 2!
done earlier in the morning? When they were getting low concentrations 31 of boron and would your people be looking into the systems to evaluate 4
l!
how this could be?
Si CRONEBERGER:
I do not recall that as being an area for investigation 7f j
that day.
81 9
FASANO: How about instrumentation with respect to thermoccuple readings 10(
or your RTDs on the resistant temperature detectors on the hot leg and cold leg, were you informed of these problems?
12 i
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CRONEBERGER:
I was informed of primary coolant system temperatures.
14 At no time that day as I recall was there a question as to the accuracy 15 of the measurements from that instrumentation.
The only real instrumentation 16' and control question that arose that day was on the question of containment 17!
isolation as I recall.
18!
191 FASANO:
Containment isolation?
20!
21!
CRONEBERGER:
Yes.
22l l
23l FASANO:
At what point was this, the 4 psi or the 28 psi?
24!
251 S8v326
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CRONEBERGQ:
Both.
The question was asked, and this was in support 2'
j of Mr. Arnold as I recall, as to when containment isolation occurred 3l and what the significance of containment isolation would be.in the 4i performance of various systems.
Si 6'
FASANO:
I gather that one of your decisions or suggestions was the i
7f; shutting down of the sump pumps?
8!
i 9!
CRONEBERGER:
Yes.
10!
11l FASANO: This would be prior to going to an automated containment, the 12!
actuation of the specific pressure within containment?
13i 14!
CRONEBERGER:
Yes. One of the recommendations was to shut down the 15; sump pumps.
16i 17' FASANO:
Were you informed at all about their concern on the source 18!
range monitors, the. intermediate range monitors which seemed to be 191 going... increasing count rates, say early in the morning?
201 21!
CRONEBERGER:
I do not recall that information.
22l i
23l FASANO:
They also had scme problems with their hot well and there was 24l instrumentation problems there.
Were you informed of this?
25i 383327
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CRONEBERGER:
I was not aware of that, that information.
2:
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%E FASANO: Okay, so on the secondary side you were mainly informed of 4;
the Condensate Polishers, Condensate Pump trip, feedwater trip and the 5!
possibility of instrument air having a part in this.
Correct?
Si 71 l
CRONEBERGER: That is correct.
81 c)
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FASANO: When were you made knowledgeable of the Reactor Building 10 peak? I guess that was somewhere about...it happened somewhere around 11 1:30 - 2:00, do you recall if indeed the first aay you were in....
u:
U!
CRONEBERGER:
I do not recall that having been mentioned the first day 14l to me.
15i 16i FASANO:
So only indirectly the discussions on actuation of containment 17' you discussed these high pressures?
18{
19' CRONEBERGE:
Only relative containment isolation, in fact I do not...when 20t we were discussing containment isolation was more a question of wnat 2h, the design basis would be for containment isolation and I do not 22:i recall that 28 pound pressure having been a part of that discussion at 23 all.
24i 25l i
S85328
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FASANO:
Did you...were you involved in any questions on the electromatic 2t relief valve and its function or the reactor coolant drain tank?
31 4
CRONEBERGER:
I was aware that there was concern about the leaking of i
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the electromatic relief valve.
I was aware that the reactor coolant drain tank rupture disk hcd blown.
There was no specific engineering 71 activity which I recall having pursued to determine what could be done having.....given those facts.
9f 101 FASANO:
How early were you given these facts?
11:
12!
CRONEBERGER:
I believe the fact, relative to the reactor coolant i
131 drain tank rupture disk, was identified in the early morning.
I do 14i not recall when the leaking power operated relief valve first was 15-identified.
I believe it was in the morning also.
16:
17l FASANO:
This would be 9:00?
18r 19t CRONEBERGER:
Yes. 9:00 - 9:30.
20!
21!
FASANO:
As...well if you would could you go on with your involvement 22!'
with the rest of the day.
Let's see we got around 12:00 and then I 23' asked some questions then later then that and then on into your second 24l and third day involvement.
25!
S85323 e
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l CRONEBERGER:
Okay.
The...as indicated from approximately noon on 2!
l through 8:30 to 9:00 p.m. I was continuously present with either Mr.
31 Wilson and/or Mr. Arnold and it was during this phase, when either 4j directly or support of other people, we were answering questions on El
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system design.
I mentioned the cases I can recall which is; the 6i design of containment isolation and the question of water being transferred 7
'l out of containment, questions relative to emergency feedwater system.
8I Beyond that I really can't recall specifics that I can give you.
As 41
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far as involvement following the March 28th it was very difficult to 10f communicate with the people at the site, get information.
On the 29th there I have very poor recollection of what occurred on communications.
There was, not on my part, any intense involvement on the TMI 2 13 activities as I recall.
The very intense support commenced Friday.
14 After we had started getting more complete information back from the plant and from Friday on I was involved here through April lith in 16!
providing 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> manning of engineering personnel to provide support 17!
to those people at the site.
18!
19!
FASANO:
Did your people get involved with the setting up of the 20:
hydrogen recombiner?
21:
22 CRONE 3ERGER:
Yes. We were directly involved with providing, both 23(
directly ourselves and through support from the architect, Burns &
24!
Roe, detailed information on how to set up the hydrogen recomoiner, 25; yes.
i B83330 l
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I 17-li FASANO: When were you knowledgeable that it was even a concern that 2!
hydrogen existed, either in vessel or in containment?
3!
4l CRONESERGER:
It is my recollection that I first became aware of that c:
i May 30.
6i 7'l FASANO:
Have you been to the site at all?
81 at CRONEBERGER:
I transferred to the site on April 11.
101 11:
FASANO:
Do you have any questions?
12:
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MARSH:
I have no questions.
14!
15' FASANO: I have a general question.
Your involvement with TMI 2 would 16!
be in the design functions? You startad somewhere in 78?
17!
18j CRONEBERGIR: Yes.
19I 20!
FASANO:
So it would be quite late?
21!
22!
CRONEBERGER: Yes.
t 231 24 FASANO:
Then as far as...what would be your knowledge and also your 2si function in evaluating or/and recommendation for design corrections S85331 t
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with the TMI 2? In particular I am thinking of some of the concerns 2:
of the electromatic relief valve, sensing unit indication, the review of some of the LERs if indeed they had some indication of design 4:
i deficiencies both on the primary side and possibly on the balance of
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j plant? If you would...maybe you could give me an idea of your history of the knowledge of these areas?
7(
0 MARSH:
Excuse me, before you begin the response I am going to break 9!
momentarily while we turn the tape over.
The time is 10:07.
I am 10 reading 472 on the meter.
11:
12!,
MARSH:
The time is still 10:07 reading 473 on the meter. We are back 13l on.
14:
15j CRONEBERGER:
I have been involved with certain TMI 2 modifications 16i since I have been here.
The direct involvement, on my part in the 17j group, has been in modifications to the secondary plant systems.
I do 18!
not recall having participated in, directly in any design changes on 19i the primary plant systems since I have been here.
20!
21!
FASANO:
But this doesn't include the modification to the EMOV or 22!
not... the electromatic, not at all?
23t 24!
CRONEBERGER:
A few examples I can cite.
There was some problems on 25i the stacks from the safety relief valves on the steam lines.
I was S85332
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involved with modifications on that stack design.
There were some 2!
l changes in the secondary plant heater drain system directly involved 3:
there and not the examples you cited.
41 FASANO:
The heater drain system apparently there was one pump out at 6i the time? Yes?
71 i
8)
CRONEBERGER: Yes.
91 10f FASANO: Also on your condensate pumps, condensate booster pumps, in 11';
general there is a automatic manual switch and apparently its usually on just manual. Are you knowledgeable of this.
Do you have any idea 131 oi -ae reason.
14' 13 CRONEBERGER:
No, I do not.
16i 17' FASANO:
How did...just, you had someone looking into the air, apparently 181 the instrument air was being.subsidi::ed by the service air, by a 19' crosscver valve? Just for information were you knowledgeable of this 20!
lack of capacity and would this be a concern of your group?
21l 22{
CRONEBERGER:
It is a concern of my group, I do not recall having been 231 aware of that until after this incident.
2 41 25i 385333 4
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1r9 FASANO:
Did you ever get results as to the initiation of the condensate 2:
pump trip, the cause of it?
3!
4!
l CRONEBERGER: The study is not complete on that yet but I am... the c;
9 tentative conclusions are that the water having entered the instrument 6!
air system did precipitate the condensate pump trip.
But as I said, 7l that is a tentative conclusion. The study is currently underway.
8l 9l FASANO: This would mean that somehow you had water get into the 10l instrument air which then caused the decrease in air or lack of air,
]iv valve closure on the the Condensate Polishers?
12l l
131 CRONEBERGER: Yes.
14)
E FASANO:
...which then blocked the outflow of your condensate pump.
16i Is that correct?
17!
18!
CRONEBERGER: Yes.
1Si 20{
FASANO:
My understanding is that condensate pumo should be, should 21!
continue to operate.
It should not... I was wondering if you knew why 22!
it would trip... I mean even under that sequence of events?
23l 241 CRONEBERGER: Under that sequence of events the condensate booster 25!
pump would trip.
i S85334
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1 11 FASANO:
Booster?
2l 31 r
CRONEBERGER:
Yes.
4!
C;
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FASANO:
But the condensate pump was the one I think that was on the 6i printout?
7l 1
0 CRONEBERGER:
That's correct. We were trying to investigate why a condensate pump might trip as a result of the booster pump trip.
101 11' FASANO: This gets back to the AMS switch.
12!
f 13 !
CRONEBERGER:
Yes.
14!
15 FASANO:
That's inconclusive at this time? You don't really have a...
16i 17 CRONEBERGER:
One of the engineers is deeply involved with that investigation 18f right new and his conclusions are tentative, yes.
191 20li FASANO:
As far as the getting of water into the instrument air, would 21i this have to travel through the service air line?
22!
23l CRONEBERGER:
Yes.
24:
25!
S83335 a
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22 1,'
FASANO:
Cross the bypass, ac'.ually across a check valve and then 2l l
through the dryers, then continue on to the instrument air tank?
3!,
4!
CRONEBERGER: Yes i
5 5
FASANO:
That's quite a tortuous path.
71 i
8 CRONEBERGER:
Yes.
9!
10l FASANO:
Do...in the design function, do you evaluate concerns or 11!
information gathered at other plants similar to TMI 2 or do you specifically 12 look at just TMI 2 and its design considerations?
In particular such 13!
plants as Davis-Besse, other B&W plants, I guess is one, where they 14!
had a similar problem with their... well they might have a similar 1 51 problem with their main steam relief valve?
16; 17' CRONE 3ERGER: My general experience since I've been here is that ISj personnel within our licensing is screening information that's documented 19!
relative to other plants and my involvement would be limited to responding 20t to items which they would identify as being potentially relevant to 21li one of our units such as TMI.
22l i
231 FASANO: Okay. At this point I... based on the experience that you 2dl have with this occurrence and again you're here, you're relatively new 25i to GPU apparently?
I would 1;ke you to take this time, if you like, l
S8533G a
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i l
23 1) to make any kind of self retrospect or the future planning.
How that 2:
l we have had this experience or possible involvement may be more timely 3L or more helpful not only here but to other utilities operating with 4!
nuclear power plants.
Si Si CRONEBERGER:
I would simply at my remarks to indicate that our ability 7'
to respond in the beginning was hampered greatly by communications 8f faults.
Simply not being able to understand fully what was happening at the plant.
That's all.
10l FASANO:
I gather this would be time msponse, time data '<ind of 12 ccmmunication that would be... your suggestion as being more valuable?
(
131 14)
CRONEBERGER: Yes.
15 16i FASANO:
I have no further questions.
17!
18!
MARSH: I have none.
So at this time, the time being 10:15 a.m., 625 19!
on the meter we will terminate this tape with just a word of thanks 20!
Mr. Croneberger for coming in.
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8853.37 f