ML19208B147
| ML19208B147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1979 |
| From: | Marsh R Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190121 | |
| Download: ML19208B147 (39) | |
Text
t-3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA j
i l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
I In the Matter of:
2l IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
3:
of I W 3 72 V w f M T 1994 M G f
Si 6!
7!
81 Trailer #203 9!
NRC Investigation Site l
TMI Nuclear ?cwer Plant 10i Middletown, Pennsylvania ll!
June 20, 1979 12l (Date of Interview) 13 July 26, 1979 (Date franscript Typea) 142 315 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
16i 17' 18!
191 20; 21i NRC PERSONNEL:
22l Robert Marsh
~3; James S. Creswell 7
Anthony N. Fasano g
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cOS c
25i 7909190jg/
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MARSH: The time is 7: 45 PM.
The data is June 20, 1979.
My name is 2:
Bob Marsh.
And I'm an Investigator with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 3
Commission assigned to the Region III Office, Chicago, Illinois.
This
.p evening we are conducting an intarview, of a confidential nature.
The 5;
intarview is being conducted in Room 225 of the Red Roof Inn in Swartara, g;
At this time prior to commencing the intarview, I'd 7
like the other NRC individuals in the recm to identify themselves and spell their last name if they would.
g; 91 CRESWELL:
This is James S. Creswell.
I'm a Reactor Inscector assigned 10!
to Region III.
12:
FASANO:
Anthony N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist, NRC, currently cut 13,,
of Region I.
5 MARSH:
I thank you.
For the expedient of conduc.ing :nis intarview we will be referring to our subject of this evening by :ne name af IAS.
And I will indicata for the record that fg g is present for the interview and is accompanied by his council.
At this time we would normally go into some backgrotad and a brief resume of the individuals experience in the nuclear field, that will be bypassed tonignt and I think we'll go directly to the areas of questions.
Creswell do you 22' want to start?
23l 24; 25i
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1:
CRESWELL:
This is Jim Creswell speaking. Sm S I'd like to go back 2:
to the day of March 28, 1979.
3; 4;
MARSH:
Let me interrupt for just a second.
I just noticed one area I 5!
omitted. IAft!p, before we started I gave you a two page memo wt.ich g;
before we begin questioning I would-like to just make reference to.
7, You've had a chance to look at that memo and I'm just briefly going to g;
describe and indicate that it covers the purpose of NRC's investigation, g
some brief words acout its scope and its authority to conduct it and A"
'
- 1**' ' G"*
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- 10l On the second page are several questions whicn I would like to get a response to you before we begin.
First question addresses your understanding of that two page memo.
Have you had a chance to read it and do you understand it?
14!
15; SQ:
Yes I have.
IT MARSH:
Second question addresses, do we have your permission, we being NRC, to tace this interview?
1_C i 20:
IMS-Yes you do.
21; 22:
MARSH:
And thirdly, the question indicates, would you like a copy of 23i the tace or transcript?
241 25:
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lj Sm8:
Yes, a copy for myself and probably for counsel.
2' MARSH:
Fine.
3{
That will be provided as I indicated earlier, first 4:
thing tomorrow morning.
If you want to, I'll give you a phone numcer, give me a buz: and I'll get.you those two copies.
There is a fourth 3;
question that is not called out at the rear of the page but it is 5i covered in the body and that indicatas your right to have a company 7
gj representative or anyone you so choose.
If it's my understanding, your choice would be strictly to have counsel here.
g, 10:
fad:
Right.
12' MARSH:
Fine.
,31 Okay, at that point then we'll proceec.
1 14:
CRES'* ELL:
Jim Creswell speaking again. S m s, again I'd like to go back to the day of March 28, 1979.
And coulc you tell us when you
,6 L
came onsite and the conditions that you found whenever you arrived onsite?
ISt 19:
ImS:
Okay.
I arrived onsite at acproximately 5:10 AM.
I got to the Unit 1 Instrument Shop at acout 5:15.
At that time I took a cuo of 22l coffee and walked into the Unit 1 Control Room just to see wnat was going on, get an idea of what was going to happen that day.
23i As the Shift Foreman who was in charge then, what was hacpening, he had told 241 me that he was to cusy right now, I can't talk with you.
25i I'll see you 4
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later on.
So at that time I went back into the Shop, finished drinking 2:
my coffee and was waiting for the relieving crew to show up.
At l
approximately 6:40 A.M., Instrument Foreman walked in and we talked 3
for a few minutes and at approximately 6:50 A.M., Unit 2 had announced p
there was a Site Emergency - Radiation Emergency, a Sita Emergency.
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Gave the, the alert siren went off I recall.
Also made the announcement for the unnecessary personnel to report to their assigned areas they 7
g; were supposed to go to.
91 MARSH:
Marsh speaking, SMS, let me interrupt for a second.
You say 10; 5:50, that sounds relatively specific, had you checked the watch or how were you aware of this?
131 I M S Yes I did.
I looked at a watch, it was 5:50 A.M. on the button.
g 15 MARSH:
I thank you.
IT 1 M 6 Okay.
At that time right after the siren went off and they 1.8 t announced the emergency, the Foreman had told us
. pert to the North Auditorium, which is the mustering area for Unit 1 personnel.
I 21{
then reminded the Foreman that the Emergency Repair Party was to 22!
report to the Health Physics muster point, wnich he had forgot acout.
So we went down there to the Unit 1 HP area.
When we arrived there, 2 31 it was a little bit of mass pancemonia going on.
People were running around not knowing exactly what was happening.
We were mustering dcwn ns (U
(
5 lj there, trying to get an Emergency Repair Party crew together.
Some ci 2
the crew was caught coming onsite, some of the crew was caught coming 3l offsite, so security had their hands full, everybody had their hands
,p full. About the only thing that I did see that struck me odd, that 3
there was something going on really bad was'one HP tachnician going g;
back into the Unit I Aux Building with a Scott Airpack on, it was either a Scott Airpack or it was a Full Faced Particulata Shield, and
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a talector.
9:
CRES'wELL:
,G Excuse me Img was that a taletector?
A 11.
Teletector, right.
13!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
15 IMO Okay.
We stayed there for approximately ch I would say 30 minutes, it was between the timeframe of 7:20 and 7:30 we were told to report to Unit 2's STE Office, which is the Startup Test Engineers office adjacent to the Unit 2 Control Room.
Okay, we, there was about 6 of us, I can't remember who all was in the party, but there was 20f mechanics, electricians, instrument, plus a foreman that was assigned.
21:
We took tne normal route to Unit 2 which is through the outsice area, the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, througn the security door and up the 23:
steps.
And upon entering Unit 2's Control Room, it was just mass 2ai confusion of people.
I never seen so many people in one Control Rcom.
25; 9\\l
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r We went directly to the STE's offica and sat there and awaited further 2;
instructions as to what was wrong and what was going on.
3l 4:
CRESWELL: % g going back to,the time that you assemcled in the Unit 3;
1 health physics area, was there any one person there in charge?
6i 7
1mG The Foreman who was with me at that time took charge and startad 8!
getting a muster sheet together because as I said before there was 9
oncoming crews coming on, there was offgoing crews going off and at this dme ac:cuntabilig was very difficult because of the pecple in 10!
and out of the plant.
So we started ac:cunting for as many people as we could.
He was relieved of that duty when we were told to go to Unit 2.
I don't know what happened to him or where he went after that, I believe he went back to the Unit l's muster area.
15:
CRESWELL: What was his name 3 g?
17; 1Ng :
Gordie Lawrenca, Gordie Lawrence.
CRE5WELL:
Gordie Lawrence.
20:
21!
lyg6 :
Right.
He was the Unit 1 Instrument Foreman.
42 23!
CRESWELL:
So he was in charge of the health physics area?
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1mQ:
Well, he was an Instrument Foreman, he did take charge of the 2;
mustering area.
Health physics, as far as a foreman is concerned, I 3!
don't know what foreman was on-duty at that time.
4' CRESkELL: Was there a Mr. Kalenevitch there?
5j Si 1M6:
Yes.
He was there.
He had shown up there about 5 minutas 7
after we arrived at the HP area.
Advised us that he was acpointed the g,
Emergency Repair Party Coordinator and Foreman and he would take over g
10:
11.
CRESWELL:
Do you recall the name of the health physics technician that you saw with a full faced protective acparatus, either a respirator or Scott Airpack?
15:
Int 3:
No I don't.
I can't recall.
, o, :.
17 CRESWELL:
Okay.
So you arrived at the Startup Test Engineers Office, who were the other 3 people that were with yor?
20i ImG :
The offgoing instrument crew would of been Carl Vincent, and I believe his partner was Matt Joyce, a new guy that just came on.
22l 231 CRESWELL.
Do you recall seeing a Mr. Sennett and a Mr. Gilbert?
24:
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3,M 6 :
Not right then and there I didn't.
No, they didn't come in and 2:
I didn't see those people until later on.
3!
4; CRESWELL:
Okay.
Abcut what time would you estimate that you arrived 5;
in the Startup Test Engineer's office in Unit 2?
Gi 7
TM6:
It would of been, ch, 7:35 plus or minus a few minutes.
8 '.
CRESWELL:
Okay.
You've mentioned the imoression that you got walking g;
in the Control Recm.
Mcw many pecple would you estimata were at the 10l g
control paneis?
12 5Y^
At the control panels, uhm, it's hard to tell ' exactly how many 13; pecple were at the control panels itself.
I would estimate that there 3,
was a gcod 50 people inside the Control Recm at the time.
As far as
,j who was at the control panel, wnat was going on, and again it's another story because there was turnovers taking place and everything else.
There was just crews caming in.
It would be a wild guess for me to say how many people was at the panel itself.
20l CRESWELL:
Was it your assessment that things were being well controlled or that there was a non-controlled type of situation?
c2 23i 1% @:
It seemed that though things were under control, 'cause I did 24!
notice the Shift Supervisors were going over prints which normally j
e Qu s
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1 would tell me that they had an idea of what was going on, trying to 2j evaluate the situation.
There wasn't any parar:oia, as to say noacdy 3j was totally out of the scene, if you know what I mean.
So, everybody seemed to be keeping a little head, trying to cbserve what was going 41 3
on, seeing what was happening.
5i CRE5WELL:
Okay.
After you reported to the Startup Test Engineers 7
g Office, what's the next thing that hacpens?
Did you report to any one individual in that area?
g 10;
}yy16 :
No.
We didn't report to any one individual at all.
We had our foreman that was with us and he stayed cut into the Control Rocm and he is the one that is supposed to coorcinata the Emergency Repair Party foes.
I would say we were in there from maybe 20 to 25 minutes and the Unit 2 Foreman, Doug Weaver, walked in and asked us, two of us, if we knew where the incore termination cacinet to the computer was.
There was a Unit 2 man that knew.
IT ISt CRESWELL:
Who was that, M 20:
1M6:
Jim Wright.
Okay.
He knew where the termination cabinet was.
21!
So they asked for 2 people to go down.
Jim and myself went down.
22!
23I CRE5WELL: 1,M 6, you went down with him?
24:
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1 IMI:
Right.
I went with who?
2:
3j CRE5WELL:
With Jim Wright.
4:
3; Im6:
Right.
I went down with Jim Wright. Our instructions were to 6i g down with a Type K *.hermoccuple reader to disconnect various inputs, 7
non-specifically given, to the computer on the incore detectors and to g
measure temperatures.
When we asked why, the reason was, the c::mouter g
.. had over ranged on engineering units.
So, we went, got a thermac::uple reader and went cown to the cabinat..
, 01 4
11:
CRE5WELL:
7 And this is you both go and get the thermoc::uole reader?
131 IW @',:
Right, we both went together, rignt.
15 CRES'aELL:
'*here did you get the reader:
.oi IT 9 0:
Out of the Vait 2 instrument storage area.
13i CRESWELL:
Okay.
21; Ih16:.:
Diay.
We went down to tae relay room wnich was down through the control tower steps we went and went into the relay rocm, opened i
23!
up the cabinet for the thermoccuple inputs to the computer.
And 20 visually looked at which ones would be the simplest to take off without 25, q'y.
a' o,
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getting involved in cutting wire straos and wrapping and everything 2[
else.
So we startad pulling, oh, sets off at a time, just i theraccouple 3;
at a time so es not to lose where they were ot; the terminal board 4;
measuring the temperatures.
Do you want to know what tamceratures we gi saw or what?
Gi 7
CRESWELL:
Please.
8!
MD:
Okay.
Scme of the temperatures we had seen were acave normal g
yg RC tamperature.
Two of the thermoccuoles, the first few we had measured, were around 700 to 800 degrees specific tamceratures I can't g
quote you, I don't know. We had taken one off and we had measured 2600 degrees in and about that vicinity, it was very close to that.
At that time neither one of us believed that this was a true reading becausa after seeing two, three that were 700, 300 degrees 2600 was 1:.
hard to believe so we decided to take a few more off.
When we took, I 1,
don't recall exactly how many, I believe through the course of tasting 1.
thermoccun?es we had at least 10 or 12 we had just connected :ne ISr total.
We had seen temperatures ranging anywhere frem I know there was a botum of about 690 same degrees to uppers of 3700 to 4000 degrees.
21.
22l MARSH:
Marsh speaking, h6were there any written records made of this time of your readings.
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Tw.Gt Okay. While we were down there Mr. Bennett came dcwn.
2:
3; CRESWELL:
About what time {pg would he nave ccme down or where were 4;
you at the measuresments when he came down.
Si Gi M:
We had just started.
We were prcbably finishing our second 7
reading because se had wanted to mark them dcwn ourselves.
Neither g;
one of us had a pencil av paper to mark it down with.
So Mr. Sennett g,
had came dcwn, alsc Mr. Gilbert.
This is when Mr. Gilbert and Mr.
10; Sennett shcwed on the scene and also an engineer frem Unit 2 came down, the one that had originally requestad that the readings be taken place.
y 131 CRE5WELL: Whowasthatit*S?
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rememcer his name.
1Si CRESWELL:
An Instrumentation Engineer.
20t M
No, I don't think he is an instrumentation engineer.
Oh my
,ch i
tnis is embarrassing.
22!
23l CRE5WELL:
Well Mr. Porter is the Unit 2.
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There-You got it.
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CRESWELL:
Ivan Porter?
4; 3l
'1,Yn6:
Ivan Portar, yea, I don't know whether he's an instrumentation Si engineer er not.
Okay, he came dcwn on the scene then also.
I believe p
Mr. Bennett was taking handwritten notes as to what the tamceratures Sj were.
91 MARSH:
1 01 Excuse me, Marsh speaking,7,MS wny do you feel he was taking notes.
Did you see him with pad and pencil.
12 1M6 : We actually asked him to take dcwn what the temoeratures were, g
what we had dcne is recorded the pull slip numoer of the thermoccuole and cross referenced it, I believe, you knew, later on to a core map because I did see a core map of the incares and trying to find out
,6 6
where they were with reference to the core, whether they were all centrally located in one' area or whether it was staggered througnout the core.
1Si 20!
MARSH:
I Thank you.
21:
22!
hS:
Okay.
As far as time frame when they arrived on the scene it would have been right after we had started making the measurements, 24!
prcbably within a sacend thermoccuple, you're talking maybe five 25:
u%.
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I 14 i
lj minutes per measurement on it.
Okay. After we had started getting 2:
some measurements there and we saw what was going on, not knowing 3j exactly where the thermocouples was located in the core we decided to 4;
make a few more measurements along with that and as I said before we gj saw temperatures anywhere from 690 to close to 1000 degrees.
We did 6i
- ree one I know for sure was 3700 around in that area and 'at that time 7
both Jim and myself turned around anu icoked at all three of the g
gentlemen that were with us and said this thing's melting down.
9!
10t was present at dat Mme, 11:
...That the core is uncovered.
That's Mr. Sennett, Mr. Gilbert, Mr. Porter.
Okay Mr. Porter kind of doubted our word and didn't believe the readings.
15 FASANO:
Casano speaking,1 W B, how do you know he doubted your word.
17; p g:
To keep the tape clean, not to embarrass pecole I won't use the words, however he did turn around and look at us and says I don't believe your readings.
Are you sure you're taking your readings 20!
correctly or is the thermocouple connected to the reader properly.
So after assuring that, he wanted a verification that the thermocouple reader was working so the only verification we could really give not 23!
having type "X" material around to check it out was to get millivolt 2 41 reader and measure the actual voltage coming uo from the incore.
So 25i q'y u
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15 I
at this time I don't know who went up to get the metar, I believe it 2
might have been Mr. Gilbert or Mr. Bennett went up to get a millivolt 3!
meter but.
4; 3;
CRE5WELL: M6 was there perhaps a digitial vold meter in that area?
6i 7
74:
I don't know whether there was digital volt meter there or not.
3; We did not bring one down with us.
Theremighthavebeenonethere from the ICS technician, NNI tachnician that works there but normally g;
10t when he leaves his equipment is all locked up so if there was one g
there it procably no doubt would have been under lock and key.
12:
CRE5WELL:
g Digressing a minute, I believe the statement that you made g
was that you felt the core was meltad down or a statament of that charactar was made.
Was it possibly, possible that you phrased it in terms that the core was uncovered.
,6 2
17' IM:
Okay, the core was uncovered is wnat I said, the core is uncovered.
g 191 CRE5WELL: Which way did vou say it?
Is that the way you phrased it.
21l W S:
Right.
We're clarify that.
The core was uncovered is what I i
had said.
23l 2 41 25!
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16 1!
CRESWELL:
Not that the core was melted down.
2:
3 IM6:
No.
1 4!
Si CRE5WELL:
Okay.
6i p
Im(3:
Anyhow getting back to the subject, we had obtained a digital 81 volt meter with a cross referenca table for voltage to tamcerature g,
wise for Type K Indicators and we had reverified I would say at least 101 75% of the thermaccupies we had originally taken readings on and g
especially the hot ones, the very hot ones, the 2600, 3000, 4000 degree one we had seen.
The two instruments both agreed with each g,
g other so at that time Mr. Porter had left the room.
14:
CRESWELL: IM6about what time would you estimata this is that you 1Si 17:
f Igt3 :
Roughly estimating I would say in the area of approximately maybe, oh boy, I gotta think now, 9:00, 9:15 around in that vicinity I would say.
21:
CRE5WELL: Werethereanymorecomments,1MS,abouttheconditionof the core.
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1:
3m6:
No it was.the general consensus amongst the instrument people 2
that were there that the core was definitaly uncovered, we kind of 3g found it hard to believe that this many high temperatures that we had 4
seen that all those incores would have been bad and the only way that 5:
they could have went bad that radically would be an uncovering of the Si core, and a super overheating.
The last thing we had done down there 7
in the relay rcom before leaving was that both Mr. Porter and the gj Instrument Foreman requested that we hook up this thermocouple reader g
to various thermoccupies so that the operations department could use it.
So we did hook up I think it was maybe five or six.
Now there
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was no actual locations given, it was just pick five or six at random, hook them up, verify that they do indicata properly and ' hen our foo was finished then.
14:
CRE5WELL: TM6 is there any doubt in your mind at the time all the measurements ara. completed that Mr. Porter has been told by the people
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down there that they feel the temperature indications indicata the
. ore was uncovered.
1Si 196 gmS:
Did he believe us?
21 CRE5WELL:
I say is there any doubt in your mind that he had not been 22l told or that he had been told, sorry, that he had been told.
22I 24!
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IS Oh no, I personally told him that and he was physically there 1:
2 to read the readings.
He saw the actual temperatures we had.
This is 3
why the first time he didn't believe it.
4:
FASANO:
Fasano speaking.
When the verification of the measurements 3;
were made, using the millivolt meter was the information then given to 01 the same individuals and how, what was the response to the second set
/
gj of readings that tended to verify, at least correlate to the original readings.
9 10t 76:
Okay.
New the sec::nd set of readings did in fact correlate the original set of readings that was taken with the thermoc::uple reader.
,u The general feeling at least amongst Jim and myself was that the readings we had were true and accurate.
All five of us that were present there did in fact visually see the actual readings we had
,6-taken both off the thermoccuple reader and millivolt reader.
Ali five 1
of us did in fact verify that the millivolt reading througn the conversion table was correct.
So I am sure we didn't read the wrong table or the wrong line or something of that nature.
At that time between Mr.
19i Sennett and myself, Mr. Wright, Mr. Gilbert, we had pretty well came 20; to the conclusion the core was uncovered.
I believe Ivan didn't 21.
really want to believe what was really taking place.
I don't know 22 whether it was an attitude of hey your measurements are wrong, you 23l guys don't know what the heck you're doing or whatnot.
I think the 24!
general consensus throughout the whole first day was numoer one nobody 25i 9,
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really knew what was actually happening, number two, some that had an inkling of what was happening didn't really want to believe what was g ing n.
Once you start seeing a temperature of 3000 to 4000 degrees 31 in a core :irconium alloy is what 3700 - 4000 degrees melting point 4
g or is it 5000, I can't remember the actual melting point of the :irconium.
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coming. The core is uncovered.
That was basically the extent of our i
test that we had done down there in the relay room.
After we had g
finished connecting up the thermoccuple reader we reportad back to the g
ST office.
11:
CREFWELL:
That would have been about what time.
12'.
13I y$ :
I would say probably between 9:25 and 9:35 around in that time
,4 A
frame till we got back upstairs.
15 CRETWELL:
Do you have any knowledge of Mr. 'dright's involvement in IT the hooking of the digital voltmeter on the T hot RTDs.
ISr ISl p {3 :
No I don't.
21; CRETWELL:
Did he leave you at any time that you were down in the 22!
cable rocm making these thermocouple measurements to perform any 23i operation like that.
24!
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l 1:
I don't know of, I can't remember.
Q 2:
3{
CRESWELL:
Did he leave you, that's what I'm asking.
Was he with you all the time.
y Si I can't really say for sure if he did leave, I can't remember.
Gj I
CReSkett:
Okay what happenee after you went back uostairs.
9!
ImB : Okay, we went back up to '"e STE's office and remained there for a short period of time, I ws:.id say probaoly twenty minutas.
At that time Mr. Weaver came in and told the Unit 1 people that they could go ahead and reassemole at the North Auditorium in Unit 1, that 131 he had enough people on site at the time to handle anything that would 14 come up.
So the people from Unit i startad reporting to the North Auditorium.
This is where we back to.
Ys ent over to the North 15'.
Auditorium.
In the meantime while everything was going on and we were taking readings and that the normal crew that would be coming on duty 13:
finally got onto the island, the off going crews finally got off the 131 island, so we had our normai manpower in there for the daytime.
20!
21, CRESWELL:
Okay.
22:
23!
~
MARSH:
Before we begin another section here, I'm going to break at 20 this time and turn the tace, time being 3:13 p.m. and reading 163 on 25 the metar.
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i 21 1
MARSH:
Again resuming at 463 meter and the time being 8:14 p.m.
2:
CRESWELL: 1m9, after you leave the auditorium what happens to you.
3 4:
Tp6:
Okay.
We were told we were allowed to leave the North Auditorium g
and all personnel were to recort to the 500 KV vold substation which Q1 is just south of the island on route 141.
As we were leaving the l-health physics people had set to a monitoring checkpoint wita friskers g
to insure that if there was anyone c::ntaminated that thm would be g
taken care of.
I believe there were seven of us including myself that was contaminated that day.
We were told to recort back to the Unit I health physics department to leave all our clothing there, anything that would be contaminated.
We were frisked before we went in to find 131 out exactly where the contamination was on us, which was over, hair, arms, everywhere.
The only thing that was not contaminated was my legs and that because the contamination did not go through the clothing lo, or a.jthing.
My arms of c::urse were because I was wearing a short sleeve shirt, my face and my scalp was pretty well contaminated.
131 Actual disintegrations per minute or counts per minuta I can't tall 19i you.
We were enecked there at the HP check::oint.
We had stripped 20; down there, put ali cur clothes, personal belongings and effects in a 21!
polybag and were told to go back and shower which is standard HP 22l procedure to remove the contamination.
Okay we had showered, came 23!
back out, was refrisked, checked for any kind of radiation on us anc 24!
myself, I was clean.
I can't know acout the rest of the people.
As 25i a
22 6
1!
far as my personal belongings was concerned HP had frisked my personal 2:
belongings, I was allowed to leave the island with my car keys, my driver's license.
The rest of my clothing and everything stayed 3;
behind.
HP insured me that they would wash my clothes, decon them and 4:
Si get them back to the substation.
Okay I went back out through the same 6
l' MARSH:
- xcuse me 'I,W%, Marsh again, what type of dosimetry were you g;
wearing at the time when you performed the duties.
g 10:
gm(3:
Self reader and also a TLD.
12l MARSH:
Okay, have you ever been provided the results of that TLD.
14:
$wO '
No I haven' t.
15; MARSH:
Okay, your self reader, your talking dosimeter direct reading dosimeter.
IS:
19!
'I,wt3 :
Right.
20:
21:
MARSH:
Do you recall what the accumulation was on that.
22i 23l tw6 ':
No I don't.
24i 25:
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l
23 i
MARSH: Okay.
2:
3; I do not recall what it was.
4!
MARSH:
And you say you have not been provided a summary of what your 3;
TLD read for that.
g; 7?
W6:
I have not seen it yet, no.
g 9!
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lot 11!
CRESWELL: imB did you look at your self reading dosimeter.
13:
g:
I had looked at it when I was over in Unit 2 up in tne STE's office and there was no indication on it.
It was the same indication.
Of c:urse I didn't zero it, I can't remember exactiv what it was 15i
~
setting at frcm the previous day.
But as far as any change was ccncerned I didn't see any change.
19!
CRESWELL:
Where do you think you received the contamination.
20; 21:
$M6:
I don't know because most of us were all in the same general area.
I believe where I received the c0ntamination is that the Unit 1 231 instrument shop was pretty well vacated.
Now I had went back in, the 24)
Unit 2 instrument shop, excuse me, was vacated right after the accident 25i k
'i
i i
l i
24 i
i y
cause everyone was in the STE's office.
New I went back there to lock 2
for test leads and things of this nature to make our thermecouple 3,
readings with so it could very well have been back there.
Throughout 4,
the rest of the morning Mr. Wright was with me and he, frem what I Si understand, was not contaminated, I don't know.
Scmehow we believe g
the only other place we could have got it would have been over there in the Unit 2 instrument shop.
/
81 CRE5WELL: W6 do you have any idea what might have caused this g
event.
11!
WS :
Well from what I've heard as to what has caused the event, the initial cause of the. plant trip was due to a malfunctioning valve on the polishing system.
The nuclear pcrtion of it again from I've heard cause I can't verify that I've seen. it, was caused frem, hcw shall I put it, the negligence of leaving the emergency feecwater valves closed, again frem what I understand, which was again a procedural I don't believe if it wasn't for the feecwater valves being error.
18:
closed we wouldn't be in the mess we're in right new.
19!
20!
CRESWELL:
Do you have any idea of what might have caused the valve 21!
closure in the condensate polisher area.
22l 23;
$M:
I think the valve closure was caused by the water in the instrument 24!'
air.
Frem what I understand I don't knew the opera', ion of their 25:
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I
25
{
polishing system over there.
From what I understand the operator had 2
just got through, I believe changing vessels on the polishers, I don't 31 think all the polishing vessels are used at any one time, I think 4;
there is one in stancby for regeneration and any other ones are in g
I don't know how many polishing vessels they have, probably six use.
I would assume.
I believe from what, again I've heard, the operator
.w had just got done changing vessels over.
My recollection of what was
/
g told me was that a check valve or ano+5er type of valve was left open which caused water to get into the instrument air supply.
This had g
caused apparently an air signal for something to happen in the polisning systam to cause one of the polishers, I would assume just one polishing unit to trip off line, this is my assumption.
Judging from the problems that Unit 2 has had with primary system as far as flow and everyting is concerned, there is spec limits as far as running that r'eactor were a lot thinner.
No doubt the polishing unit tripping off line did L.
create one heck of a transient in the plant.
All rignt, this would account probably for the turbine trip.
Okay the turbine tripping of course is as in going to AC count, possibly for the reactor trip.
Very unusual that a nuclear generating station will have a turbine 191 trip without a reactor trip, at least in Unit 2 it was a rarity.
The 20!
events after that during the reactor trip of course the pressure is 21!
going to build up once the turbine trips you lose ; edwater, you 22!
know, the reactor trips should pick up your emergency feedwater pumps 2 31 which of course did not pick up.
So we did not havc emergency feedwater 2?:
for any kind of cooling, I don't know how long the system was out.
25!
Y>'
l 26 Pressure apparently did build up frem my recollection of what is 3
2 happening here, the reactor started building up in pressure, started 3j building up in temperature and I believe the reactor would have tripped 4i on a high temcer or a high pressure greater than 2255.
The actual g;
eventa of, you know, chrcnological order off the ccmputer sheet I Gi d n' t know, the pressure, the electromatic rt:tief valve and the pressurizer p
was it RCRV2 I think it is went cpen, stayed open, frem what I understand.
g If that would have stayed ccen that would have flashed a pressuri:er dry.
Ccmmon sense would pretty well say that since ycu've got 2255 g
g pounds worth of pressure in there, gcd knows what temcerature it was at that time, I don't think cur temperatures were measured at the incere, had just started at that time, I think those temceratures existed long before we got there.
Of course that is going tc flash the steam very rapicly.
.t.
15:
CRE5WELL: 1 4 do you nave any evicence that anybocy tamcered with
,,), i the condensate system or with the emergency feecwater valves.
1Sl None that I kncw of, not tampered with.
There's been known 19,t problems en the polishing system water getting into the instrument air 20, line.
It's been a '<nown fact that Unit 2 had that problem.
A let of 21:
the maintenance people reported this to their foreman and instrument 22!
air is an instrument shop responsibility.
It is my belief that tne 2 31 i
system should have been fixed, however, it is Met Ed's belief that the 20 plant shouldn't be shut down to fix it.
25i q; h a 4..
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27 L
CRESWELL:
Do you have any evidence that kny of the emergency feedwater 2:
systems have been tampered with.
31
.p As far as tamcering with, no.
About the only tampering I could 3;
say would have been along with them is when the operator had removed g;
the tags and didn't open the valves.
Of course the same situation !
7, believe existed in Unit 1.
81 FASANO:
Fasano speaking.
Remove the tags, what tags, do you know of g,
101 any ags.
11:
twe:
I had eelieved and it was my understanding that those valves were red tagged close for maintenanca.
g 14:
FASANO:
Would that be then under a work request.
Would that entail operations to go and put a tag on before maintenanca did any work on
,5 2
those valves.
17 ISt "iWi$:
Yes it would.
I would hope so.
20 FASANO:
So this would be in the tag log.
21:
22' 36:
It should be in the tag log, there should be a work request on 2 31 it, yes.
24i 25:
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1:
FASANO:
You think there should be a sork request, there would be a 2,
work request.
3:
4 SkS :
Right.
There would.ither be, even during an inservica inspection, g
if it was not maintenance in an inservice inspection it would seem to g;
me logically that the operations department should tag those valves cut.
7 81 CRE5WELL.
John, what evidence do you have that those valves should g
99'd "**
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1%D:
That they should have been.
13 CRE5WELL:
You mentioned red tagging.
15i FASANO:
Tagout.
ITf lynD :
Right. It's a tagout procedure.
If there is any kind cf maintenance 18 going to be done on any system or anything like that, to me ai "ar as l'W again like I said this was something that I had heard, that the valves 20:
were in fact tagged out.
No one has come up to me and said any different 21!
yet, of course.
22l 23i CRESWELL:
How did you hear that lyn %.
2L 25i q tx i-l
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NS :
Rumors and propaganda, more or less from company emolayees I w rk with.
2 3:
CRESWELL:
What was the statament, axact precisely what was the statement that they made.
g Si
$W6: We had asked what was wrong with 'Me emergency feed system.
/
Why it did not go on, in fact, you know, wnat had happened.
The word g
was that I got, and this is the day of the accident, the emergency feed pumps did in fact start.
Operations did in fact see a discharge pressure in the pumps, cause there is a discharge pressure indication there, however, there was no flow.
If there is a discharge pressure and there was no flow it kind of tells you one thing, the valve's 13:
closed.
Now we had asked, you know, why was the valve closed, it was tagged.
That was the word I got, tagging mean red tag or blue tag, one of the two.
15!
17!
CRESWELL:
Was it possible somebody mentioned that some other eouicment IS:
was tagged, that - in the area -
IS!
20:
7p6 :
Could very well be that some other equipment was tagged, but r
21!
the impression I got is in fact the emergency feed valves were closed 22!
and it took them, what, approximately, from what one person told me, 2 31 it took him eight minutes to determine this factor, get down, get them 24i apen.
And I guess this would have apceared at what, between 4: 10 and 25:
4:15 during the initial turoine trip.
A
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30 1
lj MARSH:
Marsh, let me ask one quick question of the same vein just to 2
clarify and be sure that the question is asked the way I prefer it to be asked.
If I understand you right you have no knowledge whatsoever, 3:
even heresay, of any attempted sabotage or intentional act by anyone 4:
g being the cause for this 6i 7
pg:
No.
No knowledge or anything of that nature.
81 MARSH:
Second question in the same area.
Do you have ar.y information g,
heresay or direct of any type of a party possibly going on, I'm curious
,0 1
because March 28 being the anniversary data, of tne data upon which Unit 2 went critical...
13!
3kB :
Well there was suppose to be a party that day, hcwever, that was cancelled.
That was the instrument shop.
I tnink the instrument shop was going to have a party, I knew the whole unit as a wnole was going to have a party.
There was a lot of things scheduled since it was the anniversary date.
18:
19!
MARSH: Where woulo that party have been scheduled for, do you recall 20!
or know.
21!
2l 90:
I believe the instrument shcp party was going to be right in i
23:
the Unit 2 instrument shop.
The company party, I don't knew where it 24' was going to be but I do knew that there was, I believe it was an 25:
offsite 1ccation.
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31 t
MARSH:
Was that a formali:ed function.
here there flyers put out on 37 it and that...
2 3:
Tghs9b :
Yea, there were postings put out on the dcors, bulletin boards y
g; and this thing so there was Unit 2 commercial party.
5i MARSH:
Would you have any kncwledge where any of these flyers or
/
posters are still located or pigeonnaled.
g 9!
- Lh*6 :
I have no idea.
All I know there was one on our shop dcor, there was one ccwn on the bulletin board, both bulletin boards in the ae Unit 1 building.
Unit 2 I can't tell you cause I very seidem get over tne Unit 2 to do anything.
14-CRESWELL:
The purpose of that party was wnat, the anniversary data?
15:
15-
$yn tS :
Rignt.
Unit 2 commercial data or power, you know, they had an al araiversary date when they went critical I guess.
And I was also IS!
sucpose to be I guess a commercial party too or scmething like tnat 196 involved.
20:
21; MARSH:
Are you aware of any other groups in-house just picking 22:
names, health physics or janitorial staff also slating internal parties 231' unofficial.
2L 25;.
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i 1:
Smg:
I don't know, they might have, I have no idea, no recollection.
2:
MARSH:
Have you heard anything whatsoever on operational crews 3
[
planning parties of that nature.
Si 1mB:
No.
The only one I heard of was the company one and also the m
instrument shop one.
I 8l MARSH:
Do you have any knowledge of past parties let's say by operational g
staff and by operational I mean control room staff at Christmas, holidays or scmething lika this.
Would this have been a normal thing to excect or is that...
12'.
13:
gyf3 :
On the island itself?
14 15i MARSH:
On the island itself.
16; IT 1mB:
No we don't, as far as what we call party-wise no.
I worked just last Christmas and about the only thing we had done then that was 19 out of the ordinary was that the couple of the operators were female 20i on the shift had decided to cook dinner for everybody so they had 21:
brougnt in spaghetti and meatballs and I was sick that night so I 22l couldn't eat any of it.
And my basic routine was to sleep on the work 23l bench most of the night until they needed me.
2?:
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i 33 MARSH:
The obvious area I would be looking at deep concern would be 3
2, the presence of alcohol beverages in or around the control room.
3!
1M3:
I have never seen any alcoholic beverages in the c::ntrol room.
4 MARSH:
No heresay of anything.
g 71 ImB:
No. Everybody talks boy I wisn I had a Sucweiser but no it's g
never there.
I've never seen any.
g 10' MARSH:
Okay.
Thank you.
,,M.
12' CRE5WELL: 1W9atthispoint.
Tony did you have scmething.
13; 11:
FASANO:
I just wanted to go back and maybe go througnt just a couple of steps, and then...
Do you recall wna got the second instrument for the validation of the measurements when you were dcwnstairs in ne cable room.
IS!
iSi gwS:
No I don't.
I don' t know who got it.
I believe Mr. Bennett left the room.
I don't knew whether he had brought back the actual 21, instrument itself, I de know that he did have with him the conversion 22!
chart.
23.j 24i 25:
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i 34 i
't FASANO:
In making the measurements wnose making the contacts.
Was it 1
2 a team effort or was one man doing the contacts as well as the reading.
3!
7.W6:
I was doing the contacts, physically taking the contacts frem g
the back of the c:mputer and putting them onto the =eter movement, you know, the meter itself. Mr. Wright wculd verify that it fact the Qt 7
proper contact was on the proper post of the meter and we would both take a look at readings.
We were rather excitad, its not every day g
that you see a core tamperature of 3700, 2700 degrees you knew.
So of course we didn't believe it ourselves to begin with.
11:
FASANO:
Since then have you gone and...apparently you are interested in the melting point of various materials.
14:
TM6-We yes, surc = n:w.
=
15:
FASANO:
Well did you go back and Icok to see wnat your melting point, these are alumel thermccouples?
ISI 19i T W 6 ':
No I had not taken a look at that but I guess pretty darn high from what I understand.
1 don': know wnat it is.
Do you off hand 21:
know?
22!
23; FASANO:
No I don't.
I just wondered if you knew.
25 9h"
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1 35 I
l lw9:
No I don't.
There's one guy there hat does know pretty good 2
the melting points of different things.
r 3:
FASANO: We can look it up.
4 Si ei.
"J,W3 :
Yea.
71 gl FASANO:
Do you recall setting scme, you mentioned that you set scme up permanently.
g 10:
1W6:
Right.
y 12!
FASANO:
Now prior to that did you measure any trends.
Were these temperatures fluctuating to any degree over the period of time you
,4 1
were?..
13:
16, g:
They were fluctuating but the amount of fluctuation as well as
.)
I was concerned was minimal.
Because when you start talking temperatures 18t of like I said 2600, 2000 degrees plus or minus 10 degrees, there might have a couple there that were fluctuating, the icwer temperature 20:
ones may have been fluctuating a little bit more but there was no 21:
actual what I would say radical fluctuation from say you're sitting at 22t i
a 1000 now and one minute later its at 2000 degrees.
231 24:
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1 FASANO:
Do you recall seeing any temperatures very low like 200 2
degrees.
3:
1WsQb :
No I don't.
4 Si FASANO:
You don't.
ei 7:
g; Iwath :
NC-91
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lot 11.
CRESWELL:
John at this point I would like to ask you, do you have any comments that you would like to make of any nature.
14' t>m q3 :
As pertaining to what.
16:
CRESWELL:
Anything.
1Si MARSH:
Marsh speaking, Its been our policy to turn the mike over to 191 the interviewee for any comment or point that he wants to make and 20 make a mattar of reco-d before we complete.
?.1; 22:
tynS : Well it sounds gross and maybe a little inhumane but I am kind 23i or glad the accident hapoened.
Because I think it is going to waken 20 some people up.
I think we are going to learn a lot from it.
I 25!
'l I
i
i i
i' 37 1;
believe it is going to make nuclear power safer.
And I am kind of 2
glad it happened in a new plant mainly due to the fact that the core 3;
life being as shortlived as it was, it was only what only 97 days or 4
90 days or something.
The actual radiation byproducts frei.: a shortlived g;
core of that naturs as far as plutenium-wise or cesium-wise or anything of that nature, *,ne byproducts were icw and limitad.
But I hope
..ei management learns a lot, I really do.
I think they ought to taka the i
view now of shutting the plant down and fixing what's righe, rather than waiting till the last acment.
101 MARSH:- Marsh speaking, I would like to say thank you for your time and your recollection.
Before we do finish up, counsel is there any comment you want to put en recora.
Okay, fine, there's a negative 131 indication.
I assure you that is one of the goals of this investigation to wrfng out of what we've got as much corrective actica and icentify 15i as much as we can as to what brought this about and what has to be done to prevent it from happening again.
1Sl T,4 :
It is my understanding that NRC is changing their ideas toward ISi centrol rocm operators, retraining program.
Have they given any 20:
thought at all to relieving CR0 of a little bit of his responsibility 21:
and putting two CR0s at that panel rather than one.
That's a hell of 22!
a lot of resporsibility to have up there.
I sure wouldn't want it and 23j the way Unit 2's control recm is for one man to operate that control 2 41 rocm that is a nightmare.
The RPS cabinets are hid, you can't see 25i ny \\
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1 them, a lot'of your primary instruments that you need are in the back of the panel you can't see them.
Whoever engineered that job over 2{
3 3[
th*.re well. he has a lot to be desired.
r 4:
MARSH:
g; Parsh speaking, much of t*11s is coming fror.e,the course of t.5e a!-
interviews ~and our investigation.
Much of it will be addressed, not 7
caly as it pertains to this plant but to the industry as a whole.
No y anyone t.5en c e M me t.".en being 3:36 and reading 819
~
er c mmen s 81 on the meter I will tarminata the tape and once gain say thank you.
g, 10:
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