ML19208B097
| ML19208B097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1979 |
| From: | Coleman M, Hitz G, Mark Resner Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspector & Auditor (OIA) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190052 | |
| Download: ML19208B097 (37) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA t
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSI0tl l
l In the Matter of:
2 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3l of A
Gregory R. Hitz i
Shift Supervisor of Operations Si Mark S. Coleman i
6i Control Room Operator 71 8!
Trailer #203 9i NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 101 Middletown, Pennsylvania ul June 6, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13}
Julv 6, 1979 (Date Transcrip: Typec) 141 301 15l (Tape Numcer(s))
16l l
17!
i 18!
191 20!
21; NRC PERSONNEL:
22:
Larry Jacksen, Radiation Specialist 23!'
Mark E. Resner, Investigator 24 25l C37 l2
?9091go g g g
i i
P RESNER:
This is an interview of Mr. Gregory R. Hitz.
Mr. Hitz is a 2 '
j Shift Supervisor of Operations employed with the Metropolitan Edison 31 j
Company at the Three Mile Island facility.
Also being interviewed is 4t c.j Mr. Mark S. Coleman.
Mr. Coleman is a Control Room Operator employed by Metropolitan Ediscn Company at the Three Mile Island facility.
This interview is being conducted in Trailer 203, which is located just 7
outside of the south gate to the Three Mile Island facility.
Today's date is June 5, 1979.
The present time is 1:35 p.m. Eastern Daylight time.
Individuals representing the NRC at this interview are Mr. Larry 10f Jackson; Mr. Jackson is a Radiation Specialist employed with Region I, v;
~'
excuse me, Region II of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I E
Speaking and moderating this interview is Mark E. Resner.
I am a 1
13!
Ir.vestigator with the Office of Inspector and Auditor in HQ, the U. S.
141 Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Both Mr. Coleman and Mr. Hitz had been 15!
interviewed previously and during that interview they were given a two 16i page document which explained the purpose, the scope and the authority 17!
with which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission conducts this interview.
IS{
In addition, it apprised them of the fact that there entitled to a 19f renresentative of their choice to be present during this interview 20i should they desire one, a;d also that they are in no way compelled to 21!
talk with us should they not want to.
On the second page of these 22{
documents that Mr. Coleman and Mr. Hitz were given are three cuestions 23l which they have answered.
I will state these for the record.
Mr.
I 29 25i
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-T c3' l
2 1!
Hitz's document, question 1, do you understand the above? He checked 2!
l yes, is that correct Mr. Hit:?
3!
4!
HITZ: That's correct.
Si l
6i RESNER:
Question 2, do we have your permission to tape the interview?
7 Mr. Hit: has checked yes, is that correct Mr. Hit:?
8!
HITZ:
Yes, that's also correct.
101 11 RESNER: Question 3, do you want a copy of the tape? Mr. Hit: has 12 checked yes, is that correct Mr. Hit:?
13i 14!
HITZ:
That also is correct.
15; 16[
RESNER:
Okay we will provide a copy, excuse me, with a copy of the 17l tape at the conclusion of the interview.
On the second page of Mr.
18!
Coleman's document, he has answered tnese three questions, the same 19f three and the affirmative, is that correct Mr. Coleman?
20i 21I COLEMAN:
Yes sir.
22l t
23l 24l 25 d
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11 RESNER: Okay we'll provide you with a copy of the tape at the conclusion 2
l of the interview.
Both individuals were given a document which explained 31 Title 18 of the U. S. Code, Section 1001, which addresses fraud and 4;
false statements.
Both Mr. Hitz and Mr. Coleman, have signed and dated Ci}
this document indicating that they understand what the document says.
Si At this time, I will turn the interview over to Mr. Jackson, who will b
propose some questions to both individuals.
1 81 m
JACKSON:
I'll start off here talking in generalities. What I'd like 10f to do is dwell on the makeup tank venting which caused gaseous releases, U
and I'd like to go back as far as your able, back toward the 28th.
I 12f know that possibly, Greg, you were assigned Unit 1 the first day, and 13!
you can only go back so far.
And I'd like for you, if you would, to 14!
pick up where you got involved with Unit 2 operations, and what were the activities involving the makeup tank releases?
If you can, explain 16; why you were venting the makeup tank, and who you were telling these lh releases and this type of information.
Can you sta t off on a general 181 basis like that?
19i 20!
HITZ:
This is correct, yes.
Let me start off by when I first came to 21 Unit 2.
And that would have been the day of the 28tn.
It was approxi-22l mately one o' clock in the afternoon.
We hao decided in Unit 2... I'm 23 sorry, we had decided... those of us in Unit 1... had decided that a 24l tour should be made of the Auxiliary Building in Unit 2 to determine if 25!
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we could see where any leakage we had into the building was coming 2l i
from.
And if we could do anything about that.
I talked to several 3\\
people in Unit 1 and volunteered to do that job because as a Shift 4:
j Supervisor, during the Unit i refueling outage, I was assigned to Unit c
~
2.
And the exposure that I had had... the accummulated exposure in 6i i
the core was very low.
So-I volunteered for that job to go down into 7Ii the Auxiliary Building with an HP tech.
And observe what was going on 8
l in the Auxiliary Building.
So, at approximately one o' clock, I arrived f
at the Unit 2 Control Room with an HP tech, some Scott air bottles, and i
10]
protective clothing. Talt
+o several individuals in the Unit 2 11!
Control Room; explained to them that we were going into the Auxiliary 12 Building. We were going to make a tour and determine:
(A) if there 13!
was water on the floor, (B) where the water was coming from, and (C) if 14!
we could anything about it.
The "P tech and I went into the Auxiliary 15' Building.
There was water on the floor on the 281 level, at almost 16i every floor drain on that level.
I went to the radwaste panel on the 1
305 level, and tried to transfer water from the Auxiliary Building sump 18!
and the Auxiliary sump tank to the miscellaneous waste holdup tank and 1$1 the neutralizing tanks, but I couldn't not get any of the pumps to run.
20' I also found that the Reactor Building sump pumos were in the auto 21!
position, but they were not running.
I turned the switches for the 2
Reactor Building sump pumps to the off position, and further isolated 23 some valves dcwnstream in the flow path.
And to the best of my recol-24!
lection, they were the inlet and the outlet valves to the filters to 25i
\\1 a cp
5 i
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preclude any water from possibly leaking by any valve into the Auxiliary 2!
j Building.
I couldn't get any of the pumps to start on the panel, and 3l because of the 20 to 30 minute limit on the air bottle that we had, I 4!
decided to take a tour downstairs in the 281 level.
The first place I ci
~ j went was into the Auxiliary Building sump tank room, where the Auxiliary 6i Building sump and the sump tank are situated.
The sump itself was full of water right to the top. The radiation levels in that area were approximately 10 R/ hour.
That's 10 Roentgen per hour.
Every floor 9!
drain, that had the standing water in it, the radiation levels were 10 considerably higher in those areas. We also checked with the instrument 11l that we had, the area of the makeup tank room and it was extremely 12f high.
At the door it was 10 R/ hour.
I did not have a key to open the 13!
door, so I could not stick the teletector inside the door to get any 141 better readings, or to get a better idea of what w._
7 on in that 15i room.
But the door itself was 10 R/ hour.
At this time, we ran out of 16i air.
We came out of the Auxiliary Building.
Reported to the Unit 2 17l Control Room what we had seen, and what we had done.
And then, I went ISI back to Unit 1.
I reported, as the Duty Shift Supervisor to Unit 2 on 19!
the morning of March 30th, at approximately 6 o' clock in the morning.
20!
I was the day shift Shift Supervisor.
I had on my way to the Control 21!
Room, I had passed the on-shift Shift Supervisor in the hallway, and he 22 was going to an interview at that time.
I'm not sure who it was witn.
I 23!
I believe it was with one of the GPU representatives, or an NRC repre-24 sentative.
I'm not very sure at this time, just who he was going to 25j interview with.
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1!
JACKSON:
That would have been Potts?
2!
l 31 i
HITZ:
No, sir.
That would have been Bill Zewe.
41 c;'I JACKSON:
Bill Zewe, 6i HITZ: Yes.
Bill and I talked about... we talked in the hall for a 0
couple of minutes.
And I asked him how he was doing, because. Bill was 9!
the shift Supervisor on the day of the incident.
So, I wanted to see 10 how he was doing. And then I told him I would icok at the turnover 11 notes, scan the panel, take my tour of the Control Room and talk to the 12 CRO's to he got back. And then we'd have our formal turnover at that 13 time.
I started scanning the panel in the Control Room.
One of the 14 '
first things that caught my eye was the pressure in the makeup tank.
15)
The pressure in the makeup tank at that time was somewhere between 60 16i and 70 pounds.
I'm not really sure at this time, but it was extremely 17 high.
And the level was approximately 20 to 25 inches.
I immediately ISI asked the CR0 why the pressure in the makeup tank was so high.And hi<
19' response was that we were degassing through the makeup system in the 20l makeup tank.
21i i
22l RESNER:
Do you recall that CR0's name?
23h i
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7 1.
HITZ:
Yes, it was Craig Faust.
There were two CR0s involved.
I 2l l
talked to both of them.
Craig Faust and Ed Fredericks was the CR0s 31 that were on night shift.
And those were the two individuals that I i
4!
j talked to.
We were degassing, was their answer. We were cycling MUV c
13, which was the vent valve off the makeup tank, in short bursts.
And 61 every time we cycled the makeup tank valve, we would always send an r
7l operator into the Auxiliary Building to put the waste gas compressors 81 i
in manual.
There was a leak in the waste gas line, or in the valve of]
itself, which if ycu didn't start the waste gas compressors and keep 10f the vent header pump down, as close to a vacuum as you could, you would 11!
get a release.
So they... to preclude this release, they sent an 12!
operator in, put the waste gas compressor in manual, vented the makeup 13-tank for a short period of time, closed the valve, and the operator 14f.
came back out.
One of the problems at approximately 6:15 to 6:30, the 15!
degassing process started to increase at a rate which the short time 16; that the valve was opened would not keep up with venting the makeup 17 tank.
They told me that there was an Aux operator downstairs dressing 18l at the time, and at this particular time on the morning of the 30th, it 191 was very difficult to get an operator into the Auxiliary Building.
It 20l took a long period of time.
Somewnere between 20 minutes to an hour i
21:
I'm sorry, 30 minutes to an hour.
The man had to dress.
He had to 22 have the RWP had to '. signed by an letter person, had to be signed by 23]
the Shift Supervisor.
The clothing required, double coveralls, wet 24j suit, so forth and so on, Scott air packs.
And it took a period of 25!
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time te get that individual dressed anc through the HP control point, 2
j and into the Auxiliary Building.
This individual was down there.
I 31 j
don't know who the individual was, the Aux operator.
But he was down 41 getting dressed at the time.
The pressure in the makeup tank increased c!
to approximately 82 to 83 pounds... that's ball park, 0.K.
And the 6I relief valve on the discharge of the makeup pump opened.
The makeup 7i tank level went to zero.
8!
ot*j JACKSON:
Did you all recognize... how long did it take you recognize 10!
that...
11!
12f HITZ:
That the relief valve 13i 14!
JACKSON:
...that the relief valve opened?
15i 16(
HITZ:
As soon as the relief valve opened, the makeup tank level went to zero.
And I knew that the relief valve was opened.
Also the pressure 18!
decreased in the tank, simultaneously.
It was an instant thing.
I 191 knew it right away.
Now, you've got to understand that that relief 20!
valve is on the water side, and not the gas side.
And that relief 21!
valve discharges to the reactor coolant bleed tanks.
Alright, it does 22l not discharge any gas, and it discharges liquid.
- 0. K.
Do you understand?
I 23l i
2 41 25\\
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JACKSON:
I do.
2!
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HITZ:
Alright.
The relief valve closed, and I could tell that because the level started to ccme back up.
And pressure stabilized.
It didn't come down anymore, 0.K.
And it was somewhere belcw 80 pounds.
I can't 6i i
give you a feel.
I'd just say 75 pounds, maybe, alright.
I then knew 7l that we had to get the pressure decreased in the makeup tank.
- Again, 8
the pressure started to build up some.
Right away the pressure started to build up again in the makeup tank vent, or that relief valve MUR 1 10 opened again.
And the level went to zero, again.
At this time, there 11, was no alternative, but to put the makup system on the SWST, that's the 12!
barated water storage tank.
The reasons we did that was to have a i
13 positive suction pump water to the makeup pumps, alright. When that 14 happened, all the levels in the reactor coolant bleed tanks started to 15i go up along with the pressures.
Because now the relief valve was 16!
discharging evirything.
Not only was the SWST supplying water to the 1-/!
suction of the puaps, but it was also supplying water to the makeup 18{
tank, which was discharging into the bleed tanks. My concern at this i
19!
time, was now that that I knew that the bleed tanks were hot, radiation 20l wise, I was draining the BWST through the relief valve into the bleed 21l tanks.
I know that the bleed tank level indication on, at least the B 22 and the C tank, and I don't remember scanning the A, but I'm sure that 23 the A pressure was high.
I don't know where the level was.
But they 2dj all indicated high... off-scale hign.
25l v.
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JACKSON: Any pressure?
2!
3i HITZ: Yes, pressure and level.
Somebody indicated to me that we had 4!
lost over two feet in the BWST.
Si 61 RESNER:
Do you recall who that individual was?-
i I
81 HITZ:
No, I don't.
There was an individual who went to the back of oi
~'
the panel, and he said we lost two feet.
It's possible i.t could have 10 been Bill Zewe, but I'm not sure of that.
My concern now-was overflowing 11 the bleed tanks onto the floor in the Auxiliary Building, which I knew 12!
would have been a precarious situation, because I already had enougn i
13 water on the floor.
I didn't want any more contaminated radioactive 14 water on the floor.
I also was draining the BWST, which was my source 15i of water for the reactor coolant system.
The objective was to get 16 water back into the makeup tank, to isolate the BWST, and to keep the 11 bleed tanks from overflowing.
We tried to line up the bleed tank to 18(
the makeup tank, but the pressure was so high in the makeup tank, that 19!
the pumps would not pump in.
The discharge pressure of the transfer 20i pumps was not enought to pump into the makeup tank. We then ordered 21{
the CR0s to line up two demin water transfer pumps directly to the 22l akeup tank. And they did raise the level in the makeup tank to ap-i 231 proximately 20 to 25 inches..
15 to 25 inches, in that ball park, 25l 0.K.
At that time, we isolated from the BWST.
Bill Zewe and I conferred 25'
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l 11 i
i 1:
j with each other, and I said, " Bill, you know the only way to get the 2!
level... the pressure down is to open the vent and leave the vent 3l l
open."
I told Craig Faust to make sure that that Aux operator was on 4;
l his way into the Auxiliary Building.
If he wasn't... tell him to get 51 going now.
0.K.
And we'll fill out the paper work when he gets back, 6i as far as the RWP, so forth and so on.
I told him to put the waste gas 7\\
j compressor in manual and leave.
Not to stay at the panel.
I then 81' ordered him, well between Bill and I, we ordered him to open MUV 13, 9l which was the makeup tank vent.
At this time, I called the ECS in Unit 10l1 1, and I told them that there was a possibility of a release.
Now 11' j
you've got to understand that the makeup tank vents to the vent header 12!
does not vent to the stack, and it does not vent to the Auxiliary 13 Building.
It vents to the vent header, 0.K., which is a normal operation.
14!
,i RESNER:
To the vent?
16i 17 HITZ:
18i 19t RESNER:
20!
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21 HITZ:
To the waste gas and vent header.
You should not get a release 22j by venting to the vent header.
Now we knew we had the valve... there 23}
was a valve that leaked.
There was a leak in the vent header.
- 0. K.
I 24!
But to our knowledge, by running the waste gas compressors in manual, 25; fm M
C, $ !
k
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it limited or precluded the release.
I called Unit 1 just as a pre-2l l
cautionary measure, and said there is a possibility of a release.
I 3!
i know you've got the offsite teams in position, and I know the onsite 4;:
teams are in position.
There's s possibility you might want to put the c:
helicopter up.
And then I hung up.
The next thing I remember was I
~
6i heard the helicopter on the radio, and I heard him announce 1,200 mR at 600 feet. My next question was where is he? Because I didn't know at i8' that point where he was, alright.
And they reported that he was over
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the vent header... over the... not the vent header, but the station 10l stack.
11!
12 RESNER:
Yes.
13!
14' HITZ:
But about this time, Gary Noll came to the Control Room, and 15' reported to the Control Rocm.
He immediately seen what was going on.
16 He ordered Bill Zewe to control the activities in the plant and of the 17j Control Room operators.
He ordered me to nave direct communications 18f with the ECS Director, Unit 1.
And to ensure that the Director at Unit 19!
I has talked to the Civil Defense, talked to the Bureau of Radiological 20 Protection, and specifically have Maggie Brown on the radio... on the 21i telephone talking specifically to her.
That individual was Bill Potts, 22]
to the best of my recollection.
And that, he ensured me that that was i
231 in fact, being done.
And we continued on.
I fed Unit 1 all the RMS 24{
information, and the plant status, and Bill directed the activities of 25i
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13 1!
the Control Room operators, and us apparently, too.
The readings on 2!
l the stack immediately started to decrease.
The makeup tank pressure 31 I
continued to decrease.
The waste gas compressor ran, and we continued 4t j
to leave MUV 13 open to get the pressure down in the makeup tank.
And Si j
we operated that day, or operated that way for several days after that 6i j
... weeks.
After that, maintaining the pressure in the vent headers as 7
low as possible, keeping the vent open, which precluded any releases 81 from being made to the atmosphere.
Or in fact only to secure those releases.
10f 11f JACKSON:
Later on that day, there's a couple of log entries that...
12 and we've been told before that that was left open.
uc 141 HITZ:
Yes.
i 15' 16 JACKSON:
And you operated that way for several days.
But later on 1h that day, I think, maybe into the night, there's a couple of entries 18!
where it said closed makeup tank vent, I believe.
Or maybe it said 19!
open makeup tank vent, I'm sorry. And it never indicated being closed 20'
,be fo re.
But, do you know for sure that you didn't close it on your 21!
shift? Right?
22l 23l 24f i
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E: What we did was, we got ourselves into a specific band.
I 2'
j believe later on we decided that we were going to operate on this 31 specific pressure band.
And if the pressure was below that particular 4!
pressure, we would close the valve, and if it got above that particular pressure, we would open the valve.
I'm not sure when we decided to do 6i i
that. You've got to understand that when the shifts... the shift I Il ran, I was.here at 6 in the morning and I didn't leave until later on 0
in the afternoon.
It was close to five, six o' clock, 0.K.
And I...
o,
~!
it's possible that we would have started that then.
I know we operated 10 in a band.
Exactly what time, what the time of day was, or even what 1
the day was when we started that, I really can't tell you what that 12';
time period is.
But there was... there was, you understand what I 13j mean by a specific band.
14!
15i JACKSON:
Sure, you're talking about an operating band on pressure in 16{
in the makeup tank.
17l!
18!
HITZ: That's correct.
That was after a discussion we had with some of 19!
our management people.
They dt.cided that, hey, you know, we'll operate 20!
in a band. And that band changed as we gathered information, and as we 2 11 got a little wiser, that band changed.
And eventually, we operated 22l with the valve opened all the time.
Keeping a negative pressure on the 1
23l vent... actually, the makeup tank sort of... the gauge showed less 241 than zero, indicated pressure, which is where we tried to maintain all 25i
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the time.
Instructions were given to the CR0s to fill the makeup tank 2!
j very carefully, monitoring the pressure. Maintaining the pressure as 31 l
to close to zero as it possibly can.
4!
c JACKSON:
Let me go back now, and kind of walk back through this.
I've 6i got some information that'I want checked out.
The first thing is about 7
l 4:35 in the morning, the strip chart shows that makeup tank dropping to 8!
zero.
And it stays down there until after 7, I believe.
I have not 98 verified the times on that strip chart.
But, from other testimony I've 10 heard, the strip chart seems to be fairly accurate time wise. And so, 11 it's down... it's running on the base line, and it's just pretty 12 steady.
It doesn't show any increase.
Can you... do ynu recall the 13l time when you first looked at that? When the level might have started 14 back up? Or do you think it was up when the... did I understard you 15i to say it was up when you looked at it?
16:
1Y!
HITZ:
I think it was... I'm almost 100% sure that it was up when I 18' first looked at it.
191 20(
JACKSON:
- 0. K.
Fine.
21!
i 22l HITZ:
If I had the strip chart, I'd be able to... did you look further 2 31 back in time or forward in time on the strip chart? Well, what was 24!
after 7 o' clock you say, it came back up.
What did it do after that?
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JACXSON:
It came back up... I've forgotten now... maybe 20%, something 2l in that range, and then it dropped back down, almost to zero again.
3 But, immediately turned back up.
And that was... time wise... I 4!
i think that puts it a little after 7, by the strip chart.
5 Gi HITZ:
And that's the time period I arrived.
Or I believe that I came i
71 in, the leve1 dropped from you said possibly 20% down, and then came 8
back up almost immediately?
9!
10 JACKSON: Yes.
11!
l 12 HITI:
That's about the time period where I came in, or approximately 1
13!
in that tim period.
I'd have to have the strip chart and be able to 14 look at it 0.K.
You know it's possible that the chart was not exactly 15!
time correct, 0.K.
And I'd have to talk to...
16[
17l JACKSON:
- 0. K.
I'm going to make a diagram here.
The chart is running 18 along, and of course the makeup tank level is varying like this and 19l then all of a sudden it starts up, and then it does this.
Wiggles 20f around a little bit on the case line and this is about 4:35, 0.K.
And i
21!
then it goes down to... sometime shortly after seven, and then it coes 22f something like this, goes up, spikes up, and it then it drops back i
23{
down.
And it makes some long peaks.
24 25i i
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17 l!
HITZ:
That is the way we reduce pressure.
This area here, where you 2
see the large increase?
3 41 JACKSON:
Yes.
i St 6i HITZ:
You see the large increase, and then it stays up.
7j i
JACKSON:
Yes.
9l 1
HITZ:
If we were on a normal makeup flow path, which means you have 11:
letdown.
12!
13)
JACKSON: You had it lined up to the makeup tank?
14:
15i HITZ:
But with the pressure so high in the makeup tank, you cannot get 16i letdown.
If you remember letdown was almost nonexistent.
Very small, 17l yery low.
With the increased pressure in the makeup tank of approximately 18i 60 - 80 pounds, in that ball park... your letdown was almost nonexistent, 19' if it was in existence at all.
Because the pressurizer level was 20 showing a steady trend in increase, when I came in.
Which shows that 21!
we were not letting down.
This area here, where you see the level 22l coming up and what he's showing is an increase in level in the makeup l
23l 24!
25i
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tank.
That's when the pressure was reduced we could start getting 2l j
letdown flow reestablished, and possibly makeup to the system also from 3{
the bleed tanks.
4l l
Si j
JACKSON:
Can you get a ball park time on that based on when you got in the Control Room, looked at the chart and maybe as to when you had the 7
CR0 open the vent?
8 9
f HITZ:
I came into the Control Room at approximately between 5:30 and 6 10!
o' clock, that's ball park times.
The Control Room operator opened the 11l vent and makeup tank approximately sometime around 6:30, in that ball 12 park.
It could have been later than that.
We were extremely busy 13 looking at things.
Watching all the instrumentation in the Control 14 Room.
Trying to make the right decisions.
So our major goal, 0. K., is 15!
to protect the public, and we wanted to make sure the decision we made 16i would not affect the public. We felt that by overflowing the bleed 17 tanks, that that would be a greater risk, than venting the makeup tank 18!
to the waste gas system.
So we vented the makeup tank to the waste gas 19!
system... I'm giving you ball park times... sometime between 6:30 and 20!
quarter to 7.
That's ball park.
2 11 22'
' JACKSON:
Was anyoie else involved in this decision, other than you l
23 and, I believe you said, Bill Zewe?
24!
25j p)o C$!
r e
i i
{
19 l
1!
HITZ:
Bill Zewe was there.
And Craig Faust... we conferred with 2!
l Craig Faust, also. Jim Floyd was in the Control Room at the time.
And 3I l
we didn't do much talking with Ed Fredericks.
Ed Fredricks... he was 4;
operating the secondary side.
So, -e didn't talk to Ed too much about 5!
it, to my recollection.
Now the people that I remember talking to the 6i most, was Zewe and Faust.
7$
8 JACKSON: When you called the ECS, did you make the call?
9l 10 HITI:
I made one... yes, I made one of the calls.
I know I made a 11!
call.
i 12!
i 13!
JACKSON: And you talked to Potts?
14!
.15; HITI:
I talked to Potts, I know, the second time.
The first time, I 16!
don't remember who picked the phone up.
I just said, "This is Hitz in i
17l Unit 2.
This is the situation, and this is what I think.
You ought to 18f think about... and I think that the helicopter ought to go up.
If 191 it's not already up."
Who that individual that I talked to?
I don't 20!
really know.
21l 22!
JACKSON:
Do you recall any NRC people in the Unit 2 Control Room? If 2$
there were any at that time.
i 24l 25l i
A c3'
e l
20 i
l l'
HITZ:
There were NRC people there, I know they were there.
I don't
)'
2 remember what their involvement was.
I was too busy with the problem 31 that I had in front of me, and trying to make the decisions that I had i
0 41 to make. Of course they were not conferred on, alright, but it's a i
5l j
decision when a BWST level drops two feet, you know, in a matter of a 6i few minutes, that 's something you have to take action on right away.
7I You know there are 8,400 gallons a foot in that tank, and that 6,800 8
gallons. That's a lot of water..
1.600 gallons, 0.K.
And that's a lot of water.
And we wanted to make that decision as soon as we could.
10l I, myself, never talked to an NRC person.
- 0. K.
I never turned to an 11 NRC guy and said, "Look, this what I'm going to do."
I just did it.
12!
Because it was something had to be done at the time.
I 131 14' JACKSON:
Do you know if anyone else might have talked to NRC about it?
15i 16i HIT 2:
No, I don't.
It's possible.
There were things going on behind i
17 my back.
I know that Jim Floyd was standing to the back of me, 0.K.
IS{
Zewe was to one side of me.
Faust was on one side.
What went on in 19i the back row behind me, I can't tell you.
I don't know.
I was con-20' centrating on the console.
And not concentrating on what was going on 21:
behind me.
22l t
23j JACKSON:
You can't confirm or deny whether or not maybe Jim Floyd did 2d{
some calling on his own?
25!
i cj !
l i
{
21 l
v
]
HITZ:
No, I can't.
2; i
31 JACKSON: As far as contacting the ECS, or...
41 c
~
HITZ:
No, I can't.
I know that I did not talk to an NRC official, 6i myself.
If anyone else di-d, I cannot confirm or deny that.
7 0-JACKSON:
- 0. K.
Do you recall, how soon did you become' awa e that 9
venting that tank was going to cause a release? I'm not talking atout 10f this specific instance right now.
Up at this point, it's very common 11 knowledge, I guess to a lot of people, I won't say everybody, but to a 12!
lot of people, that venting the makeup tank is going to cause scme sort 13!
of release because of an unidentified leak.
14!
15 HITZ:
Is your question how soon was I aware, you know, you had a 16 pretty good release on your hands?
Is that what you are saying.
17!
181 RESNER:
If I can interupt you, maybe you can give us a little logic 19!
why you decided to put the helicopter up? Why the helicopter should be 20!
put into service?
l 21j 22{
23 24!
25i
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22 I
l!
HITZ:
The rea:.on I took that logic, is that they had told me that they-2 l
were cycling the vent valve in short cycles on the back shift.
To 3i l
preclude, they did the first time thr.y cycled chey got a small release, 4l or they got a release, 0.K.
Si Si JACKSON:
Let me interupt'right here.
This is Jackson.
You say the 7
first time they cycled it.
8;\\
t QI HITZ:
Early in the shift.
10f i
11 JACKSON:
Is that...
12!
13 HITZ:
That would have berr, sometime in the morning between 11 o' clock 14' at night and 6 in the morning, when I showed up.
15:
16; JACKSON:
- 0. K.
17[
i 18f HITZ:
- 0. K.
And they said what they did to preclude that release, or 19!
to limit that release was to start the waste gas c0mpressors in manual.
20!
And that sucked, the waste gas commpressors are a compressor or a pump 21!
that sucks on a line, which has gas in it.
And it takes the gas and 22 puts it in a tank, alright.
So what they told me they were doing, was 231 starting the compressor in manual, running it all the time and it all i
24!
constantly sucked on the header. Well, if it had to do that, you know, 25l
.no esi
1 l
f 23 f
s 1:
my Aux operator that we had sent in there had not yet arrived at the 2:
compressors, even though he was now on his way in.
I didn't want to 3l take any chances on it.
I figured, you know, got the helicopter up in 4!
l the air.
Se safs, just in case.
I didn't expect a release beuuse the
l t
compressors were running.
I figured the compressors would handle it, 6i would continue to suck it 'out of the header and put it in the waste gas 7l
~
tank where it belonged. The first time I knew I had a substantial 8'
l release on my hand was when the ~elicopter... I heard him on the Cl radio.
And then I knew that there was gas the compressors were handling.
10 That's the first time I kr.aw that we were into a significant problem.
11:
i l
12 JACKSON: Was the morning of the 30th, was that your first shift to 13!
come in on Unit 2? Or had you worked Unit 2 between the 30th and 28th?
1 1 55 HITZ:
Alright.
I reported for work on the 28th.
I was supposed to be 16i the duty shift supervisor on the 28th... the morning of the 28th.
17!'
They had called Brian Mehler out because he had worked in Unit 2 the ISI day before. And I had been on what they called a long weekend.
So, I 191 was not up to speed on what was going on in Unit 2.
When I reported 20!
for work, I was told like... I called... I paged the shift supervisor 2
in Unit 2.
And the Unit 1 shift supervisor picked up the phone and 22 told me to come to Unit 1.
So when I came to Unit 1, he informed ma 23!
that Unit 2 had had a trip.
That Mehler was over there, Ross was over 24 there and several individuals were over there, and it... they were 25i 4\\
ed'
/
s
/
f f -
24 w.,
I 11 having a problem.
And he said th5t I should stay in Unit 1, because 2!
~
I worked from apppgximately'6 j
Mehlar had already reported for Unit 2.
31 o' clock on the.28th, till approximately 7 o' clock in the morning on the i
4I 29th.
I went home at that time, got some sleep and reported back for c'
work on the 30th at 6 o' clock.
And that was my first day in Unit 2, 6f '
then. Yes, that's correct.
7!
i 8!
JACKS 2:
Do you have a ' feel for hcw long these 'Ju sts were when you i
h were opening the.MUV 13 makeup valve?
10!
11 HITZ:
To my recollectian it was approximately a minute.
But I can't 12!
say, yeah, it was a minute, I don't really know that.
I'm just telling I
13 you what I'm pretty sure they said.
141 15, JACKSON:
You've pretty much answered most of the questions I had, as 16' far as your involvement, Greg.
Mark, when did you come on shift on the l
17!
30th?
t 18(
l 19!
COLEMAN:
Or, the 30th, my memory is pretty weak now, so I don't remember 20 much.
Not like my supervisor here.
He seems to remember quite a bit.
21l
~
I don't remember... I remember I was going to report to Unit 2, and I 22!
know I... by then they were making us stop at the Observation Center.
I 23 I think I got there maybe about 3 o' clock in the morning, into the 24 25; C 4, "'
k C
I 25 ll!
Control Room.
And I don't remember too many details of what happened 2]'
then.
I might of even had the panel that day after I relieved Craig.
~
I don't remember for sure 4;
I c*
JACKSON:
So you relieved Craig on the 30th?
Gi t
l 7
COLEMAN:
I may have, I don't remember that for sure.
8!
oi JACKSON:
Can you take a look at the log over here, and see if...
101 11{
COLEMAN:
Yeah, I could probably tell.
12!
13!
RESNER:
For the record, Mr. Jackson referring to a lag of...
14' f
15 JACKSON:
This is the CR0 Log.
16:
17:
JACXSON:
The day is on the 30th.
If,r 19t COLEMAN:
Right there.
At 9 o' clock it says on the log that I relieved 20 a shift.
21:
22 JACKSON:
- 0. K.
23!
2di 2Si M
f c,' '
c
l 26 i
l!
COLEMAN:
So, I had the shift that day... the panel.
2; 31 JACKSON:
- 0. K.
Can you look down that and tell me if you had any 4:'
involvement or possibly anything to do with these releases?
Si COLEMAN:
Well, the first entry I made it was.9:01, so, and I said I 7
was venting the makeup tank.
8!
Qt f
JACKSON:
Now, who would have initiated that? Would that have been 10 Faust or you? What does that entry mean?
11l 12!
COLEMAN: Well, to me that would mean that I initiated it.
It certainly i
13I looks like my handwriting.
It starts about 7:40 here.
14!
15:
RESNER:
Is this p.m. work your referring to in time?
16:
f 17l COLEMAN:
No this is in the morning; 0740.
I must have got in there 18f about a little before 8.
19i 20!
HITZ:
One thing, looking at the times that are in this log, I guess 21l that the time period..
more time went by than I really thought went 22f by.
Because here it says... you look at the times... for 6:07 energize 23l 6:14 energize pump pressurizer heaters started venting the makeup tank 24!
25l t
t 6
i m
cV' s
I i
27 l
t l
at 7:10. Well, that's the short burst.
That's where we try to get the 2l l
waste transfer pump, running to the makeup tank.
I told you we tried 3!
to get it frcm the bleed tank.
4' lc'
~ !,
COLEMAN:
I remember during that day... that we were having trouble 6i getting water lnto the makeup tank, because of that waste transfer...
71 i
yes, the WOLP-5 pumps that put out about 80 pounds discharge, and we 8i couldn't get any water in the makeup tank.
I remember that fact.
What 9
time? I don't know exactly.
101 i
11]
HITZ:
Here's where we isolated from the SWST.
See that? So that 12!
would correlate to what you had seen on your chart.
Remember you said 8 o' clock.
Didn't you tell me 8 o' clock or something.
14:
15 JACKSON:
It was between 7 and 8.
I'm not sure of the time exactly.
16 17!
HITZ:
Yeah.
So that would correlate the time.
18t 19I JACKSON:
Do you think the log is correct as far starting the venting 20!
about 7:10?
21i 22l HITZ:
That's possible.
I'm sure that tne records that are kept in the P
23!
ECS will verify that... when they were notified.
If you check...
I 2$!
they document every call that is made to the ECS.
25!
cp i h]i l
28 1l l
JACKSON:
I thinK that we do have some conflicting times about when 21 things were done.
31 41 HITZ: What does the ECS say? Do you know?
Si 6i JACKSON:
I don't recall exactly what the ECS says, because a... a 7l fellow's got that log out with him this afternoon doing some work I'm thinking that it says... sometime around 8 o' clock.
Maybe after 8.
91 O
HITZ:
That would be conflicting with us.
11!
JACKSON:
No, that's a correction.
I have a note here that the...
'3 where it was taken from the ECS Log... started makeup then at 0700.
14'!
And that's attributed to Crawford in the ECS Log.
15i 16!
HITZ:
- 0. K.
l 17,!
i 13' JACKSON:
And I also have another note that attributed to the shift 19!
foreman's CR0 log, which is the one we' re looking at... same entry...
20!
0710.
21f 22 RESNER:
The time now is 2:18 p.m.
So, we will momentarilly break to 23!
change this side of the tape.
24i 25i M
t Cfl
1 l
29 i
l!
RESNER:
This is a continuation of the interview with Mr. Gregory Hit:
2 '
i and Mr. Mark Coleman. The time now is 2:30 p.m. EDT.
31 0
4l JACKSON:
In the break while we were changing the tape, Mr. Hit: and i
c!
]
Mr. Coleman have looked at the logs and, I'd like for the record to get them to comment on the times in the logs, as to whether or not they 7
feel like they are preety good times.
i 8!
i 9l COLEMAN: Well, from the point on here like 0740, the day of the 30th, 10; it looks like my handwriting is starting here.
And I'll verify anything 11 I put down there on that log as for timeliness, by the clock on the 12l wall in the control room. That's what time I entered that particular 13 log entry for that day.
141 15i JACXSON: Your entry at 9:01 pertaining to venting the makeup tank, is id!
it your opinion now, this late in the game, that the venting was in t
17,l process or that's a new start on the vent?
18!
191 COLEMAN:
I wculd tend to lean towards saying that we started to vent 20{
right here.
I'm not... sometimes the shift supervisor will say, let's 21:
mare a note of that in the log.
And maybe at 9:01, one of the supervisors 22l might have told me that put in the status.
That's possible too.
I 23 can't say for sure whether it was a beginning or just a status repor+.
24l in the log.
25;
,c q 7
l 30 1:
JACKSON:
And Greg, you stated during the break that you did not recall 2l giving any order to shut that vent after it was opened at say, we'll 31 call it 7:10 now, for the sake of argument.
4i Si5 HITI-As I look at the log that we have in front of us here, first I'd 6i like to comment on tha times.
I agree with Mark, that the times that 7f' are in this log are taken from a clock, and the times that I stated, as 8
far as things were happening in the plant, I do not look at a clock, oi
~
and it's very evident to me now that more time has passed than what I 10f thought had passed.
So the time frame that I'm talking about, like I n9 said I think we started venting in the makeup tank between 6:30 and 12 6:45, I said.
And it looks like that was 7:10 here that we started 13I venting the makeup tank.
I would go by the times in the log book, and 14' not what I think the times are, because these are clock times by the 15' CR0s.
And Mark, in particular, I know takes everything that he logs in 16; a log book, he looks at the clock, and logs the time.
I know that we 17f bad told Craig Faust, Bill Zewe and myself, not to close the makeup 185 tank vent unless we directed him to do so, either one of us.
Now 19t sometime after Mr. Miller arrived in the Control Rocm, my duties were 20!
more to talk to the ECS and give him RMS data and plant status.
I do 21!
not know if Mr. Zewe told him to close the vent or not.
Henceforth, 22!
the log entry at 9:01, venting the makeup tank, I don't know wheter 23l 24t 25!
d b
c g'
I
{
31 i
l!
that is, (A) we are starting a new vent, or (B) that's plant status.
l 2!
l It's quite possible it's plant status.
I just don't know that.
I have 3l no idea.
i 4!
Si j
JACKSON:
Before you started this vent, you stated that, I think you 0
and Zewe and probably Faust, discussed a vent.
Did you all discuss the Tl effects of the release, in terms of dose rate offsite, or what you Oi might be putting up the stack?
91 i
10[
HITZ: We believed that when we opened the makeup tank vent, that we 11 would not get a release or a significant release, due to the fact that starting the waste gas compressors in manual had pumped down the waste 13 gas vent header, and not given any significant releases prior to this 14 venting.
So we did not expect a major release or any release of any 15I consequence.
16:
17f JACKSON:
Did you have any guides for venting the tank as far releases?
181 Do you know if any existed at that time, when you should terminate the 19l tank? As far as...
20!
21:
COLEMAN:
No sir, there was not.
22 i
23l JACKSON:
- 0. K.
241 25!
u C}!
t i
32 1
t 1:
COLEMAN: That was a decision that was made by the shift supervisor, 2;'
myself and Bill.
The decision was made to get the pressure down in the 3!
makeup tank to preclude overflowing the bleed tanks.
I can't reiterate 4!
i
.at enough.
The bleed tanks were extremely hot, radiation wise, you ci l
know, levels 10 R or greater.
And they were hotter than that later on.
~
Si That type of water, I don't want in the vent header and I don't want 71 j
laying on the floor.
There are drains in the vent header.
And once 8':
that water gets on the floor there's no way of controlling any releases E
of gases, which you're coing to have when the water evaporates.
- Now, 101 you've to be able to conh.ol what your doing.
And we were definitely 11 in control of what we were doing, because we opened that valve.
We could close that valve if they wanted to close it.
The valve... the i
131 line itself did not vent to any station vent.
It vents to a system 14!
that contains the gases in the waste gas tank.
You know, I can't...
15:
I've got to tell you, that we had the general public and we had the 16i safety of the people in that plant on our minds, when we did that.
You 17!
know, it's not like we were taking and running the hose out the side of 18i the building and venting it right ints atmosphere.
That is not what 19!
that system does.
That system goes right into the waste gas tank.
And 20l I'm sure that in our minds, we knew tne water laying on the floor would 21!
be a much greater hazard to the people in this area, than it would be 22!
... and also to the workers, than it would be if we were venting the 1
231 gases through into the waste gas system.
Once that water is on the 24!
floor your out of control.
You have no control.
25!
c ol-
}w().
'l o}
u l
f 33 1
Ili JACXSON:
So up until this time then, you hadn't heard any discussions 2!
j of terminating vents in relation to protective action guides, EPA 31 l
protective action guides, or any other offsite dose consequences?
41 l
c
~
HITZ:
No, no.
7 JACKSON:
Your running purely operational right now.
81 9r HITZ: At this particular time in plant life? Yes.
i 10' 11 JACKSON:
One other thing that came up while we were changing the tape, that I'm not sure whether we got on tape earlier, but I did want to get 13!
it on there, was I believe, Greg you stated that when the makeup tank 14:
relieved to the bleed tanks, the bleed tanks pressures pegged high.
Is 15-that a true statement?
16; i
17l HITZ:
Yes.
That's correct.
When the vent... when the relief valve, ISI the water side relief valve on the makeup tank opened, I knew... and 19 the irjividual, whoever that individual #t was, said that the BWST 20{
level is dropping.
The first place I looked was the bleed tank.
The 21!
pressure indicator were off scale high. And so were the level indicators.
22!
With the BWST level coming down, the pressure indication high and the i
2 31 level indication higb, it was a direct indication to me that we were i
20 draining the BWST, right to the RC reactor coolant bleed tanks.
And i
25i i
'/uJ C9,l e
i l
34 l!
thus, had the possiblility of overflowing those tanks through the vent header right onto the floor.
The path... let me explain the path.
Si
- 0. K.
The path would be into the vent header and there's drain pumps in 4t j
the vent header, which allows water to drain from the gas system out ci
~
j and ther go to a floor drain.
And at that volume of water and that pressure, they would have splashed out o_f the floor drain and onto the 7l floor.
- 0. K.
8{
9!
JACKSON:
- 0. K.
I think that pretty much covers the questions.
I did 101 have a couole of little questions here, I wanted to ask you while I had 11 you regarding your trip through the Aux Building on the 28th, and 12!
anything else that you might throw in, whether it's direct knowledge or 131 indirect knowledge, but did you have any indictions or did you hear it 14!
discussed whether there is any indication that you had liquid released 15' through relief valves in the letdown system? I know the relief valves 16 on the... letdown relief valve and I don't recall the numbers, relieve 17!
to the bleed tanks, I believe.
Is that correct?
18!
191 HITZ:
Yes, That's correct.
20l 21!
22l 23l 24!
25i
-t c?'
l 35 1:
JACXSON:
But there are some letdown valves... there are some valves 2l j
in the letdown system downstream at the demineralizers, that I believe, 31 j
according to the print and to some discussions that I had with people, 4t that relieve into the floor drain.
Do you have any idea whether or not c'
j those relief valves could have lifted?
Si, 7I l
HITZ:
It's possible, I would imagine.
I have no direct knowledge of 8 '
that.
My trip to the Auxiliary Guilding was down the main halls.
I 9
could not get into valve alley, where these would be located.
These 10i:
valves were located behind the concrete block wall.
You know, there 11!
was not way to get into that area, and take a look.
I had limited air i
12f supply.
There were certain things I wanted to try to do.
I knew I 13f wanted to try to move some water off the floor.
I wanted to try to get 14:
some readings in some general areas and transmit those back to the 15' Control Room, so they could have a feel for where the readings were the 15; highest of where I had been.
To try and piece together why these areas 17f where high and what was in those areas, and what was going on down in 18!
the plant.
But, no I physically did not see any relief valves lifting.
19i 20j JACKSON:
Do you have any... do you know what the relief valves are 21i set at in that system? An estimation?
f 22 231 24l
- s!
') hi C 9, !
~
)
i 4
1
E i
i 36 l
1!
HITZ:
The one before the demineralizers is 130 pounds, I believe.
The 2!
l ones after the demineralizers, the one in the makeup tank is 80 pounds.
3I The one that we talked about earlier... that's 80 pounds.
The other 4::
ones... I'd cnly be guessing.
I don't know.
You know without looking Cl
]
at the print.
Figuring out where they are.
I don't know that.
6i i
71 l
JACKSON:
I think I'll cut the questioning off there.
I appreciate it.
81 HITZ:
Your welcome.
10l 11!
RESNER:
This concludes the interview with Mr. Hit: and Mr. Coleman.
The time now is 2:41 p.m., EDT.
13!
141 15i 16; 17!
18i 19!
20!
21; 1
22 i
23l 24!
25 4
C 9, !
4
.