ML19208B087
| ML19208B087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1979 |
| From: | Creswell J, Sieglitz R Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190037 | |
| Download: ML19208B087 (31) | |
Text
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1 t
UNITED STATES OF ANERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.i I
E In the Matter of:
1 2:
IE THI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
3 of Mr. Richard E. Sieglit::
Supervisor for Unit Maintenance 4!
Si i
6!
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Trailer #203 91 NRC Investigation Sit.e TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 101 Middletcwn, Pennsylvania t
1 11 July 3, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview)
IN!
Auoust 1,1979 (Data Transcript Typea) 326 15!
(Tape Numcer(s))
16i 17' 18!
19i 201 21!
NRC PERSONNEL:
22!
Mr. James S. Creswell 23!
Mr. Anthony N. Fasano l
Mr. Dale E. Canaldson 24:
Mr. Robert Marsh Fj d J 2Si
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I lj MARSH:
At this time... continuing at this time with the second tape in 2j the series.
The time is 11:04. And we will continue with the interview of m!
Richard E. Sieglitz.
Tony, I think you still have some questions left.
41 FASANO:
All right. The emergency feedwater system... is a quality g
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system... is a safety-related cystem for Unit 2?
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SIEGLITZ: Yes, I believe it is, yes.
Si FASANO: To what extent?
lot 11!
SIEGLITZ: We have two designations on Unit 2.
One is QCM for mechanical, 12; which basically says the integrity of the system has to be maintained under 131 all conditions. The other is QCF, which is QC functional, which means that 141 the system not only has to maintain it's integrity but it has to operate
'1Si under all conditions. Off the too of my head, and without reviewing the 16i appropriate documentation, I cannot say, whether it's QCF or QCM, but I'm 1T pretty sure it's QCM.
1St 19I FASANO:
In my review of the system, it turned out to be a QCM, I believe.
20l And apparently it's different than Unit 1.
21j 22!
SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
23i 24l 251 o' [k i
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FASANO:
It's not.
It doesn't have the M designation.
I 2!
SIEGLITZ: That's correct. We have Burns and Roe made that designation, 4l QCF, QCM United Engineers... I'm sorry Gilbert Engineers on Unit 1 just 1
had QC.
01 Si FASANO:
Dick were you familiar with a problem in the Aux Building, I believe it's Aux Building waste tanks miscellaneous and the auxiliary?
And I think they're just needed as WTL-T2 and WTL-T5.
In our interviews, 9!'
we find that these tanks have ruuture-disks, and the concern here was that 101 maybe one of them had a ruptured disc and the lineup for the taking of the 11!
t sump water out of the Reactor Building might have gone into one with the 12',
ruptured disc, and come out into the sump located in the Aux Building.
Do 1.?
you recall this ever being discussed?
14 151 SIEGLITZ:
No, I don't recall ever hearing that said before.
1Si 17!
FASANO:
So this is something really that you never heard of, and so far I 181 can' t find any documentation.
I wondered if you had ever seen any documen-191 tation on that?
20!
21!
SIEGLITZ:
No, I don't recall that ever being identified as a problem.
22f 23}
FASANO:
Now you did mention that you did have air... instrument air and 241 I guess your instrument air and service air are one system?
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3 SIEGLITZ: They're two separate systems.
hhere'saninstrumentaircom-g presser... or there are instrument air compressers and service air com-pressers.
But, they are cross-connected.
4i FASANO:
So, they are one system?
Et Si SIEGLITZ:
In fact, they are one system, yes.
71 8!
FASANO:
Do you know that there are some problem reports.
I guess they go 9!
l back sometime that identify this as a problem, and what I'm asking really 10!
is... was there something in the works to change these systems, so there's 11!
some separation?
12!
131 SIEGLITZ: We had been looking.
I believe one reason for being the cross-14!
tie, is because of the capacity of the instrument air system... is just 2E about at full capacity.
And the reason is that the service air was more or 16; less the backup resevoir for...in such a case.
There was, I had mentioned 17 '.'
previously, the difficulty with moisture accumulating in the compressors, IS!
we had looked and were still looking at possible solutions and resolutions 10 j
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to this problem to minimize the water problem.
20!
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FASANO:
I understand that there is some work that was sent to Reading, or 22'i a request to Reading, where there are valves to be ordered so that you can 23{
actually shut off or isolate a certain section of the service air, so that 24!
you have so much service air capacity, and then instrument air would include 2
some of the current service air capacity.
Is that correct?
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SIEGLITZ:
I'm not quite sure.
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FASANO: As far as the... you mentioned that Weaver had gone down to check the status of the air receivers and some of the valving in the icwer area g) in the Turbine Building.
l 6i i
SIEGLITZ:
That's co. rect.
71 Si FASANO:
I guess he didn't inform you that there was water found?
i 9j 10i SIEGLITZ: No, he did inform me that there was water found, when he did 11!
come back to the Control Room.
He went to Operations and told them what he 12!
I had found. They were aware of it.
Like I say, he had an operator with him 131 also.
And I was cognizant of the fact at that time.
14:
15 FASANO:
So there was water found in the receivers?
16i 171 l
SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
18t 19 FASANO:
Did you know of a problem with the hot well level indicator?
201 Apparently they had hot well level that seemed to be high during this 2'9 occurrence, and I understand that there's been a problem with the hot well 22I level indication for some time.
Is this an open item that's continuing?
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l SIEGLITZ:
It is an open item.
There has been additional instrumentation g
2 pla ed on the hot well by our Instrument Department with knowledge of engineering and other departments here on site. We were checking level j
both on the hot well... on both condensers, in fact. The next time we were down for any period of time, the maqufacturer of the condenser was scheduled to... we were going to have him come in and make a thorough inspection inside the condenser, plus any recommendations on this problem.
/
So, it was an open item. We had been monitoring, and there was a backup 81 system for checking on levels.
10!
FASANO: As far.as the... going back to the air system again you mentioned that there is a daily routine by the operators to go and check, and I guess 12l f
they checked the air receivers?
131 14!
SIEGLITZ:
I believe so, yes.
They have a number of diffent surveillances 15, wnich operations performs, some which Maintenance Department performs, and 16i they can be on various frequencies.
They can be on a shiftly basis, a 171 daily basis, weekly, monthly and so forth. And I believe this is one of 18:
their daily checks that they make or shiftly checks that they make.
My 191 understanding is that the 11 to 7..
11 p.m. to 7 a.m., shift, if I remember 20t right. And it's once a day.
My understanding was that it used to be each 2
shift.
Now, I haven't looked at the old forms.
22!
2 31 i
FASANO: Was there any indication that they were having a continuing 24i problem with finding water in the accumulators, say the month or two i
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before this occurrence, or how was the status of the air system. Was it 2j w rking very well? -
3t SIEGLITZ:
It had been working well in the weeks preceding the incident.
I can say this had been identified some time previously.
They had looked at it from an engineering standpoint, looking to have some modifications 65 that were made.
They had made some small changes some weeks or months 71 prior to this. And everything appeared to be holding its own.
There was 8
no known imminent problem in the air system that we were aware of.
91 10f FASANO:
So, I understand then, that the current daily routine of checking 11:
the air system prior to this incident showed that the air system was in 12',
good condition, 13l 14:
SIEGLITZ: As far as I know, it was. We never had any problems.
15i 16; FASANO:
And you did mention that there were air problems in the past?
18(
SIEGLITZ:
Yes.
191 20; FASANO:
Now, my understanding is that whenever the concensate polishers 21'I are being changed out, or work is being done on the condensate polishers, l
2 l that now in retrospect one sees that when you have air prob'em, water in 23l the air problem, water in the air system... that some work was being done 2 41 on the condensate polishers.
I also understand that work in the operation 25i Q3G cy s
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i lj f the condensate polishers is an operations function, not a maintenance function.
2 2:
SIEGLITZ: That is correct.
4; Si FASANO:
In your daily discussions, I understand that there has been some trying to track down where this water had come from in the past, and we had 7
not come up with a conclusion.
At least, that's the discussion as I under-81 stand.
Did... in these morning discussions, was there any way oi getting 9t some correlation, so then one could have a trend of some of the causes of 5
101 some of these problems.
This one, say, as an example.
12l SIEGLITZ:
Yeah, well, this is one rer. son for sitting down in the POD daily on Unit 2.
Say, it is a new unit in service.
Unit i now they meet three 14' times a week, but in Unit 2 we had been meeting daily because of the newness 15; of the plant and bugs that were starting to work themselves out.
Engineering, 16; like I say, had looked into it. Mechanical maintenance people had looked IT at the compressors, trying to see...maybe cooling water had you know, 18i worked its way through, and we were getting it in that form and fashion.
19i' We had asked operations to check the temperatures and make sure we didn't 20l have too great a delta T going across, and possibly giving us pump problems 21 and there were several things they'd been asked to look at, and for awhile 22li thing would go good, and then every once in a while we'd ge another slug 23{
of water and we'd look at it.
Ana we might have problems there.
24!
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FASANO:
And when you say slug, my understanding...it was copious amounts of water. At least the last incident they had, they had something like 20 3i minutes plus draining of the receivers.
41 SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
Si l
Si FASANO: As far as... on the pressurizer heaters, were you knowledgeable i
71 that they were having problems with pressurizer heaters? And I understand
- l during this occurrence, they did lose either subsets or the main circuit.
9t 10I SIEGLITZ:
That's true.
That would be an indication, or a possible indication 11!
that we did have steam or moisture in the vessel... in the Reactor Building-12t
(
...because wires do on occasion ground out like that, and we do lose the 13) heaters.
After drying out, or sometime later, we go back and we can energize 14!
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them again.
15; 15; FASANO:
So, on the morning of tne 28th, knowing that the disc had ruptured 17!'
in the reactor coolant drain tank, you then could assume the steam... and 18r' this would not have been an unusual thing in your mind?
19l 20i SIEGLITZ:
Yeah, S. could be, because the pressurizers... the RC drain 2 '
tank is in the southwest quadrant of the Reactor Building, and the pressurizer 22'I is inside the 0 ring just to the north of that.
So they are in fairly 23l close proximity there.
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4 FASANO:
So, you've been in Unit 2, and you've actually seen the location of each of these pieces or components.
3l l
SIEGLITZ: Yes.
41 Si S:
FASANO: Well, then I'd like to ask you, did you see the location of the i
so-called tail pipe indicators or temperature devices on the pressurizer 7}
manifold or each of the tail pipes?
i 81 91 SIEGLITZ:
No, I never specifically looked for those.
101 11; FASANO:
I'm still wondering wh.v if you had them properly located, why one 12!
would have to go and probe it.
It's just a question in my mind.
13l 14!
SIEGLITZ:
Sorry, I can't answer that.
15 16i FASANO: Well, my understanding was that there was also a pressuri:er 17:'
heater problem that was continuous.
In other words, the sub-breakers would ISI go out and the operators would not know in that they didn't have indication, 191 unless the main breaker goes.
And at the time, the indication would be the 20; recovery of the pressuri:er.
Then they would send an operator down to 21l actually, I guess, to put the breakers back in.
Do you know of this? And do you know why this was continuing?
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lj SIEGLITZ:
Thare was some question to the adequacy of the breakers in f
comparison to the size of the pressurizer heaters.
The electrical department, i
the electrical engineers, prior to this, had been studying this problem, 3
4 and I believe a problem report had been written to GPU, and some research had been done on it to check the sizing to see if they in fact were compatible 5
.l the heaters with the breakers.
Some people felt this might have been the Qi problem.
In fact, there was an item aft over from startup and we wanted i
to leave some money in the budget for the possibility, if in fact, it did 8t show that they were not compatibl.,.natched we might want to change breaker sizers, but it was... I think it had ever been really finalized whether 10l they were a proper match or not.
I bslieve B&W said they were.
They were 11!
compatible. We had the same design in Uni
- 1 and things should be... that 12!
worked satisfactorily.
13) 14i FASANO:
Yeah, there is slightly temperature... your average temperature 15i for Unit 2 than there is for Unit 1.
I don't know how that would enter in.
16i As far as the room that these breakers are located, I think it's called the 17!
M20 area?
18!
191 SIEGLITZ: We call it the M20 area.
It's the same room that has the 201 safety valves to the main steam lines.
21:
l 22!
FASANO: When I go down there, at least, it's even hot now.
23l 24i 25i Cy,.
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l SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
2:
i FASANO:
And there are fans blowing on those breaker panels.
31 4l i
SIEGLITZ: We finally, in the later stages after investigating the breakers for some time, they tried putting monitors and various kinds of recorders Si on to monitor to try and see if they had scme sort of a current or 4 voltage spike.
I think.after a while, people got to thinking, well, maybe while 81 the doors open to take this monitoring, that the heat in the rocm was 91 affecting our readings. And I think that was one of the list opinions that i
10l we had, that if we had the proper cooling on them, we actually minimizing 11!
the number of times that we did have the trip.
So, I think the heat in the 12l l
room was playing a big part in our problem.
131 14:
FASANO:
So the location may be a concern.
Now this is... is this a 15i safety related system?
16i 17!
SIEGLITZ: The pressurizer heaters... I do not believe they are.
They 18f again, I would have to check with the... I'm pretty sure they're not.
191 20f FASAN0:
One other problem that seemed to... well there are at least a 21[
couple of them that were going on that took time from the operators... not 22 major, but again, there things that were taking up e.
My understanding 23 was that on the makeup tank there was some difficulty in automaatically putting your overhead hydrogen into the makeup tank.
Did you know about 25i
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this ongoing problem? And was it maintenance jurisdiction to actually, 11 say, solve that problem and fix it.
21 3!
SIEGLITZ:
This was an ongoing problem. We had assistance from B&W personnel.
4!
l We had assistance from Met Ed mechanical engineering personnel. We had Si looked into the line on several occasions, opening up valves, replacing the Gi type of selenoid valves and check valves in the line. We tried blowing 7
steam from the outside from the header back into the line. And it finally 8!
i got to a point, because a lot of the line runs up on top of the roof, and 91
'it was in the winter and it was cold. We felt maybe we just had a line 101 i,
that was blocked or frozen, and we were going to wait until warmer weather, 11:
and try it again. We did have the line cleared to some point at a time, 12!
and it was working, and then we ran into difficulties again.
So, what 1 31 finally we did was we hooked up hydrogen bottles locally there in the lh builaing, and brought bottles in as needed, and the makeup tank was pressurizec 15' from a local hydrogen source rather than per design from outside the
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buil.fing.
17:
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FASANO: And this would be an aux operator function based on some local reading, or I guess you do have Control Rocm readout on the overhead pressure?
20j 21I SIEGLITZ:
I believe there is.
But, yes, operations did control the 22 function.
The only interface maintenance would have is we would station 2
hydrogen b'ottles at some station point.
Operations would take the bottles, 2
hook them up, secure them, and remove them when they were empty.
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FiSANO:
On the K3 relay, do you recall Ivan Porter being involved at all in getting this relay either tripped or modified so that it would latch i
2!.
I actually?
31 4
l SIEGLITZ:
On the RC pumps?
Si Gi FASANO:
Yes.
7 Si SIEGLITZ:
It's possible.
I can't say for sure one way or the other.
INC 91 is involved intimately with electrical, as well as other typee of controls, 10!
and sometimes there is an overlap between electrical department, and I&C in 11!
matters such as this.
It's possible, but n'armally, I would say, Dick 12l j
Bensel would be the cognizant engineer.
131 14!
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FASANO:
Getting back to the interface between engineering and maintenance, ic,-
when we were talking about the final sign-off of a system, say, it came 15:
through QC, came over to maintenance, then you would sign it off as being
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completed and you would mark in your log that indeed, on such and such a 18i date, everything is finalized.
Mcw did... if you were... how did the 191
~
originator or the supervisor of the originator, how was he informed that 201 the job he had asked for sometime back was ccmpleted?
21;
'2'l SEIGLITZ:
Normally, he wouldn't.
That may be falacy in the system, the 2
way it's set up at present.
Like I say the originator would initiate a 2 41 work request. When the job was done, if it was a job of a major consequence, 25i kfd '
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or a major piece of equipment, the whole station staff that attend the P00, 2l-which is basically all the departments, would be aware that we're working I
on such a component and that it would be back in service.
If it was a e
3!
minor problem, packing leaks or any number of minor problems, no one would ever know that it was completed other than if they would have walked by and look for themselves to see if it was done.
Si i
7j FASANO:
I guess some of the more important jobs might have been of interest, 81 but again that's the system we had at that time.
91 10l l
SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
11:
12l FASANO:
My understanding that you were at the individual who was the 131 supervisor may or may not have been informed?
14:
15i SIEGLITZ:
That's true.
16 L' 1 FASANO:
But there was no requirement that you be informed?
18l
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SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
20r 2"C; FASANO:
You left the site about 3:30 that day?
22l 2 31 SIEGLITZ:
Yes, I believe that's... no, wait a minute... I was across the 2
street.
I went to the 500 KV substation, roughly 11:00 o' clock, and I was 25i
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l there roughly till 3:30, and then I came back on site to relieve Dan Shovlin, y
so he could have lunch.
And then he came back, and relieved me, and I went back across the street again.
I left Met Ed property sometime around 7 that night, I bleieve.
4,;
Si FASANO:
Back to the instrument air again, and the service air.
Was there any knowledge that there was a leaking check valve between the service air 71 i
and the instrument air, prior to... I think it has recently been discovered, 8'
but I was wondering if any knowledge of this has been in the past or...?
10f SIEGLITZ:
I don't recall anyone discussing an air leak, especially... I 11!
don't think it would be of major consequence, unless it was directly affecting 12i i
the operation of the component at that time.
It would have been identified 13) and put on the work request.
But, I don't recall that specific item.
1 41 15i FASANO:
The instrument air and the service air, are these QCi 16i 17!
i SIEGLITZ:
No, they are not, neither one of them.
181
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FASANO:
Non-safety related systems?
20t 21 SIEGLITZ:
I believe that's correct.
22!
i 231 FASANO:
Yet, they do cperate the 11 valves on the emergency feedwater, 2 41 right, on the ICS system?
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16 i
j SIEGLITZ:
I believe you are correct, I'd have to check.
1; i
2!
FASANO:
But, I do think you have a 32 valve and a 33 valve that bypasses t
either the ll's or 12's, or both, are electrical operated?
41 Si SIEGLITZ:
I'm not sure of that specific component.
I know like on reactor l
containment, and certain valves which have air operators there art, or even electrical, they do have air cylinders there to fail in a set position, i
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should you have loss of air or loss or power.
So, on some components even 91 though the system itself may not be, there is enough resevoir, or reserve 101 i
capacity to fail components in the made you want them.
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12!
FASANO:
You would expect then that the 11 valves probably have this 13t redundancy?
14:
f 15, SIEGLITZ:
I would have to check, I'm not sure.
16; 17' FASANO:
You did mention a number of names.
Just for the record, I was 1~81 wondering if we could maybe spell them out.
I think that you mentioned loi
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Rippon?
20l SIEGLITZ:
Charles Rippon.
He's an electrical foreman on Unit 2.
- Weaver, 22 Doug Weaver, he's an I&C foreman on Unit 2.
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I FASANO: And Jo.ies.
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SIEGLIT2:
Sam Joules.
He's a mechanical foreman in Unit 2.
31 4i l
FASANO: And Keene.
5) 1 Gi SIEGLITI:
Keene. He's an I&C technician that works for Doug Weaver.
I'm not sure on tha spelling of his name.
81 i
91 l
FASANO: And Peavy.
10j 11!
SIEGLIT2:
He's also an I&C technician and I am not sure on his spelling, 12; either.
131 14 FASANO:
Do you recall any other maintenance personnel that was either in 15i the Control Room, or that you remember participating?
16i 17!
SIEGLITZ:
No, I do not.
181 1 91
^
FASANO:
All right.
At this time, maybe I'd like to turn the microphone 20!
totally over to you.
And if you'd like to give any of your ideas, based on 21}'
the experience that you gained on the 28th, and subsequently reviewed, if 22 you could express some ideas or some knowledge that may help in coping with 23i similar situations in the future.
And this could be comments with respect
'4 to what was performed by the onsite people, meaning the Met Ed, the inter-25i i
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faces with B&W, the interfaces with the Nuclear Reguitory Commission, the number of people involved, commumications... anything you'd like to state
... any facts. Maybe the structure of the repair party and shift workers which would seem to have come up, so I'll turn that over to you at this 41 point, and maybe you can express yourself.
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SIEGLITZ:
I think the one thing that strikes me... after the first day, 7{
I was not even on the island for the next four to five days.
At that time, 8!
we were trying to minimize the number of people onsite.
I was set up 9!
across the street in the Observation Center, and we were trying to direct 10l The only people basically on site, we had a our operations from there.
11:
lead foreman from each department, Mr. Weaver, Mr. Joules and Mr. Rittle 12!
And that was the shift that I was on for the first were on the day shift.
13i few days.
Barry Rittle, he's the normal lead electrical foreman on Unit 2.
14!
On the day of the incident, like I mentioned, he was not on site when the alarm went off, and it was at that time that they had barred further personnel 15:
ISi from entering the island, and that was the reason that he was not in the i
l Control Room that morning.
These individuals would work basically out of 17!
ISI the I&C shop which was adjacent to the Unit 2 Control Room.
They were 19)
They were the direct interface with the operations and engineers there.
and people that were running the program of recovery from day 2 roughly to 20t 2'~!
I was across the street with other maintenance people, a large day 4 or 5.
22f part of our time and efforts were set up in setting up what was known to be 23f
" Trailer City".
The vast number of people that came in required a lot of 24I facilities to work out of. Getting them trailers and leveling them up and 25j
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i 18 i
g getting telephones installed and electric power and heat.
And quite a number of things were involved.
I think the effort alone in this was hundreds and maybe even thousands of hours involved in setting this up.
I 3!
don't think anyone ever considered anything of the magnitude of this.
The 4:
response from the industry, in my own personal feeling was... was really something. There were engineers, that hadn't been on site for years, that Si had gone to work for other companies, and I hadn't seen... when I was on site for construction, I saw a lot of people again, who had been all over the country responding to the need here. And I think that was very commendable 9I of the whole industry, and of the individuals involved.
This really makes 101 i
you feel good, to think that people are that dedicated to a project to come 11; back even in lieu of what had happened here. There were vast people.
The 12!
problem was monumental in setting up tasks.
I think that was defined 131 fairly readily, from the start in upper management, assigning the different 141
~
companies that came to respond to give them specific tasks and duties. We 15i ran the maintenance, some interface with them, getting them the proper 16; documentation and acclimation of the plant through the model that we had, 17i' which was helpful, I know, for Westinghouse for one, to get some sort of a 18l feel for where decay heat systems would tie in.
This was helpful.
Plus we 191 had taken photographs of many of the components in the plant previously to 20!
help acclimate people should we have to work at some later time on high 2]'!
radiation areas.
I think these were very helpful.
Many of the pictures 22' i
were of a closeup type of a nature to look at a specific component.
I 23l1 think in the future if someone wanted to do this, they might also want to 24I stand back a little bit, use a wide angle lens, and give people a little 25i i
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20 more view of what the overall picture looks like.
Rather than a tight closeup view of a specific component.
2' f
3!
FASANO:
How about movie pictures?
41 Si SIEGLITI:
I know Westinghouse did same.
'a me the one I had seen, even Si being familiar with the equipment it was hard to really get a feel for it.
7 i
That is another alternative.
I'm sure under the right application it could 81 be very helpful.
But, the one film that I'd seen was of a nature that I 91 don't think would have helped anyone.
10l 11:
FASANO:
Huw about communications? Apparently your contact with... it 12!
seems like the operators... do you think maintenance should be i,nformed to 13!
a greater detail, say, when they first came in?
Like you had a feeling 14:
that you just had to do your routine job.
15; 16 SIEGLITZ: Well, presently the training that's involved, a maintenance 17 '
function does not require upper management or upper supervisors to have 181 training in the ways of licensing.
I think the more you know about the 19t system, the better off you are in many aspects.
I'd probably perform even 20t better if I were more operations trained anr1 oriented, rather than adminis-2h tratively or technically trained in fixing a specific component.
I think 22 the more you know about the overall picture, the better ycu are to treat 23 the symptoms and go directly to the problem.
I think this would be helpful.
241 I think, one problem, I know wa had in the beginning, and rightly so, was 25!
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1:,
the vast concern no one wanted to change the status quo of the plant.
We had problems.
It seemed that one thing would lead to another, would lead to another and rightly we didn't want to change anything without having a 31 problem.
But if you had to out and out do something with the various
[
groups and committees, and everyone else that reviewed procedures, I'm not Gl sure how that might have worked.
I know the NRC had several grot:ps.
The i
j was an ALARA group, we had the engineering people from GPU and the Met Ed,
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they were involved.
By the time a procedare even to do what might have 8;
seemed to be a simple job, it was days, rather than hours or minutes 9l before you could get concurrence.
Something I think would have to be 10l formalized among plants that if they had an emergency, how would you 11:
react, what would be the approval circuit.
I think this kind of thing 12l l
should be looked at in the front end, and see some of the problems you 13) i have.
14i 15i FASANO:
So the training program... I gather that the training, when you 15; did your training exercises, these mock emergency situations, you really 171'
... sounds like maybe there should be more overall involvca.ent in the...
18f j
to me, based on what we learned now, a more realistic time of day.
Like 19!
changing over shift, it looks like you had training on each shift, but then 20!
there's a training, certain complications, which weren't even thought of.
21!
22f SIEGLITZ:
I think cne of them, like I say, would be the final review 23l circuit, prior to doing something.
During emergency training, you are 24l' basically going through the same review circuit we do for normal corrective 25i s
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1l maintenance. Never envisioning that there be more, or additional parties 2!
getting into the circuit, which would further complicate the procedure.
I 3
think at that time, I think the result is get the applicable, knowledgeable
[
people involved, and here's where you get into your onsite people.
I think g
they know the plant, at least the intricacies of the plant, better than someone can who is offsite.
And to bo there, and get the feel and the minute by minute charges in the plant, I think you almost have to have
,(
someone there calling these shots.
You hear in the paper about various 81 plants and people from all over being able to run a reactor, or any kind of a plant, and my feeling is I don't think you can adacuately do that.
You 10l can be technically an expert in your fiela, but unless you are right there, 11:
I think you lose something.
12l 131 MARSH:
I've got an area, I'd like your comments on.
And looking at some 14!
of the past trip history for Unit 2, and ta,4ing with other people, it 15',
appear; that, well in looking at roughly 10 previous trips, 7 of those have 1 51 occurred within about an hour to an hour and a half of changeover... the 17!
shift change. You indicated that you normally come in earlier for the 18t transition from one shift to the other.
Can you give me your impressions 19!
of how these transitions r.ormally work.
Is it a chaotic period? Has there 20!
normally been a lot of confusion? Is there any reason why we should see a 21!
pattern that trips normally occur close to a changeover period?
22!
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SIEGLITZ:
No, I don't see why you have that.
I know like the shift foreman 24i in the Control Room there, they sit down at their desk and they go over 25; s
ct
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what has transpired following their shift and the prior shift, I've never seen any chaotic... that word I dcn't think I like, but... it seems to be 2.,
orderly... organized. Operators, they relieve on shift, on station, so 31 it's not that you have a station that's unattended for some period of time.
And-if their relief doesn't come in, then they stay.
I don't know why that correlation should take place that your trips occur near the end of the Si shifts.
8!
MARSH:
That word chaotic, by the way, was used by one of the.CRO's so it is not original with me.
10!
11; SIEGLITZ: Maybe that's something he knows within his own house that I 12!
wasn' t privy to.
14; MARSH: Well, this is why we're looking for your input.
If I understand 15-you right then, your experiences, the transition, at least, as far as it 16; addresses the maintenance function, you feel its normally been orderly and IT' adequate enough to allow you to do your job.
ISr 19i SIEGLITZ:
Yes.
20!
2
MARSH:
Do you have more time?
22' I
231 FASANO: Just two minor questions.
Catalytic when they do maintenance, 24t they do it in accordance with the same procedures that your inhouse mainte-2*I
~;
nance people perform their maintenance.
Is that correct?
l
I 24 SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
Catalytic is more or less an arm. They're aa f
outside contractor working for Metropolitan Edison.
If work items come in I
and there of such a nature that either, A, I don't have the people to 31 y
support that effort at this time, or B, I feel that they have more experience
... might be a heavy rigging job, or something that's a manpower job that
- t is going to eat up a lot of men, I will assign this job'to Catalytic.
They 6i work through the same paper work that we work through, and perform in the same manner, as if they were a fourth or fifth division of the maintenance 8i department.
91 101 FASANO:
Are these mainly done, are the catalytic jobs done mainly on day 11; shift, or are they on days like yours?
12!
13:
SIEGLITZ:
No, they are... Catalytic are strictly day workers.
They only 14; exception would be to that is during an outage.
If we're down, we'd be 15i working our people on varaus shifts, and they would probably be working on 16; the same shifts.
IT ISi f.i?ANO: Were they be working on the night shift on the 28th?
191 20t SIEGLITZ:
No, they were not.
T5.ey were strictly daytime at that.
In 7,:
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fact, we were even winding down their support on Unit 2, even in the 22' l
maintenance function.
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FASANO:
One other problem that seems to have been evident was the condensate pumps seemed to have had a low head pressure.
Was this an ongoing problem, I
where any bypass to the hot well? And I understand that the bypass...
31 valves were throttled, at least partially, to minimize your recirc to the 4!
j
... I guess to the hot well, so you have maximum coming through the polishers at
, 6,i to the boosters.
And was there an outgoing problem with these condenser 1
... the condensate pumps that you knew of, or was this something that i
7{
i apparently is
...?
81 91 SIEGLITZ:
I wasn't aware of a pump problem.
I know there was some problems 10j on the condensate system that Burns & Roe had been asked to look at... in 11; certain modes, in certain flow levels, I should say.
There was some vibration 12' on the lines on there. They had been studying that.
On previous trips, we i
131 had broken some yokes on some of the valves into the hot well.
They later 14!
founo that some of them were due to restraints on the valve not allowing 15?
them adcquate motion.
There were severcl of them that were not restrained, 16i but yet had broken, gone back to the vendor and they recommended using a 175 cast steel rather than a cast iron yoke.
And I believe it was two valves ISr that had that on.
But we had not had a problem on that for several months 191 prior to the incident.
20l 0
2-FASANO:
I have no further questions.
22l 2
MARSH:
I have two very brief questions.
I'll just state them together, 2
and then if you have anything to respond to, we'll go into it in greater 25i cQ T
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26
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detail.
y Do you have any knowledge, direct or indirect or even heresay, in 2{
any manner whatsoever, that would make you believe that sabatoge or adverse i
human actions, someone actually coming in here and trying to bring this 3t thing about took any part in this incident, either in the creation of it or i
in making it more savere?
Si 6i SIEGLITZ:
No, I do not.
8 MARSH:
Second question in that same line, is there is some curiosity, 9!
especially since March 28th is the anniversery date that Unit 2 went 101 critical, or went commercial, that there may have been some celebrations in 11:
progress, or may have played a role.
Do you have any information, again 12'.
heresay or scuttlebut, that there were parties planned or may have been 131 under way at the time of the incident or before?
14!
15:
SIEGLITZ:
No, I do not.
As a matter of record, I wasn't even aware that 16; I hadn't kept tract that was the anniversey date.
That's the first was.
17' time I've heard that.
ISr MARSH:
Yes, it was..
365 days, I believe, nearly to the hour that they 20t went critical.
- 0. K.
Tony, do you have one more question?
21!
22';
FASANO:
You reminded me of one area that I'd like to pursue slightly in i
23}
i t.
It's really a fall out. My understanding is that there has been some 24!
work done to explain the condensate polisher valves going closed with the 25i q.
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l 27 introduction of water into the service air... instrument air... line.
And I understand GPU was doing this. Are you knowledgeable of this work?
2 3;
SIEGLITZ:
No, I'm not.
Since the incident the Met Ed maintenance force
{
has been playing, I would call it more a minor role in the Unit 2 work.
GPU has come in with their construction people there, startup people, Gi outside contracting people and has been doing the lion's share of the work and all the modifications, and new fixes on Unit 2.
Our Met Ed maintenance people have been involved.in doing some surveillances and PMs and some major component difficulties that were identified, such as seal leakage on 10' the condensate booster pump, on doing meggering readings for checking levels in the Reactor Building, and basically a support type effort.
We 12',
haven't been doing any full-fleged major corrective maintenance on Unit 2.
131 14!
FASANO:
This particular effort was started, and my understanding is that 3
they did run some tests.
I believe some of your I&C people were involved in working with the GPU people.
17i 181 SIEGLITZ:
It's quite possible.
I&C department is the one exception in 194 that construction people, even during the initial startup relied on our I&C 20 people.
That's one trade that you just can't pick up off the streets.
21 It's a specialty, and as such we have in the past supplied them with I&C I
22l people as needed.
23!
24!
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I 28 l
FASANO:
This work then, is inconclusive, I understand.
You don't know nothing of it?
2!
3 SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
41 Si FASANO:
It raises one other question. How are you people coordinating 6;
then, GPU and Met Ed? It seems that you have maintenance going on.
How
/
are you going to be kept up to some level of knowledge of your plant, if al indeed, you're not involved or at least kept in total briefing of what is 91 being done?
101 11; SIEGLITZ:
Presently, we still have every morning... there's a Jack 12:
Herbein meeting.
It is going over the priority jobs of the day, priority 131 jobs in the recovery program.
A lion's share of the job are GPU jobs.
And 14!
at those meetings they would request for an I&C technician to check this or 25 to check that. And the I&C, like I say, we had our own people setting up 16; radiation monitors and instrumentation on the new fixes.
In that aspect, 17' we've been tied in, and it's througn this morning meeting that we've been 78l
~
getting direction along those areas.
191 FASANO:
Would the same work request system be set up, so that GPU would
'l
'l' follow the same route as you people were doing, or is it going to be something 2d9 completely different, and disconnected?
23l 24!
25!
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29 l
SIEGLITZ:
1; The GPU work was not done under our work request system.
They 2j had a different system, and prior to having a tie-in to an existing system, f t gets approved by the PORC, and all the applicable procedures are written 3
before it's actually tied into our system.
This was done to expedite the bureauracy involved in getting the paper work generated and approved.
They 5,
l went through their repair circuit... I'm sorry, their procedure circuit, Si design circuit with engineering people, did the work with proper docu-mentation for their program, which.in the meantime was run in a parallel I
effort through our approval circuit.
So, at such a time, when the tie-in 91 was going to be made to an existing system, our paper work would be in line and ready to accept their job, their work.
i 12:
FASANO: Just on the morning that you were there, did you know of, or would 13) you have reason to call Burns & Roe at that time.
It seems like Burns &
14i Roe would be more involved with the maintenance function, than say with 15:
operations.
So, I'm asking, do you know if they were ever contacted? Have 15i you knowledge of it?
17!
181 SIEGLITZ:
I would not know.
In fact, I don't recall even hearing their 191 name mentioned that morning in the Control Room.
I don't know of anyone 20t i
identifying that problem.
21!
2$
FASANO: Thank you.
I have no further questions, 23 24!
25i t
'i!s c3
30
\\
i 1j MARSH:
- 0. K.
Time being 11:48 a.m.
Readings 686 on the meter. We'll j
terminate this tape, and just express our thanks to you for your time.
t 3t l
4!
si 6i 7!
8:
9f 101 l
12:
131 14!
15; 16; 17 18 19t 20!
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