ML19208B083
| ML19208B083 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1979 |
| From: | Creswell J, Sieglitz R Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190034 | |
| Download: ML19208B083 (73) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of:
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IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW
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of Mr. Richard E. Sieglitz Supervisor for Unit liaintenance x
Si 6j 7i i
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Trailer #203 91 NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania 11:
July 3. 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13!
Aucust 1, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 325 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
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171 181 19!
201 21; NRC PERSONNEL:
22l Mr. James S. Creswell 23l Mr. Anthony N. Fasano Mr. Dale E. Donaldson 24l fir. Robert Marsh
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25; C Y; 3 P
9 7909190039
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i lj MARSH:
The date is July 3, 1979.
The time is 9:34 a.m.
My name is Bob 2j Marsh and I'm an Investigator with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, i
3j assigned to the Region III, Chicago Illinois Office. On this date we are
.gl located in trailer 203 at the Three Mile Island Sits.
The purpose of 5
conducting an interview of Mr. Richard E. Sieglit::.
Dick is a Supervisor ip for Unit Maintenance. With which unit Dick?
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8j SIEGLITZ:
Unit 2.
9l MARSH:
The Unit 2 at the Three Mile site for Met Ed.
Dick, prior to the 10 beginning of this interview I want to make reference to the two page memo you have in front of you.
We've discussed it briefly before we went on tape and I just want to review it a little bit indicating that it does 12 14l state the authe d y for NRC's investigation, it's goals and some of your rights during this interview that the fact that you have the right to refuse the interview and some other words to your rights.
At the second
,_w page of that memo are several questions which I've asked you to answer.
There are not likely to orally respons to them at this time.
First question reads:
Do you understand the above, making reference to the two page memo?
20l SIEGLITZ:
Yes I do.
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22!
MARSH:
And second question reads:
Do we have your persmission to tape 23t this interview, we being the NRC?
24l 25; y
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l If SIEGLITZ:
Yes you do have that permission.
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MARSH: And thirdly: Would you like a copy of this tape and/or transcript?
41 gj SIEGLITZ: Yes I would like that.
6i 7i MARSH:
Okay, Dick, I'll indicate at this time that I'll provide you a copy g{
of the tape soon as we finish here...I can duplicate it and as soon as the g
transcript is completed we will also get you a copy of that.
There is a ur ques nw c is n caH ed u specMicaHy on that second page,
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10 but is covered in the body of the memo and that addresses your right if you g
so desire to have an accompanied representative or anyone else that you see fit present during this interview. Can I get your desires on that?
14:
SIEGLITZ:
I'll sit here by myself I believe.
16; MARSH:
Okay.
I'll indicate, Dick, at this time that should you at any 17' I
time during the course of this interview feel you do want company people in 18f or a union rep, just make that indication, we'll stop and get people in 19l here.
20 21!
SIEGLITZ:
Okay, fine.
22l 23l MARSH:
Or otherwisa we'll go ahead and preceed.
Thank you.
Now, before 24l we begin the interview there are other people in the room.
Some still 25!
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1 arriving and I'd like to go around the table and have each individual 2
identify himself, scell his last name and indicate his position.
If you'd i
f start please.
3 4i Sj CRESWELL:
This is James S. Creswell.
I'm a Reactor Inspector from Region III.
t 7
gl FASANO:
Althony N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist Performance Appraisal Brarch assigned to Region '.
- g; 10f DONALDSON
Dale 2. Donaldson, Radiation Specialist, Region I.
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MARSH:
Okay, fine.
That's it.
Rich, to begin with if you could, would 13i you give us a brief summary of your experience in the nuclear field?
Lc LIEGLITZ: Okay, prior to starting work with Metropolitan Edison, I'd worked at the Babcock and Wilcox Company for ten years as a construction 17l superintendent.
Of that tice, I'd have spent some time preliminarying the regional office in an administrative capacity and in preparations for the North Hanna Unit 3 and 4.
That work was involved with overland hauling and preliminary procedure writing for the program before the start of work.
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After that I spent approximately a year and a half at Three Mile Island 22l Unit 2 in the construction capacity with the Babcock and Wilcox Company.
l 231 Started on the island writing initial procedures for the erection of the i
24 NSS system.
Went from a procedure writer to project engineer for S&W and 25i QO cf 1
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later to construction superintendent which had the responsibility of over-2!
seeing the labor and the progress of the erection of the NSS system, after I
which I came to work for Metropolitan Edison in the capacity of an engineer 3
4;:
senior in the maintenance department and am presently supervisor of mainten-ance in Unit 2.
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6i MARSH: Alright, thank you.
At this time prior to turning it over the NRC 7
8l nves ga s f r specmc quesdons, N me you to begin wM 2e Wal notification or how you became aware of the incident on March 28th and then g
0; just take your recollections chronologically through the first day of that
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event.
12l SIEGLITZ:
Okay.
On March 28th I was at home.
I received a phone call in 131 the morning at approximately 5:10 a.m.
The caller I do not remember his 141 name at this time. We have on station at time, engineers from either the Reading Office or from Jersey Central and Penn Life assisting... assisting engineers.
He had dalled me, he was asked by George Kunder to give me a call and stated that we had reactor trip a turbine trip and that they would 181 like me to come in to review our new known name manage list, see which 19!
types of items we could work from when the unit was off the line.
This is 20!
a normal practice.
At that time I had no indication that there was anything abnormal.
I got dressed and got to the island.
I believe I arrived on the 22!
island approximately 6:00 a.m., went directly to the Unit 2 control room 23!
where at that time Bill Zewe and some of the other operators were at the 2 41 control panel.
They appeared to be rather busy.
I did not go directly to 25!
y.
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5 lj them, I saw George Kuncer and some other people in the control room at the 2
back of the control room. They asked me to get my know name manage list i
3j out, review, see what type of work possibly we could perform when the i
4j people came in at 7:30. They also would ask me to see if we had a spare 3;
rupture diaphragm to the RC bleed tank. They had believed that this had 6
possibly ruptured.
I preceeded to the back of the control room and at that 7j time that was the only dialog I had.
I did not know exactly what had gone I
gi on other then they felt that they had had a trip due an air problem, closing the valves in the feedwater system inturn tripping the turbine and inturn g
tripping the reactor.
I went back to my list, started reviewing what jobs 101 that I knew we had parts for, looking over priorities, normally we figure y
roughly about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or a day at most between the time we trip to we cc back on the line in that time frame tried to eliminate those jobs that
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either I didn't want to or tha*. we couldn't work at this time.
Sam Jules, my maintenance foreman, happened by the window, I got hold of him and asked him to look for a spare rupture diaphragm, he being the lead mechanical foremar, on Unit 2.
At that time I don't recall any other specifics so roughly 7:00 or shortly before when the raciation alarm did go off, and really that was the first time that I was, you know, realize that it was rsally more than just another trip.
I knew they...they said they were having trouble getting RC temperatures and then getting consistant readings, 21; but I hadn't gotten involved with specifics.
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MARSH,:
Let me interrupt.
Between that period of roughly 6:00 o' clock when 2 41 l
you arrived and 7:00 when you recall the alarm going off.
Had your people 25; Does anything come to mind?
actually started any work?
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6 ilj SIEGLITZ:
No, we had not.
Until 7:30 in the morning, that's the normal 2
starting time for our day shift people. The foremen normally come in 3
between quarter to 7 and 7:00 o' clock and I normally come to the control 4j room anyway before 7, get the turnover from the previous night, see what Sj specific problems they had and get specific priorities for that day so that when the men starting at work, the foremen are already aware of it and got 5
out some preparation started.
But, no, know one had starting work on the 7
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dayshift, in fact, with the alarm going off shortly before 7 most of the people didn't even get onto the island.
g 10i CRESWELL: You mentioned that someone told you that the...they thought the 11:
ruptured diaphram had blown on the reactor coolant drain trank?
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i 131 SIEGLITZ:
Um um.
15' CRESWELL:
Was that George Kunder that told you that?
16i 17' SIEGLITZ:
I don't rememoer specifically whether...it might have been 18!
Kunder.
I talked to Kunder, the shift foreman.
There were already some 196 engineers, Unit 2 engineers in the control room.
I don't remember whether 201 it was Kunder's specifically though that told me that information.
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CRESWELL:
Had they indicated that they had shut off the EMOV at that time 23:
or the, block valve?
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I lj SIEGLITZ:
No, I was not aware of that until later on during the incident.
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CRESWELL:
But you would estimate it was approximately 6:00 o' clock when 4j they were...you were in the control room?
i 51 6.
SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
7 8l CRESWELL:
Okay.
Continue.
91
- ***#9'""Y **""" *** * *"
101 emergency procedure.
I recollect the engineers going to the telephones and making the numerous calls to the NRC and other agencies.
At that time the 13i repair party, the maintenance repair party started showing up in the control I had Sam Jules who I said previously was my lead mechanical engineer, room.
he showed up.
' had Charlie Rippon who is electrical foreman, Unit 2.
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Doug Weaver who's lead electrical...I'm sorry, lead I&C foreman or instrument control foreman for Unit 2, he showed up and we had them in ready in the back of the control rocm depending what action operation desired of us.
Approximately 7:10 a.m., Bill Zewe asked that we had an electrician go down and check the K3 interlock to the RC pump.
Charlie Ri;:pon sent, he and one 20!
of the electricizqs went downstairs to check on that and.at that time I did 21!
not get their response back as to the position that they found it in.
They 22!
l reported back I believe directly to Bill Zewe or the shift fnreman.
At 23l that time we were involved in getting the men to get mustered at the Observa-24) tion Center, that word was put out at approximately 7:15.
I gave clearance 25,;
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to Don Barry cr...I'm sorry BERRY to come to the Unit 2 control room at 1
2 7:15. He asked permission to get in there.
At the time I thought the l
31 guards had asked for Don Barry.. 8ARRY who's our communications specialist 4;
on the island and under the circumstances I felt that I should have him in Si the control roou with the telephones, the radios and any other communication 6i problems.
Don Berry who did come is an operations engineer familiar with 7'
- the condensate polisher systems and some of the other systems, so he was g
a...it was acceptable to have him in the area anyway for his information and expertise.
Roughly about this time I also had Doug Weaver when we al 10j heard that there was problems with the air system probably causing the whole start of our problems.
He went down to the instrument air compressors, g
checked the systems and the traps and found that they were loaded with water.
An operator and he allowed them to bleed down and I understand they bleed for sometime with water.
Approximately 7:30, the alarms, like I 14,.
said, had been sounding or had sounded earlier prior to 7 o' clock, not knowing what people may have come early and being some of the outer trailers of the complex I asked Doug to get 2 of his people to check the outer trailers out back because there might have been a dead spot where they might not of heard the alarms and be sitting in the trailers.
So he sent 2 of his people, Paul Xeene and Phil Peavy out to the trailers to make a round and they were to report right back. At 8: 45, there was a question about the operability of the Aux building exhaust system.
Charlie Rippon 22l i
was asked to invesitgate that and I do not have specifics as to what he 231 found, I believe he got to the door of the aux building and I have not 2 41 questioned him a= to what he had.
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9 lj MARSH: The 7:30 sweep of those back trailers was that... aid you get a response to that as to what they found?
2 31 SIEGLITZ:
They found no one in the trailers.
4 Si CRESWELL: You mentioned earlier that you sent Sam Jules' out to find a 5
7l ruptured diaphragm. Did he find that?
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SIEGLITZ: Yes, we did have them.
He went to his office which is just on g
1gl the turbine floor, just...not to far away from the control room, check the books, the bin location, I believe he made a phone call over to the warehouse and had positive identification that yes we did have some in the warehouse.
13l CRESWELL:
There was somebody in the warehouse?
15:
SIEGLITZ:
Yeah.
16i 17!
CRESWELL:
Thank you.
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SIEGLITZ:
Approximately 8:50, the aux building fire alarm went off.
Doug 201 Weaver went down to the panel which is just inside the aux building itself 21!
as you go through the double doors.
He silenced the alarms...there was no 22 fire but the alarm had gone off.
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!lj MARSH:
How does he know there was no fire? Did he make a sweep of the 2f building? Did he walk through it or as to what manner did he determine i
3j that there was no fire?
4' Sj SIEGLITZ:
He acknowledged the alarm.
The alarm had shut off did not g!
reinject.
I gl MARSH:
So they just reset...
91 0l SIEGLITZ:
They just reset the alarm and did not come back in again.
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CRESWEi.L:
12t Which...do you know which alarm this was?
131 SIEGLITZ:
Specifically, no, I do not.
From that time on t6 approximately 10:40 we were in a stanaby condition in the control room with the repair party. We did not to my knowledge go out and work on any components.
We were there should operations desired us to check on something or to do work on the component. We are in the control room at one time the other emergency location had to evacuate.
Their personnel came into the control room.
We 196 stayed at the back at the southwest corner because of the deadening of 20l sound of conversation would be in a minimal in there and finally we moved them into the old startup engineers room so they get as r st people out of the room itself so there would be less confusion, less noise in the control 23l t
room.
But there was not a lot of confusion.
It was quite, you know what 241 I mean.
It wasn't so you couldn't hear other people talk.
You could talk f
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in a normal tone of voice anywhere in the control room and be heard.
The 2
next thing I recall is, well it's about that time, sometine between 10:30 3j and 11, it was decided that we should evacuate the island other than only
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4l necessary personnel require to maintain the plant in a safe condition.
Dan 5
Shovlin had arrived in the control room earlier in the morning, I would say 6i sometime in the area of 7 o' clock, I'm not sure on the exp ? time that he 7
arrived.
He being senior to myself he requested that he stay in the control gi room and that I would leave with the other people.
So he took over the g;
repair party. We went downstairs check out, went across the street, initially i
101 we were suppose to go to Observation Center and when we got there because g
of the number of people and the difficulty with parking we were requested g
to go to the 500KV substation.
I reported out there, at that time they were making a second frisk of people, making sure that they were not contami-nated or had any or were not radiated, as there were technicians out there.
I got a hold of a radio and was in communication with the Observation Center and any messages that the control room might have to either hold specific individuals or what have you were relayed from the Observation Center to me and we had people in the holding pattern in both locations should specific people be need to look at specific jobs.
Approximately 19i 12:30 or there abouts, the word was put out that we could release the people once their cars had been examined and checked and they were found to be clean.
Later in the afternoon time wise it was somewhere between 3:00, 3:00 and 3:30 I believe, I was asked to come back onto the island to relieve 23!
Dan Shovlin who was going to get some lunch.
I was on the island for a 24!
short period time until he got back.
No other actions were initiated while 25i I was there and then he relieved me.
And that was the first day.
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i DONALDSON:
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Let me go back and pick on the repair party team for awhile.
2 If I understand you correctly, you are the repair party leader?
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SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
5I 00NALDSON:
Okay.
Now normally where would be your reporting station in an ei emergency?
7;i 81 SIEGLITZ:
The ECS down at...dcwn by Unit 1 HP. We were...I was already in the control room, we already had 3 of the foreman there and we were being asked questions and I'd say there was a repair party there. There were individuals, mechanics, electricians and that type down at that location that were prepared, you know, to go in and there were in proper attire to 13i do so.
We had some foremen and some other people who were in the area and 14' right at the control room which were in the ante room right there off the 1E control room.
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00NALDSON:
But you normally would report to the ECS?
181 191 SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
201 21!
DONALDSON: Okay.
Do you know who took charge of the repair party that was 22 located at the ECS?
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l 13 SIEGLITZ: No, I do not recall.
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2t DONALDSON: You didn't establish communications or...
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4l 5l SIEGLITZ: There was communciations, but I was not in contact with them.
I was getting direction in the control room from George Ku'nder or once with 6
Bill Zewe and they were trying to minimize us at the communication chain, 7
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and the type of things that we were asked to go check were not in areas g
where we would have to be suited up.
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i DONALDSON: Okay.
Now normally the repair party operates under whose 12!
I direction or who do they coordinate with in the ECS?
14:
SIEGLITZ: Well, where they're in the direction of operations or whoever, you know, would require us to do the services.
Generally, we're a support 16i function of operations.
They determine what problems they have and ask us 17i to investigate or resolve them.
181 19I DONALDSON:
Okay, prior to conducting any kind of repair function, who in 201' the ECS do you normally coordinate with?
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SIEGLITZ:
The engineers are also located...there were engineers in the 23l l
Unit 2 control room, lead electrical, I&C, mechanical engineers were present 241 along with George Kunder and they were with the foreman if something was 25j 1
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asked or questioned, looking up information from drawings that were available 1
2l there in the control room, deciding on what they felt would be the most 3l probable cause of a problem and checking that aspect out.
4; DONALDSON: Okay.
Let me just show you this diagram here for a minute.
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What I'm what really interested in, if you look at that that's extracted Q1 f
from the procedures and from the emergency plan...
81 MARSH:
Dale, excuse me, could you identify what he's looking at the title 91 on...
101 11!
DONALDSON:
Titled, " Normal Emergency Organization", and you'll notice that 12' the repair party falls under the ECS director which is the radiar.f on protection supervisor.
Now, do you normally coordinate with the radiation 1M protection supervisor prior to conducting any kind of emergency repair or 15 maintenance operation?
16i 17l SIEGLITZ: Okay, at this time Dick Dubiel was in the control room before 18:
people did go out he was advised of what we wanted to do and where we were 191 going to go and we get his concurrence prior to leaving the control room.
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So he was aware of where our people were going and wha + they were going to 21; be looking at.
22l 231
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DONALDSON:
Under the normal organization, would that normally be Mr.
24i Oubiel you coordinate with or would it be with the ECS director that is the 25i supervisor of radiation protection?
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15 SIEGLITZ:
1.
When you say normally, are talking about other than emergency condition. Normally we do not work or take direction from him or bect.ase 2
3 of the process and that's another whole chain.
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DONALDSON:
You coordinate with...
I 61 SIEGLITZ: We coordinate and he's aware and if we're involved in areas where RWP coverage would be required, yes, his people are involved...
g 9l DONALDSON: Okay.
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SIEGLITZ:
In a review circuit or advisory condition depending on the scope 12!
and the location and the specific job in question.
But at the time no, we 13!
were getting direction from operations being the shift supervisor, shift 141 foreman in there chain or and George Kunder.
15 16i DONALDSON:
Okay, so from your viewpoint you were from the standpoint of radiological coordination dealing with Dick Oubiel?
18i 19!
SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
20l 21!
00NALOSON: Okay.
Normally we would expect to find you located in the ECS 22l 23f and working with the supervisor of radiation protection or his alternate for radiological controls prior to entry?
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SIEGLITZ:
Um um, yes.
1 2:
3 DONALDSON:
I wonder if you could explain or describe the thought process 4j that went on in est.blishing 2 repair parties.
One, at the designated g) location at the ECS and the second repair party in the control room?
r 6i SIEGLITZ:
I think what happened because of the time of day and when it's l
setup, like I say, our normal shift changes at 7:30 the night time shift g
g the shift workers who are the normal repair party did report downstairs to the ECS. We have, I'd say, had shift change people do come in early.
We 101 had some of those people and as they came by not knowing the scope or what we had we maintained them or held them at that location as some of these 12!
initial request came out to check this, check that.
Like I said we didn't know what the scope would be or how many people would need, so I'd say we were presently there in the control room, there is this little inte room where the office off to the side and we held them at that point.
That's the reason.
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DONALDSON:
So your saying that the people who mustered at the ECS were 191 classified as " Shift Maintenance Personnel"?
201 21i SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
22l 23l l
00NALDSON:
And people who mustered in the control room were not shift 24I maintenance workers, they were regular day workers.
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g SIEGLITZ: Day workers, yes.
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3l DONALDSON: Okay. Are you 2.vare or familiar *<ith the assignment how the i
emergency repair functions by the response plan.
What maintenance wo:..rs Sj are supposedly qualified to perform those functions? Would it be daylight workers? Would it be shift maintenance or...?
61 71 SIEGLITZ:
No, there's no differenciation betwean skills of a daylight 8!
worker versus a shift worker and the only designation is what hours he works. Whether he's in a revolving shift or he's constantly daylight.
As far as classification of people whether they be first class, second class repairmen or apprentice.
In there diciplines it's know differenciation.
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We have the same skills spread across both shift workers and day workers.
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DONALDSON: Okay.
Now, I could assume the daylight workers as well as the 15i shift maintenance workers would both be trained in their emergency responsi-16i bilities?
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SIEGLITZ:
They're both equally trained, I'd say, yes.
19l 20l DONALDSON:
In emergency planning an implementation of the Three Mile 21, Island Site plant?
22l 23l j
SIEGLITZ: As far as implementation, I would say...okay, I'd say no.
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l Because when the plan was run when testing is done it's the shift maintenance'5 25i party that response to the drills, when we had drills.
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7l 00NALDSON: Okay, so I guass my logical question is why then did we get 2
inv lved in the situation where daylight workers who by the emergency plan 3l are n t assigned that emergency duty mustered in the control room i
4 and appeared to have performed the bulk of emergency type repair and mainten-
- "'?
5i l
6i SIEGLITZ: Well, like I say, skill wise the people are equally qualified 7\\
from a technical standpoint.
Like I say, these people were there in cases Si they went with there foreman during the secondary plan.
10j DONALDSON:
Skill wise you would say that they're equally qualified. Would 11; you say that they're equally qualified from an understanding of the interrela-tionships, '.he coordination and control and communication aspects of the 13) emergency plan?
14' 15; SIEGLITZ: They were pouring through a chain of command where there's a day 16; worker or not.
I think the question is you have the foreman there who has 17!
the delegation or responsibility of his people.
He inturn was reporting to 18i me.
191 20t FASANO:
Dick, on the shift workers, are they assigned to both plants?
21l 22 SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
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241 25!
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19 FASANO:
1:
On the dayshift people, are they assigned specifically to a particular PI""*2 2
l 3t SIEGLITZ:
4 The day workers we do in the mechanical department we do rotate 5
them every several months we rotate the people from Unit 1 to 2 and vis versa.
Electrically, basically they've stayed in Unit 2 since construction.
65 g
I&C people are basically specialized in the Unit 2 since construction.
Si FASANO: Would you then say that the people i_n the dayshift were more knowledgeable of Unit 2 than the emergency party shift people?
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sIEGLITZ:
I would say they're more familiar with Unit 2 then the shift workers. Shift workers do know where the...where to get the documentation, the drawing the procedures because they spend roughly half there time at
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Unit 2, so they are familiar with the system but not to the degree and not 15-to the specialist consideration that you have on days, you have I&C techniciana 16i that are intimately involved with there RMS systems and the ICS systems and 17!
the turbine and what have you, and you don't have this specialty on the 18l backshifts.
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20; DONALDSON:
I quess what gives me a problem is we've got an organization 21!
setup here that you have operated a different number of years and you've i
22}
drilled it a number of times and the first you implement it we find that 23:
maybe a better way of doing things evolved, maybe not. Why would you 241 deviate from something that yet had practiced, something that you had been 25i O'
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20 llj trained on and something that you has seen operate.
That's tt.e though 2
process I want to get to. 'Was it because of what...?
I 3l 4l SIEGLITZ: Well, well the resean being, the people we have in the control t
Sj room like I mentioned, both the foremen and the technicians and repairmen that we had in the control room were Unit 2 daylight people, have the 6
1 expertise at their fingertips.
They were work on the same components day 7
in, day out. They have the specialty skills.
The people irr the repair 8
party you have to be setup in that fachion because on the off hours you g
Won't haVe these specialist onsite for immediate response.
The other people have to be there to respond in an emergency until you can get other 111 specialty people if required.
And at the time we felt the people with the most skills who are most familiar would be the applicable people to use.
131 The other people were there should we need more personnel or to backup 14:
these people and that was to why we went in the direction we went.
16i 00NALDSON:
Okay.
Relative to some of the entries and activities that were 17l occurring on the morning of the 28th, you mentioned that Rippert...
18{
19 SIEGLITZ:
Rippen.
20t 21f DONALDSON:
...Rippon went to the door of the aux building, I'm assuming 22l i
that's the Unit 2 aux building he went?
23!
24l 25i N
a 4, t
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21 ij SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
I 2!
CONALDSON:
3 And he was attempting to check on the aux building exhaust system.
Did he take a rad chem technician or an instrument or have a repair party monitor with him?
5 Si SIEGLITZ:
I right now cannot say from direct knowledge.
I'm assuming he g
did, like I say we cleared everything with Dubiel, he knew when we were sending people from the control room and he had people and equipment available.
10;:
It would be an assumption rather than a positive statement on my point at this time without further investigation.
12!
00NiLDSON: Okay. Would the samething be true for Mr. Weaver's entry to 13I acknowledge the fire alarm?
141 15 SIEGLIR:
16:
Yeah, same condition.
17]
00N/LDSON:
Now in talking with Mr. Shovlin he claims that he was in charge 181 of the repair party in the control room.
That doesn't seem to coinside 19!
with your recoilection of the situation.
Did Mr. Shovlin in fact designate 20i 21l you to be in charge?
22!
SIEGLITZ:
I was in the control room prior to his arriving.
I was there 23i first because of the trip and being cognizant supervisor on Unit 2 and Mr.
24!
Shovlin on overall station.
I was the first one there, like I say, I 25!
t
22 1,
started preparations for normal repairs whatever they might have been, and 2,
the initial starts until he did come onsite.
Until he got up the speed and i
3!
f und out where we were and what the status was I still maintained the i
4 contact and the dialog between anyone in the control room that needed g
maintenance response and it wasn't until later in the morning that prior to 6
learing the control room where he took over everything 'and then I left.
71 O NALDSON:
Um um, okay.
I wonder if that you were in fact the repair 8'
party...
10)
SIEGLITZ: Yep.
11!
12!
DONALDSON:
... king leader in the control room until you did leave when the 131 island was evacuated?
14' 15!
SIEGLITZ:
Yes.
16i 17j i
DONALDSON:
Okay.
Let's talk a minute about some of the constitution of 18i the repair party.
There is a...been a change in one of the emergency plan 191 into many procedures that was issued in February of 79, which makes the 20!
statement that only those individuals that received the required training 21:
will be assigned to repair party functions. Were you aware of this require-22' ment prior to the 28th?
23 l
24l 25i
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t
l 23 i
SIEGLITZ:
I'd gone through training and also had Mr. Shovlin.
Are you l
2 talking about the individuals whether they be daylight workers, is that 3l what you're leading to?
i 4l DONALDSON:
Correct, correct.
Actual members who were doing the work.
Si Si S_IEGLITZ: Well like I said, we did not physically do any work per se.
In i
,d l
81 regard to your statement, no, the people that we had up there had not gone 9l through those drills, just the shift 'c;orkers.
10:
CONALDSON: Orills, do you mean the training?
11!
12l l
SIEGLITZ: The training drills, yeah.
131 14!
DONALDSON: Well which is it? There's both. There's a requirement for 15 annual drill with the repair party and there's a requirement for training 16i which is separate from the drill.
17!
18t SIEGLITZ:
The shift people all had the training in...wnen the drills were 19 run they were run on a number of days on a number shifts to try an get a 20l i
drill on each shift so that all people had experience to their annual test.
21; 22l i
DONALDSON:
Talking about the 7 drills that were run between September and 23 November...
24l 25i
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24 g
SIEGLITZ:
I believe it was in that time frame, yes.
i 2!
I DONALDSON:
Okay.
The training that you attended in repair party functions, g
what was the purpose of that training session other than to of course train yourself and directing the teams?
Si SIEGLITZ: Why one of the basic concerns you have is your communication that could always be a problem, not that I'm saying it was a problem here but that's one thing that's involved. Where your equipement is located.
91 Basically where to report, who to report to, type of things.
11!
00NALDSON:
Um um.
Wa5 that training conducted so that, I believe, the maintenance foreman yourself, Mr. Shovlin could inturn train repair party 131 team members?
14:
15; SIEGLITZ:
I'd say basically administrative rather than technical, you 16:
know, I had to repair something if more, you know, like I say, administra-17I tive type rather than...
18!
19i DONALDSON:
This instruction in the emergency plan.
20r i
SIEGLITZ:
Right, right.
22' i
231 DONALDSON:
Okay, about 8:00 in the evening we have indications that the 24f organization changed somewhat and that in the mind of at least the emergency 25!
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25 i
I y
director who at the time was Gary Miller, they began to entry a recovering phase.
Do you recall or were around anytime to observe any changes in the 2
i 3j way things were done? That ia did you begin pursuing certain recovery ff kinds of repair actions either in the auxiliary buildings or anywhere?
5!
SIEGLITZ:
No, I was not onsite at that time.
I believe~I had left by 6
about 7:00.
I spent most of the afternoon across the street and except for 7
8 I was stationed across the street in an auxiliary capacity that might be 10;;
needed whether it be directing people or setting up schedules for the I
following day to ge. our people on shifts and get organizing in that fashion.
11!
So from that time on and on the following days I was not actually even on 12' the island.
I was stationed at the Observation Center.
131 14' 00NALDSON: Okay.
I have a...just a couple more charts I'd like you to 15:
take a look at.
Just verify for me whether or not they appear correct in 16i line with your understanding.
I guess from what you id me here that I 17!
can see that one of the things perhaps it's not correct.
This is titled, 18f
" Emergency Organization", in effect 3/28/79, 0730 through 0900.
And the 191 area I'm particularly interested in is here.
Now you can see I have emergency 20t repair team leader, superintendent of maintenace, obviously that was yourself, the supervisor of maintenance, although you were coordinating with Mr.
22 Shovlin.
23{
l 24i 25l Cyb s
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26 ilj SIEGLITZ: Yeah, we were standing adjacent to each other side by side and, y u know.
21 3!
i f
DONALDSON: Okay. These were the daylight maintenance workers.
Does that
[
relation appear correct?
Gi SIEGLITZ:
Yes, that's correct.
Your saying just daylight I&C.
I&C is 7!
Just one department that.we have in maintenance function.
9t DONA LDSON:
You did have other departments there?
11; SIEGLITZ: We nad other in addition to I&C.
12:
i 131 DONALDSON: Okay, fine.
Now if we come down here...go ahead Tony.
LG 15:
FASANO:
I was wondering other than I&C were in the control rocm?
16i 17i SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
ISr 19!
FASANO: What other diciplines were there?
201 21:
SIEGLITZ:
I had I&C which is my instrument and control people.
We had 22f mechanical people and we had electricians, e'ectrical department people.
231 24i 25i
r I
27 00NALDSON: No mechanical?
7 l
2 i
SIEGLITZ. UNINTELLIGABLE 3!
4 4!,
NA N
ay.
N w, wn in e
an s c.ar s rawn incorrecd y 5l l
it has to be corrected but the repair party was under a maintenance foreman 6
and the information we have is that was Cal Nevitch.
Does that ring a bell?-
81 1
9!
SIEGLITZ: Yes that's correct.
Cal Nevitch is a shift maintenace foreman, 10 u:
DONALDSON:
Correct.
12t i
131 SIEGLITZ:
So he would be a foreman who had gone through the training and 14i the drills and was aware of how to respond in an emergency such as this and 15i that was where he should have been stationed with his people.
16; 17!
DONALDSON:
Okay.
18:
i 19f SIEGLITZ:
And his people also is a spread of the dIciplines.
He has a 20l l
mechanical, electrical and I&C people on with him.
21!
22!
DONALDSON:
Now the way this is set up, now he was in fact working along 23i this chain here, through the ECS director, supervisor radiation protection.
24!
You did not coordinate with him? Verified that they had or had not done 25:"
any functions?
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l 28 ilj SIEGLITZ: No, I had not,.let me think for a second.
Like I said we 2
basically used the pecple in the expertise we had in the control room the 3
hour that I was in the control room.
I was aware that he was there and he i
4j did have more people and we were using him mere or less as a backup should 5l the' people I have for whatever reason not be adequate or enough or skilled 6i in a specific task or job.
Skilled maybe is a bad word, they're skilled but I'm saying if I needed someone with a specific expertise he may have had someone there with that expertise greater than one of the individuals 8
that I had in the control room at that time.
g 10f CONALDSON: Okay.
11:.
12f i
FASANO:
Dick, let have this diagram here.
As I see this emergency party, 13!
emergency repair party shift maintenance and you have emergency repair party leader.
Should they be under...
16i SIEGLITZ:
Yeah, the party reports to the forema...
The foreman is the lead.
In the event of an off hour emergency he would be the emergency ISI repair team leacer where having sraerintendent of maintenance shown that ne 19!
would be the senior maintenance man onsite until such time that someone 20!
senior to him could arrive.
21!
I 22!
j DONALDSON:
UNINTELLIGABLE, cerrect?
231 241 25i (j (;+ 7 7i-t t
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29 SIEGLITZ:
Yes.
I 2l 00NALDSON: Okay, so that takes us to about 9:00, now...
3 I
41 n
f clarificadon.
De organizational c.hads wMch we're 5
6 making reference to are rough draft charts drawn by NRC for possible use in the formal report which this team will be issuing.
Just so the record si I
81 shows what we're looking at here, these are NRC generated organizational i
charts.
9!
i 10j "JONALDSON:
Correct. The next chart I'd like to refer to is one titled, ll!
I
Emergency Organization" in effect 3/29/79, 0900 to 1100.
And now if we 12' look at this one we see now that the repair party teams have all relocated 131 and are essentially located in the Unit 2 control room and I believe that 14!
occurred approximately 8:00.
161 i
SIEGLITZ:
Okay.
17l 18h DONALDSON:
Okay.
For clarity I'd shown it under the 9:00 to 11:00 organi-191 zation.
Does this appear to be a correct understanding at that time?
201 21!
SIEGLITZ:
From what I 'saw in the later... in the morning and the afternoon 22t of the 28th...that's dated the 28th...okay, your saying on the T8th also.
i 23 24j 25!
Cb/
00/2
l
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30 l{
DONALDSON: Right.
I 2!
SIEGLITZ: Okay.
Yeah, by that time, I'd say, Gary Miller was in the 3l 4j control room and he was basic 411y calling the shots.
He would get his 5
pe ple, his operations people, his engineers determining what action, if 6
any, w uld be necessary and, yes, I would be getting direction basically in that fashion.
.d.
8!
DONALDSON: Okay, and then this dotted box which reads, Inplant Radiation
,l Protection and Repair Party Monitors.
Your understanding, I believe from an earlier statement was that Dick Dubiel, the supervisor of radiation 11!
protection and chemistry, was briefing or coordinating with you repair 12!
party people to provide repair party monitors and radiological guidance?
131 14!
SIEGLITZ: Yeah, he would be.15-16i DONALDSON:
So that appears to be a correct relationship?
18!
SIEGLITZ:
Yeah, that would still come under him.
He had his HP foreman 19!
that were...he had some in the control rocm, I believe there was scme down 201 in the ECS, like I said, I was not there so I don't know, you know, all the 21!
personnel that were there, but I know there was communication continuous 22l communication back and forth between the two locations, and before we sent 23l people out, he was advised of where or what we were going to do and where 24{
we were going to go.
25i
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l 31 DONALDSON: Okay. One finally point of verification, if you would...if you 1!
could for me.
Back to t'11s previous chart.
You notice we have the Unit 1 2
I 3j superintendent and the Unit 2 superintendent were acting as Cary Miller's assistance. One was going through the emergency plan procedures and making Sj su e each t.Mng was being done and t.5e oder MWual were camng de ECC director for clarity, was essentially insuring that Gary's directions et were being implemented.
Now, what I'm not sure about, and I get some conflicting information, is who was primarily going through the emergency plan and procedures to assure that they were being implemented? Was :t, in g
i fact, Unit 2 superintendent?
101 i
11 SIEGLITZ:
I remem*
early, Unit 1 superintendent, the one eluding to, is Jim Seelinger.
131 14!
DONALDSON:
Correct..
15, 16; SIEGLITZ:
The Unit 2 superintendent, Joe Logan.
171 ISl 00"ALDSON:
Right.
20!
SIEGLITZ:
Jim Seelinger, prior to being assigned to Unit i superintedent 21:
was a technical support superintendent on Unit 2.
He was quite up the 22 speed on the technical specs, procedures, policies and what have you on 23l' Unit 2.
I do rememccr one time when he did come in the control room and I 241 don't remember what time in the morning it was.
He did pick up the emergency 25!
A',
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32 1;
plan procedure review, look over it and said, "Well, we're right on, you 2j know, we're doing everything we've said we've done". As far as to, whether 3
Mr. Logan after that had been keeping up step by step with the procedure 4
that I do not know.
51' DONALDSON:
Do you recall who Gary assigned when he walked in the control 6
7j room.
I believe he normally designates certain people that will do certain 1
8l things?
91 SIEGLITZ:
No, I do not recall.
i 11.
DONALDSON:
Okay. Well I can say that at least in terms of the recair 12t I
party area that these relationships appear correct.
Some of the titles, of 131 course, need to be brought in line with current information, but the general reporting relationships and everything appear...
16i SIEGLITZ:
Yes.
17' i
ISt DONALDSON:
...consistant to your understanding?
19!
l 20; SIEGLITZ:
Uc um.
21; 22!
DONALDSON:
A couple of final questions in the area of repair party team 23l training.
I believe that the responsibility for training the repair party 24!'
teams by procedure is delegated to the superintendent of maintenance who in 25i l
{)0 3 C O,1 9
I l
33 1!
turn may designate other individuals to conduct that training as you may see fit. Had you or were you aware of anyone who had been designated to 2
{
conduct this training during 1978?
3 4!
SIEGLITZ: The training that I recall was the training that was station g;
6 wide, in that we had the drills, I don't recall a specific individual in 7l the maintenance department assigned to say your the training director, see that it's done.
81 The program was, like I say, station wide with all the departments involved.
g 10!
DONALDSON:
Your not aware of any specific courses and entitled, " Repair 1..1:
Party Team Training", that might have been conducted by any of you foremen?
,J l
131 SIEGLITZ:
No, I'm not aware of that.
15i DONALDSON: Anyone else? Okay.
Then just a catch up here in the area of radiological c:ntrols.
Are you familiar with the emergency dose criteria for emergency repair functions? The statire policy as it were relating to 1St the maximum per.aissable dose under for saving, plant equipment?
19!
20t SIEGLITZ:
I know for saving a life would be 100 R, for plant equipment I'm 21 not sure what the number is, off the top of my head.
I know we did have it 22!
in training, I don't recall right now.
2 31 24l 25i Qu t
l I
l
34 1
DONALDSON: Tony.
2!
FASANO:
Dick...
3 l
4l
'RSH:
Excuse me.
Before we get it on, this is a break point point where Si 6l I can interrupt for a second and reverse the tape here so wo will take a 1
quick break. The time 10:19 and reading 697 on the meter.
7 8!
gj MARSH:
reading, the time being 10:20:and reading 698 on the I
meter we'll resume at this time.
Dale, I think you had one or two last questicns.
12l
(
DONALDSON:
Right, they came to mind as we flipped the tape over.
You 131 mentioned that, Dick, that you had directed scme individuals to go out and 15; sweep the trailers to assure that everybody had heard the emergency announce-ment. Would that be a normal function?
16' 17l SIEGLITZ:
No, that is not a normal maintenance function.
The way we are ISI situated here on the island, there are,? number of trailers in the out 191 buildings that, in fact, I have some maintenance trailers east of the unit 20l i
and electrical shop and my shop where some people would congregate that 21, early in the morning.
And normally that would be a security function, and 22t that's there job to do it.
I had the people there and just a(ter the 23 people left the control room we realized well, that wasn't really our 24!
l function, but the people had left and knew right where they were goint and 25i they would be back shortly so we did not abort that mission.
.M i
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ts
I I
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l 35 DONALDSON:
And the other comment you made relative to authorizing certain l!
2{
people on site. Would that normally be your responsibility also?
i 31 SIEGLITZ: Normally it would be who's in control in the...the senior man 4
in the control room in a situation like this.
Zewe was busy at the control
~!
!,t panel, the other people were busy up there and we'd picked up the phone, I called across the room and they said, yes, allow them in and then I allow them in, so.
g 91 DONALDSON: Thank you.
t 10 11!
FASANO: Dick, you saia that you were contacted by phone at 5:10 a.m. on the 28th?
i 13i 14!
SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
Ici FASANO:
Then when you came in and you did go through the gate with no problem?
18!
19t SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
20t 21!
FASANO: What time, I don't have the time down as when you arrived in the 22 control room, Unit 2?
23.
24; 25!
t i
{
36
!lj SIEGLITZ:
I'm not sure, it was somewhere in the nature between 6:00 and i
6:10 I believe.
2 I
3i FASANO:
And you mentioned that you had seen a number of people.
Do you 5{
know how many?
Gi SIEGLITZ:
I would say, Zewe and maybe 3, maybe 4 people.
They were 7,
perator types that are normally in the control room.
The operators were 8
gj at the panels, I could see that they were involved in something, what I exactly did not know.
11!
i CRESWELL: You would say know more than 5 people?
12',
I 131 SIEGLITZ:
I would say that's correct.
At the control panel area.
There were some engineers, Unit 2 engineers in the back of the control room but out of site of...line of site of any operator who wanted to see any equipment.
16i t
17' FASANO:
Did you later find who these were?
18i i
19i SIEGLITZ:
No, I...they were normal operators that I'd seen in the c::ntrol 20!
room before and I did not take note of them.
2 11 22)I CRESkELL:
Were you aware of the conversation that George Xunder had with 23l Lee Rogers carrying over and Jack Herbein, telephone conversation?
24l 25i i
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7, SIEGLITZ: This is what in the very early hours of 6, 7 o' clock?
l 2;
CRESWELL: That's correct.
It would be between 6 and 6:30 approximately.
3l l
4:
SIEGLITZ:
I believe there wts phone of that kind o# a nature where you're et 6
g nna have more...they would in the shift supervisor's office.
I was not in that office all the time.
/j l
81 CRESWELL: Was George in the office whenever you came in?
Si 10!
l SIEGLITZ:
George Kunder?
12' I
CRESWELL:
Right.
131 14!
SIEGLITZ: Yeah, he was at the back of the control rocm right cy the shift supervisor's office, yes.
So he'd either be in the office itself or directly 1Si outside of it so that...giving direction to me.
i 171 18:
CRESWELL:
But he wasn't on the phone during this period of time that you recollect?
20!
21;l SIEGLITZ:
I don't recall.
22' I
23l j
FASANO:
When you got there, you got the know name outage.
And you'd 2 41 l
started to raview that with there specific jobs and priority of jobs.
Do 25i I
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you recall anything on that you had already setup as a priority just off 2,'
hand?
l 3:
SIEGLITZ:
4 No, I'd have to dig it out again and see specifics.
i Si CRESWELL:
6 As I recollect, some of the items on the know name outage list were like the dipping birds?
/
l 8!
SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
91 10:
CRESWELL: Did you in your study of that list make pceparations to do work 11!
say on those license?
131 14!.
SIEGLITZ:
Yeah, the individual...the where and know name outage list works is that as work request are evolved in the plant and we find that cannot be 15i worked during normal mode of operation.
If it takes a more restrictive 15i mode, aither certain components or the entire plant to be shutdown we identify these and put them on this list so that at a later time when the 181 plant is in these modes we can in fact have a tickler system or scmething 19!
to revert back to and work on these items.
We make notes as to what status 20!
I of material we have and we have a weekly update on this program.
21i 22l j
CRESWELL:
On the dipping birds what was the particular problem with them?
23l 24' 25 ar
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39 lj SIEGLITZ:
I don't recall specifically in aa instant.
I had to check on i
2l 31 CRESWELL:
I believe another item there was water level in a shield area.
4 Si 01.
SIEGLITZ: Well, that was...the i neutron sheild tanks which go around the f
reactor vessel and one other time we had found that the water level have g
been down and operations was going to go in and check that.
Operations had checked that function because they also filled them up.
They were going to g
1 k into that.
I believe one of the items we had was on the drain pipes di off the relieve valves.
IL They had some previously identified high temperature reading. We did have a trip on one of the items with an operations man because operations is on a shift around the clock.
They were going to go in and check and see if they could determine which valve was leaking by.
151 CRESWELL:
Okay.
I believe another item was some sort of flexable connection between the vent on the steam generator over to the waste gas treat:ent system and scme valves in the waste gas system.
Do you recollect that problem of that sort?
19!
20i SIEGLITZ:
No.
I don't recall.
21:
i 22l CRESWELL: When you go into the control room appears to me that somebody is 231 f
giving you an assignmant to review this know name outage list to make 2 41
~
preparations for implementing these repairs.
The impression I get at this 25!
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40 i
d point is people are thinking or whoever gave you this assignment are
~
2 thinking that they' re gonna be ready to go back up...or... I'm sorry... to 3
have a stable condition that will allow these repairs.
4j SIEGLITZ:
That was the impression I had when, you know, I arrived onsite.
g 6l Like I said, at that time they still...the plant was...the turbine had y
tripped and the rea: tor tripped but like I say, people were still at the c ntrol panel which wouldn't har been normal.
dormally if the had tripped 81 gj by the time I would have gotten in the island since I do live some 30, 35 10l minutes away.
Things are pretty much stabli:ed and, you know, they would be waiting on me.
But when I walked in the control room somothing was f
still going on to keep their interest...
r 13i CRESWELL:
Yeah.
14:
15i SIEGLITZ:
...and, like I say, after the radiation alarm when off I reali:ed really for the first that I shouldn't even be bothered worrying if their i
put it away and didn't even look into it any further.
And I 18i realized we had more than or it appeared that it was more than just a normal trip.
20l 21f CRESWELL:
Now, it was stated to you that they though they needed repair 22l the reactor coolant drain tank rupture discs?
23l 2 41 25!
C G, 7 o
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f 41 I
ilj SIEGLITZ: Tha 's correct.
And in order to get to work that you would have 2
to.s into the r. actor building.
l 31 CRESWELL:
Did that strike you as odd that they needed to replace the 4l gj reactor coolant drain tank rupture disc?
Gi 7l SIEGLITZ:
They had felt that they had had the line blow down through the safety valve.
It overpressurized the drain tank and they had bla 1 the 8
rupture diaphragm. At that time I... it's a possibility any of its a 91 p ssibility and at initial had not thought further on it.
I went ahead a 10 looked at the components.
l 12!
I CRESWELL: Was this Bill Zewe that related to you that they were lefted...
1 31 lefted the valve and had a blow down to the reactor coolant drain tank and 14!
ruptured the disc?
16:
SIEGLITZ:
No, Bill, I did not have direct contact with Bill until after 171 the alarm went off sometime after 7 o' clock.
When he asked me to check the 18i interlock on the reactor coolant.
That was about the first time, I believe 191 that I talked to him.
Prior to that I tried talking to George Kunder 20i j
several times and he was actively involved between checking the status on 21l the plant, checking printouts and what have you.
It was more or less peace 22' l
meal what I could find out from the shift foreman and from George Kunder as 231 to actually what had happened.
2 41 i
25i Q\\4 CS!
42 Il!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
l 2l l
FASANO:
Just a little bit more on this know name outage.
That, that you 3
i 4j have in front of you is a...the current know name outage for Unit 2.
And 5
the'date on there is 3/20/79.
6i 5IEGLITZ: That's correct.
7 Si FASANO:
g That would mean that we had at least, ten more days, I'm nct I r.ean eight more days to nake it...
10!
i 11!
SIEGLITZ: Say, the 28th.
13l FASANO:
So, there were other sheets available to you?
I quess they make these lists up and they would be added on.
Is that correct?
15i 16; SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
37!
We normally had a meeting on Wednesdays, and we just never got to it that day.
18r 19!
FASANO:
As I recall, seeing a sheet, which some of the items on that sheet 20!
didn't Rppear in this particular item.
21:,
22!
SIEGLITZ: What would hacpen is the indivi tal foreman, some items we would 2 31 patch right in the maintenance office when work requests were processed.
24!
Yes, we could not work in this component at this time, we put it directly 25i t
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43 1:
on the no name management list at that tin.e.
Other work requests would go 2'
to the field to the individual discipline.
They would review it, some of I
31 them, they could work at this time, others had to be delayed to a later i
4l time.
And it was these items that the individual disciplines would make up 5f and at our weekly meeting, or prior to that, we'de bring back and we'de add 6l f t to the list, and put it out for the following week.
N gf FASANO: One of the items I think I remembered, and it may be on there, but g
I don't recall was the checking of the pressurizer relief valves, the e ec ma c as weH as ne 50 code safedes.
Nere you howledgeaMe cat 10 they were having a leaking problem on those valves?
i 12!
SIEGLITZ:
131 I was knowledgeable that they had a leaking problem on the code safeties.
14!
They were not sure as to which one it was.
The tail pipes were hot.
They'de always run hot and one seemed to be running hotter than the other.
Operations, I did not have it on my l'st because this is a maintenance list, that was carried on the daily plan of the day form that we had, and operations was going to check that, if and when we came down.
That and the 18:
new front shield tanks which they had done on previous trips.
191 20!
FASANO:
Then, in this case, operations would do the maintenance check?
21:
22' SIEGLITZ:
It wasn't necessarily a maintenance check, operations goes into 23 i
the building, they have certain surveilances to perform, when the unit 24l comes down, so they are in the building in the first place and while they 25i g}g a
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lj were there, they were going to have :he operations people go up and just 2j hands on type of a check and see which one was hot and t:y and determine i
3j which safety valve was probably leaking line.
We would have done any aj repairs necessary, it was just that, an indication of the plant came down l
Sj and'then people were on site, it could have been shift maintenance people, i
61 but operations normally goes in right away anyway.
It was a question of 7
time they wanted to get there, if in fact there was a leak while there still was some temperature gradient they could determine i ich line was g,
notter.
g 10f
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FASAN0_: Then, during your, I quess you have a meeting with operations and discuss problems that they are going currently ;o that maintenance is kept up to date of operational preblems.
14:
SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
15:
16i FASAHO:
17;:
Are you familiar with previous problems with these particular valves?
18i 19i SIEGLITZ:
I had not know of any problems on the electromatic relief valve, the question that we had was the normal code safeties.
We felt that we
{
were getting some leakage, and that was the reason for a higher than what 22l we anticipated temperature on the drain pipes.
But, no I, prior to that we 231 l
had not identified any problem with the electromatic relief valve.
24!
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1 1!
FASANO:
Did you, do you remember talking with Doug Reeber about the RTD i
thermocouples.
RTD, I'm sorry RTD temperature censors?
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31 i
4(
SIEGLITZ: No.
Si i
6j CRESWELL: By the way of explanatior. Tony, what we're ta'lking about there
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is there was additional volt meter connected to the T-hot resistance i
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temperature devices.
I believe by Mr. Wright and what he's asking you was gj since you had Mr. Weaver working for you and he had responsibility for the instument technicians, is that recollectance correct?
ui SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
12!
13:
CRESWELL: Whether you were aware that the assignments were made, perhaps Mr. Ivan Porter asking you that these measures be taken.
16:
SIEGLITZ:
This was on that one the morning of the 28th you're saying?
17' 18l CRESWELL: Yes.
19!
20!
SIEGLITZ: Okay, Ivan was the lead I&C engineer, as well as the electrical and mechanical engineers were also in the control rocm.
He and Doug Weaver 2,
i do work intimately together being in their discipline and I'm not involved 23l j
with every nut and bolt that's turned and twisted..Tnd Doug wouldn't necess-24)'
arily...
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f CRE iWELL:
So, they....
I 2!
i 3j SIEGLITZ:
Something that you take a reading and a check on something, no, 4
not necessarily.
i 5'
CRESWELL: Were you aware of some measurements that were taken on the Si f
incore thermocouples down in the cable room?
8 SIEGLITZ:
Yes.
I was aware tnat that was going on.
g 10i CRESWELL: Okay.
To what extent?
11:
12!
SIEGLITZ: Well, I...the question was obviously when we had gone through I
the transient like this had the core been exposec or anything like that the 14 first question is to what is the incores reading.
I remember arriving or Kunder asked that I would check on those. His immediate r sponse would be to go with Doug Weaver and some of his people cause there the people that would do that type of work and...
IS!
19!
CRESWELL:
Your recollection is though, that they want to make the measurements 20!
to determine safety core bit uncovered or not?
21!
r 22!
SIEGLITZ:
Yeah.
23l 24i 25l
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1
47 i
llj CRESWELL: Okay.
Did you hear people saying things like that, check the 1
2j thermocouples to see if the core is been uncovered?
31 5
4j SIEGLITZ:
I don't remember the actual words to see if the core was uncovered g
but I remember them sayin; we want to check the incores and see what kind y
of readings we're getting.
Ol I
7!
I CRESWELL: Do you recall who was saying that?
8\\
9!
SIEGLITZ: No, not by name.
It could have been either operations or engineeri ig.
10:
At that time they were pretty much get their heads together and between the i
two of them are trying to weed out or to come up with possibilities for 12!
better identifying perimeters for telling exactly where they are so it could have been either one or both of them.
14'.
15; CRESWELL: Um um.
You mentioned that the lead electrical and your lead mechanical engineers were there.
That would have been Mr. Sensel and Mr.
r 171 Warren?
18i 19!
SIEGLITZ:
Yes.
20j 21i CRESWELL:
Do you recollect that they were ever censulted during that 22l morning or afternoon about their particular specialty?
In other words, 231 it's my understanding those people were involved with the implementation of 24l the emergency plan.
Making the notification, that sort of thing.
But do 25i c
Ch!s a
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48 I
i lj you peronally have knowledge of their ever being asked, say, Mr. Sensel of 2
being consoled about the starting of the reactor coolant pump?
I 3t i
4j SIEGLITZ: Yes, I'm sure...I know he was.
I remember he and our electrical gl forman.
Like I say, our foremen were very closely with the engineering Si staff within their diciplines.
And it's normal procedure if you would ask 7
one individual more likely then not he'd be involved with the...if the g
maintenance foreman was asked, he'd get all his pr.per work together but he'd be consulting also with the engineering people and I do remember Mr.
g ensel ta W ng w m our foremen.
10f u!
CRESWELL: Who was that foreman?
12!
13l SIEGLITZ:
Charlie Rippon.
14!
l 15; CRESWELL: Okay.
171 SIEGLITZ:
And later on in the morning Mr. Barry Riddle came to the control room, but that was just shortly before we evacuated.
He's the lead electrical 19i engineer.
He was outside the plant and thay didn't war.t to give him access, 20t l
but he got to the control room and I asked him to get to the control room 21l but by the time he got there it was time when they cleared all extraneous 22j j
people from the area.
23l 24l 25i N\\
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49 l
1{
CRESWELL: The discussion that Mr. Bensel had regarding the reactor coolant 2
pump what was the nature of that discussion?
I 3:
4j SIEGLITZ:
To my knowledge they wanted *.o check the circuitry, make sure that it would start.
I do not recall the specifics as to what they had g
I 6l when they came back.
There were feelings that there might had seme cavita-7 tion or they had some vibrations and they had shut the pumps down initially, 81 but...from an operations standpoint where they want to start them up again, I do not recall.
l g
l 10[
CRESWELL:
Did you direct electricians to go down there in that are:?
12!
SIE'iLITZ:
131 I directed them to go down to check and get whatever information back to the operations people wanted after conferring with Mr. Dubiel that we were going to leave the control rocm.
15i 16; CRESWELL: Who did you send down there? When I say dawn there, that's in 171 the auxiliary building.
18!
19I SIEGLITZ:
No, it's in the turbine building en the 305 elevation...
20!
21l CRESWELL:
Right 22 23!
SIEGLITZ:
The 6900 volt switchgear panel.
That will be Charlie Rippon and 24!'
I do not recall which technician he took with him.
I'd be guessing who it 25i f
f
.e i
h
50 1
is right now.
I believe it was our chief electrician who was in the control 2
room at the time also, but I'm not sure.
3 4j CRESWELL: Did they report back to you or did they report back to operations?
i Si SIEGLITZ:
They reported back to operations, correct.
6i 7
CRESWELL:
So you don't ' mow what the out ccme was?
g 9i SIEGLITZ:
I do not recall, no.
I could find it out, but I don't know 10 right now.
12' CRESWELL:
In one other instances during the morning, did you direct people i
131 to perform test?
15i SIEGLITZ:
As far as I can recall that was about it.
Things were from a ISi maintenance standpoint, you know, more or less in the stancby mode.
I'd say we were in the back of the control room and then we moved to the I had 18t the personnel move to the old shifts...I'm sorry...the startup engineer's 19!
office right adjacent to the control room to keep any possible commotion at 20!
a minimum.
And we were pretty much in obeiance and after 9 o' clock or so 21i until we were asked to leave it was quiet from our standpoint.
We were 22i there in case something was needed or necessary but I don't recall of any 23 i
other actions.
24i 25; t
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51 1
CRESWELL:
Er. Warren was there also who's the lead mechanical engineer?
1 2!
SIEGLITZ: Yes.
3 4:
g.
CRESWELL: Was he ever consulted regarding his dicipline during the thing?
Si SIEGLITZ:
No that I co recall. We did not do any mechanical type checks.
Those jobs are generally more involved then going down to see if a circuit g
breaker or something is opened or tripped or where an alarm or an instrument would be.
At that time they were just trying to respond to the emergency and just get back indications that the operations wanted for a better feel.
11:
12:
CRESWELL: Was Mr. Weaver in the control room whenever you came in?
14:
SIEGLITZ:
Yes, he was...I believe he was there before I was.
15:
16i CRESWELL: What was he doing?
1T ISI SIEGLITZ:
He was in the control room.
I believe he had...when I had first 19) go there I think he had just come back from...or it was just shortly after 201 that from the instrument air compressor to see what the possible cause of 21l the trip might have been.
And when he went down there and found there was 22',
)
water in the lines, the operators started bleeding the water down.
Other 231 i
than that he was also in a standby mode other than what I previously mentioned.
2?)
25:
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52 1
CRESWELL: What was your impression then after he had done this work about 2
what had caused the trip?
31 4{
SIEGLITZ: We had identified...we've had problems with % instrument air 5
r service air compressor with water in the lines.
Operations has a surveil-lance where they go by and check the traps and make sure'they're bleed off.
et But to the extent of the amount of water seemed abnormal.
7 8l CRESWELL: Was there any concern about any other air operated valves in g
the plant rather than the ones associated with the condensate polisher 10j system?
i 11!
12!
SIEGLITZ:
I didn't remember anyone addressing that directly.
I think 131 that's one of the reasons Doug went down there, Ocug Weaver th.-*
is, to ensure that the lines were free, that we would have air to other components 15 so they woulo operate properly.
17!
CRESWELL:
So to your knowledge there was no problems with any other valves 18t other than the ones that I referred to?
191 20l!
SIEGLITZ:
To my knowledge that's correct.
21i 22 FASANO:
Alright.
To go back to our sequence at that time when you got in 23[
to the control room, were you knowledgeable of the electromatic valve then 2 41 having stuck opened?
25j
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53 1
1 SIEGLITZ:
No I was not.
25 FASANO: Were you ever notified during that morning thc' indeed that had 3
4j been stuck open and the block valves had been closed?
l Si gl, SIEGLITZ:
No, it was later that night or the next day I' think when I heard, that's the first time.
t i
i 3\\
FASANO:
9t If you had heard that that had been stuck open with...then would the rupture of the reactor coolant drain tank disc mean more to you?
11:
SIEGLITZ:
It could've but it could've just been the ode safety which that had lifted and you had a good surge that could have done it too possibly.
131 14:
CRESWELL: You'. e not aware then of the capacility... relative capacities of the relief valve on the reactor coolant drain tank, the rupture disc capacity 16; of somewhat?
17!
18i SIEGLITZ:
No, I haven't been involved from an operation standpoint, no.
191 20l CRESWELL:
Have you ever had the rupture disc blown befare on Unit 2?
21!
22; SIEGLITZ:
Not to my knowledge.
i 23l 24l 25i Q)"
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54 l
C_RESWELL: Did that strike you bas odd that they'd blown it?
7 2!
E 3j SIEGLITZ: Well, it was the first, time that it happened, you know, we had 4{
a 1 t of other components fo-the first time somethings happened to them I
too so I hadn't really considered it.
I know you have the safetys there cdf and they're there for a reason. And if the surge if thsy had over filled I
the system they could have lifted them.
7 8!
i CRESWELL:
If you had had to go into the containment to repc.
this rupture g
disc, you would be concerned about water levels in containment also, right?
101 i
lli SIEGLITZ:
Surely.
t 12!
131 CRESWELL:
Did anybody make any mention to you how much water was in the containment at that point in time?
151 SIEGLITZ: No.
The... let me think now.
We were asked to A check and see 17!
If we had a rupture diaphragm and when I first walked into the cor, trol room 181 for the...cause we probably want to replace it and that being the case I 191 don't think anybody was concerned at least not at 6 or 7 o' clock in the 2.0l morning with how much water that might be on the floor.
They just felt 21!
that the diaphragm had ruptured, probably the wai.ur was in the tank and 22l l
what have you and then it was later that the alarm went off and people 23!
l started thinking, well at least to my knowledge, something else has gone 24!
wrong.
25i Q.1I a!
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a
55 l
CRESWELL: Did anybody tell you there was like steam in the containment?
2; 3j SIEGLIR:
No.
4;
,}
CRESWELL: When did you first beccme aware that there was steam in the containment?
6 i
71 gl SIEGLITZ:
I didn't consider it.
I wasn't made aware of it.
9t CRESWELL: Well lets saf that somebody had uld you well gone on in and 10 replace the rupture disc.
I mean, how would you check to find out something 1ike that?
i 13!
SIEGLITZ: Well first from a radiological standpoint first we would have to check and monitor before we sant pecple in to do work. We would have required an RWP that's normally done anyway when we first go in.
16i l'!
CRESWELL: Were you aware at that point in time of any undue radiation levels in containment?
191 4
20 SIEGLITZ:
No I was not. Not until the alarm went off roughly 7 o' clock 21:l there abouts.
22!
231 i
FASANO: You were aware that the reactor coolant pumps were shut?
24j 251 p ') ',')
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56 1;.
SIEGLITZ: Yes I was.
29 3j FASANO:
Did that seem to be an unusual situation at that time in trip?
4; SIEGLITZ:
5t Yeah, normally they would still be running, I believe.
They 6{
were saying because of high vibration they shut them dow'n to prevent damage to the equipment it was shut down.
I Sl FASANO:
g By high vibration or was there...was that the reason you were given, high vibration?
11.
SIEGLITZ: That's what I understood, yeah.
13!
FASANO:
Okay, know one discussed the a net positive suction head limits or the limit on the 1200 pounds?
25 16i SIEGLITZ: No, I had not heard that at that time.
17!
18i CRESWELL: Did anybody mention to you that we need to go in to check the 19!
pumps?
201 21i SIEGLITZ:
Not at first, I don't remember that, no.
They had shut them down and I think the first concern was with the drain tank that that would 23!
had gone it would probably take more work and. there was no concern at first 24!
about the pumps.
251
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57 I,
lj CRESWELL:
Could you give me more of an idea of how extensively you prepared 2
getting out your no name outage list and reviewing it and so forth? You 3l asked a guy to go check and see if you had a spare reactor coolant drain tank rupture disc. What else did you do in preparation?
5!
6l SIEGLITZ: Well at that time I can say when I first came~ in normally we're down for a day or less.
I was looking to see what type of jobs that we had J
that we could do in that type of a time frame. What we have parts for and normally when I had that compiled I'd sit down with normally Jim Floyd or g
Kunder and Shift Superintendent...I'm sorry...the Unit Superintendent.
Review what job we anticipate working on, what kind of a schedule we're 11:
looking at so they with us work up starting up the unit again.
I never did e4..
get quite that far. The alarm went off.
I was trying to find out exactly in my own mind what had gone wrong...gone on and...
15:
CRESWELL:
How did you go about doing that?
17!
SIEGLITZ: Well I tried...I didn't want to interrupt anyone who was at the 18t control panel or in front of the control room.
So as people would come 19i back whether it be the shift foremen or George Kunder or whoever I tried to 20:
get sc4ne information and then something else would come up and they'd be 21{
pulled away and I didn't really get a full story from any one individual 22'I and so it was really a peace meal at best and basically being in standby I 23}
wanted to sit down and tell them what type of jobs we could've worked in i
2 41 the time frame we had and we just never got to that point.
25!
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58 I,
gj CRESWELL:
How much time did you occupy yourself just from the time that 2j y u're told, you know, get ready and do some maintenance until you give l
that up and start on some other activity?
3 4:
SIEGLITZ:
Si Well, like I said, I was in the control room some 40, 45 minutes so between that time trying to peace meal what was going on and reviewing ei over the list quickly and grabbing Mr. Jules when he went by to tell them 8
what I wanted him to find I may have spent, you know,15, 20 minutes something like that actually looking at the list and trying to determine what we were going to work on and then I wanted to sit down with everyone else to review what we wanted and make sure what I felt was priority we needed was what they felt was priority.
13l CRESWELL: Okay, okay.
Did you feel you had enough pecple to perform the 14!
task that were...that you thought you were gonna have to do?
15, 16i SIEGLITZ: Well, the no name lis' we never get all the jobs.
And that's 17!
why I say it's a question of if aliminate, let say we can work 10 or 15 ISt jobs and we only have enough people to work 2/3 of them.
Operations and 191 engineering and they would say, okay of those lets get these this time.
20!
These the ones we really...we should have.
21!
22 CRESWELL:
So you worked at the next stage of giving people task?
23l 241 w
I
l 59 l
SIEGLITZ:
1{
No, we had not gotten that far.
The only task that we had 2{
really looked at was the ruptured diaphragm, getting parts on that and I i
3j told the foreman to get whatever paper work needed te. go and do that type i
of job.
4, 5
6l CRESWELL: Would he have initiated a work request at that point in time?
7l i
SIEGLITZ:
81 He would've but like I say, when the time he came back and said, I have the' part, that was roughly when the alarm went off and we never 91 pursued it for a...
i 101 11:
FASANO:
Just a little bit more on the electromatic valve.
From what I 12!
understood operations would go in and put their hands on it cr...
131 14 SIEGLITZ:
A contact parameter or some sort of other device, yes.
16i FASANO:
Alright.
And you already had mentioned that the temperatures were 17!
I reading higher apparently at a location which would indicate the code 18t i
safetys whether leakers.
How would this parameter make any difference?
19) 20l SIEGLITZ:
Well, the question is we were trying to determine at one time we 21:
thought it might have been both code safetys that were leaking by.
Operations 22 and engineering had been looking into it for I guess several weeks just 23i prior to this and it was determined later on that it was one and that they 24!
willing to verify what they felt was the problem.
25i
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60 Iy FASAMO: Was there any discussion prior to the event of using the block 2
valve to determine whether you could eliminate at least the electromatic
}
valve?
3:
i 4i SIEGLITZ:
No, I don't recall any discussion along those lines.
5 6i l
FASANO: Are you familiar with the block valve?
7 8l SIEGLITZ: Yes.
g; 10i FASANO: What kind of history do you recall on that?
u:
SIEGLITZ:
There -cs some history from '.'-it 1 in the changing the valves 13!
over and this was all prior to my coming onsite and it was basically history and I had never really pursued it in great detail.
16i f
FASANO:
The block valve I'm talking about, not the electromatic valve.
171 18t SIEGLITZ:
Oh, I'm scrry, I'm sorry, no.
201 FASANO:
No problems with that?
i 21!
i 22!
SIEGLITZ:
Not to my knowledge, no.
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i FASANO:
y So the operators should not have fear of the engineers to shut 2
that while you were in operation?
31 SIEGLITZ:
.Not. that I know of.
4,:
Si FASANO: Okay, when you got in were you...did you find ou't at that time 01 that the 12 valves were in the shut position?
l 81 SIEGLITZ:
No, I was not aware of that at the time when I came in.
Just the emergency feedwater '2A and 12B valve.
That should be open for emergency response and I found later that it was closed.
12!
FASANO: Alright. Was there any maintenance either by the Metropolitan 14!
Edison people or their subcontractors? Are the contractors, such as, Catalytic that would have required a tagging or reason for shutting these 15; valves between the 26th and the 28th?
16; 17:
SIEGLITZ:
Not that I recall, no.
18l 19h Yourequirenoworkthatwouldhaverequiredmaintenancepeopletl:
FASAkJ:
0 20t have closed this valve? These two valves in fact?
21:
2Nl SIEGLITZ:
No, sir.
That's correct, I don't recall of any work in that 23!
i area.
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62 CRESWELL:
Has anyone ever approached you in the last 3 to 4 months about 1.
2{
repairing the leak in that safety valve?
l 3:
SIEGLITZ:
Could you...would...what do you mean by fixing the leak i.1 the 4
safety valve?
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6i 7j CRESWELL:
Operations, a member of management, an engineer or anybody every y
approached you.
I think it's been fairly well determined that the safety valve, one of the safety valves was leaking.
g 1.01 I
SIEGLITZ:
Correct.
11!
12l l
CRESWELL: And there was a pretty good guess on which one it was.
131 141 SIEGLITZ:
Correct.
15 16i CRESWELL:
And it was on the order of say 6 gpm leakage through the safety 171 valve.
19:
19i SIEGLITZ:
Okay.
20
2L CRESWELL:
Had anybody on the staff every approached you about repairing 22l i
that safety valve?
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l If SIEGLITZ: Well, prior to the incident, that was one reason for determining gj which valve was leaking.
It's not a job that you're gonna go in and do in 3
a couple hours and that was why you wanted to identify where it was and y
line up for preparation if we were down for several days to make the required
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fix.
i 6i CRESWELL: Okay. Who was it that was wanting to make the...?
y 8l SIEGLITZ: Well, that sculd've been through the POD which is a...the Plant gj Operations meetings we.te: daily =ad '".at would have been a composite crew 0
of Jim Floyd and the station...the unit superintendent, engineering people, HP people.
12 13i CRESWELL:
But I asking you did any one individdal evidence any concern about that safety valve leakage?
ISr SIEGLITZ:
No.
Other than the fact that you, you know, you have leakage and, you know, we're trying to minimize...you know, minimize that, but 18:
not...
191 20t MARSH:
Byt it had been a part of your previous statements of that PCD?
21.
I 22!
SIEGLITZ:
That's correct, yes.
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64 1!
CRESWELL:
But you con't recollect who raised the issues?
l 2!
SIEGLITZ:
No, it was a known leak, but...
3f 4l CRESWELL: How long was it known?
g; Si SIEGLITZ:
7 I would say it was in the neighborhood of several weeks, 2 to 3 g{
weeks maybe.
And... excuse me...and operations was monitoring the type of flow rate they did have or leakage that they felt that they had.
So it g
wasn't just a leak or somebody said well we have a leak forget about it.
They were cogni: ant of it and we're trying '
determine if it had gotton i
any worse.
121 l
13l CRESWELL:
If things had recovered during this outage here and then say you could have got back up in a day, would you have repaired the valve?
16:
SIEGLITZ:
I think we would've...I know we would've gone in and try and 17!
determina ~5at the cause of the leak was. Maybe it was for some reason it 18t was hanging open. We would have taken it as a minimum of visual inspection 196 taking a look, see if we could determine what the problem was, what our 20!
i access.
21:
CRESWELL:
I don't'quite understand that because what would you charac-23i i
terize to get at.
And it has at this point. is going, maybe take a parameter 24) k and see which ones leaking, okay...
25i CY
i 65 i
elj IIEGLITZ: But that was i..itially, that was initially by operations.
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3 CRESWELL:
Okay.
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gj SIEGLITZ: But when our daylight people would be on..,come into the plant, 6
in the morning not knowing we were going to have a trip a~t this time, but 7
assuming we had a trip at in er 11 o' clock at night, operations would have 8;
to go in right then and there to take this initial reading and we would get g
our people together later in the evening or by morning and go in and if we 10l were going to do repairs take a look at it...but...
11!
CRESWELL: You would have to make that decision about whether you were I
going to do the repairs or not?
131 1 41 SIEGLITZ: That would be a joint decision with the Unit 2 staff.
16i CRESWELL:
Informally you would get together and discuss it?
17 181 SIEGLITZ:
Yeah, we'd ilave a meeting determining what the cause, what other 191 problems we had, how long we wanted, you know, we were going to stay down 20i and whether or not it was felf that it was desireable or we felt it was 21!
required at that time to lengthen our time off line to make such a repair.
22j 23l l
CRESWELL:
Did the plant superintendent would ultimately make that decision?
29 2s; 4
C (,2,
66 SIEGLITZ:
Yes.
1!
2:
3j CRESWELI.: Would that be Gil...would that be Gary Miller or...
41 i
SIEGLTTZ: Joe Logan.
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61 CRESWELL: Joe Logan would make the ultimate decision?
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81 t
9l
-SIEGLITZ: Yes.
l 101 CRESWELL: But even after the temperatures were taken to determine which 11:
valve was leaking then you would have a meeting then to determine if you 12',
I would pursue that further?
131 14!
SIEGLITZ:
Yes, that's true.
15<
16i FASANO:
Just a little bit more on the electromatic valve.
Do you know 17';
what kind of valve this is?
18t 19i SIEGLITZ:
What do you mean, by vendor you mean or...electrcmagnetic relief 20i is designed to...so that you can lift off if you got excess pressure so you 21!
don't lift you code safetys.
22!
23i FASANO:
Pilot operated or spring loaded or...?
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67 If SIEGLITZ:
Up ta this time no, I had not been involved with any difficulties 2,
with it and I had never go into the specific mechanisms or operations of i
3 the valve, no.
4; FASANO:
Okay.
It is a electrematic valve which you then can set what g
6{
pressure you want it by actuating a pilot valve.
The pilot valve does 7
actuate by a switch when you get down unbalancing the pressure and then "9
8i 9I SIEGLITZ:
Okay.
11:
FASANO:
It's held by pressure in a seated position.
So it's not a spring and so as... that's generally what...
121 14:
SIEGLITZ: Okay.
16i FASANO: Okay.
The...okay, on the backs of the 12...the emergency feedwater 173 block valves, the 12 valves, do you recall anyone requesting or noting that 1SI this valve, the B valve the emergency water feed valve 128 had excessive 19) oil or grease leakage and stain on the pipe prior to the 29th?
20!
21; SIEGLITZ:
No I do not recall that.
22' i
23l FASANO:
If such things are found these are usually noted and work request?
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j 68 I
I SIECLITZ: That's correct.
If anyone finds what they feel to be a deficiency, If 2j it can be an operator, it can be an engineer, could be someone in the l
31 staff, anyone who feels that sometMng is a deficiency, he may initiate a f
work request which is inturn signed by his supervisor and then submitted to the maintenance department for action.
I have not seen anything on that.
g Si FASANO:
If scmeone went in to pack this valve probably because of leakage, would this...could this be or would it have been done without a work requesc?
g 91 SIEGLITZ:
No.
10I i
11!
FASANO: Would it have been done without a tagging?
12l 13l SIEGLITZ: No.
14!
15, ASANO: Okay.
I noticed in looking at Jour log or maintenance request, that you have a cancel.
The meaning of this is, the word cancel?
17 ISt SIEGLITZ: The word cancel could be in the log for a number of different 191 reasons. We could find that there's a duplicate.
Like I say, anyone can 20!
identify a probiein.
Between shifts we could have 2 people identify the 21!
same problem, it could be someone from operations walking by and seeing a deficiency and maybe an engineer or anyone who walks by might note something 23j and he could intiate a work request.
In many cases the jobs are canceled 241 because of duplicates.
Other times jobs maybe canceled that will be the 25i main reason for canceling the job.
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l 69
!lj FASANO:
The...as far as...okay then, anyone can actually request a work 2
request?
l 3I 4j SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
i Si FASANO:
6 Then this goes to his supervisor if it's a nonsupervisor who then signs it?
/
8j SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
10!
FASAN0: Then it's transmitted to...
11:
12l SIEGLITZ: To the maintenance, applicable maintenance office whether it be 131 Unit 1 or Unit 2.
14i 15; FASANO: And the cycle then is that maintenance would then assign to a dicipline?
17' 1Sf SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
19!
201 i
FASANO:
And then from that dicipline someone is assigned to do the work?
21l 22l l
SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
2 31 24l 25!
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70
)
l FASANO:
Operations is contacted prior to the work?
7 2!
i 3j SIEGLITZ:
Correct.
4; Sj FASANO:
Then operations is in control of the work while its being performed?
5i SIEGLITZ:
Let me just interject here one step.
There's a QC component before work proceeds, pr:cedure QC approves, station approves, corporate 8:
approve procedure is written and attached to it and reviewed by QC.
They're cognizant of the work to be performed.
Then it would go to the operations department after switching and tagging applications, written and an RWP if required depending on the nature and location of the job.
After 12!
these documents are in hand they would go to the control room, have their 131 tags hung.
The man would verify his tags to make sure they all are hung and in the proper position and once he clears with, the switching and tagging 15i operator then he would proceed with his job.
16 1T FASANO:
If the job is done and there's no and the retest I guess the 18i retest would be done by operations or maintenance depending on the extent 191 of the retest?
20!
21l SIEGLITZ:
That's correct.
Normally the retest is done by operations and l
22' when the man completes the job he'll contact the switching and tagging 231 operator, notify him that his work is complete, bring the work request to 2il the control room and where he signs off that he's complete with is portion 25i 1 -
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i 71 1!
f the work and then it's turned over to operations for testing or retest.
2 Sometimes depending on the nature of the job operations may request for the
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man to be there if he, lets say, putting in seats he might have to make an 3
4i adjustment after it's valved back into the system and in that case we'd be around for the retest.
Other cases it may just be turned to operations and Gj they run tieir test, they check it out and put it back in service and close out ? heir work request.
~
81 FASANO:
Al right.
In the end though after the, no matter who coes the retest, does operations have to sign that I'lis not acceptable and is ready 101 for operations again?
11!
12:
SIEGLITZ: That's correct.
There is on the blank so noted.
13i 1M FASANO:
Alright.
Then this form is transmitted tack to QC if it's indeed 15:
a quality system?
161 17!
SIEGLITZ:
Yeah.
Normally what happens, all the work request will come 181 back to the appropriate maintenance office. We review everyting to make 191 sure it's completed, satisfactorily.
If it's a non-QC work request we will 20l close it out.
If it is a QC work request we'll send it to QC, they verify 21l also that everything is satisfactory.
They will sign it off, and it will 22' come back to us and then we will sign if off, close it out and close off 23, l
the work request.
24l 25i O\\
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72
!lj FASANO:
Alright.
I 2:
l MARSH:
31 Tony, I'm going to interrupt at this time. We're going to terminate 41 this tape and put another one on.
The time being 11:03 a.m., reading 1364 Si t
6i 7l 1
81 91 10!.
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