ML19208B081
| ML19208B081 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1979 |
| From: | Ian Porter, Shackleton O Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region V) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190031 | |
| Download: ML19208B081 (22) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RO2 C NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 11 In the Matter of:
t 2:
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
3 of Ivan D. Porter Instrument Control Engineer
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Si 6{
I si Trailer #203 9!
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10i Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
Julv 2. 1979 12l (Date or Interview) i 13!
July 25. 1979 14;,
(Date Transcript Typeo) 324 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
16i IT 18!
19i 20j 21l NRC PERSONNEL:
22; Owen C. Shackleton James S. Creswell 23l Anthony N. Fasano 24!
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25; C. 'g h 7909190 Og 9
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lj SHACKLETON:
The time is now 2:04 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time.
This Owen 2,
Shackleton speaking.
This is an interview of Mr. Ivan D. Porter.
Mr.
3 Porter is employed as an Instrument Control Engineer for the Metropolitan 4l Edison Company, presently assigned to Unit 2 at the Three Mile Island Nuc) tar Power Station.
This interview is t e.ing place in trailer #203, Si 6
which is parked just outside the south security gate at the Three Mile j
Island installation.
Present froo the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission gj to conduct this interview is Mr. James S. Creswell.
Mr. Creswell is a Reactor Inspector assigned to Region III.
Also present is Mr. Anthony N.
g Fasano.
Mr. Fasano is an Inspection Specialist in the Performance Appraisal Branch presently assigned to Region I.
My name is Owen C. Shackleton.
I'm an Investigator assigned to Region V.
Just before going on tape, I presented 12!
to Mr. Porter, the two page document from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 131 Commission, which explains the scope and purpose of this investigation, and identifies the authority of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to this investigation.
And also explains to Mr. Porter his right to be refused to be interviewed; his right to have someone of his choice present during the course of the interview, and his right to not to have to submit a signed 18i statement.
On the second page of this document there are three questions, 131 and Mr. Porter responed to all three questions with an affirmative "yes" 20!
At this time, for the purpose of record on tape, I'm going to ask answer.
21!
Mr. Porter these questions orally.
Mr. Porter do you understand fully the 22' document I'm referring to?
23i
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241 25i D
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PORTER:
Yes, I do.
I 2!
i 3l SHACXLETON: And do we have your permission to tape this interview?
4!
I PORTER: Yes.
Si 6i SHACXLETON:
And would you like... you have it marked here that you would 7
like a copy of the tape.
Is that correct?
8{
9l P
es, sir.
101 n!
SHACXLETON:
And also a transcript.
131 PORTER:
Please.
141 15I SHACXLETON:
All right.
We'll provide you a copy of the tape at the close 16,i of the interview, and a transcript when it's completed. And now I'll turn 17!
the interview over to Mr. Fasano and Mr. Creswell.
181 191 CRESWELL:
Ivan, in our previous interview with us, you stated that you 20t were involved with the reactor coolant pump start that took place approx-211 I
imately 7:00 o' clock.
I wonder if you could go back to that period of 22{
time, and tell us what your involvement was with that... the starting of 23{
that pump?
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g PORTER: Well, as I recall, attempts had been made to :; tart pumps, and 2
without successfully closing the breaker... and it was called to my atten-tinn.
I was requested to go down to ea 7 KV breaker
) see if what we 3
4j call now... what is called the K3 relay, which must be picked up and the 5
relay to be picked up.
Several service systems for the pump have to have 6
6; interlocks satisfied.
And, I did go down to the breaker, and was looking 7l for any pump with a K3 relay picked up.
I didn't do anything positive at t
8j that time to cause a pump to start.
I believe the pump that they had first tried to start... the K3 was not picked up on... but whichever pump it g
was eventually was started apparently the relay was satisfied an1 picked 10 up.
It's a little unclear in my mind. We tried several times during the day to start pumps, and I made several trips to the breakers.
And to sort 12!
l out what I did each given time, I guess is a little difficult.
I know at 131 one point I hit a relay to try to coax it to pull in and I broke the glass 14; out of it.
And I know at one point in time, we did try... I believe we tried to close the breaker holding the flashligh on the relay to actually hold the contact in.
I do remember those sequences.
Later in the day, we put jumpers in to positively pull the relay in.
We bypassed the contacts 18f on the start sequence.
But, the jumper was not installed that early in the 19!
day.
It's difficult for me to recall precisely what I did at any given 20l trip down to the breakers.
21!
22l CRESWELL:
0.K. Ivan, the time when the glass was broken and I believe you 231 said you used a flashlight one time to hold the contacts up.
Would that 24!
have been on the pump with the broken glass, where you could reach in and 25i hit the contacts?
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li Far!R:
I'm not sure on that.
I'm not sure that it's relevant, but I'm 2
not sure.
31 4
CRESWELL: Would you have taken the open relay out to...
i Si Sj PORTER:
I think the one we did it on we took the cover off the front, and 7l held a flashlight on it, but I just, you kr.2w, pushed up on starter and the
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g, the relay with the butt of the flashlight.
But, I'm not clear as to which trip down, what was done.
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10J CRESWELL:
11; Let's see... on one of your trips down, I think, Mr. Wright was I
there at the breaker.
12',
r 131 PORTER:
Could have been, yeah.
15i j
CRESWELL:
This is the start where the they drew very, where the pumps drew loi very little current maybe 100 amps.
171 18r PORTER:
Yeah, in fact, I... due to the indications on the local amp 191 meters is difficult to read 100 amps.
I wasn't sure it was drawing ar.y 20t current.
21l 22l CRESWELL:
0.K.
What was your reaction whenever you saw that low reading?
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PORTER: Well, at anytime when I saw that, I just felt that we didn't have water up in the pumping tower.
I wasn't moving any water.
2j 3!
CRESWELL:
So that the pump itself would have been voided?
4i l
51 i
PORTER: Yeah.
6i i
71 CRESWELL: What did that mean to you as far as the condition of water level 8
gj in the reactor coolant system?
10t PORTER: Well, I guess the only thing it could mean and it did at that day, 11:
f I guess, that there wasn't water out in the loops.
But, I thi'tk, by that time, it was due to the temperatures in the loop. We thought that.
14i CRESWELL:
But, it would have indicated that the water level was below the pump... the level correspond 1ng to the pump?
1T PORTER:
Yeah.
18!
19!
CRESWELL:
In our previous discussion with you, I guess we determined that 20!
there were some measurements made down in the cable room by use of a thermo-21:
couple reader and a digital voltmeter.
22l 23 PORTER:
Uh, uh.
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CRE5WELL: Do you recall when those measurements were made that anyone I
2j stated that they felt the core was undercovered, by the temperature indica-l tions they were seeing?
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PORTER:
No.
I don't know that that statement was made.
Si Si CRE5WELL:
So, you don't recall if Mr. Wright... if Mr. Bennett, cr Mr.
7 l
Yaeger ever told you together or separately that they felt that temperature g
indications indicated the core was uncovered?
g 10I l
PORTER:
I don't specifically rememoer them saying that, no.
I'd... I think everybody involved with it was probably concerned about the water 12!
level and they were seeing, seeing the temperatures we were seeing but I 121 guess I don't recall if of anybody stating that specifically.
But, I might 14!
15:
of myself, I guess.
I just don't recall that clearly, right now, what anybody said at any given time.
17!
CRESWELL:
You don't recall making any kind of a statement like that to Mr.
18t Miller?
191 20!
PORTER:
I don't believe I did, no.
As I recall, of course the hot tempera-21!
tures bothered me, but on also the low temperatures caused me to suspect 22; the condition of the readings.
And I didn't know if it was due to the i
231 thermocouples themselves, or steam in the... you know, the humidity in the i
24l building affecting the readings or what the problem was.
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I lj CRESWELL:
But, didn't you believe the higher ones?
25 3
PORTER:
I can't say that I really believed them, no.
They concerned me.
l But the fact that we had such low readings also, to me just confused and 4
Sj made the whole thing somewhat unreliable.
I guess in retrospect, we're all i
6i a 1 t smarter about why they were lower maybe, but...
71 CRESWELL:
8, The reason that you'd be a lot smarter about them being lower is what?
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10j PORTER: Well, I guess we acknowledge now that the temperture is probably hot enough to have actually affected the thermoccuple metals, themselves.
13 CRESWELL:
Do you recollect that any of the thermoccuples that were measured down in the cable room reading at 75 millivolts?
16 PORTER:
I don't, no.
I beliave Jim Wright said later that he did have a reading that high.
I don't recall that.
In looking at the data that Skip 18I had recorded down there, none of them are quite that high.
I think.
56 is 191 the highest.
20!
21l CRESWELL:
You don't recollect anything?
22!
23!
PORTER:
I don't recall seeing 75.
I do know Jim has mt 'tioned later he 2 41 did see a reading that high.
I don't recall seeing one that high.
That's 25!
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really too high to be reliable at all.
Even the 56 is above the melting 2
point for the metals, or right in the region of the nelting point.
31 i
4j CRESWELL: After our interview with you, you supplied me with some names of 5l people that are involved in evaluating thermoccupies, and one of those Si pe ple I believe was Don Robertson.
"e's a consultant with L&N.
Apparently 7i you discussed with him on the 29th, certain...
8 PORTER:
Have you talked to him?
g 101 CRESWELL:
I have been in touch with Mr. Robertson, yes.
12!
PORTER:
All right.
I wasn't sure what date it was.
It was one of the 13 following days.
I thought that it was either Friday or Saturday, but 0.K.
15.'
It could have been the 29th, too, I guess.
16i CRESWELL:
171 Did you contact anybody else on the 28th about the thermocouples?
ISt PORTER:
No.
191 20!
CRESWELL:
Did you contact anyone else about the thermocouples, rather than Mr. Robertson?
22l 23!
PORTER:
No.
He, in my mind confirmed what I felt about them.
So I didn't 2$i see any need for myself to pursue it much more.
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CRESWELL: When you had discussions with him, was it mainly though about 2
the conditions of the thermocouples on the time period like the 29th?
I 31 PORTER:
Yes.
4 51 CRESWELL:
As opposed to the conditions that you had seen on the 28th, 6
7l where you had very high temperatures?
l 8I PORTER: Yes.
g 101 CRESWELL:
On the 29th, temperatures would have been considerably lower.
i 12; PORTER:
Yes.
13!
14i 15.'
CRESWELL: Tony, do you have some questions?
16:
i FASANO:
I'd like to just go back a little. 'You mentioned when you saw the 171 current, it was 100 amps even less, when, the first time you started, when 18i Mr. Wright was with you.
You tried to start the first pump, the low current.
20l 21 PORTER:
Yes.
22!
231 FASANO: And you said that this indicated possible low water in the loops, 24!
but you said, "We thought this already." Who are the "we thought this 25i already"? Who are the "we"?
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l 10 PORTER:
I had this trouble last interview.
I think everyone in the Control 1,
2 Room, the people looking at the plant and stuff, knew that we had temperatures 3
e nsiderably off-scale in the hot legs and stuff.
And it wasn't feasible i
4h for it to be, you know the hot legs to be full of water.
And I don't... I Sj believe that I thought that pump wasn't even running when I came up from the breakers.
It was... I was even suprised later to find out that, you 6
know, that they shut it off manually.
I thought the breaker had tripped free.
g, 9t FASANO:
Okay, at that time then, you had confirmed that it had run and was very low current?
12t PORTER:
Yes.
131 14!
FASANO:
So now you have confirmed that in your mind, on the 28th, that there is a low current and the general consensus of the people in the Control Room was that they had a lack of water in the loop.
When you first came in, if I remember, one of the things you did was to look at the RTD.
1Si 191 PORTER:
Uh, uh.
20; i
21l FASANO:
Did... and at that time they seemed to be high, and if I remember 22!
right, you kind of believed these temperatures when you actually measured 23!
them?
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PORTER:
Yes, it was sometime later before I got a good measurement on the 2
temperature.
But, from looking at the redundant indications, I believe...
I just didn't believe that just one instrument was high that they were all 3
4l giving basically the same information.
5!
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FASANO:
Then as I remember about 8:30, or so, you did confirm this.
6
.J Approximate the time.
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8i PORTER:
Yeah.
I'm not sure what time it was.
It was either 8 or 8:30, g
s mething like that. We put the digital voltmeter on the RTD to read it.
10!
11:
FASANO:
So, now you had, in your mind, the high RTD's and the high temper-y ature, and the idea of void.
You had fluid missing in the pump casing.
I mean these are things that are going through your mind.
Now, during intra-141 ment interwound, was the measurement of the thermocouples?
16i PORTER:
Yes, I only physically witnessed... I guess 4 on the digital 17i voltmeter and maybe 3 or 4 more with the voltmeter.
I was not down there 1St for the whole period of time that they took the complete set of data.
191 20:
FASANO:
Yes, but the reason they did a redundant measurement was because 21l you had doubt in the first measurement and you wanted to confirm that.
22!.
Correct?
231 241 25i b.
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ilj PORTER: Well, we couldn't get readings on the computer, so that's why we went downstairs.
And we took the readings of the digital indicator.
On 2
the digital indicator you have to disconnect and hook up each one.
And 3
4l with the numbers I was getting, I couldn't see the value in reading them that precisely.
So, they went ahead and took a complete set with just 5
i 6j reading the millibles on the terminals.
i 7
8' 91 9
10!
fact, it was sometime later, I was even aware that they existed.
I guess I forgot they took them, quite frankly.
I'm sure they must of have told me.
12l t
Well, they do confirm it though.
Their still scattered anywheres from 200 degrees to 2,500 which is about what I saw on the digital readout.
There 14!
are just more of them.
15!
161 CRESWELL: When you say digital readout, Ivan, you're speaking of the thermocouple reader?
181 19!
PORTER:
Right.
Now, the voltmeter is digital, also, yes.
20!
21:
FASANO:
By this time, do you recall having any thought ch, well, I can't 22!
i say thought. With all of these pieces of information, how did you relate 231 this to Miller.
I believe you were dealing with Mr. Miller.
And did you 2 41 come to... I mean in you mind now, you had at least three points there 25i that seemed to confirm some concern for that core?
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PORTER:
Yeah, I guess.
I'm not sure what we' re driving at here, but...
I 2!
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FASANO: Well, I want to know if Mr. Miller had the same information that 3
4j you had, and the people making decisions had this information and could use 5l it possibly?
I Si f
PORTER:
I think we all had it.
But, I'm not sure what differently we w uld have done with it, either.
And assuring the core was covered, I 8
g guess, was the prime concern in trying to get water in the loop so we could 10l run a pump.
But, I felt like I wasn't deciding what should be done with the plant.
But I felt like everything they were trying to do was...
that's what was aimed at anyway.
And I don't...
131 FASANO:
14i Okay, one other piece of data that may or may not have got in the Control Room, I don't know, but Floyd had been in Lynchburg, and I believe he made some calculations based on information that was given to him early in the morning.
And came up with some estimates, based on computations he made on Unit 1.
I think this was related to the activity in the dome...
18(
some detector. And I think that he estimated that maybe one quarter, one 191 eighth of the fuel cladding might have been damaged.
Did you know of this 20i information or did...
You're shaking you head no?
21!
22!
i PORTER:
No.
I heard that first when I heard this testimony.
231 24i 25t
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y FASANO:
0.K.
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PORTER: The President's Commission.
I had not heard that before then.
41 FASANO:
I have no further questions right now.
5 I
Si y
CRESWELL:
Ivan, before you went down to look at the K3 relays, first had i
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the operators been trying to start the pump.
Were they observing all g
pressures, cooling water flow, in the Control Room?
10i PORTER: You can't really observe the pressure and stuff.
It either picks y
up the pressure switches or don't... or doesn't, excuse me.
The things j
like the pressure switches 'and stuff you don't really know they haven't picked up, unless you can't start the pump.
15i CRESWELL:
So, before you went down there, you didn't know whether the Control Room people had been observing these things.
You had to go down there to that area to find out?
ISt 19!
PORTER:
We've had trouble with them occasionally in starting the pump.
20j There's quite a few interlocks involved.
And we've had trouble with them 21!
in the past.
I guess that's why the first thing you go to look at is the 22l K3 relays that has been a problem, at in times in the past.
23l 24!
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f CRESWELL: What caused the problems in the past?
i 2i l
PORTER:
I'm not sure specifically.
I think any one of them has maybe, you 31, 4
know, the, lift pressures and backstop oil pressures, nuke service flows, gj and stuff like that.
I'm not sure...
Sj CRESWELL: As the Instrumentation Engineer in charge of this sort of thing 7
8
... instrumentation, would you be apprised of these problems that happened in the past.
g; 10!
PORTER: We might if it was chronic, and any one component.
I don't know that we've had to change the design of any switch or arything like that.
It's just that there are quite a few interlocks, and they'd pick up the one relay to allow the pump to start.
141 15!
CRESWELL:
But you don't recollect what the problem has been in the past?
17!
I PORTER:
Not specifically, no.
ISI 19i CRE5WELL: Well, when you got down there, were you able to determine that 20:
there was low oil pressure or low cooling water flow, or anything like 21!
that?
22l 23l PORTER:
No, you'd have to take voltage readings to figure out which 24l contact it was.
I was just looking to see if relay was picked up or not.
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i 1!
CRESWELL:
As I remember, there's a fair of numbers of relays on the panel 2
there for the breaker, and what maybe eight different relays?
31 f
PORTER:
That's possible.
Between your protective relays and control 4j Si relays, yes.
6i 7j CRESWELL:
Do any of these other relays indicate what the problem was?
I 8j Whether it was low oil pressure, or low cooling water flow?
9!
PORTER:
No.
Of course, a protective relay trip... it should drop a 10; target and indicate if you have an overcurrent, or a differential, or 7,
something like that.
I 131 CRESWELL: Are there any targets on any of the breakers?
1s; n'
reta any me, e her hat day r any
.er day, of 16i dropping any targets on relays.
181 CRESWELL:
Tony, unless you have something else, we'll let Owen look at that.
20!
21l FASANO: Well, just some background.
I'd like to ask about, in particular i
the reactor coolant pump vibration instrumentation.
One of the reasons for 23!
shutting the pump in some of the past interviews, included the vibration units.
Okay.
Are you familiar with those? The shaft vibrations and, I 25i think they say, IRD?
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l lj PORTER: Well, the IRD is the vendor that builds the equipment.
I believe i
2!
... I'm not sure... I think the alarm... the alert alarm... the alarm 3
setpoint had bean 15 mils on that.
The alert came in at ten on the shaft vibration.
I think the operating limit was 3 on the frame vibration.
4j Si FASANO:
I guess these were set.
You set them based on the manufacturer's 6i 7!
recommendation for the particular motor or pump?
81 i
PORTER:
B&W provides the guidance for those.
I think the operating limit g
10l is either 20 or 25 mils on that.
But, I'm not precisely sure of what we f
were using at that time.
12:
FASANO:
13 In the limits and precautions, I think they are something like that.
I noticed on the panel, they were 26 and 30 mils.
I think that's on the shaft.
15; 16; PORTER:
Yeah, it's the shaft if it's that high.
Yes.
18(
FASANO:
This would be... I mean would you or could you make a decision on your own to actually change your limits, or would you go by the B&W recom-mendation.
21i 22l PORTER:
No, you'd use the B&W recommendation, I believe.
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j 18 lj FASANO:
It's going to be a safety-related kind of thing.
Would it?
l 21 31 PORTER: Mostly for a very exprisive pump... for the safety of the pump 4
itself, of course you could destroy the seal, if you shook it hard enough,.
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I guess.
But, I'm not familiar enough with what vibration limit might 6
damage the seal, or whatever.
71 i
8f FASANO:
I had looked over some problems reports that were in.
I noticed g,
that you had done some work on eccentricity... and I think it was you, it could have been.
101 11!
PORTER:
I did quite a bit of the work on the initial calibration on this, y
yes.
14' 15,'
FASANO:
- 0. K.
Were you familiar with the hot well level indication problem?
16:
PORTER:
To some extent, yes.
We'd been working on that.
18!
FASANO:
Was that an ongoing problem?
19!
20l PORTER:
It had been, yes. What we were getting was a loss of level 21:
indication when the main steam bypass valves were open.
And we've been for sometime trying to figure out exactly what was causing it.
231 24l 25i
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p FASANO:
It's still under study?
l 21 PORTER:
On March 27th it was.
It's not really known at this time.
I had 3
4l been down to the concensor vendor, discussing what we had seen, and the 5
pr blems with it. What we done to try to track it down, the week before that.
6 7!
FASANO:
8 How would that have affected the or would that have affected the hot well levei, say, the on th 28th? Would there be the correlation there?
i 10 i
PORTER: Well, it cou'd, yes.
The level switches we had on one or two occasions, I won't try to eleaborate as to exactly which one, but the level
, '~>!
23!
had cone... or the indicatea leni had gone low enough so that it had l
cav:,ed emergency makeup vaives to open, and add water to the condenser.
It And we didn't really know for sure !<hether ths water was in there or not.
151 3
h It was false indication that we...'although it would appear it was somewrure in the condenser, because when the bypass yalves are closed, when then 17!
you'd get high water level indicar. ion.
It appeared to be an indication problem versus an actual low level, although the two section condenser, we 19t weren't sure whether the water was really in the other water box and the 2.0f level indication was proper or whether we were doing something to the 21(
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indicated. level and water was in the same box that the indicator was in.
22i i
23t FASANO:
So you could be getting water in when you dfdn't need that water 2 41 in.
In esselce?
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1 PORTER: We had definitely had that happen at time or two, yeah.
2!
FASANO:
- 0. K.
Do you have anything else?
3 41 5l CRESWELL:
Ivan, one thing, I have already asked you whether any of the pe pie that were measuring the in core thermocouples down in the cable room 6
had mentioned to you that the core was uncovered, and you have answered no.
I would like to talk then hypothetically,.if each technician had made a 81 statement like that to you, would you have a 'Spted that, or would you have g;
questioned that? I trying to get an idJa what ki0d of an impression that would make on you.
u:
ul PORTER:
Has one of them said t:sv told me that?
131 14l CRESWELL:
Excuse me.
15:
161 PORTER:
Has somebody said they told me that?
171 ISI CRESWELL: We have certain adications that statements like that were made.
19i Yes.
20' 21; PORTER:
I don't know how to answer that question.
I'd think everybody was 22I concerned about the core.
I don't know whether they were concerned... but 23{
I was... to the best of my recollection, I was concerned that we didn't L
241 have water in the hot leg, anywhere back to the vessel.
I can't even begin 25i I
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21 lj to think that I was thinking of slightly uncovered, or 10% uncovered, or l
2!
50% uncovered, or whatever.
To me the indications were that we couldn't 3j have water in the hot leg, and I don't... I recall being rather upset at 4j everything I was seeing. And I just... I can't answer what they did 5
specifically... what the discussions were.
I Si 7l CRESWELL:
But to get back'to wnat I was saying though, let's assume that f
.e cally t.5ey & teH you dat. WouM you acce3 R, or wouM you 8
reject it?
g 10!
f PORTER: Well, I certainly don't think I'd just reject it on the spot.
i 12l CRESWELL:
0.K., Owen?
i 14!
SHACXLETON: Thank you, Mr. Porter.
Do you anything you want to say at this time, before we close off?
17!
PORTER:
No.
ISI 19!
SHACXLETON:
All right.
At this time, we'll close this interview.
The 20!
time is 2:35 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time. And the reading on the meter is 21!
537.
22!
23!
24l 25i
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,i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
2 In the Matter of:
2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 2
of Ivan D. Porter Instrument Control Engineer 4
Si 6i, 7i Si I
Trailer #203 9)
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 1 01 Middletown, Pennsylvania lli July 2. 1979 12l (Date of Interview) 13 July 25,1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 324 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
15i 17!
181 19i 20; 21; NRC PERSONNEL:
22l Owen C. Shackleton James S. Creswell i
23i Anthony N. Fasano 24, 25t s '\\
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lj SHACKLETON: The time is now 2:04 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time.
This Owen 2j Shackleton speaking.
This is an interview of Mr. Ivan D. Porter.
Mr.
3 Porter is employed as an Instrument Control Engineer for the Metropolitan 4
Edison Company, presently assigned to Unit 2 at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station.
This interview is taking place in trailer #203, Si g
which is parked just outside the south security gate at the Three Mile Island installation.
Present from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct this interview is Mr. James S. Creswell.
Mr. Creswell is a r
Reactor Inspector assigned to Region III.
Also present is Mr. Anthony N.
Fasano.
Mr. Fasano is an Inspection Specialist in the Performance Appraisal 10!
Brar.ch presently assigned to Region I.
My name is Owen C. Shackleton.
I'm 11:.
an Investigator assigned to Region V.
Just before going on tape, I presented 12',
I to Mr. Porter, the two page document from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 131 Commission, which explains the scope and purpose of this investigation, and
,4, A
identifies the authority of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to this investigation.
And also explains to Mr. Porter his right to be refused to be interviewed; his right to have scmeone of his choice present during the i
17) course of the interview, and his rignt to not to have to submit a signed 18; statement.
On the second page of this document there are three questions, 191 and Mr. Porter responed to all three questions with an affirmative "yes" 20!
At this time, for the purpose of record on tape, I'm going to ask answer.
21l Mr. Porter these questions orally.
Mr. Porter do you understand fully the 2J1 do:.ument I'm referring to?
23l t
24!
25:
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Of l
t 2
PORTER:
Yes, I do.
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2l i
3j SHACKLETON:
And do we have ycur permission to tape this interview?
41 PORTER:
Yes.
cl Si SHACKLETON:
And would you like... you have it marked here that you would 7,
like a copy of the tape.
Is that correct?
g 9l PORTER:
Yes, sir.
101 11!
SHACKLETON:
And also a transcript.
12 ','
i 131 PORTER:
Please.
14' 15i SHACKLETON:
All right. We'll provide you a copy of the tape at the close 17{.
of the interview, and a transcript when it's completed.
And now I'll turn the interview over to Mr. Fasano and Mr. Creswell.
181 19!
CRESWELL:
Ivan, in our previous interview with us, you stated that you 20t were involved with the reactor coolant pump start that took place approx-21; imately 7:00 o' clock.
I wonder if you could go back to that period of time, and tell us what your involvement was with that... the starting of 23l that pump?
i 24!
25!
o l
I I
3 i
l 1l PORTER:
Well, as I recall, attampts had been made to start pumps, and 2j without successfully closing the breaker... and it~was called to my atten-3l tion.
I was requested to go down to the 7 KV breakar to see if what we 4j call now... what is called the K3 relay, which must be picked up and the 5
relay to be picked up.
Several service systems for the pump have to have 6
interlocks satisfied.
And, I did go down to the breaker, and was looking 7l for any pump with a K3 relay picked up.
I didn't do anything positive at g
that time to cause a pump to start.
I believe the pump that they had first gj tried to start... the K3 was not picked up on... but whichever pump it was eventually was started apparcntly the relay was satisfied and picked 101 up.
It's a little unclear in my mind.
We tried several times during the 12l day to start pumps, and I made several trips to the breakers.
And to sort 1
13l out what I did each given time, I guess is a little difficult.
I know at one point I hit a relay to try to coax it to pull in and. I broke the glass 141 out of it.
And I know at one point in time, we did try... I believe we tried to close the breaker holding the flashligh on the relay to actually hold the contact in.
I do remember those sequences.
Later in the day, we put jumpers in to positively pull the relay in.
We bypassed the contacts on the start sequence.
But, the jumper was not installed that early in the day.
It's difficult for me to recall precisely what I did at any given 201 trip down to the breakers.
i 21!
i 22) i CRESWELL:
23t 0.K. Ivan, the time when the glass was broken and I believe you said you used a flashlight one time to hold the contacts up.
Would that 24:
have been on the pump with the broken glass, where you could reach in and 25i hit the contacts?
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1 1.'
PORTER:
I'm not sure on that.
I'm not sure that it's relevant, but I'm 2{
not sure.
I 3!
4l CRESWELL: Would you have taken the open relay out to...
Si PORTER:
I think the one we did it on we took the cover off the front, and Gi
[j held a flashlight on it, but I just, you know, pushed up on starter and the l
the relay with the butt of the flashlight.
But, I'm not clear as to which 8
trip down, what was done.
g 10f CRESWELL:
Let's see... on one of your trips down, I think, Mr. Wright was there at the breaker.
I 131 PORTER:
Could have been, yeah.
15:
CRESWELL:
This is the start where the they drew very, where the pumps drew very little current maybe 100 amps.
18r PORTER:
Yeah, in fact, I... due to the indications on the local amp 19t meters is difficult to read 100 amps.
I wasn't sure it was drawing any current.
21!
22!
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
What was your reaction whenever you saw that low reading?
23l 24!
25i c, g 6 5iJ
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5 l
PORTER:
lj Well, at anytime when I saw that, I just felt that we didn't have 2j water up in the pumping tower.
I wasn' t moving any water.
i 31 CRESWELL:
So that the pump itself would have been voided?
4; 5l 6{
PORTER: Yeah.
I 71 l
CRESWELL: What did that mean.to you as far as the condition of water level g
in the reactor c::alant system?
g 10l PORTER: Well, I guess the only thing it could mean and it did at that day, s.
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12;,
I guess, that there wasn't water out in the locos.
But, I think, by that time, it was due to the temperatures in the loop. We thought that.
13l t
14' CRESWELL:
But, it would have indicated that the water level was below the 15 pump... the level corresponding to the pump?
17 FORTER:
Yeah.
181 19!
CRE5 KELL:
In our previous discussion with you, I guess we determined that there were some measurements made down in the cable room by use of a thermo-couple reader and a digital voltmeter.
22!
23l PORTER:
Uh, uh.
24!
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6 1
CRESWELL:
Do you recall when those measurements were made that anyone f
stated that they felt the core was undercovered, by the temperature indica-2 f
tions they were seeing?
3 4j 5l PORTER:
No.
I don't know that that statement was made.
i 5i CRESWELL:
So, you don' t recall if Mr. Wright... if Mr. Bennett, or Mr.
aeger ever yu ge er r sea rately t.5at t.5ey fe h that temperatwe 8
indications indicated the core was uncovered?
g 10!
PORTER:
I don't specifically remember them saying that, no.
I'd... I think everybody involved with it was probably concerned abcut the water i
level and they were seeing, seeing the temperatures we were seeing but I 131 guess I don't recall if of anybody stating that specifically.
But, I mignt 141 of myself, I guess.
I just don't recall that clearly, right now, what anybody said at any given time.
17!
CRESWELL:
You don't recall making any kind of a statement like that to Mr.
Miller?
19' 20; PORTER:
I don't believe I did, no.
As I recall, of course the hot tempera-21!
tures bothered me, but on alto the low temperatures caused me to suspect 22!
the condition of the readings.
And I didn't know if it was due to the 2 31 thermocouples themselves, or steam in the.. you know, the humidity in the 24l building affecting the readings or what the problem was.
25i
- b. $
f 7
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lj CRESWELL:
But, didn't you believe the higher ones?
i 2!
3l PORTER:
I can't say that I really believed them, no.
They concerned me.
4j But the fact that we had such low readings also, to me just confused and 5l made the whole thing somewhat unreliable.
I guess in retrospect, we're all Si a lot smarter about why they were lower maybe, but...
I, 7
gj CRESWELL: The reason that you'd be a lot smarter about them being lower is what?
o, 9
10l PORTER: Well, I guess we acknowledge now that the temperture is probably hot enough to have actually affected the thermocouple metals, themselves.
13i CRE5WELL:
Do you recollect that any of the thermocouples that were measured down in the cable room reading at 75 millivolts?
16i PORTER:
I don't, no.
I believe Jim Wright said later that he did have a reading that high.
I don't recall that.
In looking at the data that Skip had recorded down there, none of them are quite that hign.
I think.
56 is 19!
the highest.
20l 21!
CRESWELL:
You don't recollect anything?
22i i
23l PORTER:
I don't recall seeing 75.
I do know Jim has mentionec later he 24i did see a reading that high.
I don't recall seeing one that high.
That's 25l
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really too high to be reliable at all.
Even the 56 is above the melting j
point for the metals, or right in the region of the melting point.
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4!
CRESWELL: After our interview with you, you suppifed me with some names of 5;
people that are involved in evaluating thermocouples, and one of those 6
people I believe was Don Robertson.
He's a consultant with L&N.
Apparently 71 you discussed with him on the 29th, certain...
i 81 PORTER: Have you talked to him?
g 101 CRESWELL:
I have been in touch with Mr. Robertson, yes.
12!
PORTER:
All right.
I wasn't sure what date it was.
It was one of the g
14l following days.
I thought that it was either Friday or Saturday, but 0.K.
It could have been the 29th, too, I guess.
16i CRESWELL:
Did you contact anybody else on the 28th abcut the thermocouples?
18t PORTER:
No.
19f 201 CRESWELL:
Did you contact anyone else about the thermocouples, rather than i
Mr. Robertson?
22!
231 PORTER:
No.
He, in my mind confirmed what I felt about them.
So I didn't 24!
see any need for myself to pursue it much more.
25:
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1:
CRESWELL: When you had discussions with him, was it mainly though about 2
the conditions of the thermocouples on the time period like the 29th?
I 31 PORTER:
Yes.
41 Si i
6l CRESWELL: As opposed to the conditions that you had seen on the 28th, 7
where you had very high temperatures?
81 PORTER:
Yes.
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101 CRESWELL:
11::
On the 29th, temperatures would have been considerably lower.
12!
PORTER:
Yes.
131 14' CRESWELL:
Tony, do you have some questions?
16i FASANO:
I'd like to just go back a little.
You mentioned when you saw the 17!
current, it was 100 amns even less, when, the first time you started, when 18i Mr. Wright was with you.
You tried to start the first pump, the low 19!
current.
201 21 PORTER:
Yes.
22!
i 2 31 l
FASANO:
And you said that this indicated possible low water in the lo(1s, 24!
but you said, "We thought this already." Who are the "we thoucht this 25!
already"? Who are the "we"?
Is sJ
I l
10 i
i 1!
PORTER:
I had this trouble last interview.
I think everyone in the Control 2j Room, the people looking at the plant and stuff, knew that we had temperatures 3
considerably off-scale in the hot legs and stuff.
And it wasn't feasible 4i for it to be, you know the hat legs to be full of water.
And I don't... I Si believe that I thought that pump wasn't even running when I came up from et.
the breakers.
It was... I was even suprised later to find out that, you q
know, that they shut it off manually.
I thought the breaker had tripped free.
g, 91 10l ay, a a
me en, y u a cn e
a ad mn aM was very low current?
12!
PORTER:
Yes.
i 141 FASANO:
So ncw you have confirmed that in your mind, on the 28th, that there is a low current and the genera consensus of the people in the Control Room was that they had a lack of water in the loop.
When you first came in, if I remember, one of the things you did was to look at the RTD.
18!
19!
PORTER:
Uh, uh.
20l 21:
FASANO:
Did... and at that time they seemed to be high, and if I remember right, you kind of believed these temperatures when you actually measured 231 i
them?
24' 25i q,
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11 lj PORTER:
Yes, it was sometime later before I got a good measurement on the 2j temperature. But, from looking at the redundant-indications, I believe...
i 31 I just didn't believe that just one instrument was high that they were all 4t giving basically the same information.
i 5!
FASANO:
6i Then as I remember about 8:30, or so, you did confirm this.
Approximate the time.
7 i
81 PORTER:
Yeah.
I'm not sure what time it was.
It was either 8 or 8:30, g
s mething like that. We put the digital voltmeter on the RTD to read it.
101 11!
FASANO:
So, nsw you had, in your mind, the high RTD's and the high temper-ature, and the idea of void.
You had fluid missing in the pump casing.
I mean these are things that are going through your mind.
Now, during intra-ment interwould, was the measurement of the thermocouples?
15i PORTER:
Yes, I only physically witnessed... I guess 4 on the digital 17!
voltmeter and maybe 3 or 4 more with the voltmeter.
I was not down there 18r for the whole period of time that they took the complete set of data.
191 20:
FASANO:
Yes, but the reason they did a redundant measurement was because 21; you had doubt in the first measurr: ment and you wanted to confirm that.
22!
Correct?
23 24:
25!
l l.a pt e
12 e
1 PORTER:
Well, we couldn't get readings on the computer, so that's why we 1:
went downstairs.
And we took the readings of the digital indicator.
On 2
3 the digital indicator you have to disconnect and hook up each one. And i
4!
with the numbers I was getting, I couldn't see the value in reading them g
that precisely.
So, they went ahead and took a complete set with just rea ng e mH les on de teminals.
6 71 FASANO:
The second set confir:ned the first?
8 9f PORTER:
I don't recall seeing 7 millible readings again, at that time.
In fact, it was sometime later, I was even aware that tney existed.
I guess I forgot they took them, quite frankly.
I'm sure they must of have told me.
Well, they do confirm it though.
Their still scattered anywheres from 200 131 degrees to 2,500 which is about what I saw on the digital readout.
There 14 are just more of them.
16i CRESWELL: When you say digital readout, Ivan, you're speaking of the 17!
thermocouple reader?
184 19!
PORTER:
Right.
Now, the voltmeter is digital, also, yes.
20:
21!
FASANO:
By this time, do you recall having any thought ch, well, I cat.
t.
22!
say thought. With all of these pieces of information, how did you relate 231 this to Miller.
I believe you were dealing with Mr. Miller.
And did you 2 42 come to... I mean in you mind now, you had at least three points there 25i that seemed to confirm some concern for that core?
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1 PORTER:
Yeah, I guess.
I'~, not sure what we're driving at here, but...
21 3
FASANO: Well, I want to know if Mr. Miller had the same information that 4!
you had, and the people making decisions had this information and could use 5
it possibly?
6i p
PORTER:
I think we all had it.
But, I'm not sure what differently we g
would have done with it, either.
And assuring the core was covered, I guess, was the prime concern in trying to get water in the loop so we could 0l run e pump.
But, I felt like I wasn't deciding what shou'd be done with the plant. But I felt like everything they were trying to do was...
that's what was aimed at anyway.
And I don't...
a FASANO:
Okay, one other piece of data that may or may not have got in the 141 Control Room, I don't know, but Floyd had been in Lynchburg, and I believe he made some calculations based on information that was given to him early in the morning.
And came up with some estimatas, based on computations he made on Unit 1.
I think this was related to the activity in the dome...
some detector.
191 And I think that he estimated that maybe one quarter, one eighth of the fuel cladding might have been damaged.
Did you knew of this information or did...
You're shaking you head no?
21:
I 22!
PORTER:
No.
I heard that first when I heard this testimony.
231 24!
25!
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FASANO:
- 0. K.
I 2:
)
3j PORTER: The President's Commission.
I had not heard that before then.
4:
g FASANO:
I have no further questions right now.
Si CRESWELL:
Ivan, before you went down to look at the K3 relays, first had g
the operators been trying to start the pump. Were they observing all g
pressures, cooling water flow, in the Control Room?
101 PORTER:
g You can't really observe the pressure and stuff.
It either picks up the pressure switches or don't... or doesn't, excuse me.
The things like the pressure switches and stuff you don't really know they haven't picked up, unless you can't start the pump.
14,.
15i CRESWELL:
So, before you went down there, you didt't know whether the Control Room people had been observing these things.
You had to go down there to that area to find out?
181 19!
PORTER: We've had trouble with them occasionally in starting the pump.
There's quite a few interlocks involved.
And we've had trouble with them 21!
in the past.
I guess that's why the first thing you go to look at is the 22l K3 relays that has been a problem, at in times in the past.
23i 24!
25i
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15 llj CRESWELL: What caused the problems in the past?
2!
3 PORTER:
I'm not sure specifically.
I think any one of them has maybe, you 4l know, the lift pressures and backstop oil pressures, nuke service flows, e
and stuff like that.
I'm not sure...
A Gi l
CRESWELL: As the Instrumentation Engineer in charge of this sort of thing 7
8{
instrumentation, would you be apprised of these problems that happened in the past.
g I
101 11.l PORTER: We might if it was chronic, and any one component.
I don't know 12l that we've had to change the design of any switch or anything like that.
I 131 It's just that there are quite a few interlocks, and they'd pick up the one relay to allow the pump to start.
15i CRE5WELL:
But you don't recollect wnat the problem has been in the past?
,,,.w 17!
PORTER:
Not specifically, no.
19' CRESWELL:
Well, when you got down there, were you able to determine that 201 there was low oil pressure or low cooling water flow, or anything like 21l that?
22l 23l PORTER:
No, you'd have to take voltage readings to figure out wnich 24!
contact it was.
I was just looking to see if relay was picked up or not.
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1; CRESWELL: As I remember, there's a fair of numbers of relays on the panel 2:
there for the breaker, and what maybe eight different relays?
3i I
.gi PORTER:
That's possible.
Between your protective relays and control Si relays, yes.
6i f
CRESWELL:
Do any of these other relays indicate what the problem was?
7 l
Whether it was low oil pressure, or low cooling water flow?
8 91 ORTER:
No.
10l Of course, a protective relay trip... it should drop a f
target and indicate if you have an overcurrent, or a differential, or i,
something like that.
13l CRESWELL: Are there any targets on any of the breakers?
15; PORTER:
15 I don't recall it anytime, either that day or any other day, of dropping any targets on relays.
ISl CRESWELL:
Tony, unless you have something else, we'll let Owen look at that.
20:
21:
FASANO:
Well, just some background.
I'd like to ask about, in particular 22j the reactor coolant pump vibration instrumentation.
One of the reasons for 23!
shutting the pump in some of the past interviews, included the vibration 2 41 units.
Okay.
Are you familiar with those? The shaft vibrations and, I think they say, IRD?
stb-pb
I i
f 17 1)
PORTER: Well, the IRD is the vendor that builds the equipment.
I believe 2
... I'm not sure... I think the alarm... the alert alarm... the alarm I
3 setpoint had been 15 mils on that. The alert came in at ten on the shaft 4j vibration.
I think the operating limit was 3 on the frame vibration.
Si i
FASANO:
I guess these were set.
You set them based on the manufacturer's 6i 7j recommendation for the particular motor or pump?
8 PORTER:
B&W provides the guidance for those.
I think the opeiating limit g
is either 20 or 25 mils on that.
But, I'm not precisely sure of what we were using at that time.
g 12' I
FASANO:
13!
In the limits and precautions, I think they are something like that.
I noticed on the panel, they were 26 and 30 mils.
I think that's on 141 the shaft.
15' 16i PORTER:
Yeah, it's the shaft if it's that high.
Yes.
17!
181 FASANO:
This would be... I mean would you or could you make a decision on 191 your own to actually change your limits, or would you go by the B&W recom-20!
mendation.
21l l
22l' PORTER:
No, you'd use the St.W recommendation, I believe.
23}
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l 18 l
lj FASANO:
It's going to be a safety-related kind of thing.
Would it?
l 2:
31 PORTER: Mostly for a very expensive pump... for the safety of the pump 4l itself, of course you could destroy the seal, if you shook it hard enough, 3
I guess.
But, I'm not familiar enough with what vibration limit might 6j damage the seal, or whatever.
71 FASANO:
I had looked over some problems recorts that were in.
I noticed 8,
g, that you had cene some work on eccentricity... and I think it was you, it could have been.
10l 11:
PORTER:
I did quite a bit of the work on the initial calibration on this, yes.
14)
FASANO:
- 0. K.
Were you familiar with the hot well level indication problem?
16i PORTER:
To some extent, yes.
We'd been working on that.
18I FASANO: Was that an ongoing problem?
20f PORTER:
It had been, yes. What we were getting was a loss of level
- 21l, indication when the main steam bypass valves were open.
And we've been for 22!
i sometime trying to figure out exactly what was causing it.
23l 24!
25r S
jl-Cf66
19 1:
FASANO:
It's still under study?
2!
PORTER:
On March 27th it was.
It's not really known at this time.
I had 3
been down to the condensor vendor, discussing what we had seen, and the 41 gj problems with it. What we done to try to track it down, the week before that.
6 7!
FASANO:
8 How would that have affected the or would that have affected the l
hot well level, say, the on th 28th? Would there be the correlation there?
a 10l PORTER: Well, it could, yes.
The level switches we had on one or two 11:
occasions, I won't try to eleaborate as to exactly which one, but the level had gone... or the indicated level had gone low enough so that it had j
caused emergency makeup valves to open, and add water to the condenser.
And we didn't really know for sure whether the water was in chere or not.
It was false indication that we... although it would appear it was somewhere in the condenser, because when the bypass valves are closed, when then you'd get high water level indication.
It appeared to be an indication problem versus an actual low level, although the two section condenser, we 19!
weren't sure whether the water was really in the other water box and the 20!
level indication was proper or whether we were doing something to the 21:
indicated level and water was in the same box that the indicator was in.
2f 23!
FASANO:
So you could be getting water in when you didn't need that water 24!
in.
In essence?
25i i
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)
PORTER: We had definitely had that happen at time or two, yeah.
y 2
FASANO:
- 0. K.
Do you have anything else?
3 41 CRESWELL:
g Ivan, one thing, I have already asked you whether any of the pe pie that were measuring the in core thermocouples down in the cable room 6
7:
had mentioned to you that the core was uncovered, and you have answered no.
Iw id like to talk then hypothetically, if each technician had made a 81 statement like that to you, would you have accepted that, or would you have questioned that?
I trying to get an idea what kind of an impression that would make on you.
12!
PORTER:
Has one of them said they told me that?
14!
CRESWELL:
Excuse me.
15i 16; PORTER:
Has somebody said they told me that?
171 181 CRE5WELL: We have certain indications that statements like that were made.
'B Yes.
20t 21i PORTER:
I don't know how to answer that question.
I'd think everybody was 22l concerned about the core.
I don't know whether they were concerned... but 231 l
I was... to the best of my recollection, I was concerned that we didn't 241 have water in the hot leg, anywhere back to the vessel.
I can't even begin 25i r'
4 a
21 lj to think that I was thinking of slightly uncovered, or 10% uncovered, or 2j 50% uncovered, or whatever.
To me the indications were that we couldn't i
3j have water in the hot leg, and I don't... I recall being rather upset at t
4j everything I was seeing. And I just... I can't answer what they did Sj specifically... what the discussions were.
I Gi y
CRESWELL:
But to get back to what I was saying though, let's assume that hypothetically they did tell you that. Would you accept it, or would you 8
reject it?
g 101 PORTER: Well, I certainly don't think I'd just reject it on the spot.
12:
I CRESWELL:
0.K., Owen?
131 14' SHACXLETON: Thank you, Mr. Porter.
Do you anything you want to say at.
this time, before we close off?
17l PORTER:
No.
18f 19i SHACXLETON: All right.
At this time, we'll close this interview.
The 20!
time is 2:35 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time.
And the reading on the meter is 21i 537.
22l 2 31 e
24i 25i J'
cp
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