ML19207C051

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QA Program Insp Rept 99900028/79-01 on 790515-18.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Insp Findings,Review of Vendor Activities,Internal Audits & Followup on 10CFR21 Notification
ML19207C051
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/31/1979
From: Hunnicutt D, Oller R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML19207C038 List:
References
REF-QA-99900028 99900028-79-1, NUDOCS 7909060374
Download: ML19207C051 (10)


Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No.

99900028/79-01 Program No.

51300 Company:

Tube Turns Division Chemetron Corporation 2900 W. Broadway Louisville, Kentucky 40201 Inspection Conducted: May 15-18, 1979 Inspector:

4 R. E. Oller, Contractor Inspector, Vendor J.nspection Date Branch

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Approved by: 4 I

D. M. Hunnicutt, Chief, Component Section II, Vendor Date Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on May 15-18, 1979 (99900028/79-01)

Areas Inspected:

Implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria, other NRC requirements, and applicable codes and standards including:

action on previous inspection finding, review of vendor activities, internal audits, and a follow-up on a x0 CFR Part 21 notification. The inspection involved twenty-six (26) inspector-hours on site.

Results:

In the four (4) areas inspected, no deviations or unresolved items were identified.

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2 Details Section A.

Persons Contacted W. Davis, Supervisor of Welding Engineering

  • H.

George, Vice President of Engineering M. Ranson, Manager of Metallurgy and Welding

  • B. Montana, Authorized Nuclear Inspector (Hartford)

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  • J. Seay, Manager of Quality Control W. Trent, Supervisor of Metallurgy
  • M. Wakefield, QA Consultant S. Woods, Supervisor of Customer Adjustments
  • S. Vitatoe, Manager of Quality Process Engineering
  • Attended the exit interview.

B.

Action on Previous Inspection Findings 1.

(Closed) Deviation A.a (Report 99900028/78-02): Failere to provide permanently marked assigned serial numbers on the ammeters on welding machines No. 32182,and No. 32048.

The inspector found that the ammeters and volt meters on these two (2) machines have now been permanently marked with assigned calibration T-numbers. Prior to the end of the inspection, a memorandum con-cerning care in the application of T-number plastic labels, was !ssued to all electricans who are responsible for these meters.

2.

(Closed) Deviation A.b (Report 99900028/78-02): Failure to control the identification serial numbers of the voltmeter and the ammeter for welding machine No. 32108.

The inspector found that in accordance with Tube Turns response letter dated October 5,1978 that the computer calibration schedule record has been corrected and the above meters are now properly identified and controlled in the calibration schedule.

3.

(Closed) Deviation A.c (Report 99900028/78-02): Failure to show the correct calibration date of May 2,1978, on the stickers attached to the voltmeter and ammeter on welding machine No. 32048.

The inspector found that in accordance with Tube Turns response letter, dated October 5,1978 the calibration stickers on the above meters now show the correct calibration date. A memorandum dated November 9, 1978, concerning proper filling out of calibration stickers has been.

issued to all of the electricians responsible for calibrating the meters.

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3 4.

(Closed) Deviation A.d (Report 99900028/78-02): Failure to show the correct calibration date on the stickers attached to the 10,000 pound Dead Weight Tester.

The inspector found that the last calibration date of March 23, 1979, for the 10,000 pound Dead Weight Tester (DWI) is shown on the records and will be put on the sticker attached to the DWT. Also, the above referenced memorandum dated November 9, 1978, issued to the electricians, also applies to this device.

5.

(Closed) Deviation /..e (Report 99900028/78-02): Failure to have available the calibration subcontractor's certifications for the June 1978 calibration of Rockwell Hardness Testers No. 41Y05 and No. 41YO6.

The inspector found that subcontractor certificates for the latest calibration, dated December 5,1978, are on file for the above devices.

6.

(0 pen) Deviation B (Report 99900028/78-02): Failure to provide documented measures to control and calibrate the weld shielding gac flowmeters on welding machines numbers 32182, 32048, 32108 and others.

The inspector found in accordance with Tube Turns response letters dated October 5, 1978, December 21, 1978, and February 27, 1979, that an interpretation request was sent to the ASME and a reply from ASME dated January 25, 1979, was received. However, the ASME response failed to provide clarification. As a result Tube Turns has investigated the, availability of equipment to use in calibrating flowmeters. The above referenced welding machines and others have not been calibrated. Tube Turns letter dated February 27, 1979, provides an Duplementation dated of June 30, 1979, for calibrating the flowmeters.

7.

(Closed) Deviation C (Report 99900028/78-02): Failure to add to the Instrument Master File, unique serial numbers for the 10,000 pound Dead Weight Tester and an ammeter. Both were assigned serial number T-464.

The inspector found that the Instrument Master File has been corrected and serial number T-464 has been assigned to the Dead Weight Tester and Number T-498 has been assigned to the ammeter.

C.

Review of Vendor's Activities 1.

Objective The objective of this area of the inspection was to assess the vendor's activities and their impact on future NRC inspections.

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4 2.

Method of Accomplishment The preceding objective was accomplished by:

a.

Discussions with cognizant personnel.

b.

Review of lists of Tube Turn's customers to whom pipe fittings, and bellows expansion joints were shipped during 1978 and 1979, also, review of lists of customers' orders for pipe fitting and bellow expansion joints which are in process in the shop.

c.

Review of the QA Manual Parts:

I, General Information; II, Standard Procedures; III, ASME Section III Nuclear Power Plant Components; and V, Seamless Products; to verify that the QA Manual provides a QA program necessary to assure product conformance to the cpplicable ASME Code requirements.

3.

Findings a.

Deviations From Commitments None.

b.

Unresolved Items None.

c.

Other Findings The Tube Turns Louisville plant holds the following valid ASME authorizations for nuclear applications:

(a) N-1111, NPT for Class 1, 2, 3 Fabrications-shop.

(b) N-2166, KPT for Class 2 and 3 and MC Fabrications-field.

(c) N-2165, NA for Class 1, 2, 3 Shop Assembly.

(d) N-2241, QSC (Materials) Manufacturer.

(e) N-2242, QSC (Materials) Supplier.

d.

During 1978 and 1979, the plant shipped welded fittings to seven (7) customers and bellows expansion joints to twelve (12) customers.

The Louisville plant has capabilities to manufacture welded pipe e.

fittings (elbows, tees and reducers) to specifications SA-234,

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4 Rh 5

5 SA-403, SA-420 and others, in nominal outside diameters of 10 inches through 84 inches with wall thicknesses in the range of 3/8 inch through 2 inches for selected siaes. The plant can manu-facture bellows expansion joints and mechanical pentrations with outside diameters from 6 inches through 37 feet.

D.

Internal Audits 1.

Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that the following items were controlled in accordance with applicable NRC and ASME code requirements:

a.

A written system has been established to assure that internal audits are performed and controlled in accordance with applicable codes to verify compliance with all aspects of the QA program.

b.

Planned and periodic internal audits are performed in accordance with written procedures or checklists by qualified personnel not having direct responsibilities in the areas being audited.

Asdit results are documented and reviewed by management having c.

responsibility in the area audited.

d.

Follow-up action including reaudit of deficient areas, is taken where indicated.

2.

Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:

a.

Review of the QA Manual Procedure TI-22-328 " Audits."

b.

Review of Tube Turns schedules " Internal Audit Schedule and Checklist", for 1978 and 1979.

Review of records of audit co'sisting of audit plans, checklists, c.

auditor's report of findings, and requests for corrective action, for the following areas of the QA program:

(1) Order Analysis and Manufacturing Order Package.

(22 Heat Treatment.

d.

Review of records of auditor qualifications and training for the ten (10) auditors identified on the 1979 Audit Schedule and Checklist.

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6 3. Findin[; Within this area of the inspection, no deviations or unresolved items were identified. E. Part 21 Report Follow-up

== Introduction:== The Tube Turns Division of Chemetron plant management located in Louisville, Kentucky called the NRC Region IV assigned inspector on April 9, 1979, and then submitted a 10 CFR Part 21 Report, dated April 12, 1979, to USNRC, regarding certain pipe fittings identified as Tube Turns Lot No. W6719, which were shipped by Tube Turns during the period of March 1978 to March 1979. This lot of fittings was found to contain a fitting which cracked when welded, due to incorrect chemistry. Tube Turns initiated a recall and test plan through their customers, to locate and return loose fittings of Lot W6719 and to have installed fittings of Lot W6719 tested by US steel. This recall plan located fittings at Waterford Unit III Nuclear Power Station site and the Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Station site. Tube Turns subsequently sent a progress report to the USNRC by letter, dated May 10, 1979. This letter indicated fittings of lot No. W6719 were located at thirteen (13) nuclear power plant sites. US steel had tested 150 loose and installed fittings at seven (7) of tne thirteen (13) nuclear sites. Three (3) of the 150 fittings were found to have the incorrect chemistry. Shoreham removed six (6) fittings rather than to wait for testing. LaSalle nuclear power station identified an installed fitting of incorrect chemistry which is being removed and the piping system is to be determined if it is a " substantial safety hazard." Tube Turns will write again to their customers who might have purchased fittings for nuclear application, and request another review of records to check that all fittings of the suspect lot W6719, have been located. 1. Objectives The objectives of this follow-up inspection were to ascertain that the reporting organization had implemented the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 and had: Met the requirements for reporting the deficiency. a. b. Performed an evaluation of the condition, including making an assessment of generic implications. Assigned responsibility and implemented a plan of corrective c. action. d. Reviewed preventive action measures. u-o o, ~ g i t) V ry2.ti

7 2. Method at Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by: a. Discussions with cognizant personnel. b. Review of Tube Turns Part 21 Report letters dated April 12, 1979 and May 10, 1979, to verify the following: (1) The reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 were met. (2) The deficiency was properly evaluated and an assement of generic implications was made. (3) Adequate corrective action was implemented in a timely manner. Review of the Tube Turns purchase order No. 21608 to US Steel (USS) c. for the original pipe material ordered to USS Specification 470-C, from which the SA-234, WPB pipe fittings were to be manufactured. d. Review of the USS certified test report shcwing the quantity and the chemical and physical properties of piping Heat No. N57028 for USS Alloy 470-C. This heat was subsequently assigned Tube Turns Lot No. W6719. e. Review of Tube Turns Internal Production Material Control Card for Lot No. W6719. f. Review of Tube Turn's Chemical analysis report dated February 23, 1979, of a 4" 0.D. Lot W6719 elbow which cracked during welding. g. Review of Tube Turns original recall notice letter dated March 30, 1979, sent to 12 customers who had purchased fittings specifically for ASME III Code work. Also, a copy of the same letter, dated April 3, 1979, (without the PS tagging instructions) which was sent to the balance of 275 customers. h. Review of a Tube Turns followup recall letter dated May 10, 1979, with the attached Tube Turn's certified material test report showing the order was for possible use in nuclear power plants and a Tube Turn's work sheet record of the status of the fittings investigation for that customer. All of these items were sent to those customers who received the March 30, 1979, recall letter. i. Review of the form used by Tube Turns to notify US Steel to visit a construction site and test the fittings marked Lot W6719. [I.lir )(30( i

8 j. Review of US Steel report letters dated April 24, 1979, and May 8,1979, to Tube Turns delineating the Lot W6719 fittings which were spark tested and accepted or rejected. k. Verbal summation by Tube Turn's QA consultant of the responses received from eleven (11) customers (distributors and fabricators) regarding the location of Lot W6719 fittings at domestic nuclear

onstruction sites.

3. Findings a. Deviation None. b. Unresolved Item None. c. Other Findings (1) Seouence of Events (a) The pipe material used for manufacture of SA-234, WPB pipe fittings was purchased from US Steel to US Steel's specification 470C which meets the applicable requirements of SA-234. (b) The piping was delivered to Tube Turns in two (2) different heat of materials, N-57028 and N-57013. Tube Turns subsequently assigned Lot Numbers W6719 and W6720, respectively, to the two (2) heats. (c) The Lot W6719 elbow which cracked during tack welding was analyzed and found to be a high carbon, low alloy material, equivalent in composition to API-5AC, also identified as US Steel Specification C-75. (d) US Steel indicated verbally to Tube Turns that one (1) or more bars of the C-75 material became mixed in with heat N-57028 (Lot W6719) at the pouring and bar rolling mill before that material was moved to the pipe forming mill. None of the C-75 material was present in the bar rolling area during the production of bars for heat N-57013 (Lot W6720). This information had not been documented by Tube Turns or US Steel. (e) Tube Turns had manufactured and shipped similar SA-234, WPB 4" elbows and 2" tees made from several lots of material, 4jhCU[$

9 / including Lots W6719 and W6720, during the period of February 1978 to March 1979 and could not determine exactly when the last of the Lot W6719 fittings were s hipped. Consequently to assure complete accountability of all of the Lot W6719 fittings, recall letters were sent to all of the 275 customers identified as having received SA-234, WPB, 4" elbow and 2" tees. This included twelve (12) customers for which Tube Turns' certified material test reports showed fittings were designated for use in nuclear power plants; one (1) of these customer's orders was for a foreign plant. The nuclear order customers received an initial recall letter dated March 30, 1979, and a follow-up letter dated May 10, 1979. The non-nuclear customer's recall letter was dated April 3,1979. (f) Responses to Tube Turns have been by both letters and telephone calls. As Tube Turns received information regarding installed Lot W6719 fittings at nuclear and non-nuclear sites, they notified US Steel by form memorandum, to perform a spark test at the respective site to identify the W6719 fittings as acceptable or rejectable. Those fittings within specification are then steel stamped "G" and those out of specification are steel stamped "NG": Written reports are then sent to Tube Turns. Tube Turns indicated the responses from nuclear customers have been good. At the time of this NRC inspection, customer's responses had resulted in US Steel performing tests on 151 fittings of Lot W6719 at nuclear power plant sites and on thirty-five (35) fittings at non-nuclear customers sites. Three (3) fittings have been rejected at the nuclear sites only. There have been 600 loose untested fittings returned to Tube Turns. This accounts for 786 Lot' W6719 fittings out of a total of approximately 27,000 that were reportly shipped. (2) Comments The following items are considered pertinent to the problem by the inspector, and were discussed witL Tube Turns management: (a) The basis on which Tube Turns and US Steel justifies their position that only Lot W6719 pipe fittings contains fittings of the wrong material (USS alloy No. C-75) has not been documented. Tube Turn's recall test plan is based on locating, recalling and/or testing of only those pipe fittings marked with Lot No. W6719. Tube Turns will document the basis for their position. {}j cd)UE.

10 (b) Tube Turns did not know if a written procedure was being followed in the performing of the spark test which is being used as the accept or reject criteria for installed and loose fitting of Lot W6719 at nuclear power plant construction sites. Tube Turns will check this matter and document their findings. (c) Tube Turns did not know if the US Steel personnel performing the spark test were trained and qualified in the testing technique. Tube Turns will check this matter and document their findings. (d) The inspector's review of the documents in paragraph E.2 and discussions with Tube Turn's QA/QC management, established that Tube Turns reporting letters to the USNRC dated April 12, 1979, and May 10, 1979, meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, paragraph 21.21 for notification, evaluation and corrective action. (e) The Tube Turns corrective action recall plan is in an in process status. Final accounting and disposition of all of the affected Lot W6719 pipe fittings remains open. (f) Tube Turns management indicated that preventive action measures under consideration include, testing of all heats of material received in the future. H. Exit Interview 1. The inspector met with management representatives, denoted in paragraph A, at the conclusion of the inspection on May 18, 1979. 2. The following subjects were discussed. a. Areas inspected. b. Status of corrective and preventative actions for the previously identified deviations. c. Findings identified in this report including Tube Turns 10 CFR Part 21 reporting letters. 3. Management's comments related to clarification of the above items. 316@ O}}