ML19207A974
| ML19207A974 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1979 |
| From: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Groce R YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-03-05.A, TASK-3-5.A, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7908230104 | |
| Download: ML19207A974 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES e ( [,g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 r,W/.:,*****/
July 9, 1979 Docket No. 50-29 Mr. Robert Groce Licensing Engi.eer Yankee Atomic Electric Company 20 Turnpike Road Westboro, Massachusetts 01581
Dear Mr. Groce:
RE: SEP TOPIC III-5.A HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS INSIDE CONTAINMENT This letter is in response to your letter of May 31, 1979, and the subsequent conference call of June 13, 1979, between NRC staff (P. DiBenedetto and J. Shapaker) and Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) staff (D. Hansen, J. Hoffman, P. Rainey and J. Stacy). Your letter addressed nine conditions established to detemine the piping and equipment which must remain available following a high energy line break.
This is to docu:nent our telephone conversation of June 13, 1979, concerning the initial conditions established by YAEC in their letter of May 31,1979. Condition 1 assumed that a simultaneous, related i
single failure would not be postulated with a high energy line break.
4 It is our opinion that each pipe break scenario should consids* the worst case (most limiting) single active failure. Unrelated passive failures, such as pipe breaks and check valves, need not be considered.
We consider conditions 2, 4 and 5 to be part of the overall oojective of the pipe break review and, therefore, not initial conditions.
Items 3, 6, 7 and 8 are considered valid initial assumptions. We indicated that a conclusion such as that presented in concition 9 could not be justified without first completely understanding the cruisequences of the postulated accident. The YAEC participants in the telephone con-versation agreed with these positions.
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Mr. Robert Groce 2-July 9, 1979 The staff further indicated that in the course of the effect-oriented systems review we would be considering the environmental qualification and electrical integrity of the systems relied on to sitigate the consequences of pipe break.
On the basis of the discussion, YAEC agreed to continue to develop the pipe break scenarios, and suggested that staff members visit the site to view some of the high energy lines inside of containment. The staff agreed that at the earliest opportunity, dictated by Yankee Rowe accessibility, staff members would visit the site.
Attachment A to the May 31, 1979 letter, which identifies the high energy lines at Yankee Rowe, was not discussed.
Sincerely, M
i Dennis t.. Zienann, ef 3
Operating Reactors Branch #2 i
Division of Operating Reactors CC:
Mr. Lawrence E. Minnick, President Yankee Atomic Electric Company 20 Turnpike Road Westboro, Massachusetts 01581 Greenfield Comunity College 1 College Drive Greenfield, Massachusetts 01301 7tiG230
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