ML19206A861
| ML19206A861 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1975 |
| From: | Nader R External Citizen/Individual/Media (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Anders W NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19206A862 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904210551 | |
| Download: ML19206A861 (2) | |
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November 30, 1975 i
Hon. Uilliam A.
Anders, Chairman U.S.
Muclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Chairman Anders:
This replies to your letter of October 31, 1975 regarding security at the Threc Mile Island nuclear pcuer plant.
Althou.7h the Muclear Regulatory Cormirsion (HRC) has attempted to minimize the problems at Three Mile Island (TMI), it scens ' hat the public statement of guards Darcy and Shapirc has ccitributed to an increased concern en the part of the MRC about security at nuclear plants.
For example, the MRC recently fined Commonwealth Edison
$25,000 and Carolina Power and Licht $7,000 for security violations, among other problems.
These violations were detected during inspections in July, about a month after Messrs. Darcy and Shapiro made their statements.
Moreover, the violations noted were relevant to the general laxness of which Messrs. Darcy and Shapiro complained.
Commonwealth Edison's violations included inadequate control over a security area and an open, uncontrolled gate.
(Chicago Sun-Times, " Edison fined $25,000 for A-plant laxity", September 19, 1975)
The violations by Carolina Power and Light included failure to inspect vehicles and failure to checl: identification badges.
(MRC Press Release 75-236, October 1, 1975)
There are others who support the statements of Messrs.
Darcy and Shapiro.
Re ce nt ly, the Massachusetts Muclear Safety Commission recommended that unless security measures are substantially improved within the next year, all nuclear power plants should be closed and a han placed on the construction of new plants.
(Critical Mass, November 1975, p.
8 and conversation with Dr. James McKensie, member of the Massachusetts Safety Commission)
A report to ERDA by the Sandia Corporation also warned of the dangers of nuclear plant sabotage and apparently will induce the NRC to strengthen its security rcgulations this winter.
(Wall Street Journal, October 23, 1975, p.
1, and conversation between members of my staff and Mr. Herbert Kouts, October 29, 1975)
It is clear that directly or indirectly, guards Darcy and Shapiro have contributed to improvements in nuclear plant security practices.
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One aspect of the NRC investigation at TMI is particularly disturbing.
This is the refusal of the NRC to consider the allegations of the guards relating to Unit 2, uhich is under construction.
The NRC declined to investigate Unit 2 on the grounds that because it was under construction, Unit 2 did not fall under NRC regulations.
I The reason this is disturbing is that the TMI investigation reported that in two cas.'s, a guard at Unit 2 could gain access to the Unit 1 control roo.n.
The guard was patrelling the roof of a Unit 2 building when he noticed an cpe't door en Unit 1, The guard was able to gain access to the door, apparent.y by hopping a short fence between the two units, and enter Unit 1.
The URC investigators apparently c onside _ ed 6his 1tc:a clce,ed when the Unit 1 door in question was locked. (NRC Investigation Report 75-18, Docket 50-289, July 31, 1975, p. 10, 25., 26)
However, it seems that it would be a simple matter for a potential saboteur to hop the same fence bet'.:een Units 1 and 2 and force opan the door to the Unit 1 building.
To ignore the security situation at Unit 2 is to ignore this relatively easy access to Unit 1 from Unit 2.
Moreover, it seems that such access would be available uith dual-unit nuclear plants in other 8
locations. It seems that NRC security regulations should cover nuclear plants under construction at multi-unit stations, unless the licencee can demonstrate that access to an operating I
reactor cannot be gained from a reactor under cc.1struction.
The following question is therefore relevant:
r' When the NRC upgrades its security regulations this winter, will the URC require that reactors under construction at multi-unit stations maintain the same security regulations as operating reactors, unless the licensee can demonstrate that access to an operating reactor cannot be gained from a reactor construction site?
Sincerely, l' )
' )/;fN Ralph Nader
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