ML19193A229

Order (Transmitting Pre-hearing Questions)

ML19193A229
Person / Time
Site:	Clinch River
Issue date:	07/12/2019
From:	Annette Vietti-Cook NRC/SECY
To:	NRC/OCM
SECY RAS
References
52-047-ESP, ASLBP 17-954-01-ESP-BD02, RAS 55083
Download: ML19193A229 (27)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Docket No. 52-047-ESP (Clinch River Nuclear Site Early Site Permit Application)

ORDER (Transmitting Pre-Hearing Questions)

On July 1, 2019, the Commission issued a notice that it would convene an evidentiary hearing at its Rockville, Maryland headquarters on August 14, 2019, pursuant to section 189a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to receive testimony and exhibits in the uncontested portion of the captioned proceeding.1 In connection with that hearing, pursuant to my authority under 10 C.F.R. § 2.346(a) and (j), the Tennessee Valley Authority and the NRC Staff should file written responses to the questions provided in the table below. Responses should be filed by July 26, 2019.

1 See Tennessee Valley Authority; Clinch River Nuclear Site; Early Site Permit Application; Notice of Hearing, 84 Fed. Reg. 31,358 (July 1, 2019).

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question 1

Safety FSER § 1.6 Staff Section 1.6 of the Final Safety Evaluation Report (FSER) states that, [u]sually, [combined license (COL)] Action Items are not necessary for issues covered by Permit Conditions or explicitly covered by the bounding parameters. (emphasis added).

Why was the word usually included in this sentence? Did the NRC Staff identify any COL Action Items in the Clinch River early site permit (ESP) application that were duplicative of Permit Conditions or bounding parameters? If so, why were they retained?

2 Safety SSAR §§ 2.0, 13.3 FSER § 13.3 10 C.F.R. § 52.17 Staff The Site Safety Analysis Report (SSAR) analyses depend, in part, on the design of the reactor(s) that could be located at the Clinch River Nuclear (CRN) Site. As allowed by 10 C.F.R. § 52.17, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) did not select a specific reactor design in the ESP application. Rather, TVAs application defined the plant-site interface through a plant parameter envelope (PPE).

1. Please describe how TVAs PPE bounds the parameters of the reactors that might be placed at the CRN Site and provides sufficient design detail to support both the NRC safety and environmental review of the ESP application.

2. Please explain whether TVAs methodology provides a basis for establishing a plume exposure pathway (PEP) emergency planning zone (EPZ) that maintains the same level of protection at a reduced EPZ at the CRN Site as that which exists for a 10-mile PEP EPZ for large operating power reactors.

3 Safety FSER § 2.4.12.3.4.2 COL Action Item 2.4-3 10 C.F.R. § 20.1406 Staff Applicant Numerous wells and borings were made at the CRN Site during the previous investigation and development of the site for the canceled Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project (CRBRP).

The FSER at p. 2-141 states, The applicant noted that many of the CRBRP wells and borings would have been removed or destroyed during the site excavation. During the April 24-27, 2017 audit... the applicant indicated that the disposition of the CRBRP

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question wells and borings installed is unknown. During 2018 site walk down activities and subsequent searches, the applicant identified three of these wells. The applicant is currently investigating their disposition and evaluating [these wells] for closure in accordance with TVA and [Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC)] requirements.

1. Please describe the depths of the identified wells and borings.

2. How many wells and borings currently have an unknown disposition?

3. Considering both the complex geology and hydrogeology (e.g., inclined strata containing fractures, faults, and carbonate bedrock joints and cavities), what are the potential safety-related or risk-significant impacts of wells and borings that are not found?

4. With regard to abandoned wells that have the potential to channel shallow groundwater flow into lower levels of the aquifer (termed short-circuiting), how would liquid effluents be addressed for those wells and borings that may not be found?

4 Safety FSER § 2.4.12.3.4.2 Staff Applicant As noted in the FSER, groundwater contamination containing legacy radionuclides has been observed in well OW-422L.

According to the FSER, Past TDEC sampling results (TDEC 2016-TN5350) from the applicants wells have indicated that radionuclides are present at or below detection limits and drinking water Maximum Contaminant Level-Derived Concentration (MCL-DC) levels in CRN Site wells PT-PW and OW-422L, and the Staff confirmed that the radionuclides present are consistent with [Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR)] operations and waste disposal practices that commenced in the 1940s. The extent of the resulting legacy contamination in the vicinity of the ORR is being characterized by ongoing [U.S. Department of Energy] remediation and monitoring studies.

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question

1. What is the basis for the conclusion that radionuclides present in groundwater are consistent with ORR operations and waste disposal practices that commenced in the 1940s?

2. How stable are the source and associated plume of contamination, and what are the Staffs expectations for how baseline for background groundwater concentrations of the contaminants of concern will be established in accordance with COL Action Item 2.4-3?

3. What is the distance between the resulting legacy contamination and the proposed site?

5 Safety FSER § 2.4.12.3.4.2 Staff Applicant The FSER states that the groundwater contamination and associated monitoring and sampling of [well OW-422L] continues to be under the purview of TDEC in cooperation with the applicant.

1. What, if any, role will the NRC have with respect to oversight and inspection of this monitoring and sampling?

2. How has the potential for duplicative or conflicting requirements for the well been addressed?

6 Safety FSER § 2.4.12.3.9.2 Staff Applicant FSER Section 2.4.12.3.9.2 concludes that the maximum groundwater level established by the Applicant was reasonable, in part based on water level measurements that took place over the period of September 2013 to March 2014. That period includes the relatively wet year of 2013 when the total annual rainfall was approximately 37 percent higher than the areas average annual rainfall. The FSER concludes that the maximum observed ground levels during the September 2013 to August 2015 monitoring period would be relatively high and near an overall maximum for the CRN Site because of the relatively high precipitation during the monitoring period.

1. The conclusion that precipitation during the measurement period was relatively high is drawn from comparison to

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question average annual rainfall. Over what period was the average annual rainfall calculated?

2. Please explain why the groundwater model used to establish maximum groundwater level is conservative.

7 Safety SSAR § 2.5.1.1.5.1 FSER §§ 2.5.1.1.1.5, 2.5.1.3.2.5 Permit Condition 2.5-1 (Permit Condition

3)

Staff Applicant SSAR Section 2.5.1.1.5.1 states that carbonate rock dissolution and karst formation are the dominant non-seismic geologic hazard in the CRN Site region. According to FSER Section 2.5.1.3.2.5, there is a lack of definitive evidence for present-day active hypogene karst development; however, that does not indicate hypogene processes were inactive in the past or could not occur in the future. Thus, for a future [COL application], detailed geologic mapping and a subsurface exploration program would be implemented to characterize the excavations for safety-related structures at the CRN Site with regard to the presence or absence of karst features in and below the floor of those excavations.

These activities are captured by Permit Condition 2.5-1 (Permit Condition 3), as discussed in FSER Section 2.5.3.4.2

1. Why is the karst hazard not more fully characterized at the ESP stage?

2. Please discuss the potential for hypogenic dissolution to develop voids underground and explain what methods or technologies would be used to further characterize the site.

3. In the context of groundwater conduit flow as well as the construction, operation and associated activities (e.g.,

monitoring) for the proposed site, describe the safety-related or risk-significant impacts of any undetected significant joints, fractures, and limestone cavities.

4. What mitigating strategies or engineered solutions might be available at a later stage to deal with karst features that may be found?

2 When the prehearing questions refer to a future COL application referencing the ESP for the CRN Site, those references could also apply to a future construction permit application referencing the ESP for the CRN Site.

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question 8

Safety SSAR § 2.5.2.1 FSER § 2.5.2.1.1 NUREG-2115 (2012)

Staff Applicant The earthquake catalog in NUREG-2115 (2012), which covers earthquakes in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) region from 1568 through 2008, was used to analyze seismic hazards for the site, along with a separate earthquake catalog developed by the Applicant, which covered earthquakes from 2009 through mid-September 2013. The Applicant merged the two catalogs and used the updated catalog in its seismic hazard evaluation at the CRN Site.

1. How did inclusion of earthquakes occurring over the relatively short time span between 2009-2013 affect the determination of magnitude and distance distributions and why?

2. What confidence is there that the combined catalog will achieve a stable seismicity estimate at the CRN Site over time?

9 Safety FSER § 2.5.2.1.6 Staff Applicant FSER Section 2.5.2.1.6 suggests that the potential complexity of seismic wave propagation at the site could not be fully captured by a one-dimensional propagation model because the site strata is composed of non-horizontal layers dipping more than 30 degrees.

Therefore, the Applicant performed a two-dimensional sensitivity analysis using Structural Dynamics Engineering-System for Analysis of Soil Structure Interaction (SDE SASSI) Version 2.0.

Please explain:

1. What wave compositions the 2-D SDE SASSI analysis assumed and why;

2. How the SDE SASSI modeled the essentially global dipping stratigraphic units at the site given that the underlying method requires modeling a localized region embedded in a horizontally stratified half-space; and

3. Whether the SDE SASSI analysis considered potential inclined wave transmission effects and what wave forms were identified to impact the ground motion response spectrum and why.

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question 10 Safety FSER § 2.5.2.1.4.2 Staff Applicant FSER Section 2.5.2.1.4.2 states that the Probabilistic Seismic Hazards Analysis (PSHA) calculations were performed for the peak horizontal ground acceleration (PGA), and spectral accelerations at frequencies of 0.5, 1.0, 2.5, 5, 10, and 25 Hz.

FSER Figure 2.5.2-2 shows calculated mean uniform hazard response spectra (UHRS) at annual frequencies of exceedance of 1E-4, 1E-5, and 1E-6. These UHRS showed the same trend of a monotonic increase between frequencies in the range of 0 Hz and somewhere between 30 and 40 Hz and then a monotonic decrease between frequencies after the peak up to 100 Hz.

Please explain:

1. At what frequency the PGA was anchored and why;

2. How the peak for UHRS was determined considering that the calculations were performed for frequencies of 25 Hz or less;

3. What magnitude and distance earthquakes excite the large amplitude of the peak spectral accelerations at the high frequencies in the UHRS and why;

4. Whether recorded earthquakes in the CEUS or around the world either singularly or collectively embody the spectral shape of the UHRS as predicted by the PSHA, and why; and

5. What aleatory variability and epistemic uncertainty are associated with the estimate of high frequency spectral accelerations.

11 Safety FSER § 2.5.4.1.4.2 Staff Applicant FSER Section 2.5.4.1.4.2 described downhole geophysical testing for obtaining properties for the CRN Site profile. FSER Section 2.5.4.1.4.2.1 states, Suspension P-S velocity logging was used to obtain in situ measurements of vertically propagating horizontally polarized shear and compressional wave velocities at 0.5 m (1.64 ft) intervals.

Considering the non-horizontal layers of the CRN Site with dipping stratigraphic units, please explain:

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question

1. Why the normal assumption of vertically propagating horizontally polarized shear and compressional waves for the CRN Site is valid; and

2. Whether the potential effect of inclined wave forms has been investigated and how the wave properties associated with these wave forms are characterized and why.

12 Safety FSER § 13.3.3.1 Staff FSER Section 13.3.3.1 at p. 13-9 states that there are approximately 186,500 permanent residents within 14 [miles] of the proposed CRN Site. Should this instead say 15 miles as stated in the Clinch River Evacuation Time Estimate report?

13 Safety FSER §§ 13.3.3.3.1, 13.3.3.3.3 NUREG-0396 (1978)

Staff Applicant According to both the Staff and the Applicant, the technical criteria for establishing the PEP EPZ for the CRN Site would be:

The PEP EPZ should encompass those areas in which projected dose from design basis accidents could exceed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase protective action guides (PAGs).

The PEP EPZ should encompass those areas in which consequences of less severe core melt accidents could exceed the EPA early phase PAGs.

The PEP EPZ should be of sufficient size to provide for substantial reduction in early severe health effects in the event of more severe core melt accidents.

Please answer the following:

1. Are there differences between the criteria for EPZ sizing described in the FSER and the technical criteria described in NUREG-0396?

2. How do public perception considerations discussed in NUREG-0396 relate to the development of the bases for the proposed exemption from the 10-mile EPZ generally specified in 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(g)?

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question 14 Safety 10 C.F.R. § 52.17 FSER §§ 13.3, 13.3.3.1.1, 13.3.3.5.1 Staff 10 C.F.R. § 52.17(b)(2)(i) requires the NRC Staff to consult with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during its review of any proposed major features of the emergency plan, which includes EPZs.

According to the FSER, the Staff requested that FEMA review the application and provide the following determinations:

Whether there is a significant impediment to the development of offsite emergency plans for the 2-mile PEP EPZ (for ESP Plan 5B), pursuant to 10 C.F.R.

§§ 52.17(b)(1) and 52.18; and Whether the proposed major features of ESP Plan 5B, specifically related to the exact size and configuration of the 2-mile PEP EPZ, are acceptable.

Please discuss any consultation with FEMA regarding ESP Plan 5A, which describes a site-boundary EPZ.

15 Safety FSER §§ 13.3, 13.3.3.1.1, 13.3.3.5.1 Staff Please briefly summarize the major concerns raised by FEMA and how those concerns were resolved.

16 Safety SECY-19-0064, p. 6 Staff Section 657 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires the NRC, before issuing a license for a utilization facility, to consult with the [Department of Homeland Security (DHS)] concerning the potential vulnerabilities of the location of the proposed facility to terrorist attack.

In SECY-19-0064, the Staff states, [b]y email dated May 30, 2019, DHS confirmed that it will conduct consultation once the COL application has been received by NRC. As part of its environmental review in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable statutes...

the staff consulted with and obtained input from the appropriate Federal, State, local, and Tribal organizations.

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question If DHS has not yet provided input, what is the basis for the Staffs conclusion that it has obtained input from the appropriate Federal organizations?

17 Safety FSER § 13.3 Staff Is radiological emergency preparedness unique for small modular reactors (SMRs), and how does such preparedness fit into an all hazards approach?

18 Safety SECY-19-0064, pp.

10-11 Applicant Staff The Staff refers to SECY-11-0152, Development of an Emergency Planning and Preparedness Framework for Small Modular Reactors, dated October 28, 2011, in which the Staff discussed the need to address both modularity to determine whether emergency planning (EP) requirements should be based on the maximum number of reactor modules onsite or whether the requirements should vary when modules are added and collocation with different SMR types to consider the impacts of SMRs of the same type being collocated with large reactors, industrial facilities, different SMR types, or any combination of these.

1. How did the Staff and Applicant assess both modularity and collocation for the Clinch River ESP?

2. What, if any, beyond design basis assumptions were used for scenarios to evaluate the EPZ for multi-module unit designs?

3. Were multiple reactors assumed to have accidents for multi-module designs that share common systems?

19 Safety FSER § 13.3.3.3.3.5 Permit Condition 13.3-1 (Permit Condition 5)

Staff Applicant Permit Condition 5 would require an applicant for a COL or construction permit (CP) that references the ESP to demonstrate that the source term for the selected SMR design is bounded by the non-design-specific plant parameter source term information in Table 13.3-1, Plant Parameter Accident Releases for Determining Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Size in Support of Emergency Planning Exemptions.

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question

1. Why is it necessary to specify a bounding source term as proposed by Permit Condition 5?

2. Are there any potential unintended consequences of specifying a bounding source term as a Permit Condition in this case?

3. If a COL applicant selected a design, applied the calculation methodology for EPZ sizing proposed in this case, and met the acceptance criteria, would Permit Condition 5 preclude granting a license if the source term for the selected design were not enveloped by the Permit Condition?

20 Safety FSER § 13.3.3.3.3.5 Permit Condition 13.3-1 (Permit Condition 5)

NUREG-0396 (1978)

EPA-400/R-17/001, PAG Manual:

Protection Action Guides and Planning/Guidance for Radiological Incidents Staff Applicant The planning basis for the existing EPZ requirements in 10 C.F.R. Part 50 was established in NUREG-0396 and was based on the objective that emergency response plans should provide dose savings for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of the EPA early phase PAGs. In EPA-400/R-17/001, PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, EPA provided recommended numerical PAGs for the principal protective actions available to public officials during a radiological accident, including guidance for early phase protective actions for projected doses ranging from 1 to 5 rems during the first 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> of an accident.

1. Please explain why it is necessary to develop a bounding source term (for potential credible accidents for the facility) in order to establish a PEP EPZ boundary that would provide public protection from dose levels in excess of the guidelines of the EPA PAGs?

2. If evacuation is conducted at doses below the EPA PAG Guidelines, what are the potential risks to the public for evacuation?

21 Safety FSER Chapter 13 Staff Applicant Regarding the assessment of different threats (insider threat, cyber, national security emergencies, such as those experienced after 9-11, etc.) and associated impacts for the proposed facility, please describe how the source term would change or how fast a

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question Permit Condition 13.3-1 (Permit Condition 5) core melt would change based on the introduction or variation of an external threat (e.g., a national security threat)? Please explain how the various threats have been considered in the development of the methodology for emergency preparedness.

22 Safety SSAR § 13.3 FSER § 13.3 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.33, 50.47 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E Staff In SSAR § 13.3 the Applicant requests approval of a methodology and radiological dose-related criteria that could be used by a future COL or CP applicant to support a specific PEP EPZ size in the COL or CP application. The Applicant does not ask for approval of a specific PEP EPZ as part of the ESP application, but rather the methodology and criteria, and limits on the maximum megawatts thermal per unit and the total number of megawatts thermal onsite as discussed in Appendix A of the FSER, Table A.4, Bounding Design Parameters Specified in the ESP.

For context and in order to fully understand the implications of the Applicants methodology and radiological dose-related criteria, and without consideration of the specifics in FSER Appendix A, Table A.4, please apply these criteria and methodology to the following operating units:

1. R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

2. Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1

3. Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit 2

4. Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1.

What would be the resulting EPZs?

23 Safety FSER § 13.3.3.4.2 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(g)

Final Rule, Emergency Planning, 45 Fed.

Reg. 55,402 (Aug 19, 1980)

Staff Applicant 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(g) states, in part, Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius... The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal. In the statement of considerations for the 1980 EP rule (45 FR 55406, dated August 19, 1980), that established this requirement, the Commission stated that smaller planning zones can be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for these facilities

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question because of the lower potential hazard and longer times to release significant amounts of activity.

The information provided to support an exemption to the general requirement for a 10-mile EPZ (for large light water reactors) would also seem to support the rationale for a case-by-case request for EPZ size (i.e., lower potential hazard and longer times to release).

1. (Staff) What would the consequences be of an exemption from the conditions for a case-by-case consideration of EPZ size?

2. (Staff) What would the consequences be of an exemption from part of the regulation that in general requires a 10-mile EPZ?

3. (Applicant) What would the consequences be of not granting an EPZ exemption at the ESP stage?

24 Safety FSER § 13.3.3.5.1 10 C.F.R.

§§ 50.33(g),

52.17(b)

Staff Applicant 10 C.F.R. § 52.17(b)(1) requires that the SSAR submitted by the Applicant set forth physical features of the site that could pose a significant impediment to the development of emergency plans.

10 C.F.R. § 52.17(b)(2) states that the SSAR may also either

[p]ropose major features of the emergency plans... such as the exact size and configuration of the EPZs or [p]ropose complete and integrated emergency plans.

In this case, the SSAR proposes major features, but the Staff has not determined the exact size and configuration of the EPZs. For example, according to a footnote in FSER Section 13.3.3.5.1, TVA is requesting NRC approval of the [ESP application]s description of the 2 [mile] PEP EPZ. TVA is not requesting approval of the application of the 2 [mile] PEP EPZ to the CRN Site, because this would be addressed in a [COL application]. The extent of NRC approval of the description of the 2 [mile] PEP EPZ is limited to whether that description reflects such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries, in accordance with Section I.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question

1. (Staff and Applicant) Please clarify why exemptions from EPZ and related requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(g) and elsewhere would be necessary at this time if the exact size and configuration of the emergency planning zones is not being approved now.

2. (Staff) If the exemptions are approved now, is this conclusionthat either a 2-mile or site-boundary EPZ would be appropriate for a COL application that references a design within the PPEfinal? What further review of EPZ size, if any, would occur at the COL stage?

25 Safety 10 C.F.R.

§§ 50.33(g),

50.47(c)(2)

Staff 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(g) states, in part, If the application is for an early site permit that, under 10 CFR 52.17(b)(2)(i), proposes major features of the emergency plans describing the EPZs, then the descriptions of the EPZs must meet the requirements of this paragraph. For the site-boundary EPZ, the requested exemption would still leave in place the requirement that, The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to the local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. This statement is repeated in 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(c)(2).

Please discuss the effect this language in the regulations would have on the proposed site-boundary EPZ. Would this part of the regulations impose any requirements for determining EPZ size that differ from (or add to) the risk-informed, dose-based, consequence-oriented methodology proposed for approval in this case?

26 Safety ESPA Part 5A 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E.IV.F.2.e Staff Applicant Section 14.2 of the ESPA Part 5A, Emergency Plan (Site Boundary EPZ), states, in part, TVA offers State and local authorities and support organizations the opportunity to participate in drills and exercises to the extent their assistance would be expected during an emergency at the CRN Site; however,

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question participation is not required. This statement is consistent with the exercise requirements for other NRC-licensed facilities with site-boundary EPZs including independent spent fuel storage installations under 10 C.F.R. § 72.32(a)(12) and the EP exemption requests for decommissioning nuclear power plants as described in NSIR/DPR-ISG-02. However, the requirement in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E.IV.F.2.e., states, Licensees shall enable any State or local government located within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in the licensees drills when requested by such State or local government.

Please clarify how this requirement would apply to a site-boundary EPZ emergency plan for an SMR. Would a permit condition related to and/or an exemption from the phrase located within the plume exposure pathway EPZ be needed to ensure that such participation is made available to State and local governments by the licensee?

27 Safety 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E Staff Applicant Is it expected at this time that any license conditions related to EP and/or exemptions from EP regulations will be needed at the COL stage if a site-boundary EPZ is established? If so, please briefly describe the license conditions and exemptions that are expected to be needed.

28 Safety Letter from J.W.

Shea, Vice President, TVA, to NRC Document Control Desk (Mar. 30, 2018)

(ML18089A605),

Encl. 1 at E1-9 Staff Applicant In CNL-18-046 (letter response to additional requests for additional information), dated March 30, 2018, Table 4 shows a dose at the exclusion area boundary (EAB) of 4.35 rem total effective dose equivalent for the CRN Largest Core. Table 3, Comparison of Design Basis Accident Progression Between SMRs and Large LWRs, states that no data is available for the CRN Largest Core for parameters including time to the initial uncovering of the core, long-term cooling capability, and core recovery. How was this EAB dose calculated for Table 4 if accident data is not available?

29 Safety ESPA Part 5A/5B 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(q)

Staff Applicant Section 16.0, Plan Maintenance, of ESPA Part 5A and Part 5B describes the change process for revisions to the CRN emergency plan. Specifically, the determining factor for whether NRC review

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question and approval is required for a plan change is whether the change is a significant change as determined by a Plan Effectiveness Determination.

How does the Plan Effectiveness Determination define a significant change? Does significant change mean the same thing as a reduction in effectiveness, which is defined in the requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(q) governing NRC review and approval for plan changes?

30 Safety ESPA Part 5A/5B 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(q)

Applicant Section 16.2.3, EPIP Changes, of ESPA Part 5A and Part 5B states that emergency plan implementing procedures (EPIPs) will receive a review in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(q) consistent with screening plan changes to the radiological emergency plan (REP). Paragraph 3.5.c of Regulatory Guide 1.219 states that [o]rdinarily, sub-tier documents such as emergency plan implementing procedures (EPIPs) are not considered to be part of an emergency plan for the purpose of evaluating proposed changes.

Please clarify the relationship between the CRN REP and EPIPs.

Specifically, what is the rationale for applying a 10 C.F.R.

§ 50.54(q) screening to changes to EPIPs?

31 Safety SSAR § 15.0 FSER § 15.0 Applicant Staff As the Staff notes in FSER § 15.0.3.2.1, to assess the reasonableness of the source terms used in the ESP PPE, the Staff and Applicant conducted comparisons of the most limiting unit (800 MWt) to that of a scaled down Westinghouse Advanced Passive 1000 reactor design. The Applicant acknowledged approximately a 25-percent greater total activity release for the scaled-down AP1000 source term than that of the surrogate plant analyzed for the PPE. The independent Staff evaluation resulted in a higher activity release using the same scaled-down ratio.

Please describe the SMR design enhanced removal mechanisms and advanced engineering features for larger retention times that are not accounted for in the assumptions for this analysis used to

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question conclude the source term for this PPE is representative and not unreasonable.

32 Safety FSER Ch. 2, Appendix A (Table A.2)

Staff In Appendix A of the FSER, the Staff notes that it identified the COL Action Items listed in Table A.2 to ensure that particular significant issues are tracked and considered during the review of a later COL or CP application referencing the ESP, if granted, for the CRN site.

How did the Staff determine which items were particular significant issues? Meteorological issues (item 2.3-1) are captured in the Table A.2, but effects of potential explosion events caused by onsite storage (as discussed on page 2-17, chapter 2 of the FSER) are not. Should the latter have been included in Appendix A?

33 Safety FSER Appendix A Staff The permit conditions, COL action items, site characteristics, and bounding design parameters tables reference Regulatory Guides, NUREGs, Interim Staff Guidance, and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) documents, but do not always specify the date or revision number associated with the document.

What was the Staffs rationale for omitting the date or the revision number for some of the key documents referenced in the Appendix A tables?

34 Safety FSER Appendix A Staff Sections A.2 and A.4 specify that the items included in the subsequent tables were for future applicants referencing the ESP for either a COL or CP. However, Section A.3 only refers to information in a COL application.

What is the rationale for the Staffs referencing only a COL in the introduction paragraph to Section A.3?

35 Safety FSER Appendix A

§ A.4 Staff Table A.4, Bounding Design Parameters Specified in the ESP, presents the bounding value for plant megawatts thermal as the maximum thermal power generated by one unit and the maximum

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question thermal power for the site. The bounding design parameters do not specify that the reactors must be of the same type or that there should be a maximum number of reactor cores onsite.

Should the Staff specify in Appendix A whether the reactor cores must be of the same type?

Should the Staff specify in Appendix A whether there should be a maximum number of total reactors onsite?

36 Safety FSER Appendix A Staff Applicant Some Permit Conditions (e.g., 2.5-1) and COL Action Items (e.g.,

2.4-1) use the term safety-related when discussing requirements for certain structures, systems, and components (SSCs). Did the Staff consider the impact of a COL or CP applicant opting to use 10 C.F.R. § 50.69, which contains four safety classes, rather than the traditional two (i.e., safety-related and non-safety-related)?

For example, would the provisions discussed in Permit Condition 2.5-1 apply to Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-3 structures?

37 Safety FSER Appendix A Staff Several COL Action Items (e.g., 2.5-2, 2.5-5) direct the Applicant to perform an analysis (e.g., conduct further evaluation of the shear-fracture zones), but they do not state that the results of the analysis need to be included or even summarized in a future COL or CP.

Other COL Action Items (e.g., 2.3-1) direct the Applicant to perform an analysis and include the results in a future COL application.

Did the Staff intend to require the Applicant to perform an analysis for some COL Action Items but not to include the results of the analysis in a future COL application?

38 Safety FSER Appendix A Staff Permit Condition 2.2-1 states that a COL applicant shall evaluate the potential Heritage Center Industrial Park Airport to determine whether an aircraft impact should be considered a design basis event. What methodology and acceptance criteria for completing this evaluation (e.g., what is the threshold probability that defines a

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question design basis event?) are acceptable to the Staff? Would a COL Applicant be required to use the same approach that was used for existing airports as described in FSER § 3.5.1.6?

39 Environmental FEIS General Staff Applicant Please describe the Staffs and the Applicants methodology and process for tracking and accounting for new and significant information that may arise between the ESP (if issued) and any submission of a CP or COL application.

40 Environmental FEIS Appendix E Staff Please highlight major themes from the comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and generally describe the Staffs responses to those comments.

41 Environmental FEIS § 2.3.1 Staff Applicant A new nuclear power plant at the CRN [S]ite would withdraw most of the water needed for building and operations from the Clinch River arm of the Watts Bar Reservoir. Melton Hill Dam is one of two dams located on the Clinch River upstream of the CRN Site.

Because the river at the [CRN Site] is part of the Clinch River arm of the Watts Bar Reservoir, Clinch River flow velocity at the CRN

[S]ite may be low when no water is being released from Melton Hill Dam.

How does this impact intake for the CRN Site? Does this impact present a concern from a construction or operations perspective?

42 Environmental FEIS § 2.7.3 Letter from J.W.

Shea, Vice President, TVA, to NRC Document Control Desk (Aug. 1, 2017)

(ML17234A003),

Encl. 3 at E3-3 Applicant In Section 2.7.3, the Final EIS (FEIS) states that the Applicants efforts relating to compliance with the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) includes a commitment by the Applicant to develop a cultural resources management plan, but that completion of this plan has been deferred until the Applicant completes an integrated cultural resources database.

The FEIS further states that the Applicant is in the process of developing a comprehensive agreement in consultation with federally-recognized Tribes outlining a process for dealing with post-1990 unintentional discoveries of NAGPRA cultural items.

The FEIS bases this information on a 2017 letter from the Applicant providing supplemental information related to historic

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question and cultural resources. Please provide an update on the status of these two efforts.

43 Environmental FEIS §§ 4.2.2.1, 5.2.2.1 Staff Applicant What is the process to acquire water rights and associated authorizations for the use of water from the Clinch River arm of the Watts Bar Reservoir?

44 Environmental FEIS § 4.4.4.1 Staff In Section 4.4.4.1 of the FEIS, the Staff states that four traffic intersections were identified that would deteriorate by 2024, due to peak construction employment, and would be below acceptable standards for State traffic thresholds. The Staff notes that several potential mitigation strategies were identified as improvements to nearby infrastructure. In Section 4.4.4.6 of the FEIS, the Staff concludes that adverse impacts to traffic for routes near the CRN Site would be LARGE for routes without mitigation, and MODERATE to LARGE if mitigation measures are implemented.

Please clarify whether the Staffs analysis of traffic impacts to these routes accounts for the four deteriorating traffic intersections described in Section 4.4.4.1 of the FEIS.

45 Environmental FEIS §§ 4.6.3, 5.6.3 National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), § 106 Staff The Staff bases its findings on impacts to cultural and historic resources in part on the NRCs ongoing consultation with twenty American Indian Tribes and the Tennessee Historical Commission (THC). Please explain whether this consultation is still ongoing and, if so, describe any new information received relevant to the Staffs findings on impacts to historic and cultural resources and how such information could affect the Staffs findings.

46 Environmental FEIS § 4.7 Staff Does the Staffs evaluation of impacts to air quality account for the contribution of traffic exhaust emissions from idling vehicles due to the increase in traffic jams associated with the construction and pre-construction phases of the project?

47 Environmental FEIS § 4.11 Staff Applicant Table 4-13 of the FEIS lists specific measures and controls to limit impacts from building a new SMR at the CRN Site. Table 4-13 was based on Table 4.6-1 in the environmental report (ER) and other information provided by the applicant. The FEIS states that

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question the Staff considered these measures and controls in its evaluation of the impacts of building two or more SMRs at the site. Please explain whether the measures identified in Table 4-13 are intended to be binding.

48 Environmental FEIS § 5.11.2.2 NUREG-1437 (1996),

§ 5.3.3.3 Staff The Staff evaluated the potential for severe accident risks associated with a surface-water pathway (i.e., hypothetical accidents resulting in radioactive material deposited on open bodies of water) and concluded that the doses associated with ingestion of aquatic food in surface waterbodies would be equivalent to or lower than the doses associated with the atmospheric pathway. The Staffs conclusion was based on the evaluation performed in Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-1437, and the Staff referenced interdiction measures as part of the basis for its conclusion in Section 5.11.2.2 of the FEIS. Please summarize the interdiction measures that would be used to limit the risk associated with the hypothetical release of radioactive material to the aquatic food pathway.

49 Environmental FEIS § 6.3 Staff As noted in FEIS § 6.3, applicants are not required to submit information regarding decommissioning at the ESP stage.

Nonetheless, § 5.9 of TVAs ER included information supporting a conclusion that the environmental impacts of decommissioning the SMR reactor designs proposed in TVAs application would be bounded by the decommissioning generic environmental impact statement (Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: NUREG-0586, Supplement 1, Regarding the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors (Decommissioning GEIS)). In the FEIS, the review team stated that it has no reason to believe that the impacts discussed in [the Decommissioning GEIS] are not bounding for reactors deployed after 2002... including the SMR designs included in TVAs PPE.

How did the review team reach this conclusion?

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question 50 Environmental FEIS Chapter 7 Staff Was the vicinity defined in the beginning of Chapter 7 applied to all the resource areas or was it defined and delineated for each resource area? Were all of those past, present, and reasonably foreseeable projects listed in Table 7-1 taken into account for the impacts analysis for each resource area?

51 Environmental FEIS Chapter 9 NUREG-1555 (2000),

§ 9.3 NUREG-1555 (draft)

(2007), § 9.3 Letter from Jennivine Rankin, NRC, to Terry Clouthier, Thlopthlocco Tribal Town (Nov. 13, 2018)

(ML18267A316)

Staff Applicant The Staff evaluated the process the Applicant used to identify alternative sites for the proposed action. To identify the CRN Site and three alternative sites, TVA: (1) defined the region of interest; (2) applied exclusionary or inclusionary criteria to define candidate areas within that region; and (3) applied exclusionary or inclusionary criteria to identify potential sites within those areas.

This resulted in the identification of fifteen potential sites, which were then ranked using general siting criteria to identify candidate sites. The CRN Site was selected as the proposed site and the top candidate sites were then evaluated as potential alternatives.

1. (Staff) Did the Staff perform a sensitivity analysis on the Applicants ranking scheme or otherwise verify the results to ensure that a potential alternative site was not overlooked?

2. (Staff and Applicant) What are the sensitive land features that helped define the alternative sites?

3. (Applicant) How were impacts to cultural resources considered in TVAs site selection process? (Staff) How were they considered in the Staffs evaluation of alternative sites?

4. (Staff and Applicant) Given that the ORR potential sites all had higher composite scores than the Redstone Arsenal site, why was it reasonable to include Redstone Arsenal Site 12 as an alternative site?

52 Environmental FEIS § 9.3.2.1.1 Applicant The FEIS notes that the Staff expects that the actual footprint of disturbance for any site TVA might actually select would be substantially greater than the 120 ac that TVA used for identifying potential sites. The footprint of disturbance identified for the CRN

[S]ite was not 120 ac but was 357 ac. The FEIS also notes, The

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question review team also recognizes that the 120-ac estimate likely does not account for optimal construction laydown, road improvements, and new transmission line construction.

Why was 120 acres the size used for identification of potential sites instead of a larger acreage, such as the 300-400 acres used by the review team?

53 Environmental FEIS § 9.3.2.3.1 Staff In discussing the Building Impacts for the alternative sites, the Staff notes that the acreages in Table 9-3 do not include corridors that would need to be cleared for the intake and discharge pipelines at ORR Sites 2 and 8, or for the new offsite buried 69-kV transmission line, and that clearing such corridors would impact primarily an unquantified additional amount of forest habitat at each site. The Staff also notes that the burial of the 69-kV transmission lines would affect artificially maintained right-of-way habitat and may affect any wetlands in these corridors for each site.

Did the absence of the information related to total acreage needed along with associated impacts to forest habitats and possible wetlands influence the Staffs alternatives analysis?

54 Environmental FEIS § 9.3.3.2.3 Staff Applicant The FEIS indicates that no field studies were conducted at the Redstone 12 Site, and no new field studies have been conducted at Oak Ridge Reservation Site 2 or Site 8. The FEIS states: The presence or absence of Federally listed, State-listed, and State-ranked species and communities in the project footprints cannot be ascertained without field studies.

1. (Staff) Did the absence of this information impact the Staffs alternative site analysis? If so, how?

2. (Applicant) Why did TVA not conduct any new field studies for the alternative candidate sites?

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question 55 Environmental FEIS § 9.4 Staff In determining the alternatives to the proposed action, did the Staff consider alternate transmission line pathways as an alternative system design?

56 Environmental FEIS § 10.6 Staff Section 10.6 of the FEIS states, certain issues are not resolved because of a lack of information. An applicant for a COL (or CP/[operating license]) referencing an ESP for the CRN Site would need to provide the necessary information to resolve these issues if the proposed licensing action ultimately would affect the resources associated with these issues.

Please provide a summary of the issues that were not resolved in the FEIS due to a lack of information.

57 Environmental FEIS General NHPA § 106 Letter from E. Patrick McIntyre, Jr.,

Executive Director and State Historic Preservation Officer, Tennessee Historical Commission, to Jennivine Rankin, NRC (Apr. 18, 2019)

(ML19149A452)

Staff In its letter dated April 18, 2019, THC found that the CRN Site ESP as currently proposed, may adversely affect properties that are eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places.

1. Did the Staff have any further interactions with THC?

2. What were THCs specific concerns about properties eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places?

Were THCs concerns addressed? If so, how were they addressed?

58 Environmental FEIS General NHPA § 106 Letter from E. Patrick McIntyre, Jr.,

Staff Has the Staff satisfied the requirements of NHPA section 106? If not, please explain what remains to be done.

No.

Category Reference Directed To Question Executive Director and State Historic Preservation Officer, Tennessee Historical Commission, to Jennivine Rankin, NRC (Apr. 18, 2019)

(ML19149A452)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

For the Commission NRC SEAL

/RA/

Annette L. Vietti-Cook Secretary of the Commission Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of July, 2019.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of

)

)

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

)

)

Docket No. 52-047-ESP (Early Site Permit Application

)

for Clinch River Nuclear Site)

)

)

(Mandatory Hearing)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing ORDER (Transmitting Pre-Hearing Questions) have been served upon the following persons by Electronic Information Exchange.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Mail Stop O-16B33 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: ocaamail@nrc.gov U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary of the Commission Mail Stop O-16B33 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: hearingdocket@nrc.gov Counsel for Licensee, Tennessee Valley Authority:

Christopher Chandler, Esq.

Ryan Dreke, Esq.

Tennessee Valley Authority 400 W. Summit Hill Drive, WT 6A-K Knoxville, TN 37902 E-mail: ccchandler0@tva.gov rcdreke@tva.gov Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of July, 2019 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop O-14A44 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Marcia Carpentier, Esq.

Ann Hove, Esq.

Ann Paisner, Esq.

Kevin Roach, Esq.

David Roth, Esq.

Maxine Segarnick, Esq.

Michael Spencer, Esq.

Susan Vrahoretis, Esq.

Anthony Wilson, Esq.

Jody Martin, Esq.

E-mail: marcia.carpentier@nrc.gov ann.hove@nrc.gov ann.paisner@nrc.gov kevin.roach@nrc.gov david.roth@nrc.gov maxine.segarnick@nrc.gov michael.spencer@nrc.gov susan.vrahoretis@nrc.gov anthony.wilson@nrc.gov jody.martin@nrc.gov

[Original signed by Herald M. Speiser ]

Office of the Secretary of the Commission