ND-19-0168, Request for License Amendment Regarding Protection and Safety Monitoring System Surveillance Requirement Reduction Technical Specification Revision (LAR-19-001)
| ML19084A309 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle |
| Issue date: | 03/25/2019 |
| From: | Whitley B Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of New Reactors |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19084A308 | List: |
| References | |
| ND-19-0168 | |
| Download: ML19084A309 (185) | |
Text
~ Southern Nuclear March 25, 2019 Docket Nos.: 52-025 52-026 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 B. H. Whitley Director Regulatory Affa1rs Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243 Tel 205.992.7079 Fax 205.992.7722 ND-19-0168 10 CFR 50.90 Request for License Amendment Regarding Protection and Safety Monitoring System Surveillance Requirement Reduction Technical Specification Revision (LAR-19-001)
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.98(c) and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests an amendment to the combined licenses (COLs) for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4 (License Numbers NPF-91 and NPF-92, respectively).
The requested amendment proposes to change the Technical Specifications (COL Appendix A),
as well as plant-specific Tier 2 information.
The requested amendment proposes to change Technical Specification (TS) Sections 1.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9, and 5.5. The Surveillance Requirements (SRs) requiring manual Channel Checks, Channel Operational Tests (COTs), Actuation Logic Tests (ALTs) and Actuation Logic Output Tests (ALOTs) to be performed on Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) components are proposed to be removed from the TSs. The approach for satisfying the reactor trip and engineered safety feature actuation system (ESFAS) response time test SRs for the PMS racks is proposed to be changed. provides the description, technical evaluation, regulatory evaluation (including the significant hazards consideration determination), and environmental considerations for the proposed changes. Enclosure 1 includes information that is considered proprietary and, therefore, is requested to be withheld from disclosure to the public under 10 CFR 2.390. provides a redacted version of Enclosure 1 and can be made available to the public. provides markups depicting the requested changes to the VEGP Units 3 and 4 licensing basis documents. Enclosure 3 can be made available to the public. provides the proprietary information that is redacted from Enclosure 3. The information contained in Enclosure 4 is considered to be proprietary and, therefore, is requested to be withheld from disclosure to the public under 10 CFR 2.390.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-0168 Page 2 of 5 provides markups depicting conforming Technical Specification Bases changes for information only and can be made available to the public. provides an affidavit from SNC supporting withholding under 10 CFR 2.390. is Westinghouse's Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, Affidavit CAW-19-4877, Proprietary Information Notice, and Copyright Notice. The affidavit sets forth the basis upon which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations. Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the information that is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the Commission's regulations.
Correspondence with respect to the copyright or proprietary aspects of the items listed above or the supporting Westinghouse affidavit should reference CAW-19-4877 and should be addressed to James A. Gresham, Manager, Regulatory Compliance, Westinghouse Electric Company, 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Building 3 Suite 310, Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066.
Correspondence with respect to proprietary aspects of this letter and its enclosures should also be addressed to Brian H. Whitley at the contact information within this letter.
This letter, including enclosures, has been reviewed and confirmed to not contain security-related information. This letter contains no regulatory commitments.
SNC requests NRC staff review and approval of the requested license amendment no later than November 19, 2019 to support Operator training updates. Delayed approval of this license amendment could result in a delay in Operator training updates and subsequent dependent activities. SNC expects to implement the proposed amendment within 30 days of approval of the requested changes.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, SNC is notifying the State of Georgia by transmitting a copy of this letter and its enclosures to the designated State Official.
Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Wesley Sparkman at (205) 992-5061.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 251h of March, 2019.
Respectfully submitted, Brian H. Whitley Director, Regulatory Affairs Southern Nuclear Operating Company
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-19-0168 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4 Request for License Amendment Regarding Protection and Safety Monitoring System Surveillance Requirement Reduction Technical Specification Revision (Publicly Available Information)
Information being withheld is annotated by enclosing within [ ] and with superscripted a,c after the close-bracket (This Enclosure consists of 44 pages, including this cover page)
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Table 2 - Summary of the Manual Surveillance Tests and Self-Diagnostic Tests for the PMS Components
Test Name Relevant (PMS)
SRs Test Description Summary of PMS Self-Diagnostics and Redundant Surveillance Test Coverage Evaluation
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Definition: $TXDOLWDWLYHDVVHVVPHQWE\\REVHUYDWLRQRIFKDQQHOEHKDYLRU7KLV
WHVWLQFOXGHVDFRPSDULVRQRIWKHFKDQQHOLQGLFDWLRQDQGVWDWXVWRRWKHU
LQGLFDWLRQVRUVWDWXVHVGHULYHGIURPLQGHSHQGHQWLQVWUXPHQWFKDQQHOV
PHDVXULQJWKHVDPHSDUDPHWHU
Test Overview:7KHPDQXDO&KDQQHO&KHFNLGHQWLILHVLIDFRPSRQHQWKDV
IDLOHGE\\FRPSDULQJDOOIRXUGLYLVLRQV¶UHGXQGDQWLQVWUXPHQWLQSXWYDOXHVLQWHU
FKDQQHOFKHFNDQGFRPSDULQJWKHUHGXQGDQW%3/PHDVXUHPHQWVZLWKLQD
GLYLVLRQLQWUDFKDQQHOFKHFN7KLVWHVWFKHFNVIRUDVLJQLILFDQWGHYLDWLRQWKDW
PD\\LQGLFDWHDJURVVFKDQQHOIDLOXUH7KLVLVDFFRPSOLVKHGE\\YLVXDO
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H[LVWVEHWZHHQWKHKLJKHVWDQGORZHVWLQGLFDWRU
PMS Components Covered:7KHGDWDIURPWKHSURFHVVVHQVRUSDVVHVWRWKH
$'FRQYHUWHUZLWKLQWKH%3/DQGLVGLVSOD\\HGRQWKH073
7KH306SHUIRUPVFRQWLQXRXVFKDQQHOFRPSDULVRQRQVSHFLILFVHQVRU
YDOXHVDFURVVDOOIRXUGLYLVLRQV7KLVLQFOXGHVLQWUDFKDQQHODQGLQWHU
FKDQQHOFRPSDULVRQFKHFNV7KLVVHOIGLDJQRVWLFWHVWLVGHVFULEHGLQ
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Test Name
Relevant (PMS)
SRs
Test Description Summary of PMS Self-Diagnostics and Redundant Surveillance Test Coverage Evaluation
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Definition:,QMHFWLRQRIDVLPXODWHGRUDFWXDOVLJQDOLQWRWKHFKDQQHODVFORVHWR
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QHFHVVDU\\RIWKHUHTXLUHGDODUPLQWHUORFNDQGWULSVHWSRLQWVVXFKWKDWWKH
VHWSRLQWVDUHZLWKLQWKHQHFHVVDU\\UDQJHDQGDFFXUDF\\
Test Overview:7KH&27IRUDOO30665VH[FHSWLVVDWLVILHGE\\
PDQXDOO\\LQMHFWLQJDVLPXODWHGGLJLWDOVLJQDODWWKH073DQGYHULI\\LQJWKDWWKH
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EORFNXQEORFNVZLWFKEDWWHU\\FKDUJHUXQGHUYROWDJHDQG&07OHYHOORZ
PMS Components Covered:7KH%3/SURFHVVRUPRGXOHV&,PRGXOH
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Test Name
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PMS Components Covered:
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7KH306VHOIGLDJQRVWLFWHVWVKDYHEHHQVKRZQWRDGHTXDWHO\\WHVWWKH
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4.3.2 Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
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4.3.3 Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-19-0168 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4 Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents (Publicly Available Information)
Additions are identified in blue text Deletions are identified by red strikethrough text Omitted text is shown as three asterisks (* * *)
(This Enclosure consists of 30 pages, including this cover page)
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-19-0168 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4 Conforming Changes to the Technical Specification Bases (For Information Only)
Additions are identified in blue underlined text Deletions are identified by red strikethrough text Omitted text is shown as three asterisks (* * *)
(This Enclosure consists of 95 pages, including this cover page)
Technical Specifications Bases PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - MODE 2 B 3.1.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.1.8 - 6 Revision 45 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.8.1 The power range and intermediate range neutron detectors must be verified to be OPERABLE in MODE 2 by LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation and LCO 3.3.3, Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Intermediate Range Instrumentation. A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is performed on each power range neutron flux (Table 3.3.1-1 Functions 1 and 2) and intermediate range neutron flux (LCO 3.3.3) channel prior to initiation of the PHYSICS TESTS. This will ensure that the RTS is properly aligned to provide the required degree of core protection during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS.
SR 3.1.8.21 Verification that the RCS lowest loop Tavg is 541°F will ensure that the unit is not operating in a condition that could invalidate the safety analyses. Verification of the RCS temperature at a Frequency of 30 minutes during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS will provide assurance that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated.
SR 3.1.8.32 Verification that the THERMAL POWER is 5% RTP will ensure that the plant is not operating in a condition that could invalidate the safety analyses. Verification of the THERMAL POWER at a Frequency of 30 minutes during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS will ensure that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated.
SR 3.1.8.43 The SDM is verified by performing a reactivity balance calculation, considering the following reactivity effects:
a.
Control bank position; c.
RCS average temperature; d.
Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation; e.
Xenon concentration; f.
Samarium concentration; and g.
Isothermal temperature coefficient (ITC).
ND-19-0168 Page 2 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases CVS Demineralized Water Isolation Valves and Makeup Line Isolation Valves B 3.1.9 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.1.9 - 4 Revision 27 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.1.9.1 Verification that the CVS demineralized water isolation valves and makeup line isolation valves stroke closed demonstrates that the valves can perform their safety related function. The Frequency is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
SR 3.1.9.2 Verification that the closure time of each RCS makeup isolation valve is less than that assumed in the safety analysis (i.e., < 30 seconds), is performed by measuring the time required for each valve to close on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The Frequency is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
SR 3.1.9.3 This SR verifies that each CVS demineralized water isolation valve actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
The actual or simulated actuation signal is processed through the component interface module to verify the continuity between the output of component interface module and the valve.The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Chapter 15, Accident Analysis.
ND-19-0168 Page 3 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases AFD (CAOC Methodology)
B 3.2.3 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.2.3 - 4 Revision 28 BASES LCO (continued)
Figure B 3.2.3-1 shows a typical target band and typical AFD acceptable operation limits.
The LCO is modified by four Notes. Note 1 states the conditions necessary for declaring the AFD outside of the target band. Notes 2 and 3 describe how the cumulative penalty deviation time is calculated. It is intended that the unit is operated with the AFD within the target band about the target flux difference. However, during rapid THERMAL POWER reductions, control bank motion may cause the AFD to deviate outside the target band at reduced THERMAL POWER levels. This deviation does not affect the xenon distribution sufficiently to change the envelope of peaking factors that may be reached on a subsequent return to RTP with the AFD within the target band, provided the time duration of the deviation is limited. Accordingly, while THERMAL POWER is 50% RTP and < 90% RTP (i.e., Part b of this LCO), a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> cumulative penalty deviation time, cumulative during the preceding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, is allowed during which the unit may be operated outside the target band, but within the acceptable operation limits provided in the COLR (Note 2).
This penalty time is accumulated at the rate of 1 minute for each 1 minute of operating time within the power range of Part b of this LCO (i.e.,
THERMAL POWER 50% RTP). The cumulative penalty time is the sum of penalty times from Parts b and c of this LCO.
For THERMAL POWER levels >15% RTP and < 50% RTP (i.e., Part c of this LCO), deviations of the AFD outside of the target are less significant.
Note 3 allows the accumulation of 1/2 minute penalty deviation time per 1 minute of actual time outside the target band and reflects this reduced significance. With THERMAL POWER 15% RTP, AFD is not a significant parameter in the assumptions used in the safety analysis and therefore requires no limits. Because the xenon distribution produced at THERMAL POWER levels less than RTP does affect the power distribution as power is increased, unanalyzed xenon and power distribution is prevented by limiting the accumulation penalty deviation time.
For surveillance of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels performed according to SR 3.3.1.54, Note 4 allows deviation outside the target band for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> and no penalty deviation time accumulated. Some deviation in the AFD is required for doing the NIS calibration with the incore detector system. This calibration is performed every 92 effective full power days (EFPD).
ND-19-0168 Page 4 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 8 Revision 43 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
Reactor Trip Initiation Logic The Reactor Trip Matrix (RTM) acts as an interface between the LCL subsystems and the RTBs. The RTM receives contact inputs from the LCL subsystems and performs the logic to determine if a division will issue a reactor trip command.
Each PMS division contains two redundant RTMs; one is configured as a ST matrix and the other a UV matrix. The combination of the two forms the complete RTM for a given division. If the ST logic is satisfied, the RTB ST coils are energized, opening both RTBs in the division. If the UV logic is satisfied, the RTB UV coils are de-energized, opening both RTBs in the division.
The PMS boundary ends at the interposing relay contacts of the RTMs.
Manual RT A manual reactor trip is initiated from the MCR by redundant momentary switches. The switches directly control the power from the RTM logic, actuating the UV and ST attachments in all four divisions.
Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTS)
The NTS is the nominal value at which the trip output is set. Any trip output is considered to be properly adjusted when the as-left value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION (i.e., +/- rack calibration accuracy).
The trip setpoints used in the trip output are based on the Safety Analysis Limits stated in Reference 2. The determination of these NTSs is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those RTS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 5), the NTSs specified in the SP are conservative with respect to the Safety Analysis Limits. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the NTSs, including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in the Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems (Ref. 3).
The as-left tolerance and as-found tolerance band methodology is provided in the SP. The as-found OPERABILITY limit for the purpose of the CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) is defined as the as-left limit about the NTS (i.e., +/- rack calibration accuracy).
ND-19-0168 Page 5 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 9 Revision 43 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The NTSs listed in the SP are based on the methodology described in Reference 3, which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel. The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each NTS. All field sensors and signal processing equipment for these channels are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Transmitter and signal processing equipment calibration tolerances and drift allowances must be specified in plant calibration procedures, and must be consistent with the values used in the setpoint methodology.
The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can be evaluated when its as-found calibration data are compared against the as-left data and are shown to be within the setpoint methodology assumptions. The basis of the setpoints is described in References 2 and 3. Trending of calibration results is required by the program description in Technical Specifications 5.5.14.d.
Note that the as-left and as-found tolerances listed in the SP define the OPERABILITY limits for a channel during a periodic CHANNEL CALIBRATION or COT that requires trip setpoint verification.Trip setpoints are automatically verified by self-checking features.
The Protection and Safety Monitoring System testing features are designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self-checking and manual testsfeatures, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded. For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing. To the extent possible, Protection and Safety Monitoring System functional testing will be accomplished with continuous system self-checking features in lieu of manual surveillance tests. As a result, some functions do not have manual surveillance requirements and the continuous functional testing features.
The Protection and Safety Monitoring System incorporates continuous system self-checking features wherever practical. Self-checking features include on-line diagnostics for the computer system and the hardware and communications tests. Faults detected by the self-checking features will alert the operator in the main control room. These self-checking tests do not interfere with normal system operation.
In addition to the self-checking features, the system includes functional testing features. Functional testing features include continuous functional testing features and manually initiated functional testing features. To the ND-19-0168 Page 6 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 10 Revision 43 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) extent practical, functional testing features are designed not to interfere with normal system operation.
In addition to the system self-checking features and functional testing features, other test features Manual tests are included for those parts of the system which are not tested with self-checking features or functional testing features. These test features allow for instruments/sensor checks.
This includes manual functional checks, calibration verification, response time testing, setpoint verification and component testing. The test features again include a combination of continuous testing features and manual testing features.
All of the tests testing features are designed so that the duration of the testing is as short as possible. The manual tests Testing features are designed so that the actual logic is not modified. To prevent unwanted actuation, the teststesting features are designed with either the capability to bypass a Function during testing and/or limit the number of signals allowed to be placed in test at one time.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and APPLICABILITY The RTS functions to maintain compliance with the SLs during all AOOs and mitigates the consequences of DBAs in all MODES in which the RTBs are closed.
Each of the analyzed accidents and transients which require reactor trip can be detected by one of more RTS Functions. The accident analysis described in Reference 2 takes credit for most RTS trip Functions. RTS trip Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis were qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the plant. These RTS trip Functions may provide protection for conditions which do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate function performance. These RTS trip Functions may also serve as backups to RTS trip Functions that were credited in the accident analysis.
Permissive and interlock functions are based upon the associated protection function instrumentation. Because they do not have to operate in adverse environmental conditions, the trip settings of the permissive and interlock functions use the normal environment, steady-state instrument uncertainties of the associated protection function instrumentation. This results in OPERABILITY criteria (i.e., as-found tolerance and as-left tolerance) that are the same as the associated protection function sensor and process rack modules. The NTSs for permissives and interlocks are based on the associated protection function OPERABILITY requirements; i.e., permissives and interlocks performing enabling functions must be set to occur prior to the specified ND-19-0168 Page 7 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 26 Revision 43 BASES ACTIONS (continued) more channels are inoperable for a Function, thermal power must be reduced to below the P-10 interlock; a condition in which the LCO does not apply. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The SRs for each RTS Function are identified in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1-1 for that Function.
A Note has been added to the SR table stating that Table 3.3.1-1 determines which SRs apply to which RTS Functions.
The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COT areis performed in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies. In lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measuredFor channels that include dynamic transfer functions, such as, lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, the response time test may be performed with the transfer function set to one, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 response time (Ref. 1). Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values. The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
SR 3.3.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
ND-19-0168 Page 8 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 27 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. Automated operator aids may be used to facilitate the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment have drifted outside their corresponding limits.
SR 3.3.1.21 This SR 3.3.1.2 compares the calorimetric heat balance to the nuclear instrumentation channel output every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If the calorimetric measurement at 15% RTP, differs from the nuclear instrument channel output by > 5% RTP, the nuclear instrument channel is not declared inoperable, but must be adjusted. If the nuclear instrument channel output cannot be properly adjusted, the channel is declared inoperable.
Two Notes modify this SR 3.3.1.2. The first Note clarifies that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is 15% RTP and that 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is allowed for performing the first Surveillance after reaching 15% RTP. At lower power levels the calorimetric data from feedwater flow venturi measurements are less accurate. The second Note is required because, at power levels 15% RTP, calorimetric uncertainty and control rod insertion create the potential for miscalibration of the nuclear instrumentation channel. Therefore, if the calorimetric heat measurement is 15% RTP, and if the nuclear instrumentation channel indicated power is lower than the calorimetric measurement by
> 5% RTP, then the nuclear instrumentation channel shall be adjusted upward to match the calorimetric measurement. No nuclear instrumentation channel adjustment is required if the nuclear instrumentation channel is higher than the calorimetric measurement.
The Frequency of every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is adequate based on plant operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift.
Together, these factors demonstrate the change in the absolute difference between nuclear instrumentation and heat balance calculated powers rarely exceeds 5% RTP in any 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
In addition, main control room operators periodically monitor redundant indications and alarms to detect deviations in channel outputs.
ND-19-0168 Page 9 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 28 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.1.32 This SR 3.3.1.3 compares the calorimetric heat balance to the calculated T power (qT) in each Division every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If the calorimetric measurement between 70% and 100% RTP, differs from the calculated T power by > 3% RTP, the Function is not declared inoperable, but the conversion factor, T°, must be adjusted. If T° cannot be properly adjusted, the Function is declared inoperable in the affected Division(s).
Three Notes modify this SR 3.3.1.3. The first Note indicates that T° shall be adjusted consistent with the calorimetric results if the absolute difference between the calculated T power and the calorimetric measurement between 70% and 100% RTP is > 3% RTP.
The second Note clarifies that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is 50% RTP and that 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is allowed for performing the first Surveillance after reaching 50% RTP. At lower power levels, the calorimetric data from feedwater flow venturi measurements are less accurate. The calculated T power is normally stable (less likely to need adjustment or to be grossly affected by changes in the core loading pattern than the nuclear instrumentation), and its calibration should not be unnecessarily altered by a possibly inaccurate calorimetric measurement at low power.
The third Note is required because at power levels below 70%,
calorimetric uncertainty creates the potential for non-conservative adjustment of the T° conversion factor, in cases where the calculated T power would be reduced to match the calorimetric power. Therefore, if the calorimetric heat measurement is less than 70% RTP, and if the calculated T power is lower than the calorimetric measurement by > 5%,
then the T° conversion factor shall be adjusted so that the calculated T power matches the calorimetric measurement. No T° conversion factor adjustment is required if the calculated T power is higher than the calorimetric measurement.
The Frequency of every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is based on plant operating experience, considering instrument reliability and the limited effects of fuel burnup and rod position changes on the accuracy of the calculated T power.
ND-19-0168 Page 10 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 29 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.1.43 This SR 3.3.1.4 compares the AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE determined using the incore system to the nuclear instrument channel AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE every 31 effective full power days (EFPD) and adjusts the excore nuclear instrument channel if the absolute difference between the incore and excore AFD is 1.5% AFD.
Each nuclear instrument channel is calibrated to an average weighted peripheral AFD, which accounts for the fact that neutron leakage from the peripheral fuel assemblies nearest each excore detector will have the largest effect on the channel response. This calibration method reduces the effect of changes in the radial power distribution, caused by either burnup or control rod motion, on the channel AFD calibration. The calibration method is consistent with the development of the f(I) penalty functions for the overpower T and overtemperature T functions, which are made a function of the same average weighted peripheral AFD (i.e., the AFD used in determining the f(I) penalty is calculated using the same radial weighting factors as are used to calibrate the excore detector nuclear instrument channels). The incore AFD used as the basis for comparison when performing this SR 3.3.1.4 is also calculated in the same weighted peripheral manner.
If the absolute difference is 1.5% AFD the nuclear instrument channel is still OPERABLE, but must be readjusted. If the nuclear instrument channel cannot be properly readjusted, the channel is declared inoperable. This surveillance is performed to verify the f(I) input to the overpower T and overtemperature T functions.
Two Notes modify this SR 3.3.1.4. The first Note indicates that the excore nuclear instrument channel shall be adjusted if the absolute difference between the incore and excore AFD is 1.5% AFD. Note 2 clarifies that the Surveillance is required only if reactor power is 20%
RTP and that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed for performing the first Surveillance after reaching 20% RTP. Below 20% RTP, the design of the incore detector system, low core power density, and detector accuracy make use of the incore detectors inadequate for use as a reference standard for comparison to the excore channels.
The Frequency of every 31 EFPD is adequate based on plant operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift. Also, the slow changes in neutron flux during the fuel cycle can be detected during this interval.
ND-19-0168 Page 11 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 30 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.1.54 This SR 3.3.1.5 is a calibration of the excore channels to the incore channels. If the measurements do not agree, the excore channels are not declared inoperable but must be adjusted to agree with the incore detector measurements. If the excore channels cannot be adjusted, the channels are declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(I) input to the overtemperature T Function.
A Note modifies this SR 3.3.1.5. The Note states that this Surveillance is required only if reactor power is > 50% RTP and that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed for performing the first surveillance after reaching 50% RTP.
The Frequency of 92 EFPD is adequate based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift.
SR 3.3.1.6 SR 3.3.1.6 is the performance of a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) every 92 days. The SR 3.3.1.6 testing is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR.
This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
A COT is performed on each required channel to provide reasonable assurance that the entire channel will perform the intended Function.
A test subsystem is provided with the Protection and Safety Monitoring System to aid the plant staff in performing the COT. The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
ND-19-0168 Page 12 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 31 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, Protection and Safety Monitoring System functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The COT shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the COT cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the COT can be performed using portable test equipment.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this COT. This portion of the COT ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP. If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function.
When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
This test frequency of 92 days is justified based on Reference 6 and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, cross-check of redundant channels, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, and tests of timers, counters and crystal time bases, which will report a failure within the Protection and Safety Monitoring System cabinets to the operator within 10 minutes of a detectable failure.
During the COT, the Protection and Safety Monitoring System cabinets in the division under test may be placed in bypass.
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Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 32 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3.3.1.6(which refers to this test as an RTCOT), except it is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within the previous 92 days. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this COT. This portion of the COT ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP. If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function.
When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
The Frequency of prior to reactor startup ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical operations and applies to the source, intermediate and power range low instrument channels. The Frequency of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P-10 allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to perform the testing required by this surveillance. The Frequency of every 92 days thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducing power below P-10.
The MODE of Applicability for this surveillance is < P-10 for the power range low channels. Once the unit is in MODE 3, this surveillance is no longer required. If power is to be maintained < P-10 for more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, then the testing required by this surveillance must be performed ND-19-0168 Page 14 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 33 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) prior to the expiration of the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> limit. Four hours is a reasonable time to complete the required testing or place the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer required. This test ensures that the NIS power range low channels are OPERABLE prior to taking the reactor critical and after reducing power into the applicable MODE (< P-10) for periods
> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
SR 3.3.1.85 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 24 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance),
and evaluating the channel response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation. Transmitter calibration must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. The differences between the current as-found values and the previous as-left values must be consistent with the transmitter drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The setpoint methodology requires that 30 months drift be used (1.25 times the surveillance calibration interval, 24 months).
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this CHANNEL CALIBRATION. This portion of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP.
If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function. When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing ND-19-0168 Page 15 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 34 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
This SR 3.3.1.8 is modified by a Note stating that this test shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to within limits where applicable.
SR 3.3.1.96 This SR 3.3.1.9 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable.
This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the power range neutron detectors consists of a normalization of the detectors based on a power calorimetric and flux map performed above 20% RTP. Below 20% RTP, the design of the incore detector system, low core power density, and detector accuracy make use of the incore detectors inadequate for use as a reference standard for comparison to the excore channels.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this CHANNEL CALIBRATION. This portion of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP.
If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function. When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
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Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 35 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed on the 24 month Frequency.
SR 3.3.1.107 This SR 3.3.1.10 is the performance of a TADOT of the Passive Residual Heat Removal Actuation valve position indicator contact inputs. This TADOT is performed every 24 months.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Function and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT. The Functions affected have no setpoints associated with them.
SR 3.3.1.118 This SR 3.3.1.11 verifies that the individual channel/division actuation response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response Time testing criteria are included in Reference 1.
In lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measured For channels that include dynamic transfer Functions (e.g., lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer Function set to one, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 response time. Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value, provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values.
The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
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Technical Specifications Bases RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.1 - 36 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor, signal processing and actuation logic response times with actual response time tests on the remainder of the channel. Allocations for signal processing and actuation logic response times may be obtained from the protection and safety monitoring system functional requirements. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from: (1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise, or power interrupt tests), (2) in place, onsite, or offsite (e.g. vendor) test measurements, or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications. WCAP-13632-P-A, Revision 2, Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements (Ref. 8),
provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the WCAP. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test.
The Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Actuation Function RTS RESPONSE TIME is the time interval between input of a PRHR discharge valve not-fully-closed position feedback signal and the loss of gripper coil voltage. The RTS RESPONSE TIME for the PRHR actuation does not include testing actuation of the discharge valves by EFSAS instrumentation signals because it cannot be tested if an ESFAS function (e.g., CMT Actuation) has already caused a reactor trip.
Each division response must be verified every 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS (i.e., all four Protection Channel Sets would be tested after 96 months). Response times cannot be determined during plant operation because equipment operation is required to measure response times. Experience has shown that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed on a refueling frequency.
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
The SR 3.3.1.11 is modified by a note indicating that neutron detectors may be excluded from RTS RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty in generating an appropriate detector input signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because the principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response.
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Technical Specifications Bases RTS Source Range Instrumentation B 3.3.2 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.2 - 4 Revision 39 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
E.1 and E.2 Condition E is entered when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D is not met. If three of the four required source range instrumentation channels are not restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed Completion Time, Required Action E.1 requires that action be initiated to fully insert all rods within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, and Required Action E.2 requires that the PLS be placed in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
F.1 Condition F addresses the situation where three or more source range instrumentation channels are inoperable. With three or more channels inoperable, single failure criterion cannot be met and the reactor trip breakers must be opened immediately.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COT are is performed in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies. For channels that include dynamic transfer functions, such as, lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, the response time test may be performed with the transfer function set to one, In lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measured, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 response time (Ref. 1). Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values. The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
SR 3.3.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in ND-19-0168 Page 19 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Source Range Instrumentation B 3.3.2 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.2 - 5 Revision 39 BASES ACTIONS (continued) one of the channels or of even something more serious. A CHANNEL BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment have drifted outside their corresponding limits.
The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. Automated operator aids may be used to facilitate the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.
SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.2 is the performance of a COT. The testing is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable.
This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
A COT is performed on each required channel to provide reasonable assurance that the entire channel will perform the intended Function.
A test subsystem is provided with the protection and safety monitoring system to aid the plant staff in performing the COT. The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this ND-19-0168 Page 20 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Source Range Instrumentation B 3.3.2 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.2 - 6 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, protection and safety monitoring system functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The COT shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the COT cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the COT can be performed using portable test equipment.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this COT. This portion of the COT ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP. If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function.
When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
This test frequency of 92 days is justified based on Reference 2 (which refers to this test as RTCOT) and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, cross-check of redundant channels, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, and tests of timers, counters and crystal time bases, which will report a failure within the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets to the operator within 10 minutes of a detectable failure.
SR 3.3.2.2 is modified by two Notes. The first Note allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within the previous 92 days. The second Note provides a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance when entering MODE 3 from MODE 2. This note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.2.2 is no longer required to be performed. If the unit is to be in ND-19-0168 Page 21 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Source Range Instrumentation B 3.3.2 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.2 - 7 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for a time greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, this Surveillance must be performed prior to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after entry into MODE 3.
The Frequency of prior to reactor startup ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical operations. The Frequency of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P-6 allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to perform the testing required by this surveillance. The Frequency of every 92 days thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducing power below P-6. The MODE of Applicability for this surveillance is < P-6. If power is to be maintained
< P-6 for more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, then the testing required by this surveillance must be performed prior to the expiration of the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> limit. Four hours is a reasonable time to complete the required testing or place the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer required. This test ensures that the NIS source, range instrumentation channels are OPERABLE prior to taking the reactor critical and after reducing power into the applicable MODE (< P-6) for periods > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
During the COT, the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets in the division under test may be placed in bypass.
SR 3.3.2.31 This SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable.
This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range neutron detectors consists of obtaining the preamp discriminator curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturers data.
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Technical Specifications Bases RTS Source Range Instrumentation B 3.3.2 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.2 - 8 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this CHANNEL CALIBRATION. This portion of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP.
If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function. When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed on the 24 month Frequency.
SR 3.3.2.42 This SR 3.3.2.4 verifies that the individual channel actuation response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response Time testing criteria are included in Reference 1.
For channels that include dynamic transfer Functions (e.g., lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer Function set to one,In lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measured, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 response time. Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value, provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values. The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor, signal processing and actuation logic response times with actual response time tests on the remainder of the ND-19-0168 Page 23 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Source Range Instrumentation B 3.3.2 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.2 - 9 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) channel.
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Technical Specifications Bases RTS Source Range Instrumentation B 3.3.2 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.2 - 10 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Each channel response must be verified every 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS (i.e., all four Protection Channel Sets would be tested after 96 months). Response times cannot be determined during plant operation because equipment operation is required to measure response times. Experience has shown that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed on a refueling frequency.
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
This SR 3.3.2.4 is modified by a note exempting neutron detectors from RTS RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty in generating an appropriate detector input signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because the principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Chapter 7.0, Instrumentation and Controls.
2.
APP-GW-GSC-020, Technical Specification Completion Time and Surveillance Frequency Justification.
ND-19-0168 Page 25 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Intermediate Range Instrumentation B 3.3.3 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.3 - 4 Revision 1 BASES ACTIONS (continued) intermediate range instrumentation channels inoperable, three of the four required channels must be restored to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 setpoint. With the unit in this condition, below P-6, the Source Range Neutron Flux channels perform the monitoring and protection functions.
D.1, D.2, and D.3 Condition D addresses the situation where three or more intermediate range instrumentation channels are inoperable. With three or more channels inoperable, operations involving positive reactivity addition must be suspended immediately. This will preclude any power level increase since there are insufficient OPERABLE Intermediate Range channels to adequately monitor power escalation. In addition, THERMAL POWER must be reduced below the P-6 interlock setpoint within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and the plant must be placed in MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times for Required Actions D.2 and D.3 are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COT are is performed in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies. For channels that include dynamic transfer functions, such as, lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, the response time test may be performed with the transfer function set to oneIn lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measured, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 response time (Ref. 1). Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values. The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
ND-19-0168 Page 26 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Intermediate Range Instrumentation B 3.3.3 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.3 - 5 Revision 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.3.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment have drifted outside their corresponding limits.
The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. Automated operator aids may be used to facilitate the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.
SR 3.3.3.2 SR 3.3.3.2 is the performance of a COT. The testing is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable.
This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
A COT is performed on each required channel to provide reasonable assurance that the entire channel will perform the intended Function.
A test subsystem is provided with the protection and safety monitoring system to aid the plant staff in performing the COT. The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination ND-19-0168 Page 27 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Intermediate Range Instrumentation B 3.3.3 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.3 - 6 Revision 1 of system self checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, protection and safety monitoring system functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The COT shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the COT cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the COT can be performed using portable test equipment.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this COT. This portion of the COT ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP. If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function.
When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
This test frequency of 92 days is justified based on Reference 2 (which refers to this test as RTCOT) and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, cross-check of redundant channels, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, and tests of timers, counters and crystal time bases, which will report a failure within the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets to the operator within 10 minutes of a detectable failure.
SR 3.3.3.2 is modified by a Note. The Note allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performed within 92 days of the Frequencies prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducing power below P-10. The Frequency of prior to reactor startup ensures this surveillance is ND-19-0168 Page 28 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Intermediate Range Instrumentation B 3.3.3 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.3 - 7 Revision 1 performed prior to critical operations and applies to the source, intermediate and power range low instrument channels. The Frequency of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P-10 allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to perform the testing required by this surveillance. The Frequency of every 92 days thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup and four hours after reducing power below P-10. The MODE of Applicability for this surveillance is
< P-10. Once the unit is in MODE 3, this surveillance is no longer required. If power is to be maintained < P-10 for more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, then the testing required by this surveillance must be performed prior to the expiration of the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> limit. Four hours is a reasonable time to complete the required testing or place the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer required. This test ensures that the NIS intermediate range instrumentation channels are OPERABLE prior to taking the reactor critical and after reducing power into the applicable MODE (< P-10) for periods > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
During the COT, the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets in the division under test may be placed in bypass.
SR 3.3.3.31 This SR 3.3.3.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable.
This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the intermediate range neutron detectors consists of obtaining the detector plateau curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturers data.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this CHANNEL CALIBRATION. This portion of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ND-19-0168 Page 29 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Intermediate Range Instrumentation B 3.3.3 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.3 - 8 Revision 1 ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP.
If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function. When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed on the 24 month Frequency.
SR 3.3.3.42 This SR 3.3.3.4 verifies that the individual channel actuation response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response Time testing criteria are included in Reference 1.
For channels that include dynamic transfer Functions (e.g., lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer Function set to one,In lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measured, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 response time. Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value, provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values. The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor, signal processing and actuation logic response times with actual response time tests on the remainder of the channel.
ND-19-0168 Page 30 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Intermediate Range Instrumentation B 3.3.3 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.3 - 9 Revision 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Each channel response must be verified every 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS (i.e., all four Protection Channel Sets would be tested after 96 months). Response times cannot be determined during plant operation because equipment operation is required to measure response times. Experience has shown that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed on a refueling frequency.
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
This SR 3.3.3.4 is modified by a note exempting neutron detectors from RTS RESPONSE TIME testing. This Note is necessary because of the difficulty in generating an appropriate detector input signal. Excluding the detectors is acceptable because the principles of detector operation ensure a virtually instantaneous response.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Chapter 7.0, Instrumentation and Controls.
2.
APP-GW-GSC-020, Technical Specification Completion Time and Surveillance Frequency Justification.
ND-19-0168 Page 31 of 95
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ND-19-0168 Page 32 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.4 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.4 - 5 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, protection and safety monitoring system functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST can be performed using portable test equipment.
This test frequency of 92 days is justified based on Reference 1 (which refers to this test as an RTCOT) and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, cross-check of redundant channels, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, and tests of timers, counters and crystal time bases, which will report a failure within the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets to the operator within 10 minutes of a detectable failure.
During performance of the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST, the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets in the division under test may be placed in bypass.
SR 3.3.4.21 This SR 3.3.4.2 verifies that the individual channel actuation response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response time testing criteria are included in Reference 21.
The response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements such that the entire response time is measured. This SR 3.3.4.2 measures the response time for the generation of a reactor trip signal from the Safeguards Actuation Input from ESFAS Automatic channels. SR 3.3.8.42 measures the ESF RESPONSE TIME for the generation of the safeguards signal itself.
Response time may be verified by actual response time tests or by the summation of allocated response times, where approved, with actual response time tests on the remainder of the channel.
ND-19-0168 Page 33 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.4 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.4 - 6 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Each channel response must be verified every 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS (i.e., all four Protection Channel Sets would be tested after 96 months). Response times cannot be determined during plant operation because equipment operation is required to measure response times. Experience has shown that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed on a refueling frequency.
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
REFERENCES 1.
APP-GW-GSC-020, Technical Specification Completion Time and Surveillance Frequency Justification.
- 21. FSAR Chapter 7.0, "Instrumentation and Controls.
ND-19-0168 Page 34 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases
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ND-19-0168 Page 35 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Automatic Trip Logic B 3.3.6 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.6 - 3 Revision 39 Interface Logic.
BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The LCL to Reactor Trip Matrix (RTM) test provides verification of proper operation of the LCL Reactor Trip (RT) Processor Module (PM) voting logic and digital outputs. Test signals are injected into the voting logic of one of the four redundant LCL RT PMs. Injecting the correct combination of test signals, simulating the partial trip signals from the eight redundant BPL PMs, satisfies the voting logic and actuates the undervoltage and shunt trip outputs of the associated digital output (DO) module. The LCL to RTM test provides overlap with the Reactor Trip Digital Output (RTDO) to Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker (RTCB) test in SR 3.3.7.1 (TADOT). Each RT PM can be individually tested and its output monitored at the RTM without tripping any of the reactor trip breakers.
A test subsystem is provided with the protection and safety monitoring system to aid the plant staff in performing the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.
The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, protection and safety monitoring system functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST can be performed using portable test equipment.
ND-19-0168 Page 36 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases RTS Automatic Trip Logic B 3.3.6 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.6 - 4 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
This test frequency of 92 days is justified based on Reference 1 (which refers to this test as RTCOT) and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, cross-check of redundant channels, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, and tests of timers, counters and crystal time bases, which will report a failure within the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets to the operator within 10 minutes of a detectable failure.
During the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST, the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets in the division under test may be placed in bypass.
REFERENCES 1.
APP-GW-GSC-020, Technical Specification Completion Time and Surveillance Frequency Justification.None ND-19-0168 Page 37 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 9 Revision 44 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
CMT is below a predetermined setpoint. Additionally, one switch for each division is provided in the Main Control Room (MCR) to allow the operators to manually clear the ADS and IRWST blocks.
The ADS and IRWST injection blocking device design uses conventional analog components that do not rely on software. The ADS and IRWST injection blocking device outputs provide CIM inputs for ADS stage 1, 2, and 3 MOVs, and the ADS Stage 4 and IRWST injection squib valves.
The ADS and IRWST injection blocking device outputs block any attempt to open the ADS and IRWST injection valves from the PMS Integrated Logic Processors.
Nominal Trip Setpoints (NTSs)
The NTS is the nominal value at which the trip output is set. Any trip output is considered to be properly adjusted when the as-left value is within the band for CHANNEL CALIBRATION, i.e., +/- rack calibration accuracy.
The trip setpoints used in the trip output are based on the Safety Analysis Limits stated in Reference 2. The determination of these NTSs is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors for those ESFAS channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49 (Ref. 4), the NTSs specified in the SP are conservative with respect to the Safety Analysis Limits. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the NTSs, including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in the Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems (Ref. 6).
The as-left tolerance and as-found tolerance band methodology is provided in the SP. The as-found OPERABILITY limit for the purpose of the CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) is defined as the as-left limit about the NTS (i.e., +/- rack calibration accuracy).
The NTSs listed in the SP are based on the methodology described in Reference 6, which incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for each channel. The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into the determination of each NTS. All field sensors and signal processing equipment for these channels are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Transmitter and signal processing equipment calibration tolerances and drift allowances must be specified in plant calibration procedures, and must be consistent with the values used in the setpoint methodology.
ND-19-0168 Page 38 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 10 Revision 44 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The OPERABILITY of each transmitter or sensor can be evaluated when its as-found calibration data are compared against the as-left data and are shown to be within the setpoint methodology assumptions. The basis of the setpoints is described in References 2 and 6. Trending of calibration results is required by the program description in Technical Specification 5.5.14.d.
Note that the as-left and as-found tolerances listed in the SP define the OPERABILITY limits for a channel during a periodic CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TESTS, or a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST that requires trip setpoint verification. Trip setpoints are automatically verified by self-checking features.
The protection and safety monitoring system testing features are designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self-checking and manual testsfeatures, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded. For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing. To the extent possible, protection and safety monitoring system functional testing will be accomplished with continuous system self-checking features in lieu of manual surveillance tests. As a result, some functions do not have manual surveillance requirementsand the continuous functional testing features.
The protection and safety monitoring system incorporates continuous system self-checking features wherever practical. Self-checking features include on-line diagnostics for the computer system and the hardware and communications tests. Faults detected by the self-checking features will alert the operator in the main control room. These self-checking tests do not interfere with normal system operation.
In addition to the self-checking features, the system includes functional testing features. Functional testing features include continuous functional testing features and manually initiated functional testing features. To the extent practical, functional testing features are designed not to interfere with normal system operation.
In addition to the system self-checking features and functional testing features, other test featuresManual tests are included for those parts of the system which are not tested with self-checking features. This includes manual functional checks, or functional testing features. These test features allow for instruments/sensor checks, calibration verification, ND-19-0168 Page 39 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 11 Revision 44 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) response time testing, setpoint verification and component testing. The test features again include a combination of continuous testing features and manual testing features.
All of the teststesting features are designed so that the duration of the testing is as short as possible. Testing featuresThe manual tests are designed so that the actual logic is not modified. To prevent unwanted actuation, the testing featurestests are designed with either the capability to bypass a Function during testing and/or limit the number of signals allowed to be placed in test at one time.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and APPLICABILITY Each of the analyzed accidents can be detected by one or more ESFAS Functions. One of the ESFAS Functions is the primary actuation signal for that accident. An ESFAS Function may be the primary actuation signal for more than one type of accident. An ESFAS Function may also be a secondary, or backup, actuation signal for one or more other accidents. For example, Pressurizer Pressure - Low 3 is a primary actuation signal for small loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and a backup actuation signal for steam line breaks (SLBs) outside containment.
Functions such as manual initiation not specifically credited in the accident safety analysis are qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the plant. These Functions may provide protection for conditions which do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance. These Functions may also serve as backups to Functions that were credited in the accident analysis (Ref. 2).
Permissive and interlock functions are based upon the associated protection function instrumentation. Because they do not have to operate in adverse environmental conditions, the trip settings of the permissive and interlock functions use the normal environment, steady-state instrument uncertainties of the associated protection function instrumentation. This results in OPERABILITY criteria (i.e., as-found tolerance and as-left tolerance) that are the same as the associated protection function sensor and process rack modules. The NTSs for permissives and interlocks are based on the associated protection function OPERABILITY requirements; i.e., permissives and interlocks performing enabling functions must be set to occur prior to the specified trip setting of the associated protection function.
The LCO requires all instrumentation performing an ESFAS Function, listed in Table 3.3.8-1 in the accompanying LCO, to be OPERABLE. The as-left and as-found tolerances specified in the SP define the OPERABILITY limits for a channel during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION or CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT). As such, the as-left and ND-19-0168 Page 40 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 53 Revision 44 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
The primary means of opening a containment air flow path is by establishing a VFS air flow path into containment. Manual actuation and maintenance as necessary to open a purge supply, purge exhaust, or vacuum relief flow path are available means to open a containment air flow path. In addition, opening of a spare penetration is an acceptable means to provide the necessary flow path. Opening of an equipment hatch or a containment airlock is acceptable. Containment air flow paths opened must comply with LCO 3.6.7, Containment Penetrations.
The 44 hour5.092593e-4 days <br />0.0122 hours <br />7.275132e-5 weeks <br />1.6742e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable for opening a containment air flow path in an orderly manner.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The following SRs apply to each ESFAS Instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.8-1.
SR 3.3.8.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside their corresponding limits.
The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. Automated operator aids may be used to facilitate performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.
ND-19-0168 Page 41 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 54 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.8.2 SR 3.3.8.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) every 92 days. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR.
This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
A COT is performed on each required channel to provide reasonable assurance that the entire channel will perform the intended ESF Function.
A test subsystem is provided with the protection and safety monitoring system to aid the plant staff in performing the COT. The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self-checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, protection and safety monitoring system functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The COT shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
ND-19-0168 Page 42 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 55 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
If the COT cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the COT can be performed using portable test equipment.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this COT. This portion of the COT ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP. If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function.
When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
The 92 day Frequency is based on Reference 5 and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, cross-check of redundant channels, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, and tests of timers, counters and crystal time bases, which will report a failure within the integrated protection cabinets to the operator.
During the COT, the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets in the division under test may be placed in bypass.
SR 3.3.8.31 This SR 3.3.8.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor and the integrated protection cabinets (IPC). The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and ND-19-0168 Page 43 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 56 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation. Transmitter calibration must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. The difference between the current as-found values and the previous as-left values must be consistent with the transmitter drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this CHANNEL CALIBRATION. This portion of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP.
If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function. When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
The setpoint methodology requires that 30 months drift be used (1.25 times the surveillance calibration interval, 24 months).
The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the refueling cycle.
This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note. The Note states that this test should include verification that the time constants are adjusted to within limits where applicable.
SR 3.3.8.42 This SR ensures the individual channel ESF RESPONSE TIME is less than or equal to the maximum value assumed in the accident analysis.
Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses.
The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the NTS value at the sensor, to the point at which the equipment reaches the required functional state (e.g., valves in full open or closed position).
ND-19-0168 Page 44 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 57 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
For channels that include dynamic transfer functions (e.g., lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer functions set to oneIn lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measured, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 (Ref. 1) response time. Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values.
The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor, signal processing and actuation logic response times with actual response time tests on the remainder of the channel. Allocations for signal processing and actuation logic response times may be obtained from the protection and safety monitoring system functional requirements. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from: (1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise, or power interrupt tests), (2) in place, onsite, or offsite (e.g., vendor) test measurements, or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications. WCAP-13632-P-A, Revision 2, Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements (Ref. 7),
provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the WCAP. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test.
ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the devices, which make up the bulk of the response time, is included in the testing of each channel. The final actuation device in one train is tested with each channel. Therefore, staggered testing results in response time verification of these devices every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is based on unit operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
The Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note: Not applicable to Function 1.a for Containment Pressure - Low. The exception is appropriate because the Containment Pressure - Low signal provides an interlock function for the containment vacuum relief valves manual ND-19-0168 Page 45 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS RCS Hot Leg Level Instrumentation B 3.3.10 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.10 - 5 Revision 23 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.10.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside their corresponding limits.
The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. Automated operator aids may be used to facilitate performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.
SR 3.3.10.2 SR 3.3.10.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) every 92 days. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
A COT is performed on each required channel to provide reasonable assurance that the entire channel will perform the intended engineered safety features (ESF) Function.
ND-19-0168 Page 46 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS RCS Hot Leg Level Instrumentation B 3.3.10 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.10 - 6 Revision 23 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
A test subsystem is provided with the protection and safety monitoring system to aid the plant staff in performing the COT. The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self-checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, protection and safety monitoring system functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The COT shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the COT cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the COT can be performed using portable test equipment.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this COT. This portion of the COT ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP. If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function.
When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
ND-19-0168 Page 47 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS RCS Hot Leg Level Instrumentation B 3.3.10 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.10 - 7 Revision 23 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The 92 day Frequency is based on Reference 3 and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, cross-check of redundant channels, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, and tests of timers, counters and crystal time bases, which will report a failure within the integrated protection cabinets to the operator.
During the COT, the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets in the division under test may be placed in bypass.
SR 3.3.10.31 This SR 3.3.10.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor and the integrated protection cabinets (IPC). The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
Transmitter calibration must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. The difference between the current as-found values and the previous as-left values must be consistent with the transmitter drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this CHANNEL CALIBRATION. This portion of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP.
If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function. When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
ND-19-0168 Page 48 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS RCS Hot Leg Level Instrumentation B 3.3.10 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.10 - 8 Revision 23 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The setpoint methodology requires that 30 months drift be used (1.25 times the surveillance calibration interval, 24 months).
The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the refueling cycle.
This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note. The Note states that this test should include verification that the time constants are adjusted to within limits.
SR 3.3.10.42 This SR ensures the individual channel ESF RESPONSE TIME is less than or equal to the maximum value assumed in the accident analysis.
Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses.
The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the NTS value at the sensor, to the point at which the equipment reaches the required functional state (e.g., valves in full open or closed position).
For channels that include dynamic transfer functions (e.g., lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer functions set to oneIn lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measured, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 (Ref. 2) response time. Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values.
The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor, signal processing and actuation logic response times with actual response time tests on the remainder of the channel. Allocations for signal processing and actuation logic response times may be obtained from the protection and safety monitoring system functional requirements. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from: (1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise, or power interrupt tests), (2) in place, onsite, or offsite (e.g., vendor) test measurements, or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications. WCAP-13632-P-A, Revision 2, Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements (Ref. 6),
ND-19-0168 Page 49 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS RCS Hot Leg Level Instrumentation B 3.3.10 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.10 - 10 Revision 23 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the devices, which make up the bulk of the response time, is included in the testing of each channel. The final actuation device in one train is tested with each channel. Therefore, staggered testing results in response time verification of these devices every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is based on unit operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Chapter 15.0, Accident Analysis.
2.
FSAR Chapter 7.0, Instrumentation and Controls.
3.
APP-GW-GSC-020, Technical Specification Completion Time and Surveillance Frequency Justification.
4.
APP-GW-GLR-004, Rev. 0, AP1000 Shutdown Evaluation Report, July 2002.
5.
FSAR Chapter 19.0, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Appendix 19E, Shutdown Evaluation.
6.
WCAP-13632-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-13787-A (Non-Proprietary), Revision 2, Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements, January 1996.
ND-19-0168 Page 50 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Startup Feedwater Flow Instrumentation B 3.3.11 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.11 - 2 Revision 16 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
In the event a channels as-found condition is outside the as-found tolerance described in the Setpoint Program, or the channel is not functioning as required, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or ESF output associated with a specific Function is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition(s) entered for the particular protection Function(s) affected.
A.1 With one or more startup feedwater lines with one startup feedwater channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in a trip condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. If one channel is tripped, the interlock condition is satisfied. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to complete this action.
B.1 and B.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met or if one or more startup feedwater lines has two channels inoperable, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 with the RCS being cooled by the RNS within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.11.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
ND-19-0168 Page 51 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Startup Feedwater Flow Instrumentation B 3.3.11 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.11 - 3 Revision 16 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside their corresponding limits.
The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. Automated operator aids may be used to facilitate performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.
SR 3.3.11.2 SR 3.3.11.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) every 92 days. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
A COT is performed on each required channel to provide reasonable assurance that the entire channel will perform the intended engineered safety features (ESF) function.
A test subsystem is provided with the protection and safety monitoring system to aid the plant staff in performing the COT. The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self-checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
ND-19-0168 Page 52 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Startup Feedwater Flow Instrumentation B 3.3.11 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.11 - 4 Revision 16 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
To the extent possible, protection and safety monitoring system functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The COT shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the COT cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the COT can be performed using portable test equipment.
The 92 day Frequency is based on Reference 2 and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, cross-check of redundant channels, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, and tests of timers, counters and crystal time bases, which will report a failure within the BPL subsystems to the operator.
During the COT, the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets in the division under test may be placed in bypass.
SR 3.3.11.31 This SR 3.3.11.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor and the BPL subsystems. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR.
This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation. Transmitter calibration must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. The difference between the current as-found values and the previous as-left values must be consistent with the transmitter drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
ND-19-0168 Page 53 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Startup Feedwater Flow Instrumentation B 3.3.11 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.11 - 5 Revision 16 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The setpoint methodology requires that 30 months drift be used (1.25 times the surveillance calibration interval, 24 months).
The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the refueling cycle.
This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note. The Note states that this test should include verification that the time constants are adjusted to within limits where applicable.
SR 3.3.11.42 This SR ensures the individual channel ESF RESPONSE TIME is less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis.
Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses.
The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the NTS value at the sensor, to the point at which the equipment reaches the required functional state (e.g., valves in full open or closed position).
For channels that include dynamic transfer functions (e.g., lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer functions set to oneIn lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measured, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 (Ref. 2) response time. Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values.
The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor, signal processing and actuation logic response times with actual response time tests on the remainder of the channel. Allocations for signal processing and actuation logic response times may be obtained from the protection and safety monitoring system functional requirements. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from: (1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise, or power interrupt tests), (2) in place, onsite, or offsite (e.g., vendor) test measurements, or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications. WCAP-13632-P-A, Revision 2, Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements (Ref. 4),
ND-19-0168 Page 54 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Startup Feedwater Flow Instrumentation B 3.3.11 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.11 - 7 Revision 16 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the devices, which make up the bulk of the response time, is included in the testing of each channel. The final actuation device in one train is tested with each channel. Therefore, staggered testing results in response time verification of these devices every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is based on unit operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Chapter 15.0, Accident Analysis.
2.
FSAR Chapter 7.0, Instrumentation and Controls.
3.
APP-GW-GSC-020, Technical Specification Completion Time and Surveillance Frequency Justification.
4.
WCAP-13632-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-13787-A (Non-Proprietary), Revision 2, Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements, January 1996.
ND-19-0168 Page 55 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Main Control Room Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization B 3.3.13 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.13 - 4 Revision 24 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.13.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside their corresponding limits.
The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. Automated operator aids may be used to facilitate performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.
SR 3.3.13.2 SR 3.3.13.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) every 92 days. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
A COT is performed on each required channel to provide reasonable assurance that the entire channel will perform the intended engineered safety features (ESF) function.
ND-19-0168 Page 56 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Main Control Room Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization B 3.3.13 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.13 - 5 Revision 24 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
A test subsystem is provided with the protection and safety monitoring system to aid the plant staff in performing the COT. The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self-checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, protection and safety monitoring system functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The COT shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the COT cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the COT can be performed using portable test equipment.
The 92 day Frequency is based on Reference 3 and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, cross-check of redundant channels, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, and tests of timers, counters and crystal time bases, which will report a failure within the integrated protection cabinets to the operator.
During the COT, the Protection and Safety Monitoring System cabinets in the division under test may be placed in bypass.
ND-19-0168 Page 57 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Main Control Room Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization B 3.3.13 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.13 - 6 Revision 24 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.13.31 This SR 3.3.13.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor and the integrated protection cabinets (IPC). The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR.
This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation. Transmitter calibration must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. The difference between the current as-found values and the previous as-left values must be consistent with the transmitter drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The setpoint methodology requires that 30 months drift be used (1.25 times the surveillance calibration interval, 24 months).
The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the refueling cycle.
This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note. The Note states that this test should include verification that the time constants are adjusted to within limits where applicable.
SR 3.3.13.42 This SR ensures the individual channel ESF RESPONSE TIME is less than or equal to the maximum value assumed in the accident analysis.
Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses.
The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the NTS value at the sensor, to the point at which the equipment reaches the required functional state (e.g., valves in full open or closed position).
ND-19-0168 Page 58 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Main Control Room Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization B 3.3.13 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.13 - 7 Revision 24 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
For channels that include dynamic transfer functions (e.g., lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer functions set to oneIn lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measured, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 (Ref. 1) response time. Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values.
The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor, signal processing and actuation logic response times with actual response time tests on the remainder of the channel. Allocations for signal processing and actuation logic response times may be obtained from the protection and safety monitoring system functional requirements. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from: (1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise, or power interrupt tests), (2) in place, onsite, or offsite (e.g., vendor) test measurements, or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications. WCAP-13632-P-A, Revision 2, Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements (Ref. 4),
provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the WCAP. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test.
ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the devices, which make up the bulk of the response time, is included in the testing of each channel. The final actuation device in one train is tested with each channel. Therefore, staggered testing results in response time verification of these devices every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is based on unit operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
ND-19-0168 Page 59 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS IRWST and Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation B 3.3.14 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.14 - 4 Revision 44 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) - Shutdown, MODE 6) to dictate the required measures. The IRWST LCO(s) provide appropriate Required Actions for the inoperability of the IRWST and Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation. This action is in accordance with LCO 3.0.6, which requires that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions for the IRWST declared inoperable shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.14.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or even something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside their corresponding limits.
The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. Automated operator aids may be used to facilitate performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.
SR 3.3.14.2 SR 3.3.14.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) every 92 days. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the ND-19-0168 Page 60 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS IRWST and Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation B 3.3.14 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.14 - 5 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
A COT is performed on each required channel to provide reasonable assurance that the entire channel will perform the intended engineered safety features (ESF) Function.
A test subsystem is provided with the protection and safety monitoring system to aid the plant staff in performing the COT. The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self-checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, protection and safety monitoring system functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The COT shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the COT cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the COT can be performed using portable test equipment.
The 92 day Frequency is based on Reference 2 and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, cross-check of redundant channels, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, and tests of timers, counters and crystal time bases, which will report a failure within the integrated protection cabinets to the operator.
ND-19-0168 Page 61 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS IRWST and Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation B 3.3.14 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.14 - 6 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
During the COT, the protection and safety monitoring system cabinets in the division under test may be placed in bypass.
SR 3.3.14.31 This SR 3.3.14.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor and the integrated protection cabinets (IPC). The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
Transmitter calibration must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. The difference between the current as-found values and the previous as-left values must be consistent with the transmitter drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The setpoint methodology requires that 30 months drift be used (1.25 times the surveillance calibration interval, 24 months).
The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the refueling cycle.
This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note. The Note states that this test shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to within limits where applicable.
SR 3.3.14.42 This SR ensures the individual channel ESF RESPONSE TIME is less than or equal to the maximum value assumed in the accident analysis.
Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses.
The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the NTS value at the sensor, to the point at which the equipment reaches the required functional state (e.g., valves in full open or closed position).
ND-19-0168 Page 62 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS IRWST and Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation B 3.3.14 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.14 - 7 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
For channels that include dynamic transfer functions (e.g., lag, lead/lag, rate/lag, etc.), the response time test may be performed with the transfer functions set to oneIn lieu of measurement, the response time for the protection and safety monitoring system equipment is based on allocated values. The overall response time may be determined by a series of overlapping tests and allocated values such that the entire response time is measured, with the resulting measured response time compared to the appropriate FSAR Chapter 7 (Ref. 2) response time. Alternately, the response time test can be performed with the time constants set to their nominal value provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values.
The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.
Response time may be verified by actual response time tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by the summation of allocated sensor, signal processing and actuation logic response times with actual response time tests on the remainder of the channel. Allocations for signal processing and actuation logic response times may be obtained from the protection and safety monitoring system functional requirements. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from: (1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise, or power interrupt tests), (2) in place, onsite, or offsite (e.g., vendor) test measurements, or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications. WCAP-13632-P-A, Revision 2, Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements (Ref. 4),
provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the WCAP. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test.
ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the devices, which make up the bulk of the response time, is included in the testing of each channel. The final actuation device in one train is tested with each channel. Therefore, staggered testing results in response time verification of these devices every 24 months. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is based on unit operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
ND-19-0168 Page 63 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Actuation Logic
- Operating B 3.3.15 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.15 - 3 Revision 27 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.15.1 SR 3.3.15.1 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST on the ESF Coincidence Logic. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST demonstrates that the ESF Local Coincidence Logic (LCL subsystems) performs the required coincidence logic using injected, partial actuation signals and communicates system actuation signals to the ILP inputs in the ESF Actuation Subsystem Logic ((Integrated Logic Cabinets (ILCs)). The ESF LCL subsystems within a division are tested every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
A test subsystem is provided with the Protection and Safety Monitoring System to aid the plant staff in performing the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.
The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self-checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, Protection and Safety Monitoring System functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST can be performed using portable test equipment.
The LCL to ILP test feature provides verification of proper operation of the ESF LCL process modules (PMs), high speed link (HSL) communication, and ILP PMs. The test signal is injected at the ESF LCL PM and monitored at the ILP PMs. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST provides overlap with the ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST in SR 3.3.15.2 by verifying communication of system actuation signals from the ESF Local Coincidence Logic to the ESF Actuation Subsystem ILPs.
ND-19-0168 Page 64 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Actuation Logic
- Operating B 3.3.15 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.15 - 4 Revision 27 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. This portion of the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP.
If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function. When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
The Frequency of every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS provides a complete test of all four divisions once per year. This frequency is adequate based on the inherent high reliability of the solid state devices which comprise this equipment; the additional reliability provided by the redundant subsystems; and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, cross-check of redundant subsystems, and tests of timers, counters, and crystal time basis, which will report a failure within these cabinets to the operator.
SR 3.3.15.2 SR 3.3.15.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST (ALOT) on the ESF Actuation. The ALOT demonstrates that both of the redundant signal paths from the inputs to the ILPs through the CIM logic and CIM output driver circuits (ILP to actuator test) in the ESF Actuation Subsystem Logic process injected LCL system actuation signals for the applicable actuation Function. During this test, a signal is sent back to the Maintenance and Test Panel (MTP) subsystem to determine if the CIM 2oo2 logic was satisfied and a component control signal was sent to the actuated device. As such, the ALOT may be performed in conjunction with other testing (e.g., automatic actuation Surveillance Requirements which verify correct valve positioning on an actual or simulated actuation signal).
ND-19-0168 Page 65 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Actuation Logic
- Operating B 3.3.15 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.15 - 5 Revision 27 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The CIM can be allowed to actuate its end device in this test. There are certain end devices that are not expected to be actuated, such as the squib valves (ADS Stage 4 squib valves tested under SR 3.4.11.5, IRWST injection and recirculation squib valves tested under SR 3.5.6.9) and the following passive core cooling system motor-operated valves:
Both accumulator discharge line motor-operated valves; Both in-containment refueling water storage tank gravity injection line motor-operated valves; and The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger inlet line motor-operated valve.
These motor-operated valves are normally in their required (open) safeguards position, they have redundant position indications and alarms, and they also receive confirmatory open actuation signals. These motor-operated valves have their power removed and locked out, and Surveillance Requirements that verify proper position and power lockout.
The ESF Actuation Subsystem Logic (ILPs and CIMs) within a division is tested every 24 months.
SR 3.3.15.31 This SR 3.3.15.3 demonstrates that the pressurizer heater circuit breakers trip open in response to an actual or simulated actuation signal.
The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The OPERABILITY of the motor control center breakers is checked by opening these breakers using the Plant Control System. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST also verifies that within the Plant Control System, signals from each division of the protection and safety monitoring system are voted two-out-of-four and the result is used to open the pressurizer heater circuits.
The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST also verifies the OPERABILITY of the pressurizer heater load center circuit breakers located between the load centers and the motor control centers for each of the five pressurizer heater groups. This is demonstrated by testing from the Division A CIM outputs to ensure the load center breakers trip open.
ND-19-0168 Page 66 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Actuation Logic
- Operating B 3.3.15 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.15 - 6 Revision 27 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation. This Frequency is adequate based on the use of multiple circuit breakers to prevent the failure of any single circuit breaker from disabling the function and that all circuit breakers are tested.
This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note that states that the SR is only required to be met when all four cold leg temperatures are
> 275°F.
SR 3.3.15.42 This SR 3.3.15.4 demonstrates that the RCP breakers trip open in response to an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance.
The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
SR 3.3.15.53 This SR 3.3.15.5 demonstrates that the main feedwater and startup feedwater pump breakers trip open in response to an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance.
The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
ND-19-0168 Page 67 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Actuation Logic
- Operating B 3.3.15 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.15 - 7 Revision 27 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.15.64 This SR 3.3.15.6 demonstrates that the auxiliary spray and purification line isolation valves actuate to the isolation position in response to an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance.
The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note that states that the SR is only required to be met in MODES 1 and 2.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Chapter 15.0, Accident Analysis.
ND-19-0168 Page 68 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Actuation Logic
- Shutdown B 3.3.16 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.16 - 4 Revision 44 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions in an orderly manner without challenging plant systems.
Required Action C.2 minimizes the consequences of a loss of decay heat removal event by optimizing conditions for RCS cooling in MODE 6 using IRWST injection. Additionally, the potential for a criticality event is minimized by suspension of positive reactivity additions.
D.1 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, or one or more ESFAS actuation logic Functions within two or more divisions are inoperable, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the likelihood and consequences of an event are minimized. Required Action D.1 requires immediately suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
This required action suspends activities with potential for releasing radioactivity that might enter the Main Control Room. This action does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.16.1 SR 3.3.16.1 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST on the ESF Coincidence Logic. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST demonstrates that the ESF Local Coincidence Logic (LCL subsystems) performs the required coincidence logic using injected, partial actuation signals and communicates system actuation signals to the ILP inputs in the ESF Actuation Subsystem Logic (Integrated Logic Cabinets (ILCs)). The ESF LCL subsystems within a division are tested every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
A test subsystem is provided with the Protection and Safety Monitoring System to aid the plant staff in performing the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.
The test subsystem is designed to allow for complete functional testing by using a combination of system self-checking features, functional testing features, and other testing features. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
ND-19-0168 Page 69 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Actuation Logic
- Shutdown B 3.3.16 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.16 - 5 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
For hardware functions this would involve verifying that the hardware components and connections have not failed or degraded. Generally this verification includes a comparison of the outputs from two or more redundant subsystems or channels.
Since software does not degrade, software functional testing involves verifying that the software code has not changed and that the software code is executing.
To the extent possible, Protection and Safety Monitoring System functional testing is accomplished with continuous system self-checking features and the continuous functional testing features. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall include a review of the operation of the test subsystem to verify the completeness and adequacy of the results.
If the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST cannot be completed using the built-in test subsystem, either because of failures in the test subsystem or failures in redundant channel hardware used for functional testing, the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST can be performed using portable test equipment.
The LCL to ILP test feature provides verification of proper operation of the ESF LCL process modules (PMs), high speed link (HSL) communication, and ILP PMs. The test signal is injected at the ESF LCL PM and monitored at the ILP PMs. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST provides overlap with the ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST in SR 3.3.16.2 by verifying communication of system actuation signals from the ESF Local Coincidence Logic to the ESF Actuation Subsystem ILPs.
Interlocks implicitly required to support the Function's OPERABILITY are also addressed by this ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. This portion of the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST ensures the associated Function is not bypassed when required to be enabled. This can be accomplished by ensuring the interlocks are calibrated properly in accordance with the SP.
If the interlock is not automatically functioning as designed, the condition is entered into the Corrective Action Program and appropriate OPERABILITY evaluations performed for the affected Function. The affected Functions OPERABILITY can be met if the interlock is manually enforced to properly enable the affected Function. When an interlock is not supporting the associated Functions OPERABILITY at the existing plant conditions, the affected Function's channels must be declared inoperable and appropriate ACTIONS taken.
ND-19-0168 Page 70 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Actuation Logic
- Shutdown B 3.3.16 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.16 - 6 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The Frequency of every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS provides a complete test of all four divisions once per year. This frequency is adequate based on the inherent high reliability of the solid state devices which comprise this equipment; the additional reliability provided by the redundant subsystems; and the use of continuous diagnostic test features, such as deadman timers, memory checks, numeric coprocessor checks, cross-check of redundant subsystems, and tests of timers, counters, and crystal time basis, which will report a failure within these cabinets to the operator.
SR 3.3.16.2 SR 3.3.16.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST (ALOT) on the ESF Actuation. The ALOT demonstrates that both of the redundant signal paths from the inputs to the ILPs through the CIM logic and CIM output driver circuits (ILP to actuator test) in the ESF Actuation Subsystem Logic process injected LCL system actuation signals for the applicable actuation Function. During this test, a signal is sent back to the Maintenance and Test Panel (MTP) subsystem to determine if the CIM 2oo2 logic was satisfied and a component control signal was sent to the actuated device. As such, the ALOT may be performed in conjunction with other testing (e.g., automatic actuation Surveillance Requirements which verify correct valve positioning on an actual or simulated actuation signal).
The CIM can be allowed to actuate its end device in this test. There are certain end devices that are not expected to be actuated, such as the squib valves (ADS Stage 4 squib valves tested under SR 3.4.11.5, IRWST injection and recirculation squib valves tested under SR 3.5.6.9) and the following passive core cooling system motor-operated valves:
Both accumulator discharge line motor-operated valves; Both in-containment refueling water storage tank gravity injection line motor-operated valves; and The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger inlet line motor-operated valve.
These motor-operated valves are normally in their required (open) safeguards position, they have redundant position indications and alarms, and they also receive confirmatory open actuation signals. These motor-operated valves have their power removed and locked out, and Surveillance Requirements that verify proper position and power lockout.
ND-19-0168 Page 71 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Actuation Logic
-- Shutdown B 3.3.16 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.16 - 7 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The ESF Actuation Subsystem Logic (ILPs and CIMs) within a division is tested every 24 months.
SR 3.3.16.31 This SR 3.3.16.3 demonstrates that the RCP breakers trip open in response to an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation. The SR is modified by a Note stating that the SR is only required to be met in MODE 5.
SR 3.3.16.42 This SR 3.3.16.4 demonstrates that the CVS letdown isolation valves actuate to the isolation position in response to an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance.
The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
The SR is modified by a Note stating that the SR is not required to be met in MODE 5 above the P-12 (Pressurizer Level) interlock. A second Note states that the SR is not required to be met in MODE 6 with water level 23 feet above the top of the reactor vessel flange ND-19-0168 Page 72 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.17 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.17 - 9 Revision 33 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
E.1 and E.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C are not met for the Functions in Table 3.3.17-1, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The following SRs apply to each PAM instrumentation function in Table 3.3.17-1:
SR 3.3.17.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days verifies that a gross instrumentation failure has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The high radiation instrumentation should be compared to similar plant instruments located throughout the plant.
Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal-processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. If the channels are within the match criteria, it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE.
As specified in the SR, a CHANNEL CHECK is only required for those channels that are normally energized.
The Frequency of 31 days is based on operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given function in any 31 day interval is rare.
The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of those displays associated with the required channels of this LCO.
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Technical Specifications Bases PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.17 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.17 - 10 Revision 33 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.3.17.21 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 24 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. This SR is modified by a Note that excludes neutron detectors. The calibration method for neutron detectors is specified in the Bases of LCO 3.3.3, "Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Intermediate Range Instrumentation. RTD and Thermocouple channels are to be calibrated in place using cross-calibration techniques. The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle.
REFERENCES 1.
Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 3, Instrumentation for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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Technical Specifications Bases DAS Manual Controls B 3.3.19 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.19 - 3 Revision 1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
B.1 and B.2 Condition B applies when Required Action A cannot be completed for the DAS manual reactor trip control within the required completion time of 30 days.
Required Action B.1 requires SR 3.3.7.1, Perform TADOT for the reactor trip breakers, to be performed once per 31 days, instead of once every 92 days. Condition A of Example 1.3-6 illustrates the use of the Completion Time for Required Action B.1. The initial performance of SR 3.3.7.1 on the first division (since it is performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS) must be completed within 31 days of entering Condition B.
The normal surveillance test frequency requirements for SR 3.3.7.1 must still be satisfied while performing SR 3.3.7.1 for Required Action B.1. The predominant failure requiring the DAS manual reactor trip control is common-mode failure of the reactor trip breakers. This change in surveillance frequency for testing the reactor trip breakers increases the likelihood that a common-mode failure of the reactor trip breakers would be detected while the DAS manual reactor trip control is inoperable. This reduces the likelihood that a diverse manual reactor trip is required. It is not required to perform a TADOT for the manual actuation control. The manual reactor trip control is very simple, highly reliable, and does not use software in the circuitry. Although the DAS manual controls are non-Class 1E, they have been shown to be PRA risk important as discussed in Reference 1. The impact of an inoperable DAS manual control is compensated for by increasing the reactor trip breaker surveillance frequency from once every 92 days to once every 31 days.
Action B.2 requires that the inoperable DAS manual reactor trip control be restored to OPERABLE status prior to entering MODE 2 following any plant shutdown to MODE 5 while the control is inoperable. This ACTION is provided to ensure that all DAS manual controls are restored to OPERABLE status following the next plant shutdown.
C.1 and C.2 Condition C applies when Required Action A cannot be completed for any DAS manual actuation control (other than reactor trip) within the required completion time of 30 days.
Required Action C.1 requires SR 3.3.15.1, Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST, and SR 3.3.16.1, "Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST," as applicable, to be performed once per 31 days, instead of once every 92 days. Condition A of Example 1.3-6 illustrates the use of the Completion Time for Required Action C.1. The initial performance of ND-19-0168 Page 75 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases DAS Manual Controls B 3.3.19 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.19 - 4 Revision 1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
SR 3.3.15.1 and SR 3.3.16.1 on the first division (since it is performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS) must be completed within 31 days of entering Condition C. The normal surveillance test frequency requirements for SR 3.3.15.1 and SR 3.3.16.1 must still be satisfied while performing SR 3.3.15.1 and SR 3.3.16.1 for Required Action C.1. The predominant failure requiring the DAS manual actuation control is common-mode failure of the PMS actuation logic software or hardware.
This change in surveillance frequency for actuation logic testing increases the likelihood that a common-mode failure of the PMS actuation logic from either cause would be detected while any DAS manual actuation control is inoperable. This reduces the likelihood that a diverse component actuation is required. It is not required to perform a TADOT for the manual actuation control device since the manual actuation control devices are very simple and highly reliable. Although the DAS manual controls are non-Class 1E, they have been shown to be PRA risk important as discussed in Reference 1. The impact of an inoperable DAS manual control is compensated for by increasing the automatic actuation surveillance frequency from once every 92 days to once every 31 days.
Action C.21 requires that the inoperable DAS manual actuation control(s) be restored to OPERABLE status prior to entering MODE 2 following any plant shutdown to MODE 5 while the control is inoperable. This ACTION is provided to ensure that all DAS manual controls are restored to OPERABLE status following the next plant shutdown.
D.1 and D.2 Condition D is entered if the Required Action associated with Condition B or C is not met within the required Completion Time.
Required Actions D.1 and D.2 ensure that the plant is placed in a condition where the probability and consequences of an event are minimized. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable based on plant operating experience, for reaching the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner, without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.19.1 SR 3.3.19.1 is the performance of a TADOT of the DAS manual trip and actuation controls for the specified safety-related equipment. This TADOT is performed every 24 months.
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Technical Specifications Bases ADS and IRWST Injection Blocking Device B 3.3.20 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.20 - 4 Revision 15 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
A.1 Condition A addresses the situation where one or more divisions of ADS and IRWST Injection Blocking Device(s) is inoperable (e.g., one or both CMT level channels in one or more divisions inoperable when required, or ADS and IRWST Injection Block in one or more divisions not unblocked when required). In this condition, the component interface module (CIM) in the affected division is required to be unblocked in the affected division within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The ADS and IRWST Injection Block manual switches may be utilized to implement the unblock. The 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is reasonable based on the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.
B.1 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met the affected ADS and IRWST injection valves must be declared inoperable immediately. Declaring the affected valves inoperable allows the supported system Actions (i.e., for ADS and IRWST inoperable valves) to dictate the required measures. The ADS and/or IRWST LCO(s) provide appropriate actions for the inoperable components. This action is in accordance with LCO 3.0.6, which requires that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions for valves declared inoperable shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The SRs for each ADS and IRWST Injection Blocking Device Function are identified in the SRs column of Table 3.3.20-1 for that Function.
A Note has been added to the SR table stating that Table 3.3.20-1 determines which SRs apply to which ADS and IRWST Injection Blocking Device Function.
SR 3.3.20.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of required instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or even something more serious. A CHANNEL ND-19-0168 Page 77 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases ADS and IRWST Injection Blocking Device B 3.3.20 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.20 - 5 Revision 15 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside their corresponding limits.
The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates that channel failure is rare. Automated operator aids may be used to facilitate performance of the CHANNEL CHECK.
SR 3.3.20.21 Verification that the position of each ADS and IRWST Injection Block switch is in the unblock position is required when less than two CMTs are required to be OPERABLE. This assures the actuation of ADS and IRWST injection is not blocked when there may be reduced or no capability for automatic unblocking from CMT level. The 7 day Frequency is adequate considering the availability of main control room status monitoring of the block signal.
SR 3.3.20.3 SR 3.3.20.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) every 92 days. The test is performed in accordance with the TS 5.5.14, Setpoint Program (SP). If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the nominal trip setpoint (NTS) (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
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Technical Specifications Bases ADS and IRWST Injection Blocking Device B 3.3.20 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.20 - 6 Revision 15 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
A COT is performed on each required channel to provide reasonable assurance that the entire channel will perform the intended engineered safety features (ESF) Function. Successful functional testing consists of verifying that the capability of the system to perform the safety function has not failed or degraded.
The 92 day Frequency is based on Reference 3.
SR 3.3.20.42 This SR 3.3.20.4 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop. The test is performed in accordance with the SP. If the actual setting of the channel is found to be outside the as-found tolerance, the channel is considered inoperable. This condition of the channel will be further evaluated during performance of the SR. This evaluation will consist of resetting the channel setpoint to the NTS (within the allowed tolerance), and evaluating the channels response. If the channel is functioning as required and is expected to pass the next surveillance, then the channel is OPERABLE and can be restored to service at the completion of the surveillance. After the surveillance is completed, the channel as-found condition will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation.
Transmitter calibration must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint methodology. The difference between the current as-found values and the previous as-left values must be consistent with the transmitter drift allowance used in the setpoint methodology.
The setpoint methodology requires that 30 months drift be used (1.25 times the surveillance calibration interval, 24 months).
The Frequency is based on operating experience and consistency with the refueling cycle.
SR 3.3.20.53 This SR 3.3.20.5 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST for unblocking. This test, in conjunction with ESF ACTUATION LOGIC TEST (i.e., SR 3.3.15.1 and SR 3.3.16.1), overlaps the ADS and IRWST injection functional tests (i.e., SR 3.4.11.4, SR 3.4.11.5, and SR 3.5.6.9) that verify actuation on an actual or simulated actuation signal, to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.
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Technical Specifications Bases ADS and IRWST Injection Blocking Device B 3.3.20 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.20 - 7 Revision 15 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this SR during periods in which the plant is shut down for refueling to prevent any additional risks associated with inadvertent operation of the ADS and IRWST injection valves.
SR 3.3.20.64 This SR 3.3.20.6 is the performance of a TADOT of the of required ADS and IRWST Injection Block manual switch. This TADOT is performed every 24 months.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of manual switch Functions and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
The SR is modified by a Note that states verification of setpoint is not required, since these functions have no setpoint associated with them.
SR 3.3.20.75 This SR 3.3.20.7 requires performance of LCO 3.5.2 Surveillances associated ensuring CMTs are capable of injecting to the RCS. CMT injection supports OPERABILITY of the ADS and IRWST Injection Blocking Devices for automatic unblocking. If one or both CMTs are inoperable for injection, all four divisions of ADS and IRWST Injection Blocking Devices are inoperable. Therefore, SRs 3.5.2.3, 3.5.2.6, and 3.5.2.7 are required to be met. See the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.5.2 for a discussion of each Surveillance and its Frequency.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Chapter 15.0, Accident Analysis.
2.
FSAR Chapter 7.0, Instrumentation and Controls.
3.
WCAP-10271, Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System, June 1996 Supplement 2.
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Technical Specifications Bases ADS - Operating B 3.4.11 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.4.11 - 5 Revision 23 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.11.1 Each ADS stage 4 isolation motor operated valve must be verified to be open every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Note that these valves receive confirmatory open signals. The Surveillance Frequency is acceptable considering valve position is manually monitored in the control room.
SR 3.4.11.2 This Surveillance requires verification that each ADS stage 1, 2, 3 valve strokes to its fully open position. Note that this surveillance is performed during shutdown conditions.
The Surveillance Frequency for demonstrating valve OPERABILITY references the Inservice Testing Program.
SR 3.4.11.3 This Surveillance requires verification that each ADS stage 4 squib valve is OPERABLE in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The Surveillance Frequency for verifying valve OPERABILITY references the Inservice Testing Program.
The squib valves will be tested in accordance with the ASME OM Code (Ref. 5). The applicable ASME OM Code squib valve requirements are specified in paragraph ISTC 4.6, Inservice Tests for Category D Explosively Actuated Valves. The requirements include actuation of a sample of the installed valves each 2 years and periodic replacement of charges.
SR 3.4.11.4 This SR verifies that each Stage 1, 2, and 3 ADS valve actuate to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ESFAS ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST and ADS and IRWST injection blocking device ACTUATION LOGIC TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance.
The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
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Technical Specifications Bases ADS - Operating B 3.4.11 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.4.11 - 6 Revision 23 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.4.11.5 This SR verifies that each Stage 4 ADS valve can actuate to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ESFAS ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST and ADS and IRWST injection blocking device ACTUATION LOGIC TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The OPERABILITY of the squib valves is checked by performing a continuity check of the circuit from the Protection Logic Cabinets to the squib valve.
This Surveillance is modified by a Note that excludes squib valve actuation as a requirement for this Surveillance to be met. This is acceptable because the design of the squib actuated valve was selected for this application because of its very high reliability. The OPERABILITY of squib actuated valves is verified by the Inservice Test Program for squib actuated valves.
The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Section 6.3, Passive Core Cooling System.
2.
FSAR Section 15.6, Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory.
3.
AP1000 Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Appendix A.
4.
FSAR Section 3.9.6, Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves.
5.
ASME OM Code, Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.
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Technical Specifications Bases CMTs - Operating B 3.5.2 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.5.2 - 7 Revision 23 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is based on the expected low rate of gas accumulation and the availability of control room indication.
SR 3.5.2.5 Verification every 7 days that the boron concentration in each CMT is within the required limits ensures that the reactivity control from each CMT, assumed in the safety analysis, will be available as required. The 7 day Frequency is adequate to promptly identify changes which could occur from mechanisms such as in-leakage.
SR 3.5.2.6 Verification that the redundant outlet isolation valves are OPERABLE by stroking the valves open ensures that each CMT will function as designed when these valves are actuated. Prior to opening the outlet isolation valves, the inlet isolation valve should be closed temporarily. Closing the inlet isolation valve ensures that the CMT contents will not be diluted or heated by flow from the RCS. Upon completion of the test, the inlet isolation valves must be opened. The Surveillance Frequency references the inservice testing requirements.
SR 3.5.2.7 This SR verifies that CMT outlet isolation valve actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
SR 3.5.2.8 This SR requires performance of a system performance test of each CMT to verify flow capabilities. The system performance test demonstrates that the CMT injection line resistance assumed in DBA analyses is maintained. Although the likelihood that system performance would degrade with time is low, it is considered prudent to periodically verify system performance. The System Level Operability Testing Program provides specific test requirements and acceptance criteria.
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Technical Specifications Bases PRHR HX - Operating B 3.5.4 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.5.4 - 7 Revision 32 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.5.4.5 Verification is required to confirm that power is removed from the motor operated PRHR HX inlet isolation valve every 31 days. Removal of power from this valve reduces the likelihood that the valve will be inadvertently closed as a result of a fire. The 31 day Frequency is acceptable considering the frequent surveillance of valve position and that the valve has a confirmatory open signal.
SR 3.5.4.6 Verification that both air operated PRHR HX outlet valves stroke open and both IRWST gutter isolation valves stroke closed ensures that the PRHR HX will actuate on command, with return flow from the gutter to the IRWST. Since these valves are redundant, if one valve is inoperable, the system can function at 100% capacity. Verification requires the actual operation of each valve to move it to its safe position. The Surveillance Frequency is provided in the Inservice Testing Program.
SR 3.5.4.7 This surveillance requires visual inspection of the IRWST gutter and downspout screens to verify that the return flow to the IRWST will not be restricted by debris. A Frequency of 24 months is adequate since there are no known sources of debris with which the gutter or downspout screens could become restricted.
SR 3.5.4.8 This SR verifies that both PRHR HX air operated outlet isolation valves and both IRWST gutter isolation valves actuate to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
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Technical Specifications Bases IRWST - Operating B 3.5.6 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.5.6 - 8 Revision 44 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.5.6.8 This Surveillance requires verification that each IRWST injection and each containment recirculation squib valve is OPERABLE in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The Surveillance Frequency for verifying valve OPERABILITY references the Inservice Testing Program.
The squib valves will be tested in accordance with the ASME OM Code (Ref. 4). The applicable ASME OM Code squib valve requirements are specified in paragraph ISTC 4.6, Inservice Tests for Category D Explosively Actuated Valves. The requirements include actuation of a sample of the installed valves each 2 years and periodic replacement of charges.
SR 3.5.6.9 This SR ensures that each IRWST injection and containment recirculation squib valve can actuate to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ESFAS ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST, and ADS and IRWST injection blocking device ACTUATION LOGIC TEST, provides overlap with this Surveillance. The OPERABILITY of the squib valves is checked by performing a continuity check of the circuit from the Protection Logic Cabinets to the squib valve. The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
SR 3.5.6.10 Visual inspection is required each 24 months to verify that the IRWST screens and the containment recirculation screens are not restricted by debris. A Frequency of 24 months is adequate, since there are no known sources of debris with which these screens could become restricted.
SR 3.5.6.11 This SR requires performance of a system inspection and performance test of the IRWST injection and recirculation flow paths to verify system flow capabilities. The system inspection and performance test demonstrates that the IRWST injection and recirculation capabilities assumed in accident analyses is maintained. Although the likelihood that system performance would degrade with time is low, it is considered prudent to periodically verify system performance. The System Level Operability Testing Program provides specific test requirements and acceptance criteria.
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Technical Specifications Bases Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.6.3 - 8 Revision 30 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.6.3.5 Automatic containment isolation valves close on their respective ESF signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. The actual or simulated actuation signal is processed through the component interface module to verify the continuity between the output of the component interface module and the valve. This SR ensures that each automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to its isolation position on its respective ESF signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. This surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Section 6.2, Containment Systems.
2.
FSAR Chapter 15, Accident Analysis.
3.
NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States.
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Technical Specifications Bases PCS B 3.6.6 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.6.6 - 7 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.6.1 This surveillance requires verification that the PCCWST water temperature is within the limits assumed in the accident analyses. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is adequate to identify a temperature change that would approach the temperature limits since the PCCWST is large and temperature variations are slow.
SR 3.6.6.2 Verification that the cooling water volume is above the required minimum ensures that a sufficient supply is available for containment cooling.
Since the cooling water volume is normally stable and low level is indicated by a main control room alarm, a 7 day Frequency is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable in similar applications.
SR 3.6.6.3 Verifying the correct alignment of manual, power operated, and automatic valves, excluding check valves, in the PCS flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to being secured. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.
Rather, it involves verification, through control room instrumentation or a system walkdown, that valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative control, and an improper valve position would only affect a single flow path. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
SR 3.6.6.4 This SR requires verification that each automatic isolation valve actuates to its correct position upon receipt of an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power. The 24 month Frequency is also acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability of the equipment.
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Technical Specifications Bases Vacuum Relief Valves B 3.6.9 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.6.9 - 5 Revision 23 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.6.9.3 This SR ensures that each vacuum relief motor operated valve will actuate to the open position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operations.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR subsection 6.2.1.1.4, External Pressure Analysis.
2.
ASME OM Code, Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.
3.
FSAR subsection 9.4.7, Containment Air Filtration System.
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Technical Specifications Bases Main Steam Line Flow Path Isolation Valves B 3.7.2 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.7.2 - 9 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) closure when the unit is generating power. As the alternate downstream valves are not tested at power, they are exempt from the ASME OM Code (Ref. 6) requirements during operation in MODE 1 or 2.
The Frequency is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
This test is conducted in MODE 3 with the unit at operating temperature and pressure. This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated.
SR 3.7.2.3 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV bypass and steam line drain valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis. The isolation times are specified in FSAR Section 6.2.3 (Ref. 7) and Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
SR 3.7.2.4 This SR ensures that each MSIV bypass and steam line drain valve will actuate to its isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Section 10.3, Main Steam System.
2.
FSAR Section 10.4, Other Features of Steam and Power Conversion Systems.
3.
FSAR Section 6.2.1, Containment Functional Design.
4.
FSAR Section 15.1, Increase in Heat Removal by Secondary System.
5.
NUREG-138, Issue 1, Staff Discussion of Fifteen Technical Issues Listed in Attachment to November 3, 1976 Memorandum from Director NRR to NRR Staff.
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Technical Specifications Bases MFIVs and MFCVs B 3.7.3 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.7.3 - 4 Revision 23 BASES ACTIONS (continued) function. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is a reasonable amount of time to complete the actions required to close the MFIV, or MFCV, which includes performing a controlled plant shutdown. The Completion Time is reasonable based on operating experience to reach MODE 2 with the MFIV or MFCV closed, from full-power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
C.1, C.2, and C.3 If the MFIVs and MFCVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or the affected flow paths cannot be isolated within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, in MODE 4 with the normal residual heat removal system in service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.3.1 This SR verifies that the closure time of each MFIV and MFCV is 5.0 seconds, on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The MFIV and MFCV isolation times are assumed in the accident and containment analyses. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. These valves should not be tested at power, since even a part stroke exercise increases the risk of a valve closure when the unit is generating power. This is consistent with the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2) quarterly stroke requirements during operation in MODE 1 or 2.
The Frequency is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
The test is conducted in MODE 3 with the unit at operating temperature and pressure. This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Section 10.4.7, Condensate and Feedwater System.
2.
ASME OM Code, Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.
ND-19-0168 Page 90 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases VES B 3.7.6 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.7.6 - 12 Revision 24 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.7.6.3 Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, testing VES once every month provides an adequate check of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the availability of system redundancy.
SR 3.7.6.4 VES air header isolation valves are required to be verified open at 31 day intervals. This SR is designed to ensure that the pathways for supplying breathable air to the MCRE are available should loss of VBS occur.
These valves should be closed only during required testing or maintenance of downstream components, or to preclude complete depressurization of the system should the VES isolation valves in the air delivery line open inadvertently or begin to leak.
SR 3.7.6.5 Verification that the air quality of the air storage tanks meets the requirements of Appendix C, Table C-1 of ASHRAE Standard 62 (Ref. 4) with a pressure dew point of 40°F at 3400 psig is required every 92 days. If air has not been added to the air storage tanks since the previous verification, verification may be accomplished by confirmation of the acceptability of the previous surveillance results along with examination of the documented record of air makeup. The purpose of ASHRAE Standard 62 states: This standard specifies minimum ventilation rates and indoor air quality that will be acceptable to human occupants and are intended to minimize the potential for adverse health effects. Verification of the initial air quality (in combination with the other surveillances) ensures that breathable air is available for 11 MCRE occupants for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Confirmation of the pressure dew point verifies that water has not formed in the line, eliminating the potential for freezing at the pressure regulating valve during VES operation. In addition, the dry air allows the MCRE to remain below the maximum relative humidity to support the 90°F WBGT required for human factors performance.
SR 3.7.6.6 Verification that the VBS isolation valves and the Sanitary Drainage System (SDS) isolation valves are OPERABLE and will actuate upon demand is required every 24 months to ensure that the MCRE can be isolated upon loss of VBS operation. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance.
ND-19-0168 Page 91 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases VES B 3.7.6 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.7.6 - 14 Revision 24 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.7.6.11 This SR verifies that the required VES testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VES filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 7). The VFTP includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum flow rate, and physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.
SR 3.7.6.12 Verification that the MCR load shed function actuates on an actual or simulated signal from each PMS Division is required every 24 months to confirm that the non-safety stage 1 and stage 2 MCR heat loads can be de-energized by the VES actuation signal within the required time. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage to minimize the potential for adversely affecting MCR operations.
SR 3.7.6.13 Verification that the main VES air delivery isolation valves actuate on an actual or simulated signal to the correct position is required every 24 months to confirm that the VES operates as assumed in the safety analysis. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage to minimize adversely affecting MCR operations.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Section 6.4, Main Control Room Habitability Systems.
2.
FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System.
3.
Regulatory Guide 1.196, Control Room Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors.
4.
ASHRAE Standard 62-1989, Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality.
5.
NEI 99-03, Control Room Habitability Assessment, June 2001.
ND-19-0168 Page 92 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases Startup Feedwater Isolation and Control Valves B 3.7.7 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.7.7 - 4 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.7.1 This surveillance requires verification in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program to assure that each startup feedwater isolation and control valve is OPERABLE. The Surveillance Frequency is provided in the Inservice Testing Program.
SR 3.7.7.2 This SR ensures that each startup feedwater isolation valve and startup feedwater control valve will actuate to its isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance.
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Section 10.4.9, Startup Feedwater System.
ND-19-0168 Page 93 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases SG Isolation Valves B 3.7.10 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.7.10 - 6 Revision 23 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.7.10.2 Verifying that the isolation time of each PORV block valve and SG blowdown isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis.
The isolation times are specified in Section 6.2.3 (Ref. 4) and Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
SR 3.7.10.3 This Surveillance verifies that each SG PORV, SG PORV block valve, and SG blowdown isolation valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The ACTUATION LOGIC OUTPUT TEST provides overlap with this Surveillance.
The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this Surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Section 10.3.2.2.3, Power-Operated Atmospheric Relief Valves.
2.
FSAR Section 10.4.8, Steam Generator Blowdown System.
3.
Regulatory Guide 1.177, 8/98, An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications.
4.
FSAR Section 6.2.3, "Containment Isolation System."
ND-19-0168 Page 94 of 95
Technical Specifications Bases Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.3 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.9.3 - 3 Revision 39 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.3.1 SR 3.9.3.1 is the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK, which is the comparison of the indicated parameter values monitored by each of these instruments. It is based on the assumption that the two indication channels should be consistent for the existing core conditions. Changes in core geometry due to fuel loading can result in significant differences between the source range channels, however each channel should be consistent with its local conditions.
The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is consistent with the CHANNEL CHECK Frequency specified for these same instruments in LCO 3.3.2, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation and LCO 3.3.8, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, Function 17.
SR 3.9.3.21 This SR 3.9.3.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 24 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range neutron flux monitors consisting of obtaining the detector plateau or preamp discriminator curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturers data. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at a 24 month Frequency.
REFERENCES 1.
FSAR Chapter 15, Accident Analysis.
2.
FSAR Section 14.2.7.1, Initial Fuel Loading.
ND-19-0168 Page 95 of 95
Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-19-0168 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4 Affidavit from Southern Nuclear Operating Company for Withholding Under 10 CFR 2.390 (LAR-19-001)
(This Enclosure consists of 3 pages, including the cover page)
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ND-19-0168 Affidavit from Southern Nuclear Operating Company for Withholding Under 10 CFR 2.390 (LAR-19-001)
- c. The release of the information might result in the loss of an existing or potential competitive advantage to SNC and/or Westinghouse Electric Company.
- d. Other reasons identified in Enclosure 7 of SNC letter ND-19-0168 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4, Request for License Amendment Regarding Protection and Safety Monitoring System Surveillance Requirement Reduction Technical Specification Revision (LAR-19-001), and those reasons are incorporated here by reference.
- 5. Additionally, release of the information may harm SNC because SNC has a contractual relationship with the Westinghouse Electric Company regarding proprietary information.
SNC is contractually obligated to seek confidential and proprietary treatment of the information.
- 6. The information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence and, under the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.390, it is to be received in confidence by the Commission.
- 7. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the information sought to be protected is not available in public sources or available information has not been previously employed in the same original manner or method.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on I
I Date Brian H. Whitley Page 3 of 3
Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-19*0168 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4 Westinghouse Authorization Letter CAW-19*4877, Affidavit, Proprietary Information Notice, and Copyright Notice (LAR-19*001)
(This Enclosure consists of 7 pages, plus this cover page)
Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3
@ Westinghouse U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Westinghouse Electric Company 1 000 Westinghouse Drive Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066 USA Direct tel: (412) 374-5093 Direct fax: (724) 940-8505 e-mail: harperzs@westinghouse.com CAW 4877 March 22, 2019 APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Subject:
Transmittal of APP-FSAR-GEF-049 (LAR-220)
The Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure is submitted by Westinghouse Electric Company LLC ("Westinghouse"), pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of Section 2.390 ofthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("Commission's") regulations. It contains commercial strategic information proprietary to Westinghouse and customarily held in confidence.
The proprietary information for which withholding is being requested in the above-referenced report is further identified in Affidavit CAW 4877 signed by the owner of the proprietary information, Westinghouse. The Affidavit, which accompanies this letter, sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of 10 CFR Section 2.390 ofthe Commission's regulations.
Accordingly, this letter authorizes the utilization of the accompanying Affidavit by Southern Nuclear Company.
Correspondence with respect to the proprietary aspects of the Application for Withholding or the Westinghouse Affidavit should reference CA W-19-4877, and should be addressed to Camille T. Zozula, Manager, Infrastructure & Facilities Licensing, Westinghouse Electric Company, 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Building 2, Suite 259, Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066.
~
Zachary S. Harper, Manager AP1000 Licensing
Enclosures:
- 1. Affidavit CAW 4877
- 2. Proprietary Information Notice and Copyright Notice
- 3. APP-FSAR-GEF-049 (LAR-220)
© 2019 Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. All Rights Reserved.
CA W-19-4877 - AFFIDAVIT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
ss COUNTY OF BUTLER:
I, Zachary S. Harper, am authorized to execute this Affidavit on behalf of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC ("Westinghouse") and declare that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
Executed on:
(J.t/zz./z.~/1 Zachary S. Harper, Manager APIOOO Licensing
3 CAW 4877 (1)
I am Manager, AP1000 Licensing, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC ("Westinghouse"), and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the proprietary information sought to be withheld from public disclosure in connection with nuclear power plant licensing and rule making proceedings, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of Westinghouse.
(2)
I am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.390 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("Commission's") regulations and in conjunction with the Westinghouse Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure accompanying this Affidavit.
(3)
I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by Westinghouse in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or financial information.
( 4)
Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)( 4) of Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.
(i)
The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by Westinghouse.
(ii)
The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse and not customarily disclosed to the public. Westinghouse has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it and, in that connection, utilizes a system to determine when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence. The application of that system and the substance of that system constitute Westinghouse policy and provide the rational basis required.
Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential competitive advantage, as follows:
(a)
The information reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) where prevention of its use by any of
4 CAW 4877 Westinghouse's competitors without license from Westinghouse constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies.
(b)
It consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage (e.g., by optimization or improved marketability).
(c)
Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.
(d)
It reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Westinghouse, its customers or suppliers.
(e)
It reveals aspects of past, present, or future Westinghouse or customer funded development plans and programs of potential commercial value to Westinghouse.
(f)
It contains patentable ideas, for which patent protection may be desirable.
(iii)
There are sound policy reasons behind the Westinghouse system which include the following:
(a)
The use of such information by Westinghouse gives Westinghouse a competitive advantage over its competitors. It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the Westinghouse competitive position.
(b)
It is information that is marketable in many ways. The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes the Westinghouse ability to sell products and services involving the use of the information.
(c)
Use by our competitor would put Westinghouse at a competitive disadvantage by reducing his expenditure of resources at our expense.
5 CAW 4877 (d)
Each component of proprietary information pertinent to a particular competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the total competitive advantage. If competitors acquire components of proprietary information, any one component may be the key to the entire puzzle, thereby depriving Westinghouse of a competitive advantage.
(e)
Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the position of prominence of Westinghouse in the world market, and thereby give a market advantage to the competition of those countries.
(f)
The Westinghouse capacity to invest corporate assets in research and development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage.
(iv)
The information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence and, under the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.390, is to be received in confidence by the Commission.
(v)
The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources or available information has not been previously employed in the same original manner or method to the best of our knowledge and belief.
(vi)
The proprietary information sought to be withheld in this submittal is that which is appropriately marked in APP-FSAR-GEF-049, "PMS Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement Elimination" (Proprietary), for submittal to the Commission, being transmitted by Southern Nuclear Company letter. The proprietary information as submitted by Westinghouse is that associated with Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) Technical Specification simplification license amendment request, and may be used only for that purpose.
(a)
This information is part of that which will enable Westinghouse to manufacture and deliver products to utilities based on proprietary designs.
(b)
Further, this information has substantial commercial value as follows:
6 CAW-19-4877 (i)
Westinghouse plans to sell the use of similar information to its customers for the purpose of licensing of new nuclear power stations.
(ii)
Westinghouse can sell support and defense of industry guidelines and acceptance criteria for plant-specific applications.
(iii)
The information requested to be withheld reveals the distinguishing aspects of a methodology which was developed by Westinghouse.
Public disclosure of this proprietary information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of Westinghouse because it would enhance the ability of competitors to provide similar technical evaluation justifications and licensing defense services for commercial power reactors without commensurate expenses. Also, public disclosure of the information would enable others to use the information to meet NRC requirements for licensing documentation without purchasing the right to use the information.
The development of the technology described in part by the information is the result of applying the results of many years of experience in an intensive Westinghouse effort and the expenditure of a considerable sum of money.
In order for competitors of Westinghouse to duplicate this information, similar technical programs would have to be performed and a significant manpower effort, having the requisite talent and experience, would have to be expended.
Further the deponent sayeth not.
- Proprietary Information Notice and Copyright Notice PROPRIETARY INFORMATION NOTICE Transmitted herewith are proprietary and non-proprietary versions of a document, furnished to the NRC in connection with requests for generic and/or plant-specific review and approval.
In order to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.390 of the Commission's regulations concerning the protection of proprietary information so submitted to the NRC, the information which is proprietary in the proprietary versions is contained within brackets, and where the proprietary information has been deleted in the non-proprietary versions, only the brackets remain (the information that was contained within the brackets in the proprietary versions having been deleted). The justification for claiming the information so designated as proprietary is indicated in both versions by means of lower case letters (a) through (f) located as a superscript immediately following the brackets enclosing each item of information being identified as proprietary or in the margin opposite such information. These lower case letters refer to the types of information Westinghouse customarily holds in confidence identified in Sections (4)(ii)(a) through (4)(ii)(f) of the Affidavit accompanying this transmittal pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(b)(1).
COPYRIGHT NOTICE The reports transmitted herewith each bear a Westinghouse copyright notice. The NRC is permitted to make the number of copies of the information contained in these reports which are necessary for its internal use in connection with generic and plant-specific reviews and approvals as well as the issuance, denial, amendment, transfer, renewal, modification, suspension, revocation, or violation of a license, permit, order, or regulation subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.390 regarding restrictions on public disclosure to the extent such information has been identified as proprietary by Westinghouse, copyright protection notwithstanding. With respect to the non-proprietary versions of these reports, the NRC is permitted to make the number of copies beyond those necessary for its internal use which are necessary in order to have one copy available for public viewing in the appropriate docket files in the public document room in Washington, DC and in local public document rooms as may be required by NRC regulations if the number of copies submitted is insufficient for this purpose. Copies made by the NRC must include the copyright notice in all instances and the proprietary notice if the original was identified as proprietary.