ML19031A827
| ML19031A827 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1977 |
| From: | Schneider F Public Service Electric & Gas Co |
| To: | O'Reilly J NRC/IE |
| References | |
| LER 1977-005-01 | |
| Download: ML19031A827 (5) | |
Text
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Frederick W. Schneider Vice President Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 201/622-7000 Production Mr. James P. O'Reilly Director of USNRC Off ice of Inspections and Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 77-05/lT 31, 1977 Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 77-05/lT.
This report is required within fourteen (14) days of the occurrence.
CC:
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40 copies)
- nirectoi, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies)
Sincerely yours, 1151:/
Report Number:
Report Date:
Occurrence Date:
Facility 77-05/lT 1/21/77 1/16/77 Salem Generating Station Public Service Electric & Gas Company
- Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Hydraulic line flange on Nos. 11 and 12 Main Steam Isolation Valves and subsequent violation of Technical Specification 3.0.3.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Operational Mode 2, Plant Pressure 2235 psig, Plant Temperature 547°F.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
On 1/15/77, a 3/8" hydraulic line ruptured on the No. 12 MSIV.
The valve was declared inoperable and the Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.1.5 was implemented.
At 1349 on 1/16/77, a similar failure occurred on No. 11 MSIV.
At 1636 on 1/16/77, No. 1 Unit was placed in Mode 3 and subsequently taken to Mode 4 to accomplish repairs.
In both instances, the resultant fluid spray wetted the area including piping insulation.
There was smoldering of the insulation.
There was no flame, except that caused by fanning action when the insulation was removed.
DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
This is the third failure of 3/8 inch O.D. 0.048-inch wall carbon steel hydraulic tubing attached to the actuator. of the MSIV's.
While still under metallurgical investigation, it appears that the failures were of a fatigue nature, due to transverse vibrational bending or inner wall bending of the tubing due to the radial restraint of a tubing compression fitting.
Minor mechanical damage to the tubing induced by installation of the compression fitting may also have been a contributing factor.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
With two (2} MSIV's inoperable, Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 was exceeded.
At the time of the occurrence, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was overlooked.
Technical Specification 3.0.3 requires that a unit be placed in Hot Standby (Mode 3) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> when condition*s in excess of those addressed in the Technical Specifications exist.
The unit entered Mode 3 at 1636 which was two hours and forty-seven minutes after the failure of No. 11 MSIV.
Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exceeded by one hour and forty-seven minutes.* This is a licensee identified item of non-compliance.
. _Report 77-05/lT 1/21/77 Both valves remained in the CLOSED position throughout this event,
-therefore, at no time was there any danger to the health and safety of the general public or site personnel.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
With.the concurrence of the valve manufacturer, all tubing similar to the failed tubing will be replaced with heavier wall (0.065.- inches) 3/8 -
inch O.D. Type 316 stainless tubing, and a different type com-pression fitting.
The increased mechanical strength of this tubing and the resistance of the new fittings to induce mechancal damage sho4ld prevent recurrence.
The tubing and fitting replacements are compatible with the original design requirements.
Reduced flow area in the thicker walled tubing will slow valve operation in the slow stroking mode, but will have no effect upon the fast (emergency) closure capabilities of the valve.
All SRO's will be reinstructed on the requirements of Technical Specification 3.0.3.
FAILURE DATA:
Tubing:
3/8 -
inch carbon steel 0.048 -
inch wall Prepared by~~~T_.~L~*~S~p_e~n_c_e_r~~
SORC Meeting No.
9-77
~~~~~~~~~
Manager -
sa1e~ Generating Station
\\
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK I I
,~..__...__._.._.....__.,6 LICENSEE NAME REPORT REPORT LICENSE NUMBER CATEGORY TY~E SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER LICENSE TYPE EVENT TYPE EVENT CATE REPORT CATE rortlcoN'T~ I Tt L!:.J I 0I5101-1 0 I 21 71 21
~
57 58 59 60 61 6S I 0 I 11 11 6 I 7 I 71 I 0 I 11 21 0 I 7 I ~
69 74 75 EVENT DESCRIPTION
~I During Mode 2 operation on 1/15/77, a 3/8 inch hydraulic line ruptured I 7
89
~
@]JI on No. 12 MSIV.
The valve was declared inoperable and the Tech Spec J
7 8 9 83
[£E]
Action Statement 3.7.1.5 was im lemented Mode 2 o eration continued.
7 8
@]§]I At 1349 on 1/16/77, a similar failure occurred on No. 11 MSIV.
At 7
8 9
~I 1636, the unit \\-laS placed in Hode 3 and subseguentl v entered Mode 4 to 7
8 9 SYSTEM cooe:
@TIJtCIDI 7
8 9 10 CAUSE COOE Lru 11 CAUSE DESCRIPTION COMPONENT COOE tVIAILIVIE!XJ 12 17 PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER L1J 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
!Al 518 15 I 44 47 VIOLATION IY I 48
~
9 The cause of the 3/8 inch, 0. 048 inch wall carbon steel tubing was
@:Ifill transverse radial bending of the tube due to radial restraint of a 7
8 9
[Ifill tubing compression fitting.
Tech Spec violation was due to personnel 7
8 9 FACILITY r.r."I STATUS L!J..!.J L£J.
1 a
g FORM OF
'J(,PQWER IO 10 10 I 10 12 ACTIVITY CONTENT METHOD OF OTHER STATUS OISCOVERV DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION I
Mode 2 I U!J
, 3--=~....... ---=----44""
45 46 N/A I
80 r so I
60 I
60 I
00 80 RELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY
(!li}
lEJ LI.I I
N /A 7
8 9
10 11 LOCATION OF RELEASE I
_1 ________
.N~/_A_*----~'
44
~
~
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES r.1:;-J NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION l!l:..I I 0 I 0 I 0 I lZJ l!:"::<" ___
N~/A ________________
-nj 7
8 9 11 12 13 8i5 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER OESCRIPTION
[!E]1010101 1
a 9 11 NA 12 eo OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES f1T511 '
N/A j
~~9~~~~---....~~~~---'"'"'""-""-'-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-....~...,,..~
LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
. r.r:1 TYPE OESCRIPTlON
~IZI ~I ---------~N~/=A--"'----------~--------,-----_,.,.J 1
a~ 10
~
PUBLICITY GIB 7
8~9 ______________
.......,o'-"".._-----~-~----~-------------~-80~
ADDITIONAL FACTORS III!] I EVENT DESCRIPTION and CAUSE DESCRIPTION continued on Page 2 7
8 9 I
BO (Ili]~----.,~~--~~--~--~~--------------~----~~---------....----~~
7 8 i so NAME:~ ____
T_. __ L_~_S_p_e_n_c_e_r ____________ ~ PHONE: (609) 365-7000 Ext.Salem-528
-.,LER n~os/1T Page 2 EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued) accomplish repairs.
Both No. 11 and No. 12 MSIV's remains in the closed position throughout the occurrence.
Technical Specification 3.0.3 requires that an effected unit be placed in Mode 3 within one hour when conditions in excess of those addressed in the Tech Specs exist.
Tech Spec 3.0.3 was overlooked and the unit entered Mode 3, one hour and forty-seven _minutes later than required.
This is a licensee identified item of non-compliance.
At 0510 on 1/17/77, No. 12 MSIV was made operable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was terminated.
Corrective action for the tubing failure was to replace the 3/8 - inch, 0.048 - inch wall, carbon steel tubing with 3/8 - inch, 0. 065 - inch wall stainless tube.
A different type of com-pression fitting (Swagelok, in place of originally supplied Deelaring) is also being used.
This action is being accomplished on all four (4) MSIV's.
Corrective action for violation of Technical Specification 3.0.3 will be to reinstruct all SRO's on the one hour, Mode 3 requirement.
This is the second and third occurrence of hydraulic line failure (ref. 76-27/31).
This occurrence 77-05/lT.
CAUSE DESCRIPTION (Continued) error.
-