ML18283B724
| ML18283B724 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1975 |
| From: | Purple R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Watson J Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| Download: ML18283B724 (15) | |
Text
OPG 2897~
Docket Nos. 50-50-260 Tennessee Val,ley Authority ATTN:
Mr. James E. watson Manager of Power 818 Power Burlding Chattanooga, Tennessee 37201 DISTRIBUTION Docket Files
- 2) PKreutzer(2)
NRC PDR (2)
PCo-lins Local PDR SVarga ORBIll Reading CHebron
- Attorney, OELD AESteen OINTE (3)
DEisenhut NDube ACRS (16)
BJones (8)
JRBuchanan JMcGough TBAbernathy JSaltzman RSitver Sh)Sheppard T%'lambach RAPurple KRGoller Gentlemen:
BScharf (15)
TJCarter The Commission has requested the Federal Register to publish the enclosed Notice of Pxoposed Issuance of Amendments to Facility License Hos.
DPR-33 and DPR-52 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.
The proposed amendments include a change to the Technical Specifications based on our letter to you dated September 29, 1975.
These amendments would revise the Technical Specifications to add require-ments that would prevent reactor startup with any immovable control rods that could have control rod drive mechanism collet housing failures.
A copy of our proposed license amendment with proposed changes to the Technical Specifications and Bases are also enclosed.
Sinc~r.eely, vl'iguE@I sIgned by4 Q24CX4 3, Purpg
~
Robert A. Purple, Chief Opexating Reactors Branch Pl Division of Reactor Licensing
Enclosures:
1.
Federal Register Notice 2.
Proposed Amendments w/Proposed Technical Specification changes PlM 2-OOPS I<g OPPIC49P
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-RAPurple
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Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9.58) hZCM 0240 4 U, 4'OYRRNMRNT PRINTINO OPPICEI I474 424 I44
a ~
Tennessee Valley Authority December 23, 197S cc w/enclosures:
H. S. Sanger General Counsel 629 New Sprankle Building Knoxville, Tennessee 37919 Athens Public Library, South and Forrest
- Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. Thomas Lee Hammons
- Chairman, Limestone County Board of Revenue
- Athens, Alabama 3S611 cc w/enclo'sures and incoming:
Ira L. Myers, M.D.
Statg Health Officer State'epartment of Public Health State Office Building Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Mr..Dave Hopkins Environmental Protection Agency 1421 Peachtree
- Street, NE.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
TEh'IKSSEE VALLEYAVZhCRXTY LCCl(M'O. 50-259
.BFiQPi8 PEPPY NLCTZAR PIN'T UNIT l PROPOSED AYl>>"NDK2% TO I'ACXLITYOPBRVZING LICENSE lmendrssent Yo.
license bo.
DPP;33 l.
The Nuclear Regulatory Corrnission (the Coamission) has found that:
'lhere is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authori.".ed by this arsnc~rent can be conducted vithout endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities Mill be conducted in corollance>>'i th the Corrmission '
regulations; and B.
Xhe issuance of this axendt"ent vill riot be ininaical to the cow:on defense and security or to tt;e health and safety of the public.
2.
accordingly, the license is arrerded by a change to the Technical Soecificatiors as indicated in the attachrx.nt to this license arrenarent and Paragr~r:h 2.C.(2) of Pacility License l'o. DPR-33 is hereby arznded to read
~~ follovs.
"B.
Tcchnical Specifications The Technical specifications contained in App.-ndices A ard B
as revised, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance vith the Technical S'wcificatior" r as revised by issued changes thereto through Change No.
3, This license attendr,"ent is effective as of the date of it issuance.
FOF~ TliE MZKZE(R PECUUs'XGRY COi'ollSSIC'J Harl B. Caller, Assistant Director for Cperating Peactors Division of Reactor Licensirg Attachrrsent:
or/ps os' rge Yo.
t
> the technical-'Spe.ifications evrssrAMe ~~
Da rsATf~
of. Xssu'an'c Form AEC.3]8 (kcv. 9.59) hKChf 0240 4 ss. e: oovrsrrsrsreNv r rrsNvsNo or rsces see/s-eae.see
TE?T'NESSEE XVLMYAUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-260 BBQvNS FERRY YUCIZPZ PMhZ UNIT 2 PROPOSED AliE?KKENT TO FACILITYOPEMTINCi LICENSE ArrendISent ho.
Iicense
?"o. DPR-52 1.
The h'uclear Regulatory Coraoission (the Cornission) has found that:
A.
4here is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this ar'recent can te corx3ucted without endangering the health and safety of the <~blic, and (ii) that such activities vill te conducted in corplianc-with the Corsoission's regulations; and B.
'Ihe issuance of this amend@I,ent vill rt Le inimical to the corvus'efense and security or to the health ard safety of the public.
Accordi.nqly, the lic nse is anended by a change to the Technical Specifications as irdicated in the attachrrent to this license arfenA'.ent and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility License Ro.
DPR-52 i.s hereby arrenced to read as follows:
"B.
Technical Sp:.cifications The Technical Specifications contained in Ao~ndices A and B, as revised, are hereby incorporated in the licens The licensee shall operate the facility ir. accordance with the Technical Specification",
m~
revised by issued changes thereto through Change
?Io.
3.
'Ihis license anenchrent is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOB THE NUCLVZi PZCULATGRY COI'2?ISSICiN lmrl B. Coller, Assistant Director for Cperating Reactors Division of Reactor Licensing
Attachment:
Change
?2o.
to the Off IC2 ~~
D SVRNIIMS) te""of"'Is5ua'nc e:
)
Form hXC-3lS (Rcf. 9.53) hZWr 0740 Q U, $, OOVCRNMCNT PRINTINO Off ICSI IS74 C2S I04
LlgKTTNG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3e 3 REACTIVITY CONf'ROL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4'a 3 REACTIVITY CONTROL Applies to the operational status of the control rod system.
Applies to the surveill'ance requirements of t:he control rod system.
~Ob ective:
~Ob ective:
To assure the ability of the control rod system to contiol reactivity.
.. To verify thc ability of the contr'ol rod system to control reactivity.
A.
Reactivit Limitations l.
Reactivitv mar in core loadina A sufficient number of control rods shall bc opcrablc so th..t thc core could bc made suhcri-tical in the most reart.ive con-dition during thc operntin!,
cycle with t:hc strongest con-trol rod fully wf thcivawn and all other opcrablc control rods fully inserted.
l.
Reec~tiv1t margin cere lect...;
Sufficient control roc!s shall be withdrawn folic::ing a vc-fucling outage when corn nitclra-tfons vere:
pclvfov."..c J to g!emon-'tratc with a mavgin of 0.3!t:
Ak/k thc cora can bc vgade su!2-critical at any t.iv.e in thc subsequent fuc:1 c:clc with t'hc "analytically c!c terr.."ncg! strcn"'.
opera!2lc cont:vol rod fully wi th-drawn and ai 1 othcir operab!e rods fully insc.rtcd.
2.
Reectivl.tv margin tnevcreble control rods 2.
Reactivitv narc. in - !noncvable cont'vol rods aa Control rod drives which can-not: be moved with control rod drive prcssure shall be considered inopcrahlc.
If a part:ially or fully with-drawn control rod drive can-not be rttovcd with drive or scram pressure t:hc reactor shall be brought to thc Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and shall not bc started unless (1) investi-gation has dcronstratcd that thc cause of thc fnilure is not a failed control rod drive mechanism collct hous>ng and (2) adequate shutdown margin has been dcmonstratcd as required by Specification
'4.3.A. 2. c.
If investigation demonstrates that the cause of control rod failure is a cracked collet
" housing, or if this possibil-ity cannot be ruled out, the reactor shall not be started until the affected control rod drive has been replaced or repaired.
a.
Each partdally nr fully
'ithdrawn opc v:lbie cortrol rod shall bc exercised nve notch at lc,.".t: once each week when opevatin..", above 307 power.
In the event:
power operation is contivuiv with three or -..nrc inopcr-"I control rods, this test shall bc pcrfovr.cd at'least once each c!ay, when opevativ.
above 30%
powct
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRDKiTS Co,
.d Control rods w'ith scram times
~ greater than thnse permitted by Specification 3.3.G.3 are inoperable, but if they can be inserted >>ith control rod drive
,pressure they nccd not be dis-armed electrically.
Control, rods with a failed "Full-in" or "Ful'1-out" posi-tion switch may be bynasscd in the Rod Scqucncc Control System and considered operable if thc actual rod position is kno>>a.
These rods must bc moved in scqucncc to their correct positions (full-in on insertion or full-oiit on wit)i-dra>>al).
Control rods with inopcrablc accuniulators or thoso whnsc position cannot.
bc positive)y ilctormincd shall bc considorcd inopcrablc.
Inopcrnblc control rods shall be positioned such "that Speci-fication 3.3.A.l is mot.
In addition, during reactor power operation, no morc tlian 'onc control rod in an>'zS 'array may bc inopcrablc (at least 4
operablo control rods must separate any 2 innpcrablc ones)
If this Specification cannot be mct thc reactor shsl) not be started, or if at power, thc reactor shall be brought to a shutdo>>ai condit.ion >>ithin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3.3.A.
REACTIVITY CONTROLS b.
The control rod diroctional cohtrol valves for inoperable control rods shall be disarmed electrically.
4.3.A.
REACTIVITY CONTROLS b.
A second licensed operator shall verify the conformance to Specification 3.3.A.2.d before a rod may bc bypassed in 'the Rod Sequence Control System.
, c.
1%en it.is initiallydcter-mincd that a control rod is incapable of norm,.] insc"tio-.
an attempt to fully insert the control rod shall be nude. If the con rnl ro=
cannot bc full> irscrtcd, a
shutdo>>si inargin test sh,.ll be made to dcronstratc under this condition that thc "orc can be made subcritica)
-.or any reactivity conditior.
during thc remainder of. =he
" operating e>clc i'itli thc analytica))y deter:".ircd, highc t >>orth con:.ol rc='
capable of >>ithdra::al, f'.ill>'ithdrawn, and.al nihcr coiitrol rods cap:.i ic of
'nsert ion fully i"..sc ricd.
B.
Each control rod shall bo coupled to its drive or completely in-serted and tho l.
Tho coupling intcgrit> sliall be
.verified for each >>'ithdra>>n con-tro'1 rod as folio>>s:
3 3/4q3 BASES:
inderted and disarmed electrically*, it is in a safe position of maximum contribution to shutdown reactivity. If it is disarmed electrically.
in a non-fully inserted position, that position shall be.consistent with the shutdown reactivity limitations stated in Specification 3.3.'A.l.
This assures that the core can be shut: down at all times with the remaining control rods assuming the strongest operyble control zod does not insert.
Also if damage within the control rod drive mechanism and in particular, cracks in drive internal housings, cannot be zuled out, then a generic problem affecting a number of drives cannot be ruled out.,
Circumferential cracks resulting from stress assisted intergranular corrosion have occurred in the collet housing of drives at several BMRs.
This type of cracking could occur in a,number of drives and if the cracks propagated until severance of the collet housing occurred, scram could be prevented in the affected rods.
Lfmiting the period of operation with a assure that the reactor will not be operated with a large number of rods with failed collet housings.
The Rod Sequence Control System is hot automatically bypassed until reactor power is above about 30% power.
Therefore, control rod movement is restricted and the single notch exercise surveillance test is only'performed above this power level.
'Ihe Rod Sequence Control. System prevents movement of out-of-sequence rods unless power is above 30%.
B.
Control Rods 20 Control rod dropout accidents as discussed in the PSAR can lead to sig-nificant core damage.
If coupling integrity is maintained, the possi-bility of a zod dropout accident is eliminated.
Tiie ovcrtravcI position feature provides a positive chock as only uncoupled drives may reach this position.
Neutron instru"..natation r~".pause tn rod rove-cut pro-vides a verification that thc zod is Eollcwing its drive.
Absence of such zesponse to drive movement could indicate an uncoupled condition.
Rod position indication is required for proper function of the rod sequence control system and the rod worth minimizer.
4 I
The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to loss than 3 inches in the extremely remote event of a housing failure.'he amount of reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal, which is less than a nornal single withdrawalincrement, will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system.
The design basis is given in subsection 3.5.2 of the PSAR and the safety evaluation is given in subsection 3.5.4.
This support is not requized if the reactor coolant system is at atmospheric pressure s'incc there would then be no driving force to rapidly egect a drive housing.
Additionally, the support is not required if all control rods are fully inserted and if an adequate shutdown margin with one control rod withdrawn has been demonstrated, since the reactor would remain subcritical even in the event of complete e)ection of the strongest control rod.
- To disarm the drive electrically, four amphenol type plug connectors are removed from tho drive insert and withdrawal so/.enoids rendering thc zod incapable of withdrawal..This procedure is equivalent to valving out the drive and is preferred
- because,
'in this condition, drive water cools and minimizes crud accumulation in the'drive..
Electrical disarming does not
~ eliminate position indication.
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR MGULATORY CORfISSION DOCKET NOS. 50-259 AND 50-260 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY NOTICE OF,PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF DfENDNENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating I icense Nos.
DPR-33 and DPR-52 issued to Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) for operation of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (the facilities) located in Limestone County, Alabama.
These amendments would revise the Technical Specifications to add requirements that would prevent reactor startup with any immovable control 4
rods that, could have control rod drive mechanism collet housing fai1ures.
Prior to issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission will have made the findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 19542 as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations.
By
/pe. 5, f99f, the licensee may file a request for a hearing l
and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding may file a request for a hearing in the form of a petition for leave to intervene OFPICC ~
SVRNAMRW OATSW POOR hEC-316 (RST. 9-55) hECM 0240 4 U, SI OOYSRNMENT PRINTINO ORSICdl IS74 424 144
~
'ith respect to the issuance of these arendtvIents to the subject facility operating licenses.
Petitions for leave to intervene m.st be filed'under oath or affirmation in accordanoe with the provisions of Section 2.714 of 10 CFR Part 2 of the Cormission s requlations.
A petition for leave to intervene mtust set forth t'le interest of the'etitioner in the oroceeding, how that interest ray be affected by the results of the proceeding, and the petitioner s contentions with respect to the pro1:osed licensing action.
Such petitions rust b filed in accordance with the provisions of this FELENL KGX TER notice and Section 2.7D, and rust be fi3ed with the Secretary of the Ccnanission, U. S. lh;clear Pwgulatory Coreission, F/oshinqton, D. C.
20555, Attention:
Dccketina and Service Section, by E
tiie "bove date.
A.copv of the petition and/or request for a hearing should Le sent to the Executive Legal Director, U, S. Huclear Regulatory Cor,.vision, h'ashirqton, D. C.
20555, md to Hr. H. S. Sanger, Ceneral Counsel, 629 New Sprinkle Building, Enoxvil3e, Tennessee 37919F the attorney for the licensee.
A petition for leave to intervene must be accorpanieo by a supporting affidavit which identifies the soecific aspect or asp"=cts oi the proceeding as to which intervention is desired and specifies with particularity the facts cn which the petitioner relies as to both his interest ar8 his contentions with regard to each aspect on which intervention is requested.
Petitions stating contentions relating only to matters out ide the Contra.ission's jurisdiction >>ill be oenied.
OFFICL~
SVRNAMCW OATS) 1'OICI AFC.31S (Rcv. 9 33) hZW1 02 10 P II, d. OOVCRNIALiNTPRINTlttd OFFICCI l874 ddd Idd
3 All petitions will l..e acted u?mn by the Conmi sion or licensing board, designated l y the Conmission or by the Chairman of Qe Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel.
Tirely petitions >rill l
. considered to determine whether a hearing should be noticed or another appropriate order issued regarding the disposition cf the petitions.
Xn the event that a hearirg is held andI a person is permitted to intervene, he becomes a party to the proceeding and has a right to participate fully in the conduct of the hearinq.
For example, he may prese nt ev1dence and exam1ne and cross-exani1ne vn.tnesses.
For further details <<ith respect to these actions<
see the Comnission's letter to Tennessee Valley Authority dated SepteImber 29, 1975f and th' attached prowscd Technical Specifications and the Safety Evaluation by the Corrnission s staff dated Septerher 29, 1975, which are available for public insp=cticn at the Corrmission s Public Locument Room, 1717 H Street, N. 1':.,
~
'ashinaton, D. C. ard at the Athers Public Library, South ard Forrest, Athens, AlabarIe 35611.,'Xhese license all'enceents and the Safety Evaluation may be inspected at the above locations and a copy may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conic:ission, Nashington, D..C.
Attention:
Dircator, Division of Reactor Licensina.
- 20555, Dated at Bethesda, l<aryland<
OPg 281975 FOR THE M:C~r'lZ BEGUM"ORY CO?A".ISS1:Gh Original signe'd by..
mohegan A. Purple Robert A. Purple, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 51 OI aICC3 SURNAME~
DATE~
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