ML18227D863

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Letter Request to Amend Appendix a of Facility Operating License. Proposes Technical Specification Changes Relating to Control Rod Insertion Limits for Unit 4, Cycle 3
ML18227D863
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/25/1976
From: Robert E. Uhrig
Florida Power & Light Co
To: Stello V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-76-69
Download: ML18227D863 (14)


Text

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, R.E. Uhrig DATE OF DOCUMENT 2-25-76 DATE REC)IVEQ NUMBER OF COP IES 8 ECE I V ED DEscRIPTIDN Ltr. notari zed 2-25-76...

Ltr. trans the following.......

ENCLOSURE Proposed Amdt. to OL/Change to Tech.

Specs:

Consisting of revisions to 'Tech.

Spec, with regards to Control Rod and Power Distrubution Limits.....W/Attachments (1 Signed Cy. Received)

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-.LQRIOA PG'4t'/FR u~ LIGHT CQiYiPANY February 25, 1976

'- gL-76-69 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:

Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director Division of Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.

C.

20555

Dear Mr. Stello:

Re:

r Turkey Point Units 3 and 4

Docket Nos.

50-250 and 50-251 Proposed Amendment to Facility 0 eratin Licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41

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Zn accordance with 10 CFR'50.30, Florida Power 6 Light Company submits herewith three (3) signed original's and forty (40) conformed copies of a'request to amend Appendix A of Facility Operating License DPR-41.

Unit 4 is currently in its second cycle of operation.

A refueling outage is scheduled for April 19, 1976 with Cycle startup planned for late May.

This submittal proposes Technical Specification changes relating to the Control rod insertion limits for Unit 4, Cycle 3.

The changes are minor and clarify the control rod insertion limit curves and explanatory text which will be applicable to Cycle 3.

The proposed Technical Specification changes are as des-cribed below and as shown in the accompanying Technical Specification pages bearing the date of this letter in the lower right hand corner.

Page 3.2-1 Sections'3.2.1.b, 3.2.1.c, and 3.2.1.d are amended to clarify the applicability of control group insertion limit curves for Units 3 and 4.

Sections 3.2.1.b and 3.2.1.c are reworded to be consistent with one insertion limit applicable for an entire fuel cycle.

Figure 3.2-1 The control group insertion limit graph for Unit 4 three loop operation is revised to be consistent with one insertion HELPING BUILD FLORIDA

Mr. Victor Stello February 25, 1976.

limit which is applicable for the entire cycle.

The revised graph is identical to the dashed-li'ne portion of the Cycle 2 graph.

Fi ure 3.2-1(a)

More conservative control group insertion limits are provided for Unit 4 two loop operation.

Pa e B3.2-1 The bases for specification 3.2 are amended to be consistent with one insertion limit which is applicable for an entire fuel cycle.

The proposed amendment has been reviewed and the conclusion reached that it does not involve a significant hazards consid-eration because the proposed control group insertion limits are more conservative than current limits.

Therefore, prenoticing pursuant to 10 CFR 2.105 should not be required.

Very truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President REU:MAS:nch Attachments cc:

Mr. Norman C. Moseley Jack R.

Newman, Esquire

STATE OF FLORIDA

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COUNTY OF DADE

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SS Robert E. Uhrig, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is a Vice President of Florida Power

& Light Company, the Licensee herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the statements made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief; and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.

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Robert E. Uhrzg Subscribed and sworn to before me I

this

<.5 day of /

. <,c.~<ED'i;q.", 1976

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/~u.ir,., 6( / P Notary Public, in and for the County of

Dade, State of Florida i~ c.g ) '"

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C'FF'QRJQA re t,~9+5 ALY CCt<a" ce1QN E'XPIRcS 3A l 2b, 1979 My Commission expires:

3.2 CONTROL p+ <>t 4 contxol rod insertion limits shown on Figure 3.2-1 and the Unit 3 control rod insertion limits shown on Figure'.2-1(b)"may be revised on the basis of physics calculations and physics data obtained during startup and subsequent operation.

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Part length rods shall not be permitted in the core except for low power physics tests and for axial offset calibration tests performed below 75% of rated power.

3.2-1 2/25/76

UNIT 4 CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIE)ITS FOR THREE LOOP OPERATION 100 80 Bank C

60 40-20 Bank D

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.0 20 40 6p'p POWER LEVEL, PERCENT RATED

]00 FIGURE 3.2-1 2/25/76

UNIT 4

CONTROL GROUP INSERTION LIMITS FOR TWO. LOOP OPERATION 100 80.

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..20 40 60 80 POWER LEVEL, PERCENT RATED 100 FIGURE 3.2-1(a)

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B3. 2 BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, CONTROL AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIGHTS Reactivity chan'ges accompanying changes in reactor power are compensated by control rod motion.

Reactivity changes associated with xenon,

samarium, fuel depletion, and large changes in reactor coolant temperature (operating temperature to cold shutdown) are compensated by changes in the soluble boron concentration.

During power operation, the shutdown groups are fully withdrawn and control of reactor power is by the control groups.

.A reactor trip occurring during power operation will put the reactor into the hot shutdown condition.

The control rod insertion limits provide for achieving hot shutdown by reactor trip at any time, assuming the highest worth control rod remains fully withdrawn, with sufficient margins to meet the assumptions used in (1) the accident analysis.

In addition, they provide a limit on the max-imum inserted rod worth in the unlikely event of a hypothetical rod

ejection, and pr'ovide for acceptable nuclear peaking factors.

Figures 3.2-1 and 3.2-1(a) meet the shutdown requirements of Unit 4.

.Figures 3.2-1(b) and 3.2-1(c) meet the shutdown requirements of Unit 3.

The Unit 4 and Unit 3 rod insertion limits may be determined on the basis of startup and operating data to provide a more realistic limit which will allow for more flexibilityin operation and still assure com-pliance with the shutdown requirement.

The maximum shutdown margin requirement occurs 'at end-of-core life and is based on the value used in analysis of the hypothetical steam break accident.

Early in core life, less shutdown margin is required, and Figure 3.2-2 shows the shutdown margin equivalent to 1.77% reactivity at end-of-core-life with respect to an u'ncontrolled cooldown. 'llother accident analyses are based on 1% reactivity shutdown margin.

B3. 2-1 2/25/76

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SAFETY EVALUATION Xntroduction By letter dated February 25, 1976, Florida Power and Light. Company (FPL) proposes changes to the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating Licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41 for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4.

The proposed changes clarify the control rod insertion limits, a limiting condition for oper-ation (LCO), for Unit 4 Cycle 3,.

Because Units 3 and 4 share joint Technical Specifi-

cations, FPL proposes to modify the Technical Speci-fications for Unit 3 to reflect the proposed revision to the Unit 4 Technical Specifications.

However, the operating limits for Unit 3 are unchanged by the Unit 4 reload for core Cycle 3.

Discussion Section 3.2 of the Technical Specifications contains graphs which define the control group insertion limits for two-loop and three-loop operation.

A description of what the insertion limits provide is contained in Section B3.2. Current Sections 3.2.1 and B3.2 have provisions for adjusting the Unit 4 insertion limits after 70% burnup of Cycle 2.

Cycle 3, however, will have one insertion limit which is applicable for the entire cycle.

Therefore, appropriate revisions have been made t'o the text and figures applicable to the Unit 4 insertion limits.

The revisions are minor and are intended to clarify the text and graphs associated with Unit. 4 to avoid confusion between Cycle 2 and Cycle 3 insertion limits.

The three loop insertion limit for all of Cycle 3 is the same as the corresponding limit for the end of Cycle 2.

The two-loop insertion limit for Cycle 3

is more conservative than the corresponding limit for Cycle 2.

Conclusions The proposed amendment will not result in any physical change to plant equipment or systems and will not ef-fect previously performed applicable safety analyses.

Comparison of Cycle 2 and Cycle 3 insertion limits shows that the proposed limits are at least as conser-vative as current limits and will provide an adequate shutdown margin throughout Cycle 3 life.

The proposed amendment is consistent with the plant operation neces-sary for the design and safety evaluation conclusions contained in the Unit 4 Cycle 3 Reload Submittal to remain valid.

Based on these considerations; (l) the proposed change oes not increa'se the probability or consequences of accidents or malfunctions of equipment important to safety and does not reduce the margin of safety as de-fined in the basis for any technical specification, therefore, the change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2} there is reasonable assur-be ance that the health and safety of the public will t

ic wi not 3

e endangered by operation in the proposed manner d

(

) such activities will be conducted in compliance er, an with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common de-fense and security or to the health and safety of the public.