ML18227D672

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Letter Submits Proposed Amendment to Facility Operating License to Amend Appendix a, Proposing Addition of Limiting Conditions for Operation & Surveillance Requirements
ML18227D672
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/30/1975
From: Robert E. Uhrig
Florida Power & Light Co
To: Giambusso A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-75-53
Download: ML18227D672 (21)


Text

NRC DIS, UTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET M i ERIAL (TEMPORARY FORM)

FILE FROM: Florida Power 5 Light C .DATE OF DOC DATE REC'D LTR TWX RPT OTHER Miami, Pla. 33101 1-30-75 1-31-75 ORIG CC OTHER SENT AEC PDR Mr. A. Giambusso 3 signed 37 SENT LOCAL PDR CLASS UNCLASS PROPINFO INPUT =

NO CYS REC'D DOCKET NO:

XXXX 40 50-25'+

DESCRIPTION: Ltr notarized 1-30-75 requesti Revised pages 3.10-2 3.12-1, for Amdt to App. A of OL-DPR-31 h DPR-41 33;12-1, 4.7-1p 4.7-2 & 1A.7-1 8c 4.7-3...

8c trans the following: for Tech Specs....

(40 cys encl rec'd)

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PLANT NAME:

BUTLER (L)

W/ Copies CLARK (L)

Turkey Point Units 3 VASSAL SCHWENCER (L)

W/ Copies STOLZ (L) 8c 4 FOR ACTION/INFORMATION ZIEMANN (L)

W/ Copies DICKER (E)

REGAN (E)

W/ Copies YEAR (I )

DHL 2-W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W&opies rein IL) KNIGHTON (E) SPE LS W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies KNIEL (L) PURPLE (L) YOUNGBLOOD (E)

W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies W/ Copies INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION TECH REVIEW DENTON LIC ASST A/T IND RC PDR (2) SCHROEDER GR IMES R. DIGGS (L) BRAITMAN GC, ROOM P-506A MACCARY GAMMILL . H. GEARIN (L) SALTZMAN OSSI CK/STAF F KNIGHT KASTNER E. GOULBOURNE (L) ME LTZ CASE PAWLICKI BALLARD P. KREUTZER (E)

GIAMBUSSO SHAO SPANGLER J. LEE (L) PLANS BOYD STELLO M. MAIGRET (L) MCDONALD MOORE (L) HOUSTON ENVI RO S. REED (E) HAP MAN KEYOUNG (L) NOVAK MULLER M. SERVICE (L) UBE (Ltr)

SKOVHOLT (L) ROSS DICKER S. SHEPPARD (L) SC. COUPE'ETERSON CSOLLER (L) (Ltr) IPPOLITO KNIGHTON M. SLATER (E)

P. COLLINS DENISE EG OPR TEDESCO LONG LAIN AS YOUNG BLOOD EGAN ROJECT I DR H. SMITH (L)

TEETS (L)

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8 TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10) NATIONALLABS 1 PD R-SAN/LA/NY

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January 30, 1975 L-75-53 Regnlalory B.--"I'ei t-ile c~@cFp h

O3 Mr. Angelo Giambusso, Director Division of Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Q. NKR KM 3 Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

'CP

~Cb l Re: Turkey Point Plant Units. 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and Proposed Amendments to ace.lity 0 'e'r'at'in L'i'cens'es DPR-'3l"'a'nd DPR-41

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As requested in Mr. Lear's letter of Dec'ember 10, 1974, and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.30, Florida Power' Light Company submits herewith three .(3) signed originals and forty (40) conformed copies of a request to amend Appendix A of the'acility Operating Licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41.

This submittal proposes addition of Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance 'Requirements with Bases for Emergency Containment Filter, Post 'Accident Containment Vent, Control Room Ventilation and Spent Fuel Pit Ventilation systems.

The changes are 'as set forth 'in the attache'd revised pages of the Technical Specifications bearing the date of 1/22/75 and are described below.

7~3.10-2 Subp'aragraph I

10, LCO for Spent Fuel Ventilation has been added.

Pa es 3'.12'-1'nd3'.'1'2-1 These are new pages'ncorporating LCOs for Control Room and Post Accident Ventilating System.

Pa es 4.'7-1','4.'7'-'2'a'n'd B'4'. 7-1 These pages have 'been changed to incorporate Surveillance Requirements for the Emergency Containment Filtering System.

HELPING BUILD FLORIDA

Mr. Angelo Giambusso January 30, 1975 4.7-3 This is a new page 'adding Surveillance Req'uirements for the Control Room and Spent Fuel Pit Ventilating systems.

We have reviewed the proposed changes and have concluded that they do not involve 'significant hazard consideration. We have also

.determined that there is reasonable assurance. that the health and safety of the public will not 'be endanger'ed.

Ve ly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice P,.res'ident REU;GEL:nch Attachments cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley Jack R> Newman, Es'q.

fE STATE OF FLORIDA )

) SS COUNTY OF DADE )

ROBERT E. UHRIG, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is a Vice President of Florida Power & Light Company, the Licensee herein;-

That he has executed the foregoing instrumen't; that the statements made in this said instrument're"true 'and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief; and that he 'is authorized to execute the instrument of said L'icensee.

o ext . rig Subscribed and sworn to before me 'this QO day. of 1975.

otary zc zn ' an or t e t te. of Flori.da at L'arge t OTARY TtiO<.IC. STA E cI TLORIOA at LARGE expires'.C NY COMh'IISSION EXPIRES APRIL 2, 1976

'i~1y Commissi'on OQtIOCQ ZNRu atAYMAAD NoMDJNo AoRNo

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5. At least ONE residual heat removal pump shal~e- yg in operation, unless Tavg is less than 160F.
6. When the reactor vessel head is removed and fuel is in the vessel, the minimum boron concentration of 1950 ppm shall be maintained in the reactor coolant system and verified daily.
7. Direct communication between the control room and the refueling cavity manipulator crane shall be available during refueling operation.
8. The spent fuel cask shall not be moved over spent fuel, and only one spent fuel assembly will be handled at one time over the reactor or the spent fuel pit.
9. Fuel which has been discharged from a reactor will not be moved outside the containment in fewer than 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown.
10. The spent fuel pit ventilation system shall be operable.

If any one of the specified limiting conditions for refueling is not met, refueling shall cease until specified limits are met, and there shall be no operations which may increase reactivity.

3.10<<2 1/22/75

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3. 12 AIR TREATMENT SYSTEMS tilation System and the Post Accident Containment Vent System.

~Ob ective: To define those limiting conditions for operation that are necessary:

(1) to remove airborne activity .from the Control Room during Control Room isolation conditions, and (2) to facilitate controlled venting of the Containment to waste gas tanks and to the atmosphere following a loss of, coolant accident.

a. The Control Room Ventilation System may be inoperable for a period of up to seven days. If the system cannot be made operable within seven days, both reactors shall be shutdown.
2. POST ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT VENT SYSTEM
a. The Post Accident Containment Vent System may be inoperable for a period of up to thirty days. If the system cannot be made operable. within 30 days, both reactors shall be shutdown.

3.12-1'/22/75

B3.12 BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, AIR TREATMENT SYSTEMS The Control Room Ventilation System is designed to partially filter the Control Room atmosphere for recirculation during Control Room isolation conditions. If the system is inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the Control Room and reactor operation may continue for a limited time while repairs are being made. If the system cannot be repaired within seven days, both reactors are shutdown in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36(c).

The Post Accident Containment Vent System is designed to facilitate controlled venting of either containment through HEPA and charcoal filters to waste gas tanks and to the atmosphere folio'wing a loss of coolant accident. If the system is inoperable, there is no signifi-cant threat caused by continued reactor operation because the system would only be used seven to ten days after an accident. Reactor operation may, therefore, continue for up to thirty days while repairs are being made. If the system cannot be repaired in that time, both reactors are shutdown in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36(c).

B3.12-1 1/22/75

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4.7 EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT FILTER SYSTEM, POST ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT VENT SYSTEM>> CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM, AND SPENT FUEL PIT VENTILATION SYSTEM Applies to the Emergency Containment Filtering System, the Post Accident Containment Vent System, the Control Room Ventilation System, and the Spent Fuel Pit Ventilation System.

To verify that these systems and components will be able to perform their design functions.

l. OPERATING TESTS System test's shall be performed at quarterly intervals.

The tests shall consist of pressure drop measurements across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks. Less than 6" of'ater pressure drop at or above design flow per cell shall constitute acceptable per-formance.

During each refueling shutdown, the Emergency Containment filtering System shall be tested to demonstrate automatic initiation upon receipt of a safety injection signal.

During each refueling shutdown, the Emergency Containment Filtering System shall be operated for at least ten hours.

2. PERFORMANCE TESTS During each refueling shutdown, in-place cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon tests at or above design flow per cell on each Emergency Containment Filter shall be performed. 99% DOP removal and 99% halogenated hydro-carbon removal shall constitute acceptable performance.

4.7-1 1/22/75

3. LABORATORY TESTS During each refueling shutdown, a charcoal surveillance specimen from one of the Emergency Containment Filters shall be analyzed for iodide removal capability. The results of the laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show > 85% radioactive methyl iodide removal at a velocity within 20% of design flow, 5 to 15 mg/m 3 inlet methly iodide concentration, > 95% relative humidity and > 250'F.

4.7.2 POST ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT VENT SYSTEM

l. OPERATING TESTS Operating Tests shall be performed annually. The test shall consist of visual inspection and operation of all system valves. Visual inspection shall include search for any foreign material and gasket deterioration in HEPA filters.
2. PERF01QfANCE TESTS Performance tests shall be conducted annually. Cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon tests shall be conducted at or above design flow on the HEPA filters and the charcoal adsorber banks. 99% DOP removal and 99% halogenated hydrogen removal shall constitute acceptable performance.

The hydrogen concentration measuring instrument shall be calibrated with proper consideration to humidity during each refueling period.

4.7-2 1/22/75

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4.7.3 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM

l. OPERATING TESTS The Control Room Ventilation System shall be operated annually for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
2. PERFORMANCE TESTS Performance tests shall be conducted annually. Cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon tests shall be conducted at design flop on the filters. 99% DOP removal and 99%

halogenated hydrocarbon removal shall constitute acceptable performance.

4.7.4 SPENT FUEL PIT VENTILATION SYSTEM

l. OPERATING TESTS The Spent Fuel Pit Ventilation System shall be operated annually for at least ten hours. The pressure drop.

across the HEPA filter shall be measured. Less than six inches of water pressure drop at or above design flow shall constitute acceptable performance.

4.7-3 1/22/75

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4 BASES FOR EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT FILTERING SYSTEM, POST ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT VENT SYSTEM, CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM, AND SPENT. FUEL PIT VENTILATION SYSTEM components are not subject I'ystem to'apid deterioration, having lifetimes of many years, even under continuous lit&

flow conditions.

Visual inspection and operating tests provide assurance of the system reliability and will insure early detection of conditions which could cause the system to fail to operate properly. The performance tests prove conclusively that filters have been N

properly installed, that no damage or deterioration has occurred, and that all components and subsystems operate properly. The tests provide assurance that filter performance has not deteriorated below original- specification values due to aging, contamination, or other effects.

B4.7-1 1/22/75

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