ML18153C791
| ML18153C791 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1991 |
| From: | Merschoff E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9110290171 | |
| Download: ML18153C791 (38) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1991024
Text
"".**
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Dock~t Nos. 50-280, 50-281
SEP a o i991-
Virginia Electric and Power Company
ATTN:
Mr. W. L. Stewart
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY
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(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/91-24 AND 50-281/91-24)
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This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on
September 17, 1991.
This meeting concerned activities authorized for your
Surry facility.
The first issue-discussed at this conference was related to
the ability of your emergency diesel generators to automatically tie-in and
effectively power their required loads during a potential loss of off-site
power event.
The second issue concerned the ability of the automatic start
feature of your charging/safety injection pumps to function as required with a
loss of off-site power.
A list of attendees, a meeting summary, and a copy of
your handout are enclosed.
We arie continuing our review of this issue to
determine the appropriate enforcement action.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,: Part 2,
Title 10, Code of federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any q~estions concerning this matter, please contact us.
Enclosures:
1. List of Attendees
2.
Meeting Summary
3.
Handout
cc w/encls:
(See page 2)
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Sincerely,
ORtGTNAl 5IC?NED SV
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Ellis W. Merschoff, Acting Director
Division of Reactor Projects
9110290171 910930
ADOCK 05000280
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Virginia Electric and Power Company
cc w/encls:
E. W. Harrell
- Vice President - Nuclear Operations
Virginia Electric and Power Company
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
J.P. 0
1Hanlon
Vice President - Nuclear Services
Virginia Electric & Power Company
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
M. R. Kansler
Station Manager
Surry Power Station
P. 0. Box 315
Surry, VA
23883_
M. L. Bowling, Jr., Manager
Nuclear Licensing
Virginia Electric & Power Co.
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Sherlock Holmes, Chairman
Board of Supervisors of Surry County
Surry County Courthouse
Surry, VA
23683
Dr. W. T. Lough
.
Virginia State Corporation
Commission
.
D*ivision of Energy Regulation
P. 0. Box 1197
Richmond, VA
23209
Michael W. Maupin
Hunton and Williams
P. 0. Box 1535
Richmond, VA
23212
C. M. G. Buttery, M.D., M.P;H.
State Health Commissioner
Office of the Commissioner
P. 0. Box 2448
Richmond, VA
23218
Attorney General
Supreme Court Building
101 North 8th Street
Richmond, VA
23219
Commonwealth of Virginia
bee w/encls:
See page 3 *
2
SEP .3 O 1991
Virginia Electric and Power Company
bee w/encls:
All NRC Attendees
G. Jenkins, EICS, RII
K. C 1 ark, PAO , R II*
J. Luehman, OE .
F. Orr, NRR
. ~Talbot, NRR
\\,,i:1ocument Control Desk
NRG Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Route 1, Box 166
Surry, VA
23883
NRC Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Route 2, Box 78-A
Mineral, VA
23117
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SEP 3 o 1991
ENCLOSURE 1
LIST OF ATTENDEES
Vir~inia Electric and Power Company
E. Harrell, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
M. Kansler, Station Manager, Surry
J. Price, Assistant Station Man~ger, Surry
R. Gwa 1 tney, Superintendent of Mai ntena*nce, * Surry *
D. Benson, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
L. Hartz, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance
D. Sommers, Licensing Supervisor, Surry
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)
J. Milhoan, Deputy Regional Administrator, RII
E. Merschoff, Acting Director, DiVision of Reactor Project~ (DRP) RII
J. Johnson, Deputy Director, DRP, RI!
S. Rubin, Acting Deputj Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RI!
C. Evans, Regional Counsel, RII
. M. Si~kul~, Branch Chief, DRP, RI!
P. Fredrickson, Section Chief, DRP, RI!
M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector, Surry, DRP, RI!
S. Tingen, Resident Inspector, Surry, DRP, RI!
G. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordinatio.n Staff (EICS),
RII
.
B. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Coordinator, EICS, RII
A. Ruff, ~roject Engineer,* DRP, RII
NRC Representatives (Participation by Teleconferencing)
B. Buckley\\ Licensing Project Manager, Surry, Office of Nucl~ar Reactor
Regulation (NRR)
J. York, Resident Inspector, Surry, DRP, RI!
J. Luehman, Enforcement Specialist, Office of Enforcement
F. brr, Senior Engineer, Reactor Systems Branch; NRR
F. Talbot, Inte~n, Project Directorate II-2, NRR
.,*
ENCLOSURE 2 .
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY
An Enforcement Conference was held at the NRC
1s Region II Office with Virginia
Electric and Power Company (Virginia Power) on September 17, 1991, to discuss
safety concerns involving the operability of your emergency diesel generators
and high pressure safety injection pumps.
Both issues involved the inability
. of these safety-related components to perform their respective accident-related
functions without operator assistance. After the Regional Administrator opened
the meeting by briefly discussing the specific NRC concerns, the Vice
President, Nuclear Operations, provided opening remarks for Virginia Power.
The Surry Assistant Station Manager gave the formal
items and topics listed in a handout (Enclosure 3).
participants during and after th.e pr_esentation were
the licensee's representatives.
presentation utilizing the
Questions asked by the NRC
answered satisfactorily by
The* safety significance and evaluation *of issues as listed in* Enclosure 3 were
discussed, in detail.
Virginia Power reiterated that, a.lthough both .the
affected EOG and the safety injection pump would not have automatically
performed their intended safety functions, the. equipment would have, in fact,
performed satisfactorily after prompt operator action.
The Regional Administrator closed the meeting by thanking Virginia Power for
the presentation.
VIRGl/f/lA POWER
Enforceinent Conference
September 17, 1991 -
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Introduction .
Emergency Diesel Generator Events
M. R. Kansler
J. A.* Price
Charging/High Pressure SI Pump Breaker
J. A. Price
Interlock Assessment
. Management Perspectiye of *Events
- M. R. Kansler/
E. W. Harrell
- **
VIRGINIA POWER
Surry Power Station
Emergency Diesel Generator Events
- **
- Events Description
- EDG No. 3
- EDG No. 2
- Causes and Prompt Corrective Actions
- Future Corrective Actions
- Safety Significance
- Conclusions
- EDG No. 3 was Inoperable Greater than 24 Hours Contrary
to Technical Specification 3.16.B.1 from May 9 to August
3,1991
- EDG No. 2 was Inoperable for Approximately 13 Hours on
July 15, 1991
Events on August 2, 1991 and August 26, 1991 Involved
the Ability of Emergency Diesel Generators to
Automatically Start and Load.without Operator Action
-
....
Following a Unit 2 SI/Rea~tor Trip, EDGs No. 2 and No. 3
Started
Offslte Power was Operable and Remained Available
during the Event
EOG No. 3 Speed Noted to be Low by Operations
Personnel and NRC Inspectors. Operator Action could *
have Raised Speed, Loading the EOG
'
One Hour Report Made to NRC Pursuant to 10CFR50.72.
Resident Inspectors Notified *
EOG No. 2 was Fully Operable during the Event
Submitted LERs on the SI/Reactor Trip and EOG No. 3
- Governor Replaced following Surveillance Testing on May 6, 1991
- High Level of Sensitivity to Safety Importance of EDGs
- Significant Management Attention and Involvement In
Maintenance Activity
.. Team Assembled to Replace and Adjust Governor
- Vendor Representative, Superintendent of Maintenance,
System Engineer, Maintenance Engineer, and EDG
Reliability Coordinator
- . ,
- May 7-9, 1991 EDG No. 3 Governor Replacement
Activities
- Dlesel Exhibited Drift during Return to Service Testing
- Team Determined that Friction Adjustment of
Sychronlzlng Motor was Required
- Team Concluded that Diesel Fast Start Operability was
Unaffected
- Friction Adjustment was Made by Governor Vendor
Representative and EOG Returned to Service
- The Root Cause for EDG No. 3 not Attaining Steady State
Speed of 900 RPM on August 2, 1991 was Failure to Reset
the Governor High Speed Limit Switches following* Governor
Adjustments on May 9, 1991
-
I
- Basic Governor Operation
- Mounted on the Front End of the Diesel Behind the
Control Panel
- Figure 1 Illustrates Governor Exterior Features
- Speed Setting Knob
- Synchronizing Motor and Friction Adjustment
- Figure 2 Illustrates Governor Interior Elements
- Speed Setting Gears
.
- High and Low Speed Limit Switches
Shutdown
Solenoid
Speed Droop
Control
Load Limit
Control
...
Synchronizing
- Motor
'
Figure 1
UG-8D Governor
Terminal Shaft
. Speed Setting
Knob
Limit
Switches
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Figure 2
UG-8D Governor
- Proper Assessment of the Impact of Governor Adjustments
- Formal Reassessment of Testing Requirements following Adjustments
- Better EDG Governor Maintenance Procedures
- -
- Tested, Verified, and Returned EOG No. 3 to Service
- Implemented and Procedurallzed the Manual Method of
Setting the EDG Governor for Fast Start Operation
- Initiated Root Cause Investigation
- Fast Start Tested EDGs No. 1 and No. 2
- Continued Assessment of Limit Switch Function
______ __J
- Following a Loss of Power to Bus No. 5, EDGs No. 2 and No. 3
Started and Loaded to Supply Emergency Power to Buses 2H
and 1 J, Respectively
Operator who Raised Speed to 900 RPM
- EOG No. 3 was Fully Operable
- Four Hour Report Made to NRC Pursuant to 1 OCFRS0.72.
Resident Inspectors Notified
- EDG No. 2 was Properly Adjusted, Loaded, and Run for an
. Extended Period of Time
- One Hour Report Made to NRC on September 12,1991 following
Evaluation of EOG No. 2 Performance. Resident Inspectors
Notified
- Preparing LER Pursuant to 10CFR50.73
- .
- ..,
.
I
- EDG No. 2 Set for Fast Start Testing using Manual Match
Marking Of Speed Control Knob on August 9, 1991
- Manual Method Proven by Fast Start Testing
- Manual Method Requires Setting and Verification
- EDG No. 2 Monthly Surveillance Testing Performed
Satisfactorily on August 12, 1991
- The Cause was Assessed to be Improper Manual Setting of the
Governor Following Successful Mon~hly Surveillance Testing
on August 12, 1991
- Verification of Internal Gear Setting could have Prevented the
EOG No. 2 Event
- Performed Successful As-found Testing on EDGs
- Reinstated Automatic Limit Switch Function and Verified Repeatability
- Implemented Diverse Methods for 'Verifying Governor Fast Start Setting
- Upgrading Procedures for Governor Maintenance and Fast Start
Operation
'
- Revised EOG PMT Matrix to Provide More Specific Testing Requirements
- Upgrade Governor Maintenance Training
- Verify Effectiveness of Corrective Actions by Monthly EDG Fast Start Testing
Through December 1991
- Implement EWR to Install a Clear Pl~stlc Face Plate Cover on Each EOG
Governor
- Issue Memorandum to Station Personnel Emphasizing lndlvldual
Responslbllltles
- Perform PMT Program Performance Assessment
- Submit Required NRC Reports
- LER for August 26, 1991 Event
. - LER 91-017 Supplement
- Submit Network Entry
..
t.
- During the August 2, 1991 Event, EOG No. 2 was Fully Operable.
EOG No. 3 was Available with Operator Action. Offslte Power
Sources were Operable during EDG No. 3 lnoperabillty
- During the August 26, 1991 Event, EOG No. 3 was Fully Operable
and Loaded. EOG No. 2 was Available with Operator Action
- Emergency Procedures and Operator Training Provide for Prompt
Diagnosis and Manual Action for De-energized Emergency Buses
I
~
- Both EOG Underspeed Conditions without Operator Action .
Exceed Licensing Design Basis Assumption of One Fully
Operable Diesel
- Engineering Analyses (IPE Model) Indicate that
- For EDG not Loaded and Assuming Operator Action within Three
Minutes - Current Offslte Dose and Control Room Habltablllty
Calculation Results Remain Bounding
- For EDG Operation at Low Speed and Assuming Operator Action
within Sixty Minutes - Containment Response and Core Inventory
Release Remain within Assumptions of Current Offslte Dose
Calculations. Offslte Dose Estimates were not Confirmed due to
. lnablllty to Model the Effect of Delayed NaOH Flow to Containment
- ..
- Excellent EOG Performance History
- EOG No. 3 Event was due to Management Control
- EOG No. 2 Event was due to Personnel Error
- Low Speeds were Identified by Operators during the Events
- Root Cause Investigation was Promptly Initiated
- Safety Significance was Llmlt~d
- Redundant EOG was Operable during the Events
EDGs with Low Speed were Available for Supplying Power with
Operator Action
- Emergency Procedures Drive Prompt Operator Action for Loss of
Emergency Power
- Extensive and Successful EOG Testing was Performed
...
VIRGINIA POWER
Surry Power Station
Charging/High Pressure SI Pump
Breaker Interlock Assessment
-
- Operational Issue
- Charging Pump Breaker Interlocks
- Sequence of Events
- Corrective Actions
- Safety Significance
- Conclusions
.
I
- "A" Charging/High Head SI Pump was Inoperable for
Numerous Durations Cont,rary to Technical Specification 3.3.B.2 between 1979 and the Present
- . ...
.
I
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"
,
- Charging Pump Interlocks
- A Certain Breaker Interlock Required Operator Action to Fulfill a
Necessary Safety Function
Speclflcally
- An Undervoltage Event with "C" Pump Alternate Breaker (15J2)
Racked Out will Lockout the "A" Charging Pump
Therefore
- With "A" and "B" Pump Operable and the "C" Pump Switch In
the Pull to Lock Position, Operator Action would have been
Required to Ensure Charging Flow after a Design Basis
-Accident with a LOOP and a Single. Active Failure
UNIT1
STATION
SERVICE TIES
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UNIT1
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RSSTA
1501
500KV
OFFSITE
POWER
262
RSSTC
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UNIT2
Surry Charging Pump Breaker Arrangement
..,_
- Plant Orlglnal Design Expected 3 Charging Pumps to be Available.
Technical Specifications Require 2 Charging Pumps to be *operable
- Design Change 78-S37B "RS and LHSI NPSH Modifications"
Injection Mode and to Address Low Head SI Pump NPSH
- Placed Swing Pump In Pull to Lock
- Engineering Review Evaluated the Breaker Interlocks during 1987 as a
Result of IEIN 86-79
- Engineering Review of Breaker Interlocks In 1990 Associated with SBO
Review
- July 1991 - Sensitivity to Manual Operator Actions Increased
- August 21, 1991 * A Deviation Report Submitted for Manual Operator
Action Required for "A" Pump Breaker Undervoltage Lockout and an One
Hour 1 o CFRSO. 72 Report Made. Resident Inspectors Notified
- Promptly Placed Unit 1 Charging Pumps In a Configuration Not
Requiring Manual Operator Action. Unit 2 was Satisfactory
- Estab.llshed Operational Controls to Prevent Swapping Pumps
without Management Approval
- Revising Procedures for Realigning Charging Pumps to Include
Restrictions on Pump Alignment
- Re-evaluating LHSI Pump NPSH Analyses
- In ltlated Operator Action Study
e:,
"'
- UFSAR States that Operator Action (Section 6.2-2) Is Necessary
Under Certain Conditions to Assure Safety Injection System
Performance
- Simulator Validation Shows that Operators Promptly {<15 Seconds)
Diagnose and Restore Charging Flow In the Event of an "A" Pump
Lockout
- Engineering Review of Design Basis Accident Analysis Assuming .
Charging Flow Is Restored In Approximately 60 Seconds Indicate
that
- Appendix K LOCA Peak Clad Temperature Limits will Still be Met
- Current Site Boundary Dose and Control Room Habltablllty
Calculations Remain Bounding
- 'A' Charging Pump Operator Action was a Recognized Operating
Requirement Prior to July 1991
- Following Discussions with Resident Inspector on Diesel Load
Sequencing, Virginia Power Engi~eering Identified 'A' Charging
Pump Interlock Issue
- Operators Thoroughly Trained on Charging Pump Interlocks and
Necessary Responses for 'A' Charging Pump during Undervoltage
Events
- No Impact on Design Basis Accident Analyses
- No Hazard to Public Health and Safety Existed
- Prompt Corrective Action Taken and Design Changes Being
Evaluated
VIRGI/VIA POWER
Surry Power Station
Management Per~pective of Events