ML18152A531
| ML18152A531 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1992 |
| From: | Blake J, Julian C, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A532 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-91-35, 50-281-91-35, NUDOCS 9202050096 | |
| Download: ML18152A531 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1991035
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30~23
Report Nos.:
50-280/91~35 ~nd 50-281/91-35
Licensee:
Virginia.Elettric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA. 23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 & 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry* 1 and 2
inspection
9-13, 1991
Inspector:_-..::--:1--~-~.J,.--.,.::~~-~------,-----,-----
C \\.~. p-* . .
Approved by:
- *
- 1. ;(_ 'v-<-, t 'i 1
-c-.-J-u~f..,,.a,+~-,~ch-,-. e~f-. ~-----~-
Eng i ne'eri ng Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
D'ate Signed
/' /7 ;4-z_
_ate Signed
I. *
I , ..,, ~.
/
'1
I
- (. '
- '
I I
- -
r r ,
.
(__... .
/
-:-
.
' .
/ Date Signed
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of pipe
supports, instrumentation maintenance procedur~s, fire protettion~ the intake
canal design, re~airs t~ the.roof on the mainsteam valve hou~e, the local
emergency operating facility, 1ST program for pumps, the licensee's ero-
iion/corrosion program, the ongoing procedure upgrad~ progrim, and
1 licensee
action on previous inspection findings.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
A minor weakness was identified in the licensee's construction procedure for
installation of instrument and. other metal tubing in that the procedure lacked
specific instructions for installation and inspection of compression fittings
(paragraph 3).
'
Management involvem~nt was evident through well-defined procedures and
assignment of priorities. The licensee's coriective action prdgram appeared
to be.effective in identification of non conformances.
Staffing and training
of personnel was adequate.
9202050096 920124
ADOCK 05000280
G
REPORT DETAILS*
1.
. Persons Crintacted
- Licensee Employees
2.
- J. A~tigos, Supervisor Quality
- R. Blount, Supervisor, Station Procedures
- W. Grady, *supervisor, NOE
0; Hart, Supervisor Quality**
- T. Huber, Supervisor, IST/NDE and Engineering Program.
- M. Kansler, Station Mana~er
- J~ Price, Assistant Station Manager
- R. Scanlan, Licensing Engineer
M .. Whitt, Senior Civil Design Engineer
D. Wong, ISI Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted during thts inspection included
design engineers, system engineers, operators,_ mechanics, technicians,
and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector(s)
M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- J.- York, Resident Inspector
S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Inspection.of Pipe Supports~ Units 1 and 2 (70370)
.
.
The inspectors performed a walkdown inspection to examine mechanical and
hydraulic snubbers installed on safety-related piping systems in the
Units 1 and 2 Safeguards Building. During the walkdown inspections, the
inspectors also examined other types of supports, including spring cans,
st~ut~, and rigid supports.
The piping systems included portions of the
main steam, safety injection, ~nd the steam supply line to the auxiliary
feedwater turbine driven pumps.
During the walkdown, the inspectors
- examined the supper.ts for damage and verified that attachment of the
supports to the piping and supporting structure was secure .. During
examination of hydraulic snubbers, the i nspe_ctors verified that fluid
levels in the snubber reservoirs were higher than target levels, and
that leakage of fluid was not occurring.
The inspectors noted that the
snubber and two spring cans on combination support number II548-PSSK~SI-
4.l were offset. This support is a trapeze type with a vertical
hydraulic sriubber and t~o spring cans attached to the piping with a
single pipe clamp.
The pipe clamp appeared to have been moved
approximately two inches and one of the spring can hanger rods was bent.
Licensee engineers performed an operability review for this hlnger. -
Based on the measured .offset, the offset angle was calculated to be 3.8
degrees, which is within the a*llowable offset of 5.0 degrees. The*
inspectors examined the spring cans and verified the settings were
2
within the specified range and tolerance for their cold set values.
Although the support is operable, lic~nsee engineers indicated thit a
work order will be issued to replace the slightly bent spring can hanger
rod.and relocate the pipe clamp to return the snubber/support to its
originally installed position.
Within the areas inspected, no v~olations oi deviations we~e identified.
3.
Review of Maintenance Procedures - Units 1 and 2 (6?700)
The inspectors examined the licensee's procedures whtch control
.installation of metal tubing and fittings~* These piocedures were as
follows:
a.
Mechanical Maintenance Procedure MMP-C-G-290, Metal Tubing and
Swagelok Fitting lnstall~tion.
b. *
lnstru~ent Matntenance Procedure IMP-C~G-92, Instrument Tubing
Maintenance Procedure.
c.
Specification SUl-0001, Installation of Instrumentation:
The maintenance procedures listed iri a. and b. above are uti~ized by
plant m~intenance personnel when installing or replacing tubing and
compression fittings.
The_ specification is utiliz.ed by
.
contractor/construction personnel when installing new tubing/fittings
under design changes and plant modifications.
Review of the maintenance
procedures disclosed that the procedures contained detailed instructions
for installing instrument and other met~l tubings and associated
compression fittings.
The procedures also contained instructions for -
retightening of fittings which are disconnected during maintenance and
other activities. Welded cir soldered tube connections are not within
the scope of these procedures .. The procedures specify precautions* and
limitations, post maintenance checkout instructions, acceptance *
criteria, and troubleshooting instructions.
Review of Specification
SUl-0001 disclosed that this specification covers the overall
requirements for installation 6f instrumentation, including tubing and
supports, instrument supports and racks, welded and mechanical
(compression) fittings, concrete expansion anchor installation
instructions, specificatioris for various classes of tubing, details frir
install.ation of various types of instruments, painting, variotis other
miscellaneo*us installation details, and QA/QC requirements.
However, *
the inspectors noted that there were only minimal instructions regarding
- . installation_of compression fittings, and that the specification did not
reference the above listed maintenance procedures.
On April 25, 1991, a piece of tubing on the backup air supply system for
the control room breathing air blew out. This system which has numerous
air bottles interconnected by metal tubing was installed by construction
personnel under a design change (DCP).
The tubing failure occurred when
an operator was attempting to depressurize the system by loosening a
fitting.
Note that this practice is_ against the tubing/fitting
. 4.
. 3 .
manufacturer's recommended practices. This problem was documented on
D~viation Report S91-0488.
Examinatton ~f the tubing showed that the
fitting _which Was being loosened had not been tightened enough during
6riginal installation. The ferrule .did not grip the tubing sufficiently
to prevent the tubing frcim slipping when the fitting ~as looseried under
pressure ..
The tubing was replaced and new fittings were installed. The
fittings in the new installation we*re checked Lisi ng go/no-go ga[Jges and
found to be acceptable.
When the remaining compression fittings in the.-
system were checked with-the go/no-go gauges, approximately 30 to 35
fittings .were found with excessive gaps between the-fitting and.
compression nut indicating that they- had not been sufficiently
tightened.. These fittings were tightened and rechecked with the* go/
. no-go gauge- to verify that they met the manufacturer's installation*_
recommendations.
Review of installation.procedures perfornied ~s a
~esult of this problem showed that maintenanc~ procedures were
accept~ble, but that the construction proced~res/specifitations lacked
sufficient detail for instaJlation of compression fittings.
The
i*nspectors discussed the lack of instruct ions in the speci fi cation and
construction work procedure (WP-101) for installation of compression
fittings with license~ engineers.
Procedure WP-101, Instrumentation
Installation, does not specify instructions for installation of
compressiori fittings.
Licensee management personnel indicated that tonstruction personnel.
would be *provided with ~opies of the maintenance procedures for use when
installing compression .fittin~s. The inspectors concluded *that the
maintenance procedures contain.adequate.instructions for proper
installation of compression fittings. However,. the-inadequate
instructions in specificatio~ SUl-001 and the latk of a construction
work procedure to control installation of compression fitting was
identified as a minor weakness in the licensee's constructi~n procedure
program.
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
Review of Intake Canal Design (37701)
The insp~ctors reviewed Deviation Report (DR)Sl-90-124.
The DR
concerned conditions when the plant was operated with the water level in
the intake canal exceeding.elevation 30.0.
Based on discussions with
operations personnel, licensee station engineers determined that the
plant was sometimes operated with the water level in the canal at
- elevation 34.0.
The canal High water level annunciator *is set at
elevation 30.0. After review of the UFSAR and other documents, station
engineering personnel were not able to determine the effect of the water
level exceeding elevation 30.0 on the* canal embankment design. Another
problem concerned the effect of the higher water levels on
instrumentation installed to ~easure the canal water level. The design.
of the intake canal is deS~ribed in UFSAR Section 15.6 which states the
canal embankments are designed to .seismic conditions.
The top of the*
- canal embankments are elevation 36.
The canal is lined with a
reinforced concrete slab.
The licensee is in the process of completing
..... *-
5.
4
a design reconstitution project which will result in formal
dot~mentation of all design calculations and the design basis documents.
D~ring the design .basis reconstitution, the licensee engin~ers
discovered that the existing calculations for the intake canal were
incomplete and did not document all design input values and applitable
loading conditions. This iss~e was documented as PPR 88-50.
The
existing calculations were reviewed and it was determined that the canal
slopes were ~table for seismic cqnditions-when the water level was at
elevation 30.0. This design water elevation is documented in a Stone.
and Webster letter ~ated Dece~ber 18; 1989, Subject:
Intake Canal
Service Water System.
As a result of DR SI-90-124~ an informal
engineerJng review was conducted of the canal slope stability with the
water level at_ elevation 34.0.
Based on this-_review, licensee design
engineers concluded that there was reasonable assurance that the canal.
slopes were stable under seismic loading when the canal waterlev~l was
at elevation 34.0.
However, design engineering recommended that the
canal water level be maintained belo~ elevation 30.0 during nor~al plant
operations, and that operators take any necessary actions when.the high
canal water level annunciator indicates the water level exceeds
- elevition 30.0. * These instructions may be revised when the design basis
documents and detailed slopes stability calculations are updated to.
formally document design input values and design loading conditions.
The inspectors examined wat~r level instrumenti and determined that the
canal water level was at elevation 28.5 during day thre*e of this
inspectioh. Regarding the water level instrumentation, licensee
.
engineers determined that newly .installed canal water level trip prtibes
are not subm*ergence proof when the c*anal water 1 evel is above elevation
32.i.
However, when the probes fail, they will fail in th~ safe
direction indicating low canal water level, which will require operator
response to correct.
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.*
- fire .Prot~ction System Des~gn ~ Alternat~ Water Supply (37761)
The inspectors reviewed Deviation Report S-91-1693 which addresses
discrepancies between the description of the backup water supply for the
fire protection system in the UFSAR and the licensee's fire protection
procedures.
The design bases for the fire protection system are
discussed in Section 9.10 of UFSAR:
The yard hydrant piping system,
diesel fire pump, and diesel oil storage tank are desigried to-class 1
(seismic) criteria. The UFSAR states that water for fire fighting is
obtained from two 300,000 gallon water storage tanks, each with 250,000
gallons reserved for fire fighting. These tanks are not seismically
qualified.
UFSAR Section 9'.10.2.2.1. states that backup water for fire
fighting can be obtained in an emergency from either of the condensate
storage tanks, which are also not seismically qualified, or from a fire
truck taking suction from the intake canal and pumping water into the
yard hydrant piping. A recent review by licensee erigine.ers determined.
that the emergency procedures have not been prepared *for using . either of
the backup water supplies, and that equipment is not in place to use the
- backup water supplies for fire fighting. This problem was documented in
.. **
6.
7.
5
.
.
DR-S-91-1693, dated November 7, 1991.
The licensee is develop~ng the.*
corrective actions to ~esolve *this problem.
The corrective actions
- i nvo 1 ve i nsta 11 at ion of piping and va 1 ves, purchase of the necessary*
hose, development of procedures, and completion of any necessary
tra-ining for fire protection p_ersonnel .. The requirements for the water
supply available for fire protection are stated in Technical
Specifitation 3.2.1.A.2.c which requires that the t~o 250,000 gallon
tanks be avail~ble.
TS 3.2.1.B.2 specifies that inoperable portions of
the fire suppression system be restored in seven d~ys, or i~ the**~vent
no fire suppression system is available, e.g~, loss of both tanks, a *
backup system be established in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Thus, the licensee complies
with the Technical Specification.
The water level in the tanks is
monitored by instrumentation in the control room, with annunciators for
1 ow fire water tank 1 evel s. ,
In the area~ inspected, deviations o~ violations were not identified.
- Repairs to Main Steam Valvehouse (MSVH) Roof (37701)
The inspectors examined DCP 89-14, Replacemen.t of MSVH° Roof Plug Covers.
This DCP ~as initiated as part of-the corrective action for viblation
280,281/89~06-02, Failure to take prompt corrective action on potential
wetting of safety-related components. This issue involved the wetting
of the AFW motors during periods of heavy rain. * For example, two work
- requests were issued in 1989 to dry the AFW pump motors, perform a
meggar check on the motets, and perform periodic tests on the pumps to
demonstrate operability of the pumps/~otors.
The inspectors reviewed.
these work requests, numbers.078859 and 084852.
The removable roof plug
. covers leaked and permitted rajn water to wet the AFW motors.
DCP 89-14
was classified as non-safety related. The modi.fication involved
fabri~atiori of removab1e.covers which are inst~lled over the plugs in
the MSVH roof.
The plug~ are missile shields which are removable for
access to equipment in the MSVH. * The inspectors reviewed documentation
associated with the DCP, including the.50.59 review, Appendix R review,
design drawings, procedures for installation of associated hardware, and
QC inspection records.
The inspectors reviewed the .results of
functional tests performed on the new covers which demonstrated the leak
. tightness of the new cover$.
The work was completed in June 1990.
The
inspectors noted that the DCP was still open pending final review of
licensee engineers.
The inspectors discussed the need for timely
closeout of DCPs after completion of field work with licensee management
personnel and questioned the 18-month delay in final closeout of the
DCP.
In th~ areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
Local Emergency Operation Facility (LEOF) {37701J
The LEOF is an onsite support facility for management of the overall
licensee emergency response.
The LEOF was developed by the licensee in
response to Generic Letter 82-33 and various NUREGs.
The LEOF is housed
in a reinforced concrete building designed in accordance with the BOCA
8.
6
Basic Building Code.
The structure provides a radiation protection
factor of at least ten.
The HVAC syste~ for the LEOF can be isolated if
high radiation* levels are detected in the i nta_ke air path, an_d the
ventilation* system pressurizes the LEOF with respect to the atmosphere
to reduce the chance of radioactivi material entering the building.
The
facility contains technical data dfsplays and plant records to assist in
the diagnosis of plant conditions to permit evaluation of _actual or
potential release of radioactive materials. The LEOF_also is equipped
with a reliable communications system to the control room, TSC, NRC,
State_ and local emergency operations*centers, and the licensee's
Corporate Eme_rgency Operations Facility which is located in Richmond,
Fire sup~ression systems are a computer room halon system and
a sprinkler system for the balance of the LEOF.
The source of electric.
power is the 34.5 kV line which provides service to the onsite triining
center and the onsite construction buildings.
An alternate feed to the
LEOF is available from the Smithfield switchyard .. In order to tie in
the alternate source*, it is necessary to manually discon_nect the power
supply from the primary source and manually shift to the backup power
supply.
The LEOF is not a safety related facility.
In th~ event of a
high radiation release from the site, lo~s of electric power, fir~ in
the LEOF, or other emergency, the licensee emergency response managemerit
function is shifted to the ~orporate*operations facility in Richmond and
the LEOF.is abandoned .. This scenario is sometimes part of onsite *
emergency exercises .
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations.were not identified*.
Inservice Testing Program or Pumps and Valves:- Unit 1 (73056)
The inspectors -reviewed the results of monthly periodic tests performed
to.demonstrate operability of the Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary
feedwater pump.
The inspectors reviewed the following procedures which control. the
testing:
l-Pi-15.lA, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump l-FW-P-3A
l-PT-15.18, Motor Driven Aux.iliary Feedwater Pump l-FW-P-3B
. These procedures specify test initial conditions, precautions, test
instructions, and acceptance triteria. Data recorded during the test
include pump discharge pressure and pump vibration data.
The PTs are
perfor~ed per the requirements of TS 4.8.A.l and 4.8.A.5.A and the
li.censee's Inservice Testing Program for Pumps and Valves*.
The PT is
also required to be completed after performing maintenance on either the
- pump or motor to demonstrate pump operability.
The following PT test
- results were reviewed:
Pum~ l~FW-P-3A (PT 15.lA)
Monthly PTs performed from June 1989
through June 1990
9.
10.
7
Pump l-FW-P-38 (PT 15.18) Monthly PTs performed from June 1989.
th_rough June 1990.
On pump l-FW-P-3A, work order 083813 was issued to crirrect a probl~m
regarding contamination of oil in inboard and outboard_ motor b~aring -
reservoirs.
The reservoirs were cleaned, flushed and refilled .and the
PT was performed following completion of the work in February 25, 1990.
On pump l-FW-P-38, a: packing leak was identified during the February 5,
1990 test. The_packing was adjusted and the PT repeated on February 6,
1990.
Review of the above data showed the PT-results were acceptable and pumps
were operable.
In the areas inspected, deviations or violations were not. identified.
Licensee Erosion/Corrosion Program
The inspectors discussed the licensee's erosion/corrosion inspection
program with the responsible site engineer.
The discussion included
recent events involving erosion/ corrosion at other facilities as well
as the licensee's plans for the Surry 1 refueling outage scheduled to
_start.in February 1992.
The licensee's erosion/corrosion engineering
staff had attended a recent EPRI CHEC', CHECKMATE' user's group
meeting where other licensees discussed theit recent discoveries in the
atea of erositin/corrosion.
During the discussion of the planning for the upcoming Surry 1 outage,
the licensee stated that the program was being expanded to include the_
remaining steam system~ that had not yet been inspected.
The systems
that are to be added to the Unit 1 program are the ~l~nd Seal Steam
System and' the Auxiliary Steam System.
These are being added because
inspections of the Gland Seal Steam System dur1ng the last Unit 2
-refueling outage revealed components which h~d to be replac~d. Other
- items which will be added to the inspection program are small-bore
piping which are outside the scope of the EPRI computer programs and are*
not easily inspectible.
The licensee intends to inspect the small-bore
piping on a best7effott basis as a preventive maintenance tool.
The ,nspectors' impression is that the licensee appears to have a very
pro-active program for the identification .of erosion/corrosion problems.
The inspectors informed the licensee that the results of the
erosion/corrosion inspections would be reviewed during the review of the
ISI inspections during the outage.
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
Procedure Upgrade Program
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's technical procedure upgrade
program (TPUPJ.
The inspection included a review of Station
8
-
Administrative Procedure,*."Procedure Process control*," VPAP-0502,
Rev. 1, dated December 17, 1990; discussion with the Supervisor Station
- Procedures; and review of the.November 1991 Repprt on the Status of
- Sta ti on Procedures. *
. During the review of VPAP-0502, the inspectors noted that Sectiori 6.3 *of
VPAP-0502 provides the *requirement: "If deviating from a procedure is
.required, the activity controlled by the procedure shall be suspended
until a p*rocedure change ( or procedure revision) is approved.
11
The
subp~ragraphs 6.3.1, 6.3.2, and 6.3.l provide guidance for* pfocessing
changes and revisi~ns using a Procedure Action Request (PAR).
When
asked if station personnel were aware of the PAR process, the Supervisor
Station Procedures referred to the November Status of Station Procedures
report, graphic presentation, showing that between .January 1991 and
November 1991, 648 PARs. had been received by the station* procedures
group .. (This numbef was derived from the graph of PAR Incorporations,
which shows the following:
January - Outstanding PAR Changes .1335 and
Incorporated.PAR Changes 7; November -.Outstanding PAR Changes 1355 and
Incorporated PAR Changes 635.)
The inspectbrs also reviewed some of the qualifications and backgrounds
of members of. the Station .Procedures Organization during discussions *
with the Supervisor Station Procedur~s.
The TPUP program *appears to contain all of the elements .necessary to
produce. workable technical procedures: the procedure writing staff
contains people with years of experience in the technical areas that
they are writing for; the program requires that procedures be verified
and validated; the program provides a workable feedback mechanism for
problems identifted during use.
'
In the areas irispected, violationi or 'deviati~ns were not identified.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 11.
Action on Previous Inspection Findirigs (92701)
(Open) Unresolved Item 50-280,281/91-26-02, PSI/ISI Deviations.
One of
the concerns addressed by this unresolved.item involved the fact that
there may be undocumented longitudinal welds in piping components in
safety related systems which were not being inspected as required by
This concern was discussed with representatives of the
site and corporate ISI organizations. During the discussions, the
. inspectors were sho~n the results of the research of the piping
fabrication and erection records from the plant construction records~
The result was a set of marked-up piping drawings which have the known
seamless and seam-welded piping components color-coded. These drawings
also show which piping components will be inspected for longitudinal
seams during the upcoming outages.
The licensee appears to be doing a thorough and comprehensive job of
determining the full extent of the problem in. the areas of i dent i fyi ng *
.all longitudinal seams in safety related piping systems.
The inspectors
informed the licensee that further review of the work to resolve this
- ****
9
item would be done during the upcoming Unit I refueling outage which is
scheduled for February 15. through May 4, 1992.
Exit Interview
the inspection scope and results were summarized on December 13, 1991,
with those* persons i ndi.cated in paragraph I. The inspector's described
the areas jnspected and discu~sed in detail the inspection r~sult~.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting
comments were not received from the.licensee .