ML18152A501

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Forwards Summary of 920610 Enforcement Conference to Discuss Insp Repts 50-280/92-12 & 50-281/92-12 Re Ability of Automatic Start Feature of Charging/Si Pumps to Function During Potential Dba.List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Encl
ML18152A501
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 06/19/1992
From: Reyes L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Stewart W
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
References
NUDOCS 9207010270
Download: ML18152A501 (32)


See also: IR 05000280/1992012

Text

Docket Nos. 50-280, 50-281

License Nos. DPR-32, DPR-37

JUN 19 1992

Virginia Electric *and Power Company

ATTN:

Mr. W. L. Stewart

Senior Vice President - Nuclear

5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen Allen, VA

23060

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY

(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/92-12 AND 50-281/92-12)

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on

{9--f-l~ .

June 10, 1992.

This meeting concerned activities authorized for your Surry

facility.

The issue discussed at this conference was related to the ability

of the automatic start feature of your charging/safety injection pumps to

function as required during a potential design basis accident.

The conference

was beneficial in providing us your perspective on the issue, and your root

cause evaluation and corrective actions. A list of attendees and a copy of

your handout are enclosed.

We are continuing our review of this issue to

determine the appropriate enforcement action.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2,

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclo-

sures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.

Enclosures:

1.

List of Attendees

2.

Handout

cc w/encls:

E. W. Harrell

Vice President - Nuclear Services

Virginia Electric & Power Company

5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen Allen, VA

23060

cc w/encls cont'd: See page 2

Sincerely,

L~~es, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

....

Virginia Electric & Power

Company

cc w/encls cont'd:

J. P. O'Hanlon

Vice President - Nuclear Operations

Virginia Electric & Power Company

5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen Allen, VA

23060

M. R. Kansler

Station Manager

Surry Power Station

P. 0. Box 315

Surry, VA

23883

M. L. Bowling, Jr., Manager

Nuclear Licensing

Virginia Electric & Power Company

5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen Allen, VA

23060

Sherlock Holmes, Chairman

Board of Supervisors of Surry County

Surry County Courthouse

Surry, VA

23683

Dr. W. T. Lough

Virginia State Corporation Commission

Division of Energy Regulation

P. 0. Box 1197

Richmond, VA

23209

Michael W. Maupin

Hunton and Williams

P. 0. Box 1535

Richmond, VA

23212

C. M. G. Buttery, M.D., M.P.H.

State Health Commissioner

Office of the Commissioner

Virginia Department of Health

P. 0. Box 2448

Richmond, VA

23218

Attorney General

Supreme Court Building

101 North 8th Street

Richmond, VA

23219

bee w/encls: See page 3

2

JUN 19 1992

Virginia Electric & Power

Company

bee w/encls:

P. Fredrickson, RII

B. Buckley, NRR

G. Jenkins, EICS, RII

K. Clark, PAO, RII

R. Pedersen, OE

All NRC Attendees

Document Control Desk

NRC Resident Inspector

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Route 1, Box 166

Surry, VA

23883

NRC Resident Inspector

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Route 2, Box 78-A

Mineral, VA

23117

R~

A~uff

06/fi /92

RII~

PFredrickson

06/ 'f,/92

RI)iEY

M~nkule

a-()6/(f') /92

l

3

JUN 19 1992

ENCLOSURE 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES

Virginia Electric and Power Company

W. Stewart, Senior Vice President, Nuclear

J. O'Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

M. Kansler, Station Manager, Surry

J. McCarthy, Assistant Station Manager, Surry

G. Kane, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance

M. Bowling, Manager, Nuclear Licensing & Programs

G. Miller, Senior Staff Engineer, Nuclear Licensing & Programs

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)

J. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) RII

E. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RII

C. Evans, Regional Counsel, RII

M. Sinkule, Branch Chief, DRP, RII

H. Berkow, Project Director, Directorate II-2, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation

P. Fredrickson, Section Chief, DRP, RII

.

M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector, Surry, DRP, RII

G. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff, -RII

A. Ruff, Project Engineer, DRP, RII

NRC Representativ_es (Participation by Teleconferencing}

B. Buckley, Senior Licensing Project Manager, Surry, NRR

R. Pedersen, Enforcement Specialist, Office of Enforcement

ENCLOSURE 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES

Virginia Electric and Power Company

W. Stewart, Senior Vice President, Nuclear

J. O'Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

M. Kansler, Station Manager, Surry

J. McCarthy, Assistant Station Manager, Surry

G. Kane, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance

M. Bowling, Manager, Nuclear Licensing & Programs

G. Miller, Senior Staff Engineer, Nuclear Licensing & Programs

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)

J. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) RII

E. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RII

C. Evans, Regional Counsel, RII

M. Sinkule, Branch Chief, DRP, RII

H. Berkow, Project Director, Directorate II-2, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation

P. Fredrickson, Section Chief, DRP, RII

M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector, Surry, DRP, RII

G. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff, RII

A. Ruff, Project Engineer, DRP, RII

NRC Representatives (Participation by Teleconferencing)

B. Buckley, Senior Licensing Project Manager, Surry, NRR

R. Pedersen, Enforcement Specialist, Office of Enforcement

SURE 2

  • .*.

?

I

1--,r-------~

VIRGl/f/lA POWER

  • Surry Power Station

Etiforcement Omference

June 10, 1992

LDeeo.1

1-,a---. --Ag,-.-enda----,,

INTRODUCTION

W. L. STEWART

MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW

M.R.KANSLER

MAY 11, 1992 EVENT

J. H. McCARTHY

AUGUST 21, 1991 EVENT

M.R.KANSLER

ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION

M. L. BOWLING

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND .

M.R.KANSLER

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

CONCLUSIONS

J. P. O'HANLON

LC>eeo.2

  • l\\\\

May 11, 1992 Event

VIRGl/f/lA POWER

J. H. McCARTHY

SURRY ASSISTANT STATION MANAGER

NUCLEAR SAFETY AND LICENSING

,,

I

,

I

ll>eeo.3

  • I\\\\

Event Description

  • ON MAY 11, 1992 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT

BOTH THE 'A' AND 'C' CHARGING/ HIGH HEAD

SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS WERE IN A

CONFIGURATION INCONSISTENT WITH THE

REQUIREMENTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.B.2 FOR CERTAIN INTERVALS FROM MAY 1,

1992 TO MAY 11, 1992

  • CHARGING PUMP STATUS

- 'A' PUMP WAS IN AUTO STANDBY AND

AVAILABLE

- 'B' PUMP WAS OPERABLE AND IN SERVICE

- 'C' PUMP WAS IN PULL-TO-LOCK AND

AVAILABLE

...

I

LDeeo.4

, ***

r--C_'h_a_l'g_in_g_Pu_,n_~_Im-~-~-ks-----,,

  • ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE CH/HHSI PUMP BREAKER

INTERLOCKS INCLUDED FEATURES TO ENSURE HHSI FLOW

FOLLOWING A LOOP AND ONLY ONE PUMP ON EACH

.

EMERGENCY BUS

BREAKER (15J2) RACKED OUT WILL LOCK OUT THE 'A'

CHARGING PUMP

  • WITH 'A' AND

1B

1 PUMPS OPERABLE AND THE *c* PUMP IN PULL-

TO-LOCK, THE LEAD FOR THE UNDERVOLTAGE INTERLOCK ON

THE

1A

1 PUMP MUST BE LIFTED TO ENSURE HHSI FLOW AFTER

A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT WITH A LOOP AND A SINGLE

ACTIVE FAILURE

  • THE MAY 11, 1992 CHARGING PUMP CONFIGURATION WAS

INADEQUATE TO ENSURE HHSI PUMP FLOW IN THE EVENT OF A

DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT COINCIDENT WITH A LOSS OF

OFFSITE POWER AND A SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE

LDeeo.5

Omditions Which Will Trip And Lockout Surry

Charging Pump Breakers

H EMERGENCY

11H

11 Bus Undervoltage ( + 1 sec)

+ 15H5 Closed

or

15J2 Closed

or

15J2 A.I.

or

15J5 A.O.

11H

11 Bus Undervoltage

+ 15J2 A.O.

15H1

BUS

15H~5H6J

UNIT 1

J EMERGENCY

BUS

15H6 A.I.

or

15H6 Closed

15J2 A.I.

KM2295Ao(5A)

Sequence Of Events

  • JANUARY 29, 1992
  • MARCH 26, 1992
  • APRIL 26, -1992
  • APRIL 29, 1992

DCP APPROVED (BUT NOT IMPLEMENTED)

THAT ALLOWED THREE CHARGING PUMPS

TO BE IN AUTOMATIC. IF 'C' PUMP IS IN

PULL-TO-LOCK FOR MAINTENANCE, 'A'

PUMP MUST HAVE UV TRIP DEFEATED.

.1-GOP-1.3APPROVED. THIS PROCEDURE

CALLED FOR THE THREE CHARGING PUMPS

TO BE IN AUTOMATIC UPON INCREASING

RCS TEMPERATURE> 350°F.

DCP TECHNICAL REVIEW APPROVED.

1-GOP-1.3 CHANGED VIA THE PROCEDURE

ACTION REQUEST (PAR) PROCESS TO

ALLOW SHIFT SUPERVISOR DISCRETION IN

CHARGING PUMP ALIGNMENT [REASON:

TESTING REQUIREMENTS FROM DCP

TECHNICAL REVIEW NOT YET COMPLETED].

.,

I

LDee0.11

I\\\\ Sequence Of Events (Continued)

  • MAY 1, 1992
  • MAY9, 1992
  • MAY 11, 1992

REACTOR CRITICAL- A TWO-PUMP

ALIGNMENT WAS ESTABLISHED WITHOUT

LIFTING THE LEAD ON THE 'A' PUMP TO

DEFEAT THE UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP

CH/HHSI PUMP PERIODIC TESTING

CONDUCTED

LICENSED CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR

DISCOVERED 'A' PUMP UNDERVOLTAGE

TRIP WAS NOT DEFEATED

IMMEDIATELY PLACED PUMPS IN PROPER

CONFIGURATION AND REPORTED THE

EVENT TO THE NRC

.-

1

-

I

LDee0.7

[1'

August 21, 1991 Event

VIRGl/f/lA POWER

M.R.KANSLER

SURRY STATION MANAGER

I

,,

LDeeo.11

Cause Comparison Of The

Au ust 1991 And Ma 1992 Events

  • MAY 11, 1992

- PREVIOUS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE

RENDERED INEFFECTIVE BY IMPLEMENTING

AN INADEQUATE PROCEDURE CHANGE

  • AUGUST 21, 1991

- DESIGN BASIS FOR OPERATION OF THE CH/

HHSI PUMPS ASSUMED MANUAL OPERATOR

ACTION IN LIEU OF AUTOMATIC OPERATION

i

-

LDeeo.11

,~

Correcti,ve Actions From August 21, 1991 Event I

  • COMMITMENTS IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE NRC

- DETERMINE IF OTHER CRmCAL PLANT COMPONENTS

REQUIRE MANUAL OPERATOR ACTION INCONSISTENT

WITH THE DESIGN BASIS

- PERFORM ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF CH/HHSI

PUMP DESIGN BASIS TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE

OPERATING CONFIGURATION (i.e.,TWO PUMP VS.

THREE PUMP OPERATION)

- REVISE PROCEDURES TO ALIGN CH/HHSI PUMPS

TO ENSURE THEIR AUTOMATIC ACTUATION

CAPABILITY IS MAINTAINED

- REASSESS MANUAL OPERATOR ACTIONS WITH

RESPECT TO SAFETY SYSTEM OPERABILITY

- DEVELOP POLICY FOR ACCEPTABLE MANUAL

OPERATOR ACTION

- TRAIN OPERATIONS AND ENGINEERING PERSONNEL

ON THE POLICY

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

IN PROGRESS

l..0990.10

1

111a-~--Corro--'Cli--:-.v-e-A~ctio~. -ns---:Fi:-rom--A-:-u-g_us_t--:2:-:1~, ~19:-~:-1-:-E-=v-ent---,,

-~

(CAJntinued)

  • ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- PLACED UNIT 1 CH/HHSI PUMPS IN PROPER

ALIGNMENT AND VERIRED UNIT 2 PUMP

ALIGNMENT WAS SATISFACTORY

- ISSUED STANDING ORDER TO PRECLUDE

INAPPROPRIATE CHARGING PUMP ALIGNMENTS

- IMMEDIATELY BRIEFED OPERATORS ON EVENT

~ TECHNICAL BULLETIN ISSUED TO ENGINEERING

PERSONNEL DISCUSSING THE EVENT AND THE

CONCERN WITH USING MANUAL OPERATOR

ACTIONS FOR AUTOMATIC DESIGN FUNCTIONS

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

l.Oee0.11

,_.

Root Cause Evaluation

VIRGINIA POWER

M. L. BOWLING - MANAGER

NUCLEAR LICENSING AND PROGRAMS

,.

'

I

LDee0.12

. Root Cause Evaluation (RCE)

  • RCE TEAM ASSEMBLED WITHIN 24 HOURS OF

EVENT DISCOVERY

  • MULTIDISCIPLINE TEAM OF CORPORATE AND

STATION PERSONNEL LED BY CORPORATE

NUCLEAR SAFETY

  • OPERATIONS, PROCEDURES, DESIGN, LICENSING

AND MANAGEMENT AREAS REVIEWED

  • FORMAL ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION REPORT

PREPARED AND ISSUED

  • RCE RESULTS PRESENTED TO BOTH STATION AND

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AND TO THE NRC

l.Olleo.13

. 1, Root Cause Evaluation (Continued) I

  • ROOT CAUSE

- INADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF A

PROCEDURE CHANGE REQUEST (PAR) WHICH

RESULTED IN A CHARGING PUMP

CONFIGURATION THAT DID NOT MEET THE

DESIGN BASIS .

  • MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

- INCOMPLETE PROCEDURE REVISIONS

- OPERATOR COMMUNICATIONS AND

SENSITIVITY TO EQUIPMENT

CONFIGURATIONS

- COORDINATION AND COMPLETENESS OF

DESIGN CHANGE

L.Oeeo.14

  • I\\\\

11121111

STANDING

ORDER

OPTRNG

PROC-2

PUMPS

Event Barriers

DCP-3

PUMPS

PROC-3

PUMPS

HEATUP

OP TRNG

SIU

DCP TECH

ON DCP

ASSESSMENT

REV

STARTUP

MEL

I

CORRECT

CONFIGURATION

INCORRECT

--********************************************..._~~~~--.. CONFDURATION

PAR

1111192

l.Oell0.15

..

I~ Root Cause Evahtation (Connnued) I

  • DETERMINE IF THE ROOT CAUSE WAS THE SAME AS

THE AUGUST 21, 1991 EVENT

..

- NO INDICATION FROM MANAGEMENT OR OPERATIONS

THAT SUBSTITUTION OF MANUAL OPERATOR

ACTIONS FOR AN AUTOMATIC SAFETY FUNCTION IS

AN ACCEPTABLE PRACTICE

- DESIGN CHANGE PROCESS WAS INCONSISTENT

REGARDING THE USE OF OPERATOR ACTIONS

  • DETERMINE IF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FROM THE

AUGUST 21, 1991 EVENTWEREADEQUATEAND

EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED

-ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS PUT IN PLACE

EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDED RECURRENCE UNTIL PAR

WAS IMPLEMENTED

- COMMITMENT TRACKING SYSTEM TRACKED

CORRECTIVE ACTION THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION

l.Dtle0.111

'.,

I\\\\.*. Root Cause Evah,,ation ( Continued) I

  • DETERMINE WHY THE EVENT WAS NOT

DISCOVERED EARLIER

- EXPECTED 3 PUMPS TO BE IN AUTOMATIC BUT

ACCEPTED 2-PUMP CONFIGURATION BECAUSE

  • ALIGNMENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY

PROCEDURE AND HAD NOT BEEN CHANGED

DURING STARTUP

  • NEED FOR VENTILATION TESTING

LD660.17

~~,

,, Root Cause Evaluation (Continued) I _

  • RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- ENHANCE BARRIERS THAT WILL PREVENT AN

INCORRECT CHARGING PUMP

CONFIGURATION

- REVIEW OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

TO DETERMINE IF ADDITIONAL DESIGN

ISSUES EXIST

- INFORM OPERATORS OF EVENT AND

ENCOURAGE THEM TO QUESTION AND FULLY

UNDERSTAND OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS

L.Deeo.18

,.

11\\ Corrective Actions And Safety Sign:i.ficance I

VIRGINIA POWER

M.R.KANSLER

SURRY STATION MANAGER

L.Oeeo.19

J

,,

Corrective Actions

I

  • IMMEDIATELY PLACE CHARGING/HHSI PUMPS IN

COMPLETE

PROPER CONFIGURATION

  • VERIFY THE UNIT 2 PUMP CONFIGURATION

COMPLETE

WAS SATISFACTORY

  • ISSUE STATION DEVIATION REPORT

COMPLETE

  • MAKE ONE-HOUR REPORT TO NRC

COMPLETE

  • REQUEST ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION (RCE) FROM

COMPLETE

CORPORATE NUCLEAR SAFETY

  • ISSUE A STANDING ORDER REQUIRING DEFEAT OF THE

COMPLETE

1A

1 PUMP UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP PENDING PERMANENT

PROCEDURE REVISION

t.Deeo.20

11\\

Corrective Actions (Continued)

  • UPDATE THE MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL)

TO ADDRESS THE

1A

1 PUMP UNDERVOLTAGE

CONFIGURATION

  • PLACE "CAUTION" TAG ON THE MAIN CONTROL

BOARDS

  • REVISE APPLICABLE PROCEDURES WITH SRO

INVOLVEMENT

  • CONDUCT MANAGEMENT BRIEFS WITH

OPERATING SHIFTS TO REVIEW THE EVENT AND

TO REINFORCE THE OPERATORS' "QUESTIONING

Al IHUDE"

  • COACH MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL ON THE

. IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

AND COMMUNICATION OF CHANGES

  • INTERIM MANAGEMENT REVIEW BOARD (MRB)

OVERSIGHT OF CHANGE ACTIVmEs

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

ONGOING

I

L.Oeeo.21

  • ~.

I ...

-:-----------,,

--"~

Planned Corrective Actions

_

  • STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT CONTROL OVER

CHANGE PROCESSES

- INITIATE STATION PLAN TO EVALUATE

CHANGE CONTROL PROCESS

- ENSURE CHANGE CONTROL IS INTEGRATED

INTO ROUTINE OPERATIONS

  • REVIEW THE USE OF OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE

CONTROLS TO DETERMINE IF DESIGN ISSUES

EXIST

l.Oee0.22

r

I\\\\

Safety Significance

  • THREE CHARGING PUMPS WERE AVAILABLE WITH

EMERGENCY POWER PROVIDED

  • SIMULATOR VALIDATION SHOWS THAT OPERATORS

PROMPTLY (<15 SECONDS) DIAGNOSE AND RESTORE

CHARGING FLOW IN THE EVENT OF AN 'A' PUMP

LOCKOUT

  • EOP IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS COVER MANUAL START

OF CH/HHSI PUMPS

- APPENDIX K LOCA PEAK CLAD TEMPERATURE

REQUIREMENTS MET

- CURRENT SITE BOUNDARY DOSE AND CONTROL

ROOM HABITABILITY CALCULATIONS REMAIN

BOUNDING

  • PROBABILITY OF DESIGN BASIS EVENT IS LOW (1.23 .. E-6)

I

LDe8o.23

I

1111111-------Conc-lu-sions-* -------,,

VIRBl/f/lA POWER

J.P. O'HANLON

VICE PRESIDENT-NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

L.Deeo.24

  • j

111111,------eooc--1u-s-ions-------,I

  • EVENT IDENTIFICATION/RESPONSE

- LICENSEE IDENTIFIED

- IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THE NRC UPON

IDENTIFICATION OF THE DISCREPANT CONDITION

- IMMEDIATELY RETURNED THE CHARGING PUMP

ALIGNMENT TO PROPER CONFIGURATION

  • THOROUGH ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION PERFORMED
  • TIMELY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE IMPLEMENTED FOR

THE MAY 11, 1992 EVENT TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

  • CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED IN RESPONSE TO *

THE AUGUST 21, 1991 EVENT WERE ADEQUATE AND

EFFECTIVE TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

LOell0.25

,,

Conclusions *

  • DIFFERENT ROOT CAUSE THAN THE

AUGUST 21, 1991 EVENT

  • ISOLATED EVENT
  • MINIMAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

I