ML18152A494
| ML18152A494 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1991 |
| From: | Aiello R, Lawyer L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A495 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-91-300, NUDOCS 9112120142 | |
| Download: ML18152A494 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1991300
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 11
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
ENCLOSURE 1
REQUALIFlCATION EXAMINATION REPORT - 50-280/91-300
Facility Licensee:
Virgiriia El~ctric and Power Company
5000 Dominion Boulevlrd
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Facility Name:
Surry Nuclear Power Station
Facility Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
Written and Operating Requalification Examinations were conducted
Nuclear Power Station locate near Gravel Neck, Virginia.
"/J
at the Surry
- ,_,,,/
/'I
/,:>
Chief Examiner:
Ronal .~hief Examtner
/IL}°s')q/
Approved By:
SCOPE:
L. Lawyer, Chief
Licensing Section 1
of Reactor Safety *
SUMMARY
Date Signed
Date Signed
Requalification Examinations were conducted during the weeks of September 9
and 23, 1991.
Written and operating examinations were administered to eight
Reactor Operators and eight Senior Reactor Operators.
RESULTS:
Seven of the eight Reactor Operators passed the examination.
Eight of the
eight Senior Reactor Operators passed the examination.
Four crew simulator
exaini nations were administered. A 11 crews were rated as satisfactory.
Based on these results, fifteen of sixteen licensed operators (93.8 percent)
passed these examinations.
The Surry Requalification Program has been
determined to be satisfactory.
Strengths: Strengths in the Surry Requalification Program were noted in JPM
format, construction and equipment simulation (Paragraph 3.C.l.a),
simulator scenario critical task identification (Paragraph
3.C.2.a), written examination construction and comprehension
(Paragraph 3.C.3.a}, simulator infidelity resolution (Paragraph
3.G) and laboratories and mock-up use (Paragraph 3.H).
9112120142 911114
-
ADOCK 65000280
y
2
Weaknesses: Program weaknesses were identified in JPM administration
(Paragraph 3.C.l . .b), operator communications and acknowledgement
of alarms (Paragraph 3.D.l) and equipment.status verification
(Par~graph 3.D.2.a).
One IFI (50-280,281/91-300-0l) concerning a conflict between AP-20 and FCA-
1.01 was identified (Paragraph 3.C.3.b.2).
REPORr- DETAILS
1.
Facility Employees Attending Exit Inter.view:
J. McCarthy, Superintendent, Operations
A. Friedman, Superintendent, Nuclear Trainirig
H. Mctallum, Operations Coordinator~ Training
L. Gardner, Lead Simulator Instructor
J. Spence, Senior Instructof
A. Brown, Supervisor Nuclear Training
T. Williams, Manager Nuclear Training
D. Modlin, Check.Operator
A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
R. Sanders, Assistant Vice President Nuclear Operations
2.
NRC Personnel Attending Exit Interview:
- R. Aiello, NRC, Region II
G. Harris, NRC, Region II
M. Parrish, EG&G
M. Branch, SRI
- Chief Examiner
3.
Discussion
A.
Program Evaluation:
Based on the examination results, th~ Surry Requalificatibn
Program meets the criteriori established in NUREG-1021, ES-
601.C.2.b (Revision 6).
One unsatisfactory individual performance.
was subject to a re-evaluation as set forth in ES-601.D.l.
An NRC
retake requalification examination was administered to this
operator during the second week.
Following re-examination, this
individual's performance was determined to be satisfactory.
B.
Reference Material:
The examination team reviewed and found the reference material to*
be adequate to support the examination.
The licensee supplied a
samp 1 i ng p 1 an de,scri bing the re qua l i fi cation eye le and the
selection process used for the topics included in the
examinations.
A review was conducted of the facility's proposed written, walk-
through and dynamic simulator examinations.
It was determined
that the validation times for questions on both the static
simulator and open reference examinations reflected the time that.
a knowledgeable operator would require to answer the questions.
The NRC substituted new material for about ten percent of each
section of the examination. This was done in accordance with
-**
C.
2
NUREG-1021. The remainder of the examination was approved with
minor changes.
Proposed Examination:
1.
JPMs:
a.
Strengths
1.
Greater than ninety percent of the JPM questions
were analytical in nature ..
2.
The JPMs were written to take advantage of
training resources such as equipment simulators
and mockups.
3.
. The JPMs were well structured and formatted.
4.
The JPM bank covered many subject areas that
were important to plant safety.
b.
Weaknesses
1.
Three JPMs contained only three to four steps to
complete the task; Although these JPMs were
safety significant and high in K/A value, they
provided little discriminatory value.
2.
Two JPMs over-prompted the operator by providing
too much information.
For example, one JPM step
required the operator to cross-connect unit 1
and 2 charging pump service water systems by
cuing him to "open l-SW-269, Charging Pump (CP)
Service Water Cross-connect".
The beginning cue
was changed to read "cross-connect units 1 & 2
CP service water systems."
In addition, the
team added a fault to this JPM. The fault was
the failure of l-SW-269 to function. This
condition required the operator to use the other
train. Similarly, another JPM instructed the
operator "to perform the immediate operator
actions of FR-S.l for ATWT~.
Th~ instructions
now read "Your task is to perform the required
actions."
3.
The examination did not include any SRO specific
JPMs. Therefore, the exam team wrote and
administered one .
2.
3
Simulator Scenarios:
a.
Strengths.
Critical tasks were all important and safety
significant.
b.
Weaknesses*
1.
Scenario 7 (FR-H.l and FR-P.l) contained actions
that required the operator to only verify
indications.
2.
Scenario 7 and scenario 20 failed to use
Technical Specifications and Abnormal Operating
Procedures as required by the examiners
standard.
3.
Written Examination:
About 40% of the examination questions require the examinee
to calculate, analyze, or evaluate.
a.
Strengths
The written examination exceeded the guidelines as
outlined in the Examiner Handbook and ES-602.
Moreover, the questions* were easy to read and
comprehend.
b.
Weaknesses
1.
The Part A examination contained some questions
- that could be used for Part Band vice-versa. In
addition, contrary to the examiners standard,
Part B contained six "direct look up" questions.
2.
Question 19 on the second week part "B" exam
contained more than one correct answer.
This
- was due to the conflict between procedure AP-20
(Main Control Room inaccessibility) and FCA-1.01
(Limiting Main Control Room Fires). The RNO in
AP-20 directed the ~perator to operate the steam
dumps locally to maintairi RCS temperature.
FCA-
1.01 directed the operator to isolate main steam
lines by closing all MSTVs.
This action would
prevent local operation of the steam dumps.
The
answer key was also incorrect because the answer
required a pressure band whereas the procedure
(AP-'20) required a temperature band.
In
addition, the answer did not refer to several
parameters such as pressurizer level that wo~ld
D.
4
have to be maintained in HSD conditions.
The
discrepancy between procedures AP-20 and FCA-
1.01 will be identified. as IFI 50-280,281/91-
300-0l .
. Operator Performance
Operator performance was adequate; however, some weaknesses were
- i dent i fi ed.
1.
Simulator
a.
Frequently operators were slow to silence alarms.
The
failure to expeditiously silence alarms detracted from
crew performance.
b.
Off normal trends were not recognized prior to the
actuation of the annunciators.
c.
Communication during casualties was inadequate. For
example, an announcement was not made to the crew to
alert them to adverse containment conditions.
Moreover, one-crew continually disregarded the need
for closed loop communications. This is contrary to
procedure VPAP-1407 Section 6.4.1, Face-To-Face
Communications Methods.
Crew performance in the simulator part of the examination
was satisfactory.
2.
JPM Performance
a.
Indications were not being clearly verified by
operators.
The examiners had to counsel operators on
the performance of indication verification.
For
example, Abnormal Procedure O-AP-5.20 (Radiation
monitor System Ventilation Vent Hi Alarm) requires
switch A0D-VS-109A/B to be placed in the filter
position. This action caused AOD-VS-110 damper to
change position.
The indication for this damper was
found on the Auxiliary Vent Panel VNTX-R on the
opposite side of the simulator.
One operator failed
to verify that the damper had repositioned.
The
failure to perform verification of indications was a
training weakness.
b.
JPM 41.0lB (Initiate Emergency Boration locally)
required an operator to open valve 2-CH-228 (Manual
Emergency Boration Valve). This valve was on the East
wall of the boric acid flats area.
While performing
this itep of the JPM the operator broke the vertical
E.
5
plane above the contamination area posting rope.
This
action was contrary to station radiological control
and ALARA procedures.
A spec~al caution was added to
the walkthrough briefing to prevent a repeat of this
event.
Examination Administration:
1.
JPM 99.04 (Perform FR-S.l, ATWS) required the operator to
perform the immediate actions of FR-S.l. JPM 99.04 was also
a time-critical JPM.
This JPM allowed the operator 3.5
minutes to perform the task .. This time did not compare
favorably with the actual time needed to complete this task.
Most of the operators finished this task in less than one
minute.
2.
The events in scenario #7 required operators to transition
into FR H.l. * Both facility evaluators and examiners were
hampered from following these operator actions due lack of
guidance in the scenario script.
3.
The facility was directed to develop a malfunction in
scenario 19 that would open the supply breaker to valve CH-
MOV-1381 (RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve).
It was intended
that the su*pply breaker malfunction should occur when a
containment isolation phase A signal was present. This
malfunction should have fai1ed the valve without control
board position indication.
However, the facility developed
malfunction failed the valve open with its supply breaker
remaining closed. This prevented the evaluation of crew
response to a loss of position indication.
F.
Facility Evaluators:
All facility evaluators were found to be satisfactory.
However,
the following deficiencies were identified:
1.
Facility evaluators were not careful to have operators
emphasize verification of indications during the performance
of JPMs.
2.
Facility evaluators sometimes gave improper cues to the
candidates.
For example, the evaluator gave an operator
values for meter indications.without having the operator
show which meter he was reading.
These evaluator deficiencies had no impact on individual pass/fail
decisions.
G.
Simulator Fidelity:
6
The team reviewed the degree to which the simulator m~t the
operational requirements of ANS 3.5. This review showed that the*
processing of Simulator Modification Reports (SMR) was adequate.
However, no formal methods of communicating .SMRs to the training
staff existed. This was confirmed during subsequent interviews
with instructors. Therefore, the team concluded. that some
instructors and operators might not be aware of some of the
differences between the simulator and the plant. In addition, the
facility responses to NRCs questions (NRC letter dated 8/23/89)
concerning the simulator perfo*rmance were not included in* the
simulator certification. Moreover, no formal method existed to
ensure that these questions were addressed and that the subsequent
simulator modifications would be incorporated into the next
recertification.
Both of the above discrepancies were identified during the prep
week.
The facility had taken prompt action to correct both
deficiencies prior to the team returning for the first week exam.
SMRs are now a required reading for instruttors.
In addition, the
NRC questions and facility responses were made an integral part of
the simulator certification. This prompt corrective action was
considered a training department strength.
Step 2 of JPM 65.03 (Recover a Dropped Control Rod) requ~res the
operator to rotate the rod control mode select switch from manual
to the CBA position. The operator should then verify a .rod speed*
of 48 steps per minutes on SI-I-408. However,after performing
these steps the rod s~eed indication read only 38 steps per
minute.
H.
Laboratories and mock-ups:
The facility has taken significant steps to ensure that station
maintenance and operations personnel receive the most effective
training possible. Surry Nuclear Power Station has developed
laboratories and acquired equipment for hands-on training.
The
labs are equipped with both plant and laboratory equipment.
The
extensive use of these training aids is a training department
strength.
I.
General Observations:
The exam team observed that most of the labels on valves are "dog
tags" that present a burn hazard.
Moreover, these tags are
difficult to read.
The lack of adequate labelling was identified
as a operations weakness during the requalification exam
administered in September of 1990 (50-280/0L-90-02). The utility
currently has a program in place to correct these labelling
deficiencies.
During the in plant walkthroughs the examiners found that the AFW
7
booster pump control switches (FW-P-4 A & B) were not labeled.
JPM 58.01 (Place Hydrogen Analyzers in service following a LOCA)
required an operator to place an affected unit's hydrogen analyzer
in service. After containment conditions were verified and valve
lineups were performed, the procedure instructed the operator to
start the analyzer.
Prior to this step,.a note informed the
operator that heat tracing circuitry must be energized for a
minimum of twenty minutes, otherwise, analyzer readings would be
inaccurate. This time requirement is critical to the proper
operation of the analyzer and therefore, should have been a
tritical st~p. Additionaliy, the time requirement contai~s a
warning but is not written as a CAUTION as required by plant
procedure.
J.
Security & HP Inprocessing:
No problems were encountered with either security or health
physics processing.
4.
Exit Interview
At the conclusion of the site visit, the examiners met with .the.
representatives of the plant staff, indicated in paragraph 1, _to discuss
-the results of the examinations and inspection findings.* The licensee
did not identify as proprietary any material provided to or reviewed by
the exami~ers. * The examiners further described the areas inspected and
discussed in detail the inspection finding listed below.
Dissenting
comments were not received from the licensee.
50-280/91-300-01
Status
Open
Description/Paragraph
IFI, Resolve conflict
between AP~20 (Main
Control Room
inaccessibility) and
FCA-1.01 (Limiting Main
Control * Room
Fires)/Paragraph 3.8.3
ENCLOSURE 2
REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT
Based on the examination results, the Surry Requalification Program met the
criteria established in NUREG-1021, ES~601.C.2.b (Revision 6), and has been
determined to be satisfactory.
One unsatisfactory individual performance was
re-evaluated according to the requirements set forth in ES-601.D.l. On re-
examination, this individual's performance was determined to be satisfactory.
1.
Reference Material and Proposed Examination:
The examination team reviewed the reference material supplied by the
licensee and found it to be adequate to support the examination.
The
licensee supplied a sampling plan that described the requalification
cycle and the process that was used to select examination topics.
Facility proposed written, walkthrough and dynamic simulator
examinations derived from this sample plan were reviewed by the NRC
examination team.
The validation times for questions on both the static
simulator and open reference exams were determined to reflect accurately
the time which a- competent operator would have needed to answer
correctly the questions.
The examination team substituted new material
for about 10 percent of each section of the examination as required by
A.
JPMs:
1.
Strengths
a.
Greater than 90% of the JPM questions were analytical
in nature.
b.
Equipment mockups were used during JPM performance.
c.
The JPMs were well formatted and structured.
d.
The JPM bank contained a variety of operational tasks.
2.
Weaknesses
a.
Three JPMs contained only three to four steps.
b.
Although these JPMs were safety significant, they
provided little discriminatory value.
Two JPMs contained cues that provided too much
information to the operator.
For example, one cue
provided instructions*to the operator on how to cross-
connect unit 1 and 2 charging pump service water
systems.
The cue instructed the operator to "open 1-
Enclosure 2
2
SW-269, Charging Pump Service Water Cross-connect".
This cue was changed to read "cross-connect units 1 &
2 CP service water systems. In another JPM, an ATWT
condition existed that required the operator to
perform immediate actions from memory.
The initiating
cue of the JPM instructed the operator" to perform
the immediate operator actions of FR-S.l for a ATWT."
This provided the operator with too much information.
The cue was changed to read "You are tasked to perform
the required actions". Moreover, the examination did
not include any SRO specific JPMs.
Therefore, the
examination team wrot~ one and administered one.
c.
Two JPMs contained inadequate lead-in steps (i.~.
focused directly on the task). This made these tasks
less of a discriminator to judge operator performance.
These JPMs were replaced by the examination team.
B.
WRITTEN EXAMS:
1. *
Strengths
a.
Approximately 40% of the examination questions
required the examinee to either calculate, analyze, or
evaluate.
b.
The written examinitions exceeded the guidelines as
required by the Examiner Handbook and ES-602.
Most
examination questions were easy to read and
comprehend.
2.
Weaknesses
a.
The Part A exams contained some questions that were
more suited for the Part Band vic~-verse. Part B
contained six questions that were "direct look up".
This is contrary to guidelines established in the
examiner's standard .
. b.
Question 19 on the second week part "B" exam contained
more than one correct answer.
This was due to the
conflict between procedures AP-20 (Main Control Room
Inaccessibility) and FCA-1.01 (Limiting Main Control
Room Fires).
The RNO in AP-20 directed the operator
to locally manipulate the steam dump valves to
maintain temperature. However, FCA-1.01 directed the
operator to verify that main steam was isolated by
closing all MSTVs. Closing the MSTVs prevented local
bperation of th~ steam dump valves.
The answer key
was also incorrect because it required a pressure band
where as the procedure (AP-20) required a temperature
band.
Furthermore, the answer did not refer to
Enclosure 2
3
several other parameters such as pressurizer l~vel
- that would have to be maintained in HSD conditions.
The AP-20 and FCA-1.01 procedure conflict has been
identified as IFI 50-280,281/91-300-0l.
C.
SCENARIOS:
Review of the simulator scenarios was simplified by the licensee's
. implementation of recommended changes during the 1991 NRC
Requalification Examination review.
The licensee's positive
response to theie recommendations has enhanced the simulator
scenarios and the examination process.
1.
Strengths
Critical tasks were clearly identified by the facility and
w~re safety significant.
2.
Weaknesses -
a.
Simulator scenario 7 (FR-H.l and FR-P.1) required no
actions other than verification.*
b.
Scenario 7 and scenario 20 failed to use Technical
Specification and Abnormal Operating Procedures a~
required by the examiner's standard.
2.
Operator Performance:
A.
Operator weaknesses observed during the simulator portion of the
examination:
1.
The 6perators were slow to silence alarms.
The failure to
expeditiously silence alarms detracted from the crew's
performance.'
2.
Operators failed to recognize off normal trends prior to the
sounding of the alarms.
3.
Communication during casualties was inadequate. For example,
events such as adverse containment were not announced to the
entire crew.
Moreover,the lack of closed loop
communications was observed throughout the scenario sets.
This is contrary to station procedure VPAP-1407 Section
6.4.1, Face-To-Face Communications Methods.
B.
Operator weaknesses observed during the walkthrough portion of the
examination:
I.
Operators were not verifying indications. The examiners had
to counsel operators on how to perform verifications.
For
Enclosure 2
4
example, Abnormal Procedure O-AP-5.20 (Radiation Monitoi
System Ventilation Vent Hi Alarm) required switch AOD-VS-
1_09A/B to be pl aced in the filter position. This switch is
located on the vent panel. This action caused AOD-VS-110
damper to reposition.
The indication for this damper was
loc*ated on the Auxiliary Vent Panel VNTX-R on the opposite
side of the simulator.
One operator failed to verify that
the damper had repositioned.
2.
During the performance of JPM 41.0IB (Initiate Emergency
Boration locally), first exam week, an operator was required
to manipulate valve 2-CH-228 (Manual Emergency Boratio~
Valve) loc~ted on the East wall of the boric acid flats
area.
The operator failed to comply with local radiological
procedures.and ALARA criteria when he broke the vertical
plane of the air space above the contamination area posting
rope.
The licensee took prompt corrective action by adding the
items listed below to the~ystem walk-through briefing
checklist .
. a.
OBSERVE & OBEY ALL STATION HP PRACTICES.
Observe and
respect all posted areas.
If a JPM should involve
pointing to a valve/component on the' controlled side
of a posted area, use a flashl*ight and do not break
the vertical plane of.the air space above the posting
_rope.
b.
Ensure that you verbalize your actions during the.
performance of the JPM.
This includes p6inting out
the appropriate meter/indication that you are looking
at and vocalizing what you observe or expect to
observe.
c.
If during the performance of a JPM, you feel it is
necessary to contact the Shift Supervisor (just as you
would if you were actually performing the'task) point
this out to the facility evaluator and he will provide
the appropriate response that a Shift Supervisor would
provide.
d.
If during the performance of a JPM, it becomes
necessary to contact or direct an auxiliary operator
to perform a local action:
In the simulator, contact them just as you would
in the plant.
During the walkthrough, inform the evaluator and
provide him the same directions you would give
the auxiliary operator.
Enclosure 2
5
3.
Examination Administration:
A.
JPM. 99.04 (Pe~form FR-S.l, ATWS). req~fred the operator to perform
the immediate operator actions of FR-S.l. The JPM is also tim~
critical in that it required the operator to finish the task
within a specific amount of time (i.e. 3.5 minutes)
However, many
operators completed the task in less than one minute. The critical
time was changed to reflect the actual time needed to perform the
task.
B.
During scenario #7, operators were required to transition into FR
H.l. Although this transition was a predictable success path it
was not contained in the scenario script. Subsequently, the
~xaminers had to either follow along in the prbcedures with the
operators or rely on their personal knowledge of procedure l-E-0.
- C.
It was requested by the examination team to develop a malfunction
in scenario 19 that would open the supply breaker to valve CH-MOV-
1381, RCP Seal Return Isolation.
It was intended that the supply
breaker malfunction should occur when a containment isolation
signal was present. This malfunction should have failed the valve
without control board position indication. However,the
ma l function as designed by the facility a 11 owed the breaker to
remain tlosed. This prevent~d the evaluation of the operator's
response to a loss of position indicati~n.
4.
Evaluation of Facility evaluators:
All facility evaluators were rated satisfactory.
However, the following
deficiencies were noted.
A.
Facility evaluators had to be counseled regarding the need for
operators to verbalize their verifications during the performance
of JPMs.
B.
While conducting JPM 55.01 (Manually Start an EDG at the Local
Panel), the evaluator gave the operator values for meter
indications without having the operator indicate the meter he was
reading.
These evaluator deficiencies, although significant, had no impact on the
crew or individual pass/fail decisions.
ENCLOSURE 3
SIMULATOR FACILITY.REPORT
Facility Licensee:
Surry Nuclear Power Station
Facility Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
Operating*Tests Administered During:
The Weeks of September 9 and 23 1991
This form is used only to report observations. These observations do not
constitute, in and of themselves, audit or inspectinn findings and are not,
without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10
CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certificatiori or approval
of the simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used
in future evaluations.
No licensee action is required solely in response to
these observations.
During the conduct. of the simulator portion of the operating test, the
following items were observed:
The team reviewed the degree to which the simulator met the operational
requirements of ANS 3.5. This review indicated that the processing of
Simulator Modification Reports (SMR) is adequate.
However, no formal method
of communicating SRMs to the staff instructors exist. Several instructors
were interviewed to confirm this concern.
It is the NRCs perception that the
instructors and operators are not aware of some of* the differences between the
simulator and the control room.
Facility's responses to the NRCs questions concerning simulator performance
(NRC letter dated 8/23/89) are not included in the current simulator
certification document.
Furthermore, no method *existed to ensure that these
questions were addressed and that approved simulator modifications were
incorporated into the existing certification document.
Both discrepancies were identified during the prep week.
The facility had
taken prompt action to correct both deficiencies prior to the team returning
for the first week exam.
This action included placing a required reading book
containing the SMRs in the simulator and making the NRC questions and facility
responses a part of the simuJator certifitation.