ML18152A466
| ML18152A466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1995 |
| From: | Forbes D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A467 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-95-21, 50-281-95-21, NUDOCS 9511140307 | |
| Download: ML18152A466 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1995021
Text
Report Nos. :
UNITED STATES .
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
50-280/95-21 and 50-281/95-21
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
October 2-6, 1995
Inspector: ~ /3 ~
Approved
D. B. Forbes
by: ~ntt~ /< &d~h~0
T. Decker, Acting Chief
Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
11/1 ~?5
D'ate igned
Date 'Signed
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of occupational
radiation exposure.
Specific elements of the program examined included:
organization and management control; audits and appraisals; external exposure
control; internal exposure control; surveys, monitoring, and control of
radioactive material; and maintaining occupational radiation exposure as low.
as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
Results:
Based on observations, interviews with licensee management, superv1s1on,
personnel from station departments, and records reviewed, the inspector found
the licensee's program for occupational radiation safety was functioning
adequately to protect the health and safety of the radiation workers and the
general public.
Radiation Protection staffing levels appeared adequate to
support on-going activities and RP personnel interviewed were well trained.
The licensee's self-assessment program was conducted in accordance with
requirements.
The licensee continued to implement effectiv~ internal and
external exposure control programs with all exposures less than 10 CFR Part 20
limits.
However, one non-cited violation was identified as failure to wear
dosimetry as required by radiation protection procedure (Paragraph 5.).
9511140307 951101
ADOCK 05000280
G
Enclosure
1.
2.
REPORT DETAILS
Persons Contacted
- M.
- D.
- M.
- B.
- D.
- D.
- B.
- H.
- J.
D.
- G.
- F.
D.
M.
- J.
- S.
- R.
- B.
- E.
- D.
- T.
T.
- J.
E.
Biron, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
Boone, Quality Assurance
Bowling, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
Bryant, Licensing
Christian, Station Manager
Erickson, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
Garber, Licensing
McCallum, Nuclear Training
McCarthy, Assistant Station Manager
Miller, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
Miller, Corporate Licensing
McConnell, Materials
Noce, Radiation Protection
Olin, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
Price, Assistant Station Manager
Sarver, Operations
Saunders, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Shriver, Assistant Station Manager
Smith; Quality Assurance
Sommers, Licensing
Sowers, Engineering
Steed, ALARA Coordinator, Radiation Protection*
Steinert, Quality Assurance
Topping, Radiation Protection
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included:
craftsmen, engineers, operators, contract personnel, and administrative
personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Kern, Resident Inspector
K. Poertner, Resident Inspector
- A. Belisle, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects~ RII
- Attended Exit Interview conducted on October 6, 1995.
Organization and Management Controls (83750)
The inspector reviewed the staffing of the radiation protection (RP)
organization as related to lines of authority and noted no changes since
the previous inspection conducted June 5-9, 1995, and documented in NRC
Inspection Report (IR) 50-280/95-11 and 50-281/95-11.
At the time of the
inspection, Unit 1 was undergoing a 37-day refueling outage and Unit 2 was
operating.
Enclosure
2
Based on a review of this area, the inspector noted that at the time of
the inspection, the licensee maintained an adequate level of staffing to
support ongoing operations and all RP personnel interviewed were well
trained to perform their assigned duties.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Audits and Appraisals (83750)
10 CFR 20.llOl(c) requires that the licensee periodi~ally (at least
annually) review the radiation protection program content and
implementation.
The inspector noted that since the last inspection in this area conducted
June 5-9, 1995, and documented in IR 50-280/95-11 and 50-281/95-11, an
audit had been conducted by the licensee's Quality Assurance Organization
entitled, "Radiological Protection Program Audit," 95-06, dated
September 5-9, 1994.
The audit assessed the following Radiological
Protection Program attributes:
Internal Exposure Control
External Exposure Control
Radiation Detection Instrumentation Program
Transportation of Radioactive Material and Waste
Training and Qualifications
Based on the audit results, the licensee concluded that regulatory
requirements were effectively being implemented.
The licensee audit
reported that this determination was based on interviews, observations of
work being performed, reviews of implementing documents, and applicable .
corrective actions implemented since the completion of the previous audits
in these areas.
However, some areas of weakness were identified in the
area of procedural compliance.
The licensee determined duri~g a follow-up
of previously opened items, that an RP audit finding {S94-07-0l), which
was issued because some workers did not understand survey data and
Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements prior to entering the
Radiological Control Area {RCA), would remain open.
The licensee did note
that worker awareness had improved and follow-up corrective actions had
. been performed; however, this item was not closed pending* further
evaluation by the licensee during the Unit 1 outage in September of 1995.
The inspector determined that the licensee was identifying areas of
weakness or non-compliance for improvement and that the audits being
performed were meeting the licensee's requirements for performing annual
audits in .the area of RP.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's internal program for self-
identification of weaknesses as it related to the RP program other than
those identified during the annual audit and the appropriateness of
corrective actions taken.
The program included Station Deviation Reports
(SDRs) and Radiation Awareness Reports (RARs).
Both systems were utilized
by the licensee to document, investigate, and track items of concern.
The
Enclosure
3
SDR system was a plant-wide system for identification of concerns, while
the RAR was a lower-tier system utilized mainly by the RP organization to
identify a variety of minor concerns.
The inspector reviewed various RARs initiated in 1995 and noted that the
licensee was identifying substantive items of concern and was following
through with appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
In general, the audits reviewed were determined to be well planned and met
requirements for conducting audits in the area of radiation protection, as
required by the licensee's appraisal process.
4.
Internal Exposure Controls (83750)
10 CFR 20.1703(a)(3) permits the licensee to maintain and to implement a
respiratory protection program that includes, at a minimum:
air sampling
sufficient to identify the hazard; surveys and bioassay to evaluate the
actual intakes; testing of respirators immediately prior to each use;
written procedures regarding selection, fitting, issuance, maintenance and
testing of respirators; written pr9cedures regarding supervision and
training of personnel and monitoring, including air sampling and
bi. oassays; record keeping; and determination by a physician prior to the*
use of respirators, that the individual user is physically able to use
respiratory protective equipment .
The inspector reviewed portions of the licensee's incorporation of
10 FR 20.1703(a)(3) during this inspection tQ include: air sampling,
bioassay results, and records for six employees who had recently worn
respiratory protection equipment.
The inspector verified that for the
records reviewed, each worker had successfully completed respiratory
protection training, was medically qualified, and was fit~tested for the*.
specific respirator type used in accordance with the licensee procedural
requirements.
The inspector also reviewed bioassay results for
approximately 120 individuals who had worked in the RCA and reviewed air
sample results for three specific jobs where airborne radioactivity was
monitored. At the time of the inspection, the licensee was tracking
approximately 124 positive intakes for 1995, of which, all were less than
10 percent of an annual Allowable Limit of Intake (ALI).
Many of the
positive intakes resulted in no internal dose after evalu~tions were
performed.
Individual intakes for 1995 were reviewed with cognizant
licensee personnel to verify the methodology for assigning a Committed
Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE).
The maximum CEDE for a single
individual was approximately 50 millirem which was a small percentage of
the regulatory limits of 5,000 millirem per year.
The inspector discussed with the licensee, respirator reduction efforts to
enhance ALARA concepts with respect to worker training and use of face
shields, decontamination efforts to minimize the potentia] for airborne .
radioactivity, and various engineering controls to include work site and
building ventilation* systems. Approximately six Radiation Work Permits
were reviewed by the inspector to determine if engineering controls were
being applied during the Unit 1 outage as required by licensee procedure
for jobs where surveys indicated that high levels of contamination existed
Enclosure
4
and respiratory protection was not worn.
The inspector noted that
engineering controls had been included on the Radiation Work Permits
(RWPs) reviewed.
Based on the review conducted in this area, the inspector*determined that
the licensee had controlled internal exposures*below regulatory limits.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
External Exposure Controls (83750)
10 CFR 20.1101, "Radiation Protection Programs", (a) states "Each licensee
shall develop, document, and implement a radiation protection program
commensurate with the scope and extent of licensed activities and
sufficient to ensure compliance with the provisions of this part."
Technical Specification 6.48 requires that procedures for personnel
radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of
10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained, and adhered to for all
operations involving radiation exposure.
10 CFR 20.150l(c)(l) and (2) requires that dosimeters used to comply with
10 CFR 20.1201 shall be processed and evaluated by a processor accredited
by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) for the
types of radiation being monitored .
10 CFR 20.1502(a) requires each licensee to monitor occupational exposure
to radiation and supply and require the use of individual monitoring
devices by:
(1) Adults likely to receive, in one year from sources external to the
body, a dose in excess of 10 percent of the limits in
(2) Minors and declared pregnant women likely to receive, in one year for
sources external to the body, a dose in excess of 10 percent of any of
the applicable limits of 10 CFR 20.1207 or 10 CFR 20.1208; and
(3) Individuals entering a high or very high radiation area.
10 CFR 20.1201 (a) requires each licensee to control the occupati-0nal
dose to individual adults, except for planned special exposures less
than 20.1206, to the following dose limits:
(1)
An annual limit, which is the more limiting of:
(i) The total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) being equal to
5 rems; or
(ii) The sum of the deep-dose equivalent and the committed dose
equivalent (CDE) to any individual organ or tissue other
than the lens of the eye being equal* to 50 rems;
Enclosure
5
(2)
The annual limi.ts to the lens of the eye, to the skin, and to the
extremities, which are:
(i)
An eye dose equivalent of 15 rems; and
(ii) A shallow-dose equivalent (SOE) of 50 rems to the skin or to
any extremity.
The inspector selectively reviewed the licensee's dosimetry program to
ensure that the licensee was meeting the monitoring requirements of
revised 10 CFR Part 20.
The inspector verified that the licensee was
NVLAP accredited based on the licensee maintaining a current NVLAP
certificate.
Licensee representatives stated, and the inspector confirmed, that all
TEDE, COE, and SDE exposures assigned since the previous NRC inspection of
this area were within 10 CFR Part 20 limits.
During tours of the RCA, the inspect.or observed personnel wearing
dosimetry devices appropriately as required by RWPs.
However, between
September 17-29, 1995, the licensee identified four individuals who had
entered the RCA not wearing dosimetry as required by the RWPs for the
areas entered.
The following multiple examples of failure to adhere to
radiation control procedures were identified:
On September 17, 1995, a worker.entered the Unit 1 Reactor Containment
Building to work on the "A" Steam Generator work platform.
Upon
exiting the area, the worker determined that he was not wearing
extremity thermoluminescent dosimetry (TLD) on the left and right
wrist as required by the RWP.
The worker immediately notified RP
personnel that he had not worn the required dosimetry.
Based on
records reviewed, the inspector determined that the l~censee had
appropriately assigned exposure to the individual for the left and
right wrist after the licensee performed an investigation of the
event.
On September 23, 1995, four workers entered the Unit 1 Reactor
Containment Building to perform the final inspection on the "A" Steam
Generator and install the hot and cold leg diaphragm.
Radiation
Protection personnel determined that teledosimetry was not being
detected at the telemetric system monitoring station for two of the *
workers in the work area.
An RP supervisor requested the two workers
to come down from the work platform to determine why the teledosimetry
was not registering on the telemetric system.
At this time RP
determined that the workers were not wearing dosimetry required by the
RWP.
Based on records reviewed, the inspector determined that the
licensee investigated this event and assigned exposure to the
individuals.
On September 29, 1995, a work~r ~ntered the Unit 1 Re~ctor Containmerit
Building to perform work in the Seal Table Room.
Upon exiting the
work area, the worker determined that he did not have the required
dosimetry and informed RP that he may have lost it. Further
Enclosure
' *
6
investigation determined that the worker had not carried the required
Digital Alarming Dosimeter (DAD) as required by RWP into the work
area.
Based on records review, the inspector determined that the
licensee investigated this event and assigned exposure to the.
individual properly.
The licensee investigated each event and corrective action was taken to
brief all plant workers on the importance of *complying with RWP
requirements.
Specific wofk groups were excluded from working in the RCA
until corrective action could be implemented.
Surry requested that an
independent assessment of the events be performed by the Virginia Electric
Power Company corporate office. Surry assigned an RP technician to the *
RCA entrance to monitor each individual entering the RCA to ensure that
personnel understood their RWP requirements.
The inspector reviewed
licensee procedures which provided guidance to personnel preparing,
briefing, and controlling work following radiation work permit
requirements and observed RP personnel conducting radiological pre-job
briefings.
The inspector reviewed selected RWPs and discussed the RWP
system with licensee representatives.
In addition, the inspector observed
personnel being briefed prior to e_nteri ng the RCA.
The RP group conduct~d
adequate briefings for personnel entering an area for the first time on a
specific RWP.
Personnel were also required to notify RP prior to entry
into the RCA.
The inspector noted in Paragraph 3, above, that the licensee had
previously identified problems with workers not complying with RWP
requirements.
The inspector informed the licensee that failure of workers
to follow RWP requirements for wearing TLD badges and other assigned
dosimetry was_a violation of licensee radiation procedure, VPAP-2101,
Radiation Protection Progfam, Paragraph 6.6.1, Revision 7, dated
August 10, 1995, which stated that workers shall wear assigned TLD badges-
and dosimetry.
Based on the licensee's efforts in ideDtifying and
correcting the violation, which meet the criteria specified in section
VII.B of the Enforcement Policy, the violation will not be cited, in
accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
External exposure controls for four other outage evolutions were .reviewed
by the inspector to assess potential exposures to workers, and to review
the licensee followup actions.
The events reviewed were as follows:
On September 14, 1995, while shutdown for refueling, the reactor
vessel water level (RVWL) standpipe indication for Surry Unit 1
- Reactor Vessel experienced an unexpected drop from approximately 18
feet to 13.3 feet which resulted in a temporary loss of shielding to
workers in the immediate vicinity of the reactor head.
The workers
were performing head detensioning. Additional operational details of
this event are addressed in NRC IR 50-280/95-20 and 50-281/95-20.
The
inspector reviewed the licensee's actions to assess any additional
potential exposures received by the workers as a result of the loss in
shielding.
Based on a review of area radiation monitors, routine
radiation surveys for the work area, and histogram readings from the
DADs worn by the workers, no increase in dose *rates during the loss of
shielding could be determined.
The histograms indicated dose rates_
Enclosure
,,
- '\\ *
7
increasing and decreasing during this time period as workers moved
around in the area to perform work.
The inspector conclude*d that the
licensee's actions to assess the exposures was adequate. Personnel in
the work area were being monitored with DADS and TLDs.
On September 13, at approximately 1830 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.96315e-4 months <br />, the PRT was vented to
the containment without the use of the required procedure.
The Surry
NRC Resident inspectors noted, through interviews, and review of logs
and completed procedures, that section 5.5 of l-OP-RC-011, Pressurizer
Relief Tank (PRT) Operations, revision 1, established the method for
venting the PRT to the vent system.
The PRT was vented *by opening
l-RC-ICV-5025 which established a vent path from the PRT through
pressure transmitter PT-1472 to containment. A review of the release
permits for that day showed that there was no Gaseous Group Release
Permit for venting the PRT to the vent system as required by step
5.5.4.
Interviews determined that there was no poly hose connected
from the vent tap, l-RC-ICV-5025, to the nearest Containment Purge
Exhaust as required by step 5.5.5. Additional operational details of
this event are addressed in NRC IR 50-280/95-20 and 50-281/95-20.
The
inspector reviewed the radiological consequences of this event and
determined that Xenon-133 gas*had been released to the Unit 1 reactor
containment and workers in the area had been assigned an SDE based on
airborne radioactivity airborne results.
Maximum SDE assigned for
this event was approximately 5 millirem compared to an annual
regulatory limit of 50,000 millirem SDE .
On September 16, 1995, as a result of lifting the reactor head, the
licensee determined that Xenon-133 gas was present in the Unit 1
reactor containment at a concentration of approximately 3.35E-4
microcuries per milliliter. The inspector reviewed licensee air
sample results and licensee assigned SDE exposures for workers in the
affected areas.
The maximum SDE assigned was approximately 147
millirem compared to an annual regulatory limit of 50,000 millirem
SDE.
On October 5, 1995, a worker walked onto the reactor upper internals
to retrieve a screw that had possibly been seen lying on the upper
internals.
The contract worker was also to maintain communications
with the crane operator lowering the reactor head intb pl~ce. Durin~
this evolution a jack stand was bent which ~topped the evolution.
The
inspector reviewed this event based on the worker entering a dose rate
field of approximately 5 Rem. per hour general area and 15 Rem. per
hour contact with the jack stands. A review of this event determined
that the worker's whole body was monitored with TLDs and multi-badge
teledosimetry which was being constantly monitored by RP personnel..
An RP technician was also stationed in the reactor cavity to provide
constant radiological work coverage.
The inspector cpncluded that the
licensee closely monitored worker external exposure during this event.
Based on observations, records review, and interviews with plant workers,
the inspector concluded the licensee was effectively controlling external
radi.ation exposure consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20
Enclosure
'\\ *
8
limits. However, examples of workers failure to follow procedure
requirements for wearing dosimetry was identified as a non-cited
violation.
One non-cited violation was identified
6.
Control of Radioactive Material and Contamination, Surveys, and Monitoring_
(83750)
10 CFR 20.150l(a) requires each licensee to make or cause to be made such
surveys as (1) may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the
regulations and (2) are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the
extent of radiological hazards that may be present ..
a.
Posting and Labeling
. b.
10 CFR 20.1904(a) requires, in part, each container of licensed
material containing greater than Appendix C quantities to bear a
durable, clearly visible label identifying the radioactive contents
and providing sufficient information to permit individuals handling or
using the containers, or working in the vicinity thereof, to take
precautions to avoid or minimize exposures.
During tours of the Auxiliary Building, and various radioactive
material storage locations, the inspector independently verified that
selected containers of radioactive material were labeled consistent
with regulatory requirements.
The inspector interviewed selected
workers to ensure personnel were properly trained to understand
posting and labeling requirements.
Discussions were conducted with selected cognizant individuals in RP
regarding their responsibilities as described in the licensee
procedural requirements.
Based on observations during the inspectioQ,
discussions with cognizant licensee personnel, and records reviewed,
the inspector.determined that cognizant personnel were knowledgeable
of the licensee's procedural requirements for controlling and
surveying potentially radioactive material.
Based on a review of this area, the inspector determined that the
licensee was posting areas and labeling radioactive material
consistent with regulatory requi.rements ..
No violations or deviations were identified.
Personnel and Area Contamination
The inspector reviewed selected Personnel Contamination Events (PCEs)
and discussed contamination control practices for selected outage
operations.
During plant tours, the inspector observed adequate
housekeeping and contamination control practices. The inspector
observed handling, packaging, and surveying of contam1nated equipment
for movement and judged the work evaluations s*atisfactory.
At the
time of the inspection, the licensee was averaging approximately 2150
Enclosure
'I *
c.
d.
. 9
ft 2 (1.57 percent) of the RCA as recoverable contaminated space.
During non outage periods~ the licensee was maintained less than one
percent (less than 200 ft) of the total RCA as recoverable
contaminated space.
The licensee maintained approximately 1.8 percent
of the total RCA as recoverable contaminated space during the last
Refueling Outage of Unit 2.
At the time of the inspection, the licensee had incurred approximately
170 PCEs in 1995, of which 127 PCEs occurred during the Unit 2 ten
year In Service In~pection (ISi) refueling outage.
At the time of the
inspection, 34 PCEs had occurred during the current Unit 1 outage and
the remainder of the PCEs for the year had occurred during non-outage
periods.
Based on a review of records, facility tours and discussions with
licensee personnel, the inspector determined that the licensee was
effectively implementing contamination control practices.
No violations or deviations were identified.
TS 6.12.1 required, in part, that each High Radiation-Area (HRA), with
radiation levels greater than or equal to 100 millirem/hour but less
than or equal to 1000 millirem/hour, be barricaded and conspicuously
posted as an HRA.
In addition, any individual or group of individuals
permitted to enter such areas are to be provided with or accompanied
by a radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the
radiation dose rate in the .area or a radiation monitoring *device which
continuously integrates the dose rate in the area, or an individual
qualified in radiation protection procedures with a radiation dose.
rate monitoring device.
During tours of the Auxiliary Building, *the inspector noted that all
HRAs and locked HRAs inspected were locked and/or posted, as required.
Based on a review of procedures, facility tours, and interviews, the
inspector determined that the licensee's implemented program for HRA
controls met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensee's TS
requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Radiation Detection and Survey Instrumentation
The inspector reviewed the plant procedure which established the
licensee's radiological survey and monitoring program and verified
that the procedures were consistent with regulations, and good RP
practices. During facility tours, the inspector observed RP personnel
operating survey instruments during the performance of radiation and
contamination surveys.
The inspector noted that survey
instrumentation and continuous air monitors in use within the RCA were
Enclosure
10
operable and displayed current calibration stickers. 'The inspector
further noted that an adequate number of survey instruments were
available for use.
During the inspection, the inspector discussed.
source check requirements with RC supervision and based on
observations determined source checked instruments were being used for
documented surveys.
The inspector reviewed selected records of radiation and contamination
surveys performed during 1995 and discussed the survey results with .
licensee representatives.
Licensee personnel interviewed were
knowledgeable of the radiation survey results for the areas to which
they were assigned.
The inspector received a thorough br1efing on the
dose rates inside the Auxiliary Building prior to entry.
During facility tours, the inspector verified, by independent surveys
or observatioR of surveys, radiation and/or contamination surveys in
randomly selected areas of the Auxiliary Building, outside areas, and
other radioactive material storage areas.
Based on a review of this area, the inspectbr concluded th~t the
licensee was performing surveys consistent with regulatory
requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area .
7.
Programs for Maintaining Exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)
(83750)
10 CFR 20.llOl(b) states that the licensee shall use to the extent
practical, procedures and engineering controls based upon sound radiation
protection procedures to achieve occupational doses to members of the
public that are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10 provide information relevant to attaining
goals and objectives for planning and operating light water reactors and
provide general philosophy acceptable to the NRC as a necessary basis for
a program of maintaining occupational exposures ALARA.
The inspector reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives
successful ALARA initiatives used during the current 37 day Unit 1
refueling outage. These initiatives included the utilization of temporary
shielding, teledosimetry, remote video cameras, and radio communications,
and mockup training. The inspector reviewed the current work scope
package for the Unit 1 outage as compared to the previous Unit 2 (46.1
days) outage performed in February and March 1995.
The l kensee
.
identified that the dose rates for *the two units were comparable.
Work
scope differences in the two Units identified an increase in work scope in
Unit 1 of approximately 18 person-rem.
The inspector determined, by a
review of documentation, that the.licensee had continued to track and
trend dose rates, develope engineering controls for exposure reduction,
perform TEDE ALARA evaluations, perform shielding evaluations and install
shielding to reduce dose rates, conduct post-job reviews with craft
personnel and supervision to improve preplanning and to e~tablish work
Enclosure
11
controls consistent with ALARA goals. Actual exposure expended as of day
23 in the current Unit 1 outage was trending slightly below exposure
projections for that day, which was consistent with the completion of
steam generator work being approximately 1 day ahead of schedule.
Based
on a review of exposure trending records for each unit, the inspector
determined that the licensee was meeting pre-establed exposure goals
during outages and that annual exposures per Unit had continued to trend
. lower.
Based on a review of the licensee's ALARA program, the inspector
determined that the licensee was continuing to implement procedures and
engineering controls to maintain occupational exposures ALARA.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
Exit Meeting (83750)
The inspector met with licensee representatives indicated in Paragraph 1
at the conclusion of the inspection on October 6, 1995.
The inspector
summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The inspector also
discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with
regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection.
The
licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary~
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee .
Item Number
50-280, 281/95-21-01
Status
Closed
Description and Reference
NCV - Licensee failure to follow
procedures for wearing dosimetry.
(Paragraph 5.) .
Enclosure