ML18152A378

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Insp Repts 50-280/88-39 & 50-281/88-39 on 881003-21.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Pipe Replacement Resulting from Erosion/Corrosion Effects on Plant Secondary Side Piping Sys Made of Carbon Steel Matl
ML18152A378
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 11/17/1988
From: Blake J, Economos N
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18152A380 List:
References
50-280-88-39, 50-281-88-39, NUDOCS 8812050267
Download: ML18152A378 (14)


See also: IR 05000280/1988039

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY-COMMISSIO.N

REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos. : 50-280/88-39 and 50-281/88-39

Licensee: Virginia Electric*and Power*Company.

Richmond, VA

23261

Docket Nos.: ~0-280.and 50-28l.

License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37 ,

'

Facility Name:

Surry 1 and 2

.

  • Inspection C

Inspex.=. '.. *

Appr'Jed by:+-,~~~--....----------------

Scope:

Results:

a e,

ie

t* rials arid Processes Section

ng neering Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

This . routine, unannounced inspect ion was in the area, of pipe

replacement resultinq from erosion/corrosion (E/C) affects on the

plant's secondary side, piping systems made of carbon steel

material and i nservi ce inspection i denti fi ed rejectab le i ndi cations

on certain 2 inch socket welds.

The licensee is conducting an extensive nondestructive examination*

program to identify erosion corrosion affected components within

suspect pipe systems.

Components which fail and. pass acceptance

criteria are evaluated by engineering and replaced as required with

chromium-molybdenum steel material for better wear characteristics.

Technical pers6nnel *in charge and others performing and monitoring

this work appear to be suffidently trained to carry out their

assigned tasks.

The repair effort of rejected inservice inspected

socket .welds in the seal injection, loop-fill and safety injection

systems was not being conducted in a well organized manner at the

time of this visit. However, following discussion, the *licensee took

the initiative to address concerns and questions* raised by the

inspector which should produce satisfactory results.

Within the areas inspected," no violations or deviations were

identified.

8812050267 '881123

PDR

ADOCK 05000280

Q

PDC

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

'

REPORT DETAILS

  • D. L. Benson, Station'Manager

,

  • R. W. Calder, Manager Nuclear Engineefing

D. Dotson, Senior Engineering Technician

D. Grady, Supervisor, Nondestructive Testing (NOE)

R. Green, Site Engineer

,*G. D. Miller, Licensing Coordinator .

  • .M. A. Ringler, Mechanical Engineer
  • E. W. Throckmorton, Inservice Inspection (ISI)/NDE Services Project

Engineer

.

'

R. Tolbert, Senior Engineer

P. Tucker, Site* Engineer

J. Wilson, Manager Nuclear Support Corporate

'

.

Other licensee employees contacted i.nc T uded construct.ion foremen,

craftsmen, engineers, technician~,*and offiGe personnel: *

Other Organizations

D. Fell, Welding Foreman, NUS

D. Phel~s, Senior (ield Engineer, Mechanical

NRO Resident *Inspector

~W. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector

  • Attended exit interview

2.

Design Changes and Modifications (37700), Units 1 and 2

a.

Replacement of Secondary Side and Auxiliary Piping Affected by

Erosion/Corrosion (E/C)

This work effort was a fo 11 owup to that documented in Reports 280,

281/88-15 and 280, 281/88-37.

In that programmatic aspects and

administrative controls of pipe replacement were reviewed and

documented in the aforementioned reports, the inspector concentrated

nis work effort in field welding activities. This included review of

material procurement documents, receiving inspection records, welding

records, . welding procedure ijnd we 1 der performance qualification

records, observation of pipe welding in progress and inspection of

partial and completed field welds.

The code of record for this

activity is the USAS.

831.1, 1967 Edition of the Power Piping*code

(Code).

At the start of this inspection, the inspecto~ met with

2

cognizant licensee personn~l in order to obtain a progress report on

the number of components examined, inspect ion point select ion,

inspection methods, component failures and replacement.

Within these areas the licensee representatives stated that the total

number of inspection points in Unit 2 were less than those in Unit 1.

This reduced* inspection* scope, was the 'result of inspection

knowledge ga~ned from the Unit 1 inspections, which were completed

earlier.

Therefore, piping systems which exhibited essentially no

E/C wall loss in the Unit 1 inspections were not inspected as much in

Unit 2. Conversely, piping systems shown to have E/C wall loss by

the Unit 1 inspecti.011s were* subje"cted to. a similiar level of

inspection.

. :

  • * *
  • *
  • *

1 I

  • 1

I

The licensee Is acceptance . criteria was developed by taki n9 wa 11

thickness measurements to calculate the E/C wear rate .. This wear

rate was then used to predict the time wh~n the pipe wall thickness

would approach its code mi.nimum wall thickness.

In addition, the

acceptance criteria provides the guidance needed .to determine if a

piping component needs to be .replaced or, repaired* immediately.

Also, it is used to project replacement*at some future time in its

operating 1ife, .or monitore~ by in~pection whi'le in service.

'

'

r

In term~ of these parameters, the* license indicated the following:

0

0

.Q

0

. .

,.

,

In certain instances replacement components made of material

essentially the same *as the original showed E/C rates which were

2 to 4 o~ders of magnitude higher than anticipated.

Certain zones of components on the suction side of the feedwater

pump exhibited 30 to 40 mills of wear.

Loop Seal E/C rate~ were in the 21 to 22 mills per year, regime ..

S/G

11811 Loop seal elbows that failed exhibited wear rates of

approximately 49 mill/year.

On October 4, 1988, the inspector met again with coqnizant personnel

and obtained a comprehensive report on component inspection and

results.

At this time the licensee indicated that 116 components out

of a total population of 202 scheduled for inspection had been

inspected.

Of those inspected, 83 components had been evaluated and

17 had been found to be-rejectable.

Two more were added to this

group following the completion of this inspection.

Following is a

tabulation of failures by pipe systems.

-*

.:,

System

Condensate

'

Feedwater,

- Loop.Seals on

B Steam Generator

- Outside Contai'nment * *

- Inside Containment

Heater Drain

Reheater Drain lA

Heater Drain

.1st Feedwater Heater

Heater .Vent

St~am Drain -,(W3D)

Condensate

. .

3

Unit-2

  • '

~

  • Unit-1

Total

Failures

  • 6.

6 * ..

. 3 '

1

~

2

i

r

Failure Type

Code

Acceptance

Min

Criteria

1

-

>

2

1

. 1-

5

3

1

2

1

1

1

1

the* failed component i.n Unit 1 above was an elbow--on the suction side

.. of the feedwater pump on the 1~N1 train. The licensee indicated that

the failed elbow was a replacement which had been installed during

    • the 1987 forced outage.

At the time.of the-insP.ection, plans called

    • for examining 38 components in Unit 1, 28 of which* are new replace-

. ments and 10 others for engineeri~g related interests. , Following is

a tabulation of*the failed components presented in terms of size, '

line-designation, years of service life and_critical dimensions.

~

Unit-2*

System/

Years

Component

Component

In

Nominal

Code Min-

Condensate Identification Service Calculated Thickness Actual Zorie

.443

1

1811 Elb~w

2CN-PSF2-117

1.2

.526

.375

.. 453

2

1a11 Elbow

2CN-PSF2-1

9.9

.510

.526

.383

.441

6

1811 Elbow

2CN-PSF2-96

9.9

.584

.401

.412

4

1811 Elbow

2CN-PSF2-128

1.2

.441

.360

.400

3

1911 X 1811

2CN-PSF2~128

9.9 failed visua.1 inspection

4

.4711i

.388

1

1811 Elbow

2 CN PSF2-133

1. 2

.432 11

.360ii

.432

2

IOii x 1411

2 CN-PSFR-15

9.9

.375

  • .314

.312

2

Reducer

Feedwater

..

. ,,

1s11r

if.W-PSFT-9

1.2

1.18611

0.96511

1. 07411

1

1411/18HT 2FW-PSFT-1

1.2

1. 04111. 28011 * 750/0. 965n . 87111 fl. 097 11 * -

0.571ii

. 2 ..

811 Elbow 2FW-PSF2-34

1.2

0.65911

0.46211

0.573 11

. 4

. .

0

.

1411 Elbow

2FW-PSF2-63

9.9

0.82811

0.499 11

0.509 11

1

1411 Elbow

.: 2FW-PSF2-84

9.9

0.499 11

  • 0.48311

1

,.

14il Elbow

2FW-PSF2-86

9.9

0.49911

  • .48911

1

Reheater Drains .

0:31911

811 Elbow

2SIT-PSF2-136

.9. 9

0.55511

0.303 11

3

au Elbow

2SD-PSF2-137*

' 9. °9

0.555 11

Q.'jQ3

0.309 11

3

  • 0.243 11

g11 Elbow

2SD-PSF2-138

9.9

0.303

  • O. 253ii

.3

Heater Vents

.

,

2.5"

2SD-PSFR-99

(

5.5

0.227

0.102 11

0.192 11

l

Reducer

0.10'9 11

3.011 T

2SD-PSFT-65

5.5

  • O: 090 11

1

,.

Drain Line

1011 T

2SD-PSFT-49

9.9

0.365

0.14511

0.15911

2

St:eam

Drain

W30

2SD-PSFR-3

9.9

failed visual inspection,

Feedwater

.433

1811 Elbow

lCN-PSF2-133

Ll

0.518 *

0.360

.431

2

  • Components rejected because of failure to meet code minimum thickness

requirements

' .. '

5

On the basis of these inspection results and engineering evaluations,

the licensee has made plans to change 30 components in Unit 2; no

decisions had been reached on Unit 1 at the time.

However, following

completion of the initial inspection, on October 7, 1988, the

inspector ascertained that 43 components had been inspected in

Unit 1; of which 12 had been evaluated.

Of these 12 components, four

had been declared failures, one***failure was* within the condensate

system and' * three *were *1 ocated in the feedwater system. . At the

time, the licensee was evaluating these failures to determine what

course of action would be appropriate.

The 30 components

schedu 1 ed for replacement in Unit 2 we-re 1 ocated in the f o 11 owing .

systems:

System

Condensate

Feedwater

Slowdown

Mainstream

Steam Drain

Reheater' Drains

.. *'

First Point Heater Drains

First Point Vents

Replaced *

Components

8

10

1

1

1

5

2

2

In addition- to the above,. the 1 i censee .; s rep 1 ad ng * the first and

second point "extraction steam lines from the low pressure turbines to .

  • the first and second point f eedwater heaters.

The rep 1 a cement

components are made of chromium!molybdenum alloy steel material to

pro vi de for improved wear resistance properties* and imp roved Service

life. Following.these discussions, the inspector accompanied by the

1 i censee representative performed a wa 1 k through inspection to

observe those 1 i ne systems undergoing inspect i ans ( visual and/or

ultrasonic) and replacement.

b.

Wel~ Inspection

Welding Procedure Review

Welding procedures specifications (WPS(s)) and supporting

proced~re qualification records (PQR(s)), were reviewed to

ascertain whether:

all essential var1ables, supplementary

essential variables and nQnessential variables were in accordanc~

with applicable editions of Section IX of the ASME Code; each of

  • the applicable procedures had been qualified in accordance with

Section IX of the ASME Code and that the supporting PQRs were on

file; each PQR listed the essential variables for the specific

welding process or processes covered and that the va 1 ues or

ranges of these var1ables were consistent with those permitted

by the WPS .and*~ere within the limits of Section IX of the ASME

Code; all mechanical tests require~ by Section IX of the ASME

-....

6

Code, had been completed and were properly documented in the

PWR: the PQR(s) had been certified by the licensee and that the

mechanical test results met minimum ASME Code requirements; any

changes or revisions of the WPS essential variables were

supported by requalification of the original WPS or a new WPS;

any changes* in the WPS* nonessentiaJ variab*l es *were properly

identified and do~umented either as revi~ions to the original or

a riew WPS.

Observation/Inspe'ction of Comple~ed Welds

Completed welds were selected at r~ndom f6r inspection, these

were as fo 11 ows:

Weld#*

157

4

4

7

18

13

19

6

,

Isometric

Drawin~

E-201

E-201

E-201

E-207

E-207

E-207

E-207

E-209

Size

Discreption

Pipe 1411 dia. sched. 40 x H

Reducer 20 11 x 10, 11 Sched. 40 x H

Elbow 1411 dia. x 0.385 11

  • Pipe, 1411 dia. x 0.375 11

Reducer *1811 x 14~1 Sched. 40 x H

.. Tee 1811 X 1811 X 1411 X 0. 500 11

Redacer 18u x 1411

. Pipe 1811 sched. 49 x H

..

The above 1 i sted welds were examined to * as sou re that the

following attributes conformed to* aforementioned *code and

licensee procedural requirements including:*

.

(1) Weld surface finish and appearance.

Include inside

diameter of pipe welds when accessible.

~

(2) Transitions between components of different diameters and

wall thickness.

(3)

(4)

(5)

Weld reinforcement.

Removal of temporary attachments, arc strikes and weld

-spatter as applicable.

Absence of surface defects inciuding cracks, laps, lack of

penetration, lack of fusion porosity, slag, oxide film and

under cut exceeding prescribed limi.ts.

I*

I

7

Welder Performance Qualifications

Weld stencils which appeared adjacent to completed welds,

identified ear.lier in this report, were noted and sub-

sequently used to ascertain whether the 1 ic*ensee had a

workab 1 e system *for.** mafot-ai:ni ng** a*** continuous record. .of

qualificat10n, status *o*f all welders* and that .this. system

was effectively oti'lized *ahd accurate. Also., the inspector

reviewed the qualification *status recor~s of welders

performing production welding to ascertain whether weld.ers

had been and were currently qualified to weld under the *

. -respective* ,proced,ures.

. -

Item

Wel~er stencils selected for this task intluded Nos. 041~

069, 122,, 182, 202, 204 and 209.

~

Material Control (Piping and Appurtenances) ..

    • Randomly selected pipe sections and attachments associated

with this design change (DC 87-11, were identified for

. . review of procurement documents including quality records

and 'site-generated quali-ty control documents, e.g. receipt

inspections arid weld travelers.

Items selected for this *

- task were as fol lows:

Purchase

Heat/lot #* -~

Order#

~o0 Elbow, 1411 x 0.37511

Pipe*, 1311 x 0~ 375

Reducer 18 1 x 1411

.

LKS

  • A-234/WP22 CSY-185834

A-335/P22

C.SY-185834

Tee 1811 X 1811 X 1411 X *0.500

Filler Metal

1/811 dia. ER90S-B3

3/32 11 dia. ER90S-B3

3/32 11 dia. E9018-B3

2365

236474;..4-7

28808NOS

A-234/WP22 CSY-185834

A335

CSY-185834

SFAS.28

G0718

SFAS.28

G6766

SFAS.5

82667

The aforementioned quality records were reviewed to verify that

mater-ial analysis*, thermal treatment and mechanical properties,

as applicable, were consistent with referenced standards and the

licensee's specification.

Within these areas the inspector noted that the Controlled Weld

Joint Record used to document quality control inspection

conducted during weld fabrication did not in all cases fully

identify each of the two components we 1 ded together.

For

example although the record contains line items for recording of

pi eel! and heat numbers, the inspector found that in many *

instances either all or part of this information was missing

  • >

I

.

c.

8

even though the record had been signed off by the QC inspector.

The inspector discussed this observation with the licensee 1s

cognizant engineer who indicated-that the applicable procedure

WP-W02 Weld Documentation does not specifically address the

subject line item, but indicated that. this. information is

recorded as normal practice> Thf*in'spector-:-stressed:**the *need

for documenting piece and heat** numbers: of coniponehts *on* the weld

record since it represents the weld fabrication .hi!itory and it

is an official per:manent recora.

Also the inspector requested

that the , subject procedure be reviewed and revised as

appropriate to address the aforementioned i nforrfiation.

<*

.

.

In addition, the inspector made the following o.bservations,

(1) ~rn ly certificates of* compliance had been furnished for the . *

replacement straight pipe sections, (2) heat numbers/material

type or other form of mater.ial identification had not been

stamped on these sections and (3) due to the absence of stamped

identification on the original sections, no traceability numbers

were being' transferred when sections were* cut to specific

lengths.

During discuss ions, on these subjects, the inspector

acknowledged that the aforementioned information was not

required by the applicable code, that this piping was hot safety

related, and tflerefore information af this. type was. not a

  • requirement.

However, the inspector .stressed the fact that in .

yiew of the wall thinning problem observed in these components,

1t would-seem to be extremely important to have complete and

accurate records e . .g. heat number~, chem-. analysis and thermal

treatment on the rep fac.ement material being i nsta 11 ed for

evaluation purposes.

In re~ponse, the licensee agreed* to make .

every effort to *obtain this information.

In reference to the

weld joint record and its coverage in the aforementioned

procedure, the inspector stated that an inspector followup item

(IFI) would be identified until the procedure was revised to

address specifically each line item on the subject form.

IFI

280,281/88-39-01 Revise WP-W02 to Address all Line Items on Weld

Joint Record~

Post Weld Heat Treatment (PWHT)

Because the replacement material/component welds required post weld

thermal trea.tment, the inspector reviewed the contro 11 i ng procedure,

SR-lOl Rev. 1 General Stress Relieving Procedure.

This was done to

ascertain whether the procedure addressed heating and cooling rates,

metal temperature monitoring, temperature uniformity and control

limits specified, equipment calibration ~nd documentation.

Because

at the time of this inspection there was 110 PWHT in process, the

inspector selected welds No. 1, 2, 3 and 5 on ISO E-202, job number

E 289S-033-J to review QC records and, strip charts.

This work

effort was conducted to verify that components were instrumented to

provide time-temperature recordings for the duration of the entire

thermal treatment cycle, sufficient thermocouples were used to

.9

measure temperature variations during heating and cooling, specified

holding time was adhered to and was consistent with applicable code

requirements, maximum heatup and.cool-down rates were* as specified

and consistent with the .applicable. -code requirements.

Except for the inspector . .foll owup item .discussed above there, were--no -

deviations or violations),dentified. *

.. ** * * ,

.

- .:

...

. * * _

3.

Inservice Inspection of Socket Welds Unit 2, (73753B)

On* or about the 12th of October. 1988 the-- resident inspector inf armed the

ReQion that the licensee had found rejectable indicati'ons in two out of

th, rty, 211 p socket welds :inspected for i nse*rvi ce inspect.ion ( ISL)

purposes during the current outage.

A followup*telephone call to the.site

supervisor for nondestructive testing (supervisor) confirmed this finding

and the inspector obtained additional details on the' subject- failures.

which were as fo1lows:

both faiJed welds *were* located in the .Loop Fill

Header, the piping was made of 211-q>, 160 schedule Type 316 stainless steel

.material, the rejectable indjcations were identified as rounded, having a

maximum liquid penetrant, bleedout area of about 0.60 inches.

  • The supervisor stated that an* addi.tional samp*ie of thirty socket welds

were tested.

This second sample produced* one rejectable weld, which

exhibited. several' linear indications located*at*the toe of the weld; the

longest being approximately 1/4 inches.

Following this finding, the

1 i censee expanded the* inspect ion samp 1 e by *adding anothe*r 162 socket *

welds; ~hus bringing the total populatfon -of. socket welds *inspected

up to 412.

On October 19, 1988, * the inspector visited Surry Unit 2 to discuss* the

inspectio~ findings, to review the inspection program and to observe the

field activity in this area. Onsite discussidns with licensee representa-

tives disclosed that of the 212 welds inspected, 21 had been -rejected for

linear and/or rounded indications which were located in the weld metal,

heat affected zone or the base metal on either side of the weld.

The

licensee stated that some of the indications appeared to be service

induced, e.g., linear in the toe of the weld, while others appeared to be

related to weld fabrication e.g., porosity cold laps while others were

related to manufacturing practices e.g., forging.

Administrative controls

established to address this work effort included Engineering work request

(EWR),88-412, Evaluate RC Piping Socket/Welds/Surry/Unit 2.

In order to

facilitate the activity, the licensee established a task group and

designated an engineer from the Corporate ISI/NDE Services Group to serve

as coordinator-and as a point of conta~t for this effort. Administrative

and work procedures to be used, were revi-ewed for content and included

the following:

SUADM-M"'.'27

SUADM-M-28

WP-W02

Requirements for a Repair or Replacement Follower

Control of Special Processes

Weld Documentation

10

The code controlling this activity was ASME Code Settion XI 1980 Edition

.with Winter 1980 Addenda.

Prior to the inspector's arrival the licensee

inspected and removed by ~rindin~ indications in two of the 21 rejected

welds.

These welds were 1dentif1ed as 4 and-5 on sketch VIR-1-4209.

The

licensee stated that the indications were rounded ranging in size from 1/4

to 0 .. 60 inches diameter. *According to-the "licensee's: reco*rds, we!"l_d" no. 4-

exhibited: one rounded indication which was* identified as porosity. This

indication was removed by grinding and no weld repair was planned.

Tne

indications in weld no. 5 were interpreted as cluster porosity which was

removed by grinding off about 1/8 inches of weld metal.* This socket weld

will requJre repai~ welding.

. *

  • ,
  • . .

.

While on site, between October 19 alid 21~ -1988, the- in~pector observed the

inspection. and grinding repair of the 'following five welds.

  • *.

. .*

DEFECT

Weld

Line

Locatior{

~

Size

Base

16

2-CH-310.

Met~l

Linear

3/811 and.1/2 11

Loqp Fi 11

-**

18

2-CH-3'10

  • e.ase

Metal

Linear

  • 3/411 * and 51811

.

Weld/

12

2-CH-393

Base Metal

Linear

7/16 11 perpendicular to weld

1/1611 & 1/211 .in weld

.

21

2-CH-309

Toe of Weld

Linear

2-1/t1long, 0. 311 long *and

Loo Fill

0.5 11 long

40

2-CH-308

Weld

Linear

Four indications 1/411 to

3/811 long

The below listed welds are those which were found to exhibit rejectable

indications and would*be repaired later during*their outage.

.

Weld

Line

Location

~

Size

5

2-RC-499

Weld

Rounded

1/411 to 0.611

Loop fill

Elongated

4

2-RC-499

Weld

Rounded

1/411

43

2-SI-273

Toe o.f Weld

Linear

3/411 long

Safety

Injection

  • Hot Leg

.,

11

Weld

Line

(cont'd) --

Location

Size

33

34

50

'18

33

J.1

13

23

15

20

15

22

17

2-SI-273

Safety

Injection

Hot Leg

Base Metal

Linear

1/211 long

2-SI-279

Safety

Injection

Base Metal,

Linear

3/811 and 1/211 long

~ Hot*Leg

..

2-?J-272

Base* Metal

Li near '

0. 437 11 & .3/411 long

Two i ndi cat ions i 31i long

2-CH-395

Weld. M&tal/

Seal System toe

Linear

2-CH-310

Loop Fill

Base Metal

Ro1.mded/

Two rounded 7/!6 11 & 1/411

~

Linear

four linear 1/811 long

, ..

'

.

2-CH-397

Base Metal

l-i near

Seal

2-CH-397

Base Metal

Linear

2-CH-397

Base Metal

Linear

2-CH-308

B*ase Metal

, Linear

Loop Fi 11

2-CH-309

Toe of Weld

Linear

2-CH-310

Base Metal

Linear

Loop Fi 11

2-CH-393

Weld

Linear

Seal

Injection

2-CH-393

Weld/Toe

Lin~ar

Seal

of Weld

Two small perpendicular to

weld;* 3/411 parallel & weld

l/16u and l/4ii long

1/411 ~qng

Thru indications* 0~_3 11 long

Ohe indication 1/411 long

1-1/411 long

1/411 and 3/811 long

7/32 11 long

Two 1/211 long oarallel &

weld one - ll411 long - weld

As a result of observations made during the grind repair of the five .

socket welds listed above, the inspector expressed the following concerns

to site management.

0

0

Not all members of the Ad Hoc organization had a QOOd understanding

of who was in charge with respect to reporting of inspection findings*

and possible repairs.

Field personnel ~roceeded to remove indications with6ut sufficient

preplanning, i.e., baseline measurements of the weld size and amount

of material removed (groove depth) were not measured/recorded before,

during and after the grinding operation.

.*

12

In one c~se the inspector noted that at the engineer's instructions,

about 1/8 inches weld metal was ground-off to re.move a weld

fabrication defect.

No evaluation of defect type and location was

documented or measurements taken in the process.

In response to

questions raised by the_ i nspec~or, th~ .engineer state~ that the

defects had been removed, l eavrng a cavity about 1/8 inches deep

which would. be rewe l ded.

  • * *

As stated earlier, following the initial report about these rejections,

the inspector discussed the findings with cognizant licensee personnel who

stated that the rejected socket welds were inspected during the preservice

inspect ion {PSI) as req,ui red by ASME Code Sect ion XI.

. * *

~

,:,

'

L

  • In a9dition., because of th~ir co~e .clas.si'fication1 ,these welds .shou_ld have

received visual and surface examinatrnn fol.lowing_ weld fabricat10n.

However, on the _basis of discussions with the engineer directing and

evaluating the field grinding/repair operation, the in~pector understood

that some of these welds may not have been preservi ce inspected.

Following this exchange of information the inspector met with site manage-

ment discussed his observations/concerns aod raised the fo 11 owf ng

questions, {1) If the rejected welds. were liquid penetrant inspected

following fabrication why *~re we finding fabrication type* indications at * .

. this time, {2) If these welds were not liquid *penetrant inspected, what

other type of inspection did they receive?. (3) If the rejected welds were

PSl(d) as reported-why are we finding.these type_ of indications, *(4) Since

we are *finding these large percentage of rejectable welds in Unit 2 wt,at

  • as~urances can you provide that a similar sitqation does not exist in *

ynit 1? As *a re~ult of.the concerns expressed and*questions raised by the

inspector, the licensee.has agreed to do the following:

0

a.

Document in detai 1 defect removal*, evaluation and measurements taken

during the repair of the rejected welds.

.

.

.

b.

Following grinding, measure welds, fitting and/or piping to assure

design thickness have not been-violated.

c.

Provide original f&brication records of all rejected welds.

d.

Provide preservice Inspection records of all rejected welds.

This matter has been identified as an unresolved item pending review of

the inspection records generated during the onqoing repair and the

remaining documents requested.

This unresolved item has been identified

as 280,281/88-39-02 Fabrication, Preservice and Repair Records of Rejected

Socket Welds.

Except for the unresolved i tern i dent i fi ed above no vi o 1 at ions or

deviations were identified.

4.

13

Exit Interview * .

The inspection scope and results were summarized on October 7 and 21,

1988, with those persons indicated* i.n paragraph L . The inspectors *

described the areas inspected and discussed in deta i 1 the inspect ion

resu.lts listed below. *. . .

, ..

(Open) UNR 280,.281/88-39-02, Fabricatiqn," P*~eservice and Repair Records of

Rejected Socket Welds

~

(Open) !FI 280,281/88-39-0l, Revise- WP-W02 to Address All Line*Items on

Weld Joint Record

'*No dissenting comments were received from the licensee:

Proprietary

information is not contained in this repo~t.

    • .