ML18142B228

Accumulation of Borated Water Near a Valve in Safety Injection System Piping

ML18142B228
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	06/08/1977
From:	Rochester Gas & Electric Corp
To:	NRC/IE, NRC Region 1
References
Download: ML18142B228 (3)

Text

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LICISEE EVEiVT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT ALLREQIjIRED INFORIVlATIOM<

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LICENSEE NAME Y

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EVENT TYPE LICENSE

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'4 25 26 30 31 32 14 15 REPORT REPORT II CATEGORY TYPE SOURCE

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68 69 EVENT DESCRIPTION Qpg During normal operations an auxiliary operator found EVENT DATE REPORT DATE 0

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7 7'4 75 BC an accumulation of borated water 80 7

89 IH I Safety Injection Pumps.

Further investigation revealed a leak in a section of 8" 7

8 9 80 Jog Schedule 10 stainless steel pipe between valves 826A and 826B.

The unit was taken 7

8 9 80

[@pe to cold shutdown as recommended by PORC.

Leaks were (cont' on attached sheet) 7 8 9 PAME 80 SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT CODE CODE COMPONENT CODE SUPPER VCLATQN

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8 9 10 11 12 17 43 48 CAUSE DESCRIPTION 0 8 As a result of metallurgical analysis and metallographic examinations, chloride stress I

COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 44 47 EH 09 corrosion cracking is believed to be the cause of the leaks.

As the investigation con-Kl tinued, further information was submitted in a supplemental (cont'd. on attached sheet) 7 8 9 80

[pp~]

near a valve in the Safety Injection System piping between the Boric Acid Tanks and

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7 89 FACIUTY STATUS

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9 10 12 13 FORM OF r

ACTIVITY.

COhITENT AELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY Q~g s

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10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

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8 9 11 12 13 PERSOiVNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

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89 11 12 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

~15 NA OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY b

44 45 46 44 45 Press release on October 8, 1976 ADDITIONAL FACTORS

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89 Ii+s 7

8 9 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION Q~g L

See Event Description

'7 8 9 10 PUBLICITY 7

89 DISCOVERY OESCAIPTION B

o erator LOCATiON OF RELEASE NA 80 80 60 80 80

.Licensee Event Repo.i

.. Reportable Occurrence 50-2

/76-24 Event Descri tion (cont'd.)

found in two sections of pipe, and liquid penetrant and ultrasonic examina-tion of 75 welds and the piping associated with those welds in the boric acid tank outlet piping revealed five other sections of pipe ol'ittings with indications.

All seven of these components of the piping system containing leaks or indications were replaced.

(Reportable Occurrence 76-24).

Cause Descri tion (cont'd.)

report, dated February 10, 1977, which supported this conclusion, and pro-vided the corrective action performed and being considered.

The supplemental

,report also described our December 21, 1976 response to IE Circular 76-06 which stated that during the 1977 refueling and maintenance ou)age additional testing and examination would be performed on piping and selected welds in the containment spqay and safety injection systems.

During the 1977 refueling and maintenance outage the boric acid storage tank outlet piping was modified to eliminate all inaccessible portions.

The exam-inations and testing consisted of the following:

1.

Nine welds in the Boric Acid Piping were ultrasonically examined.

As this included the remaining two welds which were previously inaccessible, all the welds of the heat traced boric acid supply piping to the safety injection pumps have been ultrasonically examined.

2.

Five welds in the Containment Spray Pump Discharge piping inside con-tainment were ultrasonically examined.

3.

The Boric Acid Piping to the Safety Injection Pumps and the containment spray pump suction piping was hydrostatically tested to 280 psig (mini-mum).

4.

The containment spray pumps discharge piping was.hydrostatically tested to 380 psig (minimum).

5; The Safety Injection Pumps Discharge Piping was hydrostatically tested to 1880 psig (minimum).

6..

The Spray Additive Tank was pressure tested, using a nitrogen medium, to 375 psig (minimum):

Allwelds and piping inspected and tested as. listed above were found to be acceptable.

The welds and piping in the Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems willcontinue to be examined in accordance with the require-ments of the Ginna Station Inservice Inspection Program to assure the continued integrity of these systems.

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