ML18142A499
| ML18142A499 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1985 |
| From: | Cline W, Kreh J NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region II) |
| To: | Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18142A497 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-85-16, 50-281-85-16, NUDOCS 8507010143 | |
| Download: ML18142A499 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1985016
Text
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Report Nos. :
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
MA't 2 9 \\985
50-280/85-16, 50-281/85-16
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Richmond, VA
23261
Facility Name:
Surry Power Station
Docket Nos.:
50-280, 50-281
License Nos.:
Inspection Conducted:
April 29-May 2, 1985
Inspector: Jd'Kr~' ~-
}1 / ~ µ~~'-*
Approved by: fl? r ~~
. E. Cline, C "
5'-Z3*-~S-
Date Signed
~-.,23-£5
Date Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine unannounced inspection involved 27 inspector-hours onsite
and four inspector-hours offsite in the area of emergency preparedness.
Results:
One violation was identified - failure to procedurally require issuance
of a prompt protective action recommendation (sheltering at minimum)
to
offsite authorities upon declaration of a General Emergency .
9507010143 g~g55i00
~DR
ADOCK
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
2
REPORT DETAILS
- H. L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
- 8. R. Parkhurst, Coordinator Emergency Planning
- R. F. Driscoll, Manager, Quality Assurance
- W. D. Grady, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- R. C. Bilyeu, Licensing Coordinator
- W. R. Benthall, Nuclear Specialist
J. A. Baily, Nuclear Training Superintendent
G. D. Jackson, Shift Supervisor
J. S. Fisher, Assistant Shift Supervisor
F~ P. Jenkins, Assistant Shift Supervisor
Other licensee employees. contacted included technicians and office
personnel.
Other Organizations
B. F. Dixon, Sheriff, Isle of Wight County (VA)
D. Bernd, Director of Public Works, Isle of Wight County
W. C. Andrews, Jr., Sheriff, Surry County (VA)
C. Thompson, Coordinator of Emergency Services, Surry County
NRC Resident Inspector
- M. J. Davis
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings.were summarized on May 2, 1985,. with those
persons indicated in paragraph 1 abbve. A violation described in paragraph
4 (inadequate procedure for formulating protective action recommendations)
was discussed in detail. Licensee representatives acknowledged the finding
and took no exception. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of
the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this
inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
(Closed) Violation 50-280, 50-281/84-01-01:
Inadequate training of Shift
Supervisors for protective action decision-making.
The inspector reviewed
and verified the licensee 1 s response to the Notice of Violation.
Lesson
plans for Station Emergency Manager training indicated appropriate emphasis
- upon formulation of protective action recommendations .
3
(Closed) Violation 50-280, 50-281/84-01-02:
EPIP-2.01 not adequate for
transmitting a protective action recommendation to the State unless a
release is occurring. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the
Revision 9 of EPIP-2.01 provided for transmission of
protective action recommendations to the State whether or not a release is
occurring.
4.
Protective Action Decision-Making (82202)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and (10) and 10 CFR Part. 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.D.3, this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee
had 24-hour-per-day capability to assess and analyze emergency conditions
and make recommendations to protect the public.
The inspector discussed responsibility and authority for protective action
decision-making with licensee representatives and reviewed pertinent
portions of the Surry Emergency Plan (SEP) and Emergency Plan Implementing
Procedures (EPIPs).
The SEP and EPIPs clearly assigned responsibility and
authority for accident assessment and protective action decision-making.
Interviews with members of the licensee's emergency organization revealed
that these personnel understood their authorities and responsibilities with
respect to accident assessment and protective action decision-making.
Walk-through evaluations involving protective action decision-making were
conducted with one Shift Supervisor and two Assistant Shift Supervisors.
Personne 1 interviewed appeared to be cognizant of appropriate onsi te
protective measures and aware of the range of protective action recommenda-
tions appropriate to offsite protection.
Personnel interviewed were aware
of the need for timeliness in making initial protective action recommenda-
tions to offsite officials.
Interviewees demonstrated adequate under-
standing of the requirement that protective action recommendations be based
on core condition and containment status even if no release is in progress.
One of the scenarios presented during the walk-throughs involved loss of all
offsite and onsite AC power for 20 minutes, combined with extensive tornado
damage to the Turbine Building.
In accordance with EPIP-1. 01 ( Emergency
Manager Controlling Procedure), all three interviewees properly classified
the hypothetical event as a General Emergency, but incorrectly determined
thit no offsite protection action recommendations would be necessary at that
point.
This is contrary to NUREG-0654 and IE Information Notice 83-28,
which constitute the Federal guidance that the licensee is required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) to follow.
The inspector determined that EPIP-1.05
( Response to Genera 1 Emergency) was inadequate because under certain
accident scenarios the Station Emergency Manager would not be directed to
make a protective action recommendation.
Violation (280, 281/85-16-01):
Failure to procedurally require issuance of
a prompt protective action recommendation to offsite authorities upon
declaration of a General Emergency.
One violation and no deviations were identified in this program area.
4
Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program (82204)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16), 10 CFR 50.54(q), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Sections IV and V, this area was reviewed to determine whether changes were
made to the program since the last routine inspection (July 1984) and to
note how these cha~ges affected the overall state of emergency preparedness.
The inspector discussed the licensee's program for making changes to the SEP
and the EPIPs.
The inspector reviewed SEP Section 8.2, which governed
review and approval of changes to the plan and procedures.
The inspector
verified that changes to the plan and procedures were reviewed and approved
by management. It was a 1 so noted that a 11 such changes were submitted to
NRC within 30 days of the effective date, as required.
Discussions were held with licensee representatives concerning recent
modifications to facilities, equipment, and instrumentation.
The inspector
toured the Techni ca 1 Support Center (TSC) and Loca 1 Emergency Operations
Facility (LEOF).
These facilities were both formally accepted in early 1985
for use by the station. Appropriate modifications to the SEP and EPIPs were
made to reflect the operational changes associated with these new emergency
response facilities.
The organization and. management of the emergency preparedness program were
reviewed.
The inspector determined that the only recent significant change
in this area was that, as of June 1, 1984, the Coordinator Emergency
Planning reported to the Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and
Licensing, rather than the Assistant Station Manager, Operations and
Maintenance.
This appeared to enhance the program.
The
inspector's
discussion with licensee representatives also disclosed that there had been
no significant changes in the organization and staffing of the offsite
support agencies since the last inspection.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for distribution of changes to
the emergency plan and procedures.
Document control records for the period
July 1984 to April 1985 showed that appropriate personnel and organizations
were sent copies of plan and procedural changes, as required.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
6.
Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)
Pursuant
to
and
10 CFR
Part 50,
Appendix E,
Section IV. F, this area was inspected to determine whether emergency
response personnel understood their emergency response roles and could
perform their assigned functions.
The inspector reviewed the description (in SEP Section 8) of the training
program, training procedures, and selected lesson plans.
Based on these
reviews, the inspector determined that the licensee had established a formal
emergency training program .
5
Records of training for key members of the emergency organization for the
period March 1984 to March 1985 were reviewed.
The inspector noted that SEP
Section 8.3.3 specified that persons designated to fill positions in the
emergency organization
11will receive, in a timely manner, training necessary
to prepare them to perform their functions during an emergency.
11
It was
determined, however, that individualized training given (generally by the
Coordinator Emergency Planning) to new key members of the emergency
organization was not documented in station training records. The inspector
discussed the desirability of such documentation with a licensee
representative, who agreed to pursue the matter.
Inspector Follow-up Item (280, 281/85-16-02):
Formal system for documenting
individualized training for new members of the emergency organization.
The inspector conducted walk-through evaluations with selected key members
of the emergency organization. During these walk-throughs, individuals were
given various hypothetical sets of emergency conditions and data and asked
to respq,nd as if an emergency actually existed.
The individuals demon-
strated familiarity with emergency procedures.
No training-related problems
were observed in the areas of emergency detection/classification and
protective action decision-making, although a procedural inadequacy was
revealed (see paragraph 4).
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
Licensee Audits (82210)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and (16) and 10 CFR 50.54(t), this area was
inspected to determine whether the 1 i cen see had performed an independent
review or audit of the emergency preparedness program.
Records of audits of the program were reviewed.
The records showed that an
independent audit of the program was conducted by the licensee 1 s Quality
Assurance Department on June 18-July 30, 1984, and documented in Audit
Report No. S84-04. This audit fulfilled the 12-month frequency requirement
for such ' audits.
The audit records showed that the State and 1 oca 1
government interfaces were eva 1 uated.
Audit findings and recommendations
were presented to plant and corporate management.
A review of past audit
reports (QA Report Nos. 80-16, 81-19, 82-21, 83-04) indicated that the
licensee complied with the five-year retention requirement for such reports.
Licensee emergency plans and procedures required critiques following
exercises and drills.
Licensee documentation showed that critiques were
held following periodic drills as well as the annual exercise. The records
showed
that deficiencies were
discussed
in
the
critiques,
and
recommendations for corrective action were made.
The licensee 1 s program for follow-up action on audit, drill, and exercise
findings was reviewed.
Licensee procedures required follow-up on deficient
areas i dent ifi ed during audits, dril 1 s, and exercises.
The inspector
reviewed selected licensee records which indicated that corrective action
was
taken on
identified problems, as appropriate.
The licensee had
,.,
6
established a tracking system as a management tool in following up on
actions taken in deficient areas.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
8.
Coordination with Offsite Agencies (92706)
The inspector held discussions with licensee representatives regarding the
coordination of emergency
planning with offsite agencies.
Written
agreements existed with those offsite support agencies specified in the SEP,
and the agreements had been renewed within the past two years, as required.
The
inspector
determined
through
face-to-face
interviews
with
representatives of se 1 ected 1 oca 1 support agencies that the 1 i censee was
periodically contacting those agencies for purposes of offering training and
maintaining mutual familiarization with emergency response roles.
Those
interviews disclosed no significant problems related to the interfaces
between the licensee and the offsite support agencies listed in paragraph 1.
9.
Inspector Follow-up (92701)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 280, 281/81-28-05:
Improvement
in status boards for clarity and data trending. The licensee abandoned
status boards for the TSC and LEOF in favor of video monitors
displaying plant engineering and radiological data. Computer-generated
status sheets provided frequent updates on plant conditions to TSC and
LEOF personnel.
b.
(Closed) IFI 280, 281/83-01-01:
Reconsideration of the initiating
conditions and Protective Action Guidelines for a General Emergency.
The 1 i censee reviewed this matter and determined that consistency
with the State could be maintained only be retention of the State's
dose triggers of 2 rem whole body and 12 rem thyroid at the site
boundary for a General Emergency.
c.
(Closed) IFI 280/83-28-01, 281/83-29-01:
Training on in-plant dose
contra 1 for emergency workers.
Accardi ng to 1 i censee records, this
subject was covered during Health Physics Retraining Sessions completed
on February 29, 1984.
d.
(Closed) I FI 280/83-28-02, 281/83-29-02:
control.
According to licensee records,
during Health Physics Retraining Sessions
1984.
Training on contamination
this subject was covered
comp 1 eted on February 29,
e.
(Closed) IFI 280/83-28-03, 281/83-29-03:
Improvements in training of
Fi re
Brigade.
Accardi ng
to
1 icensee
records,
the
suggested
improvements were incorporated into training and dri 11 s which were
completed for all shifts by December 30, 1984.
f .
(Closed) IFI 280,
281/84-23-01:
Provision of emergency planning
information for transient populations.
According to documents dating
from the period January-February 1985, one sign each was placed at the
7
entrances to Chippokes State Park and the Hog Island Wildlife
Management Area.
The signs both read as follows:
You are within 10 miles of the Surry Nuclear Power Station.
In
the event of a serious accident at the station, persons within 10
miles will be alerted immediately by sirens or public address
systems. After being alerted, turn on your radio for an Emergency
Broadcast System report to receive detailed instructions on
response actions.