ML18142A144
| ML18142A144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point, Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1984 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8412240008 | |
| Download: ML18142A144 (7) | |
Text
.,,,.,__ *---
Docket No. 50-280 December 14, 1984 Mr. W. L. Stewart Vice President - Nuclear Operations Virginia Electric and Power Company Post Office Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261
Dear Mr. Stewart:
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- NRC PDR L PDR Gray File CParrish JDNeighbors DEisenhut ORAB EJordan ACRS 10 CMiles SECY RDiggs KJohnston In accordance with 10 CFR 50.49 paragraph (h) of the Environmental Qualification Rule, by letter dated November 15, 1984, you requested an extension until March 31, 1985 for completion of the environmental qualification of the Surry Unit 1 charging pump component cooling water pump motors.
Section 50.49(g) of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that each holder of an operating license issued prior to February 22, 1983, shall by, May 20, 1983, identify the electrical equipment important to safety.
If existing equipment was not qualified, licensees were required to submit a schedule for either the qualification or the replacement of equipment important to safety. This schedule must establish a goal of final environmental qualification by the end of the second refueling outage after March 31, 1982, or by March 31, 1985, whichever is earlier. The rule also provides that the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation may grant requests for schedular extensions, until no later than November 30, 1985, for specific pieces of equipment, if these requests are filed in a timely manner and the licensee demonstrates good cause for such an extension.
In addition, 10 CFR 50.49(h) provides that each licensee shall notify the Commission of any significant equipment problems that may require extension of the completion date within sixty days of its discovery.
In compliance with 10 CFR 50.49(g), by letter dated May 20, 1983 you submitted a schedule for the replacement of remaining electrical equipment for Surry 1.
The schedule established a goal of final environmental qualification by the end of the second refueling outage after March 31, 1982, about December 1984.
The existing charging pump cooling water pump motors are being replaced with new, environmentally qualified motors.
Due to design differences between the new and existing motors, new pumps that are physically compatible with the new motors must also be procured.
Purchase orders for new pumps and
- motors have been issued with delivery presently scheduled for mid-February.
You have committed to install this equipment in Unit 1 during the first quarter of 1985.
Subsequently, you have submitted a request for an extension of the environmental qualification of this equipment so that you can continue operation after your December 1984 refueling outage.
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Mr. W. December 14, 1984 You provided a justification for continued operation as follows:
The charging pump component cooling water (CCW) pumps provide seal cooling water for the charging pumps.
The flow from the CCW pumps cool the charging pumps while they are in their safety mode of safety injection.
In the event of a CCW pump failure, the manufacturer has determined that the charging pumps can operate indefinitely in normal ambient conditions without seal water coolant as long as the pumped fluid is less than 115°F.
For the purpose of environmental qualification, the accident of concern is the High Energy Line Break {HELB).
You evaluated the areas of the charging pumps and charging pump CCW pumps, and determined that no single HELB can simultaneously render both the charging pump and CCW pump environments harsh.
In the safety injection mode the suction of the charging pumps is diverted from the normal source, at the volume control tank, to the refueling water storage tank by the safety injection signal. Technical Specifications require that the water in the refueling water storage tank be cooled to a temperature of slightly below 45°F.
Since the pumped fluid is less than 115°F, you concluded that the charging pumps can operate in the event of any HELB that might cause failure of the CCW pump motors.
You concluded that the failure of the component cooling water pumps would not significantly degrade the safety function or provide misleading information to the operator under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event.
We have reviewed your November 15, 1984, submittal as summarized above, and conclude that the request for extension is timely, is within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(g), demonstrates good cause for the requested extension, and provides an adequate justification for continued plant operation.
We, therefore, approve the request schedular extension.
cc: See next page Sincerely, Original Signed q H. R. Dentun Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for concurrence ORB#l~ AD:CSE*
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e Mr. W. You provided a justification for continued operation as follows:
~
The charging pump component cooling water (CCW) pumps provide sea,;:clooling water for the charging pumps.
The flow from the CCW pumps cool tni charging pumps while they are in their safety mode of safety injleetion.
. I In the event of a CCW pump failure, the manufacturer has det&~j~ed that the charging pumps can operate indefinitely in normal ambient cotidittions without seal water coolant as long as the pumped fluid is less they{ 1Y5°F.
For the purpose of environmental qualification, the accident of cono?rn is the High Energy Line Break (HELB).
You evaluated the areas of th~ charging pumps and charging pump CCW pumps, and determined that no single,?9,~s can simultaneously render both the charging pump and ccw pump environm1.rs harsh.
In the safety injection mode the suction of the c9/r~ing pumps is diverted from the normal source, at the volume control t~, to the refueling water storage tank by the safety injection signal.0echnical Specifications require that the water in the refueling water. storage tank be cooled to a temperature of slightly below 45°F.
Since;t e pumped fluid is less than ll5°F, you concluded that the chargin~gu ps can operate in the event of any HELB that might cause failure of the CC pump motors.
You concluded that the failure of the component cool1ng w ter pumps would not significantly degrade the safety function or prrovipe misleading information to the operator under the accident environmen~e~ting from a design basis event.
We have reviewed your Novemb:[.,1.r(, 1984, submittal as summarized above, and conclude that the request f~extension is timely, is within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(g), demonsti!cat *s good cause for the requested extension, and provides an adequate justi ication for continued plant operation. -We-f..u.r-the-r-eene-1-u-ee-tlla-t-t-h *.. re-x-tens--i-en-w-i--1-1-no-t-enda-nger--:J+~frpe-r-t-y-,-Gr~
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We, th ~.efore, approve the requestt(chedular extension.
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D:NRR HDenton 12/ /84
Mr. Stewart In the event of a cooling water pump failure, the manufacturer has determined that the charging pumps can operate indefinitely in normal ambient conditions without seal water coolant as long as the pumped fluid is less than 115°F.
For the purpose of environmental qualification, the accident of concern is the High Energy Line Break (HELB).
You evaluated the areas of the charging pumps and charging pump CCW pumps and determined that no single HELB can simultaneously render both the c arging pump and CCW pump environments harsh.
/
In the safety injection mode the suction of the charging pumps/is diverted from the normal source, at the volume control tank, to the r&fueling water storage tank by the safety injection signal. The water int~ refueling water storage tank is cooled by Tech. Spec. requirement to7a temperature of slightly below 45°F.
Since the pumped fluid is less than 115°F, you concluded that the charging pumps can operate in the ~~ent of any HELB that might cause failure of the CCW pump motors.
You concluded that the failure of the component cooling water pumps would not significantly degrade the safety function or provide misleading information to the operator under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event.
We have reviewed your November 15, 1984,as summarized above submittal and conclude that the request for extensioiis timely, is within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(g), demonstrates good c~tlse for the requested extension, and provides an adequate justification yer continued plant operation.
We further conclude that this extensi9.n will not endanger life, property, or the common defense and security a~d is otherwise in the public interest, and that granting this extension(.~ill have no significant impact on the environment.
We, therefore, ap ove the request schedular extension.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the ommission has determined that the issuance of the exemption will haven significant impact on the environment (49 FR 41298, October 22, 1984).
D:DL DEisenhut 12/ /84 Sincerely, Denton, Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation OELD 12/ /84
e e
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 December 14, 1984 Docket No. 50-280 Mr. W. L. Stewart Vice President - Nuclear Operations Virginia Electric and Power Company Post Office Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261
Dear Mr. Stewart:
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.49 paragraph (h) of the Environmental Qualification Rule, by letter dated November 15, 1984, you requested an extension until March 31, 1985 for completion of the environmental qualification of the Surry Unit 1 charging pump component cooling water pump motors.
Section 50.49(9) of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that each holder of an operating license issued prior to February 22, 1983, shall by, May 20, 1983, identify the electrical equipment important to safety. If existing equipment was not qualified, licensees were required to submit a schedule for either the qualification or the replacement of equipment important to safety. This schedule must establish a goal of final environmental qualification by the end of the second refueling outage after March 31, 1982, or by March 31, 1985, whichever is earlier. The rule also provides that the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation may grant requests for schedular extensions, until no later than November 30, 1985, for specific pieces of equipment, if these requests are filed in a timely manner and the licensee demonstrates good cause for such an extension.
In addition, 10 CFR 50.49(h) provides that each licensee shall notify the Commission of any significant equipment problems that may require extension of the completion date within sixty days of its discovery.
In compliance with 10 CFR 50.49(9), by letter dated May 20, 1983 you submitted a schedule for the replacement of remaining electrical equipment for Surry 1.
The schedule established a goal of final environmental qualification by the end of the second refueling outage after March 31, 1982, about December 1984.
The existing charging pump cooling water pump motors are being replaced with new, environmentally qualified motors.
Due to design differences between the new and existing motors, new pumps that are physically compatible with the new motors must also be procured.
Purchase orders for new pumps and motors have been issued with delivery presently scheduled for mid-February.
You have committed to install this equipment in Unit 1 during the first quarter of 1985.
Subsequently, you have submitted a request for an extension of the environmental qualification of this equipment so that you can continue operation after your December 1984 refueling outage.
e e
Mr. W. December 14, 1984 You provided a justification for continued operation as follows:
The charging pump component cooling water (CCW) pumps provide seal cooling water for the charging pumps.
The flow from the CCW pumps cool the charging pumps while they are in their safety mode of safety injection.
In the event of a CCW pump failure, the manufacturer has determined that the charging pumps can operate indefinitely in normal ambient conditions without seal water coolant as long as the pumped fluid is less than 115°F.
For the purpose of environmental qualification, the accident of concern is the High Energy Line Break (HELB).
You evaluated the areas of the charging pumps and charging pump CCW pumps, and determined that no single HELB can simultaneously render both the charging pump and CCW pump environments harsh.
_ In the safety injection mode the suction of the charging pumps is diverted
- from the normal source, at the volume control tank, to the refueling water storage tank by the safety injection signal. Technical Specifications require that the water in the refueling water storage tank be cooled to a temperature of slightly below 45°F.
Since the pumped fluid is less than 115°F, you concluded that the charging pumps can operate in the event of any HELB that might cause failure of the CCW pump motors.
You concluded that the failure of the component cooling water pumps would not significantly degrade the safety function or provide misleading information to the operator under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event.
We have reviewed your November 15, 1984, submittal, as summarized above, and conclude that the request for extension is timely, is within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(9), demonstrates good cause for the requested extension, and provides an adequate justification for continued plant operation.
We, therefore, approve the requested schedular extension.
Sincerely, 1JR a_/_
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: See next page
e Mr. W. L. Stewart Virginia Electric and Power Company cc:
Mr. Michael W. Maupin Hunton and Williams Post Office Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23213 Mr. J. L. Wilson, Manager Post Office Box 315 Surry, Virginia 23883 Donald J. Burke, Resident Inspector Surry Power Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 166, Route 1 Surry, Virginia 23883 Mr. Sherlock Holmes, Chairman Board of Supervisors of Surry County Surry County Courthouse Surry, Virginia 23683 W. T. Lough Virginia Corporation Commission Division of Energy Regulation Post Office Box 1197 Richmond, Virginia 23209 Regional Radiation Representative EPA Region III Curtis Building - 6th Floor 6th and Walnut Streets Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 Mr. J. H. Ferguson Executive Vice President - Power Virginia Electric and Power Company Post Office Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator - Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 James B. Kenley, M.D., Commissioner Department of Health 109 Governor Street Richmond, Virginia 23219 Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Attorney General 1101 East Broad Street Richmond, Virginia 05602