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Forwards Addl Info to Satisfy Safety Evaluation for 10CFR50.48 App R.Commitments for Addl Instrumentation & Repair Work,Results of Study Re Associated Circuits & Sketch Detailing Location & Arrangement of Svc Water Pump Encl
	ML18139B740
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	02/12/1982
From:	Leasburg R; VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	Harold Denton; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	064, 64, NUDOCS 8202220185
	Download: ML18139B740 (8)
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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

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Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Serial No. 064 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NO/SWB/jmj: SPl Attn: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Docket Nos. 50-280 Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 50-281 Division of Licensing License Nos. DPR-32 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission DPR-37 Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FIRE PROTECTION APPENDIX R SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SURRY POWER STATION The purpose of this letter is to respond to your letter dated December 4, 1981 which requested additional information to satisfy the Safety Evaluation Report for Appendix R to 10CFR50.48. This information is attached as follows:

1. Attachment I provides commitments for additional instrumentation that will be added to the remote monitoring panel and reasons why other instrumentation should not be included on the remote panel.

2. Attachment II provides the results of a study to assure that certain repair work that may be required as a result of a fire is within the capability of available manpower.

3. Attachment III provides the results of a detailed study to demonstrate that the effects of associated circuits with respect to the alternate safe shutdown functions has been accounted for and demonstrates that the systems will not fail due to.associated circuits.

4. Attachment IV provides a sketch whch details the location and arrangement of the charging pump service water pump and a description of the design and compliance to the Standard Review Plan.

We have thoroughly reviewed the Surry Appendix R Safety Evaluation Report and have provided the results of comprehensive studies that we feel clearly demonstrates that Surry Power Station is in compliance with Appendix R of 10CFR50.

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,. e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY TO If you have any questions, please contact us.

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R. H. Leasburg Attachments cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II

e ATTACHMENT I ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTATION Vepco has reviewed your concern regarding additional instrumentation on the remote shutdown panels and provide commitments and evaluations as follows:

(1) Cold leg temperature - As previously discussed, Vepco does not agree that cold leg temperature is necessary to determine-whether cooldown is being accomplished, however, in order to resolve your position as stated in Appendix R SER, Vepco will install cold leg temperature indication on the remote panels.

(2) Steam Generator Pressure - As previously discussed, Vepco does not agree that steam generator pressure is required for safe shutdown since this pressure is dependent upon and can be determined from the RCS tempera-ture, however, in order to resolve your position as stated in Appendix R SER, Vepco will install steam generator pressure indication on the remote panels.

(3) Source Range Neutron Flux - It is not necessary to add source range neutron flux indication on the remote panel since control rods can be verified to be on the bottom by indicating lights in the control room and the opposite unit's charging pump, in the worst case fire, will be lined up to the RWST which will be always adding to the shutdown margin.

In addition, an in-line sampling system is now being installed to comply with NUREG-0737. This sampling system can sample reactor coolant and provide boron concentration readout in the cable spreading room (approxi-mately the same location as the remote monitoring panel). The sample is analyzed in the auxiliary building and the instrumentation cables are not routed through the same fire area as the instrumentation cables for the source range neu~ron flux. Since boron concentration is a positive indi-cation of reactivity, redundant indication for source range neutron flux would not provide any needed information to bring the reactor safely to cold shutdown in the event of a fire.

(4) Tank Level Indication - Tank.level indication's on the remote panel such as the BIT and the RWST would serve no purpose in a fire. The BIT is always maintained full and it would not be discharged to perform it's design function during any fire scenario. The RWST may be lined up to the charging pump suction in the event of a fire which caused damage to all of the fire affected unit's pumps, however, the pumps would be required to discharge only normal makeup during shutdown which is less than or equal to 150 gpm. Sihce the RWST capacity is 350,000 gallons, it would take at least 38 hours4.398148e-4 days 0.0106 hours 6.283069e-5 weeks 1.4459e-5 months to empty the tank. This would allow ample time for direct measurement of the tanks level.

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ATTACHMENT II MANPOWER AND SCHEDULAR REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTING REPAIRS TO COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT The two systems that are required for cold shutdown that could require repair in order to reach cold shutdown are the Residual Heat Removal system and the Pressurizer Heaters (125 KW minimum). Estimates to accomplish replacing the cables damaged during a fire are as follows:

1. RHR Pump Cables - 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months s/8 electricians.

2. Pressurizer Heater (125 KW minimum) Cables - 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months s/8 electricians.

Attached is a schedule showing the tasks involved, time required and men involved to accomplish each task. This schedule is typical for replacing Pressurizer Heater Cables and the RHR Pump Cables. In the event a breaker for the above equipment was damaged, the breaker would not be repaired. The cables would be wired to any available breaker of necesi;;ary size from

the opposite unit.

The total of 16 electricians required if both the Pressurizer Heater Cables and the RHR pump cables were damaged are available and their use for these tasks would not interfere with other safe shutdown functions.

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ATTACHMENT III EFFECTS OF ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ON ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS In order to assure that associated circuits have no effect on alternate safe shutdown circuits, all circuits which power the alternate shutdown equipment, including the control circuits and the instrumentation circuits, were layed out on station area arrangement drawing so that all circuits coulg be easily traced to it's power source. In the case of safe shutdown equipment such as the charging pump, the power source is considered to be the main breaker for the charging pump. In the case of instrumentation or control circuits, the power source is considered to be the breaker on the 125 VDC or AC distribution panel.

The study clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of the alternate shutdown scheme to enable any fire area to be circumvented to always have available safe shutdown equipment. Since power and control circuits are protected with a Class lE circuit breaker, and the study drawings show the location of all related breakers, damage to associated circuits will not interfere with safe shutdown equipment. All drawings generated for this review will be submitted to you for review by February 24, 1982.

If you have any questions regarding these drawings, please contact us.

A.

e CHARGING PUMP SERVICE WATER SYSTEM REDESIGN ATTACID1ENT IV The following describes the redesign of the charging pump service water system. Refer to the attached sketch for line designation.

1. A 6 in. tie in connection will be made on 6"-WS-42-136. This will provide 'a tie in to the service water system upstream of the isola-tion valves.

2. A 6 in. isolation valve will be installed on the 6 in. line. This valve to be administratively controlled.

3. The 6 in. line will run down into the pipe tunnel where it will tie into two 2 in. lines that will be connected to existing lines 1

2"-WS-71-136 and 2"-WS-173-136. The existing line from here back to the original pumps will be removed from service.

4. Lines 2"-WS-71-136, 211 -WS-173-136, 2"-WS-71-136, and 2"-WS-171-136 will be replaced from the exit of the pipe tunnel with class 21B pipe.

5. Pumps 1-SW-P-lOA and 2-SW-P-lOB will be removed from Mechanical Equipment Room No. 3 and reinstalled in the Auxiliary Building (2 ft. elevation) in lines 2"-WS-71-136 and 211 -WS-173-136.

6. Units 1 and 2 will be cross-connected on the discharge of the service water pumps.

B. The following describes the charging pump service water system redesign's compliance with the Standard Review Plan.

1. ~ection 3.4.1 Floor Protection The relocated pumps w*ill be at El. 4' which is above the flood plane in the auxiliary building basement (El. 2').

2. Section 3.5.1.1 Missiles Internally Generated These relocated pumps will be inside the Auxiliary Building. The new location of the pumps and the separation provided will meet the requirements of SRP 3.5.1.1.

3. Section 3.5.1.4 Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena All components will be inside missile barriers and will be protected.

4. Section 3. 5. 2 Structures, Systems and Components to be Protected from Externally Generated Missiles.

These relocated pumps will be inside the Auxiliary Building. The separation provided will protect the system from external missiles.

5. Section 3.6.2 Plant Design for Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment.

This system will- be protected from postulated piping failures by separation of trains. \

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p TO CHAflGING t'UMf' OIL COOLERS ( UNIT *1 I TURBINE BLDG------- TURBINE BLDG/AUX BLDG 11448-FM*21B IF- 1 I ,

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ML18139B740

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