05000281/LER-1980-004-01, /01T:on 800521,during Cold Shutdown,Pressure Transmitter 458 Inoperable Due to Wiring Problem & Isolation Valve for Pressure Transmitter 403 Found Closed,Negating Overpressure Mitigating Sys.Caused by Cable Problem

/01T:on 800521,during Cold Shutdown,Pressure Transmitter 458 Inoperable Due to Wiring Problem & Isolation Valve for Pressure Transmitter 403 Found Closed,Negating Overpressure Mitigating Sys.Caused by Cable Problem

ML18139A298
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	06/04/1980
From:	Joshua Wilson VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139A297	List: 05000281/LER-1980-004, Forwards LER 80-004/01T-0 05000281/LER-1980-004-01, /01T:on 800521,during Cold Shutdown,Pressure Transmitter 458 Inoperable Due to Wiring Problem & Isolation Valve for Pressure Transmitter 403 Found Closed,Negating Overpressure Mitigating Sys.Caused by Cable Problem
References
LER-80-004-01T-01, LER-80-4-1T-1, NUDOCS 8006110265
Download: ML18139A298 (2)

LER-1980-004, /01T:on 800521,during Cold Shutdown,Pressure Transmitter 458 Inoperable Due to Wiring Problem & Isolation Valve for Pressure Transmitter 403 Found Closed,Negating Overpressure Mitigating Sys.Caused by Cable Problem

Event date:
Report date:
2811980004R01 - NRC Website

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I Buririg cold shutdown, with the RCS in a solid condition.PT 458 was i naperab j e' due to a wiring problem.

Subsequently, the isolation valve for PT 403 was

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found closed.

This condition negated the Overpressure Mitigating System

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The malfunction of nressure transmitter 458 was due to a cable problem.

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ATTACHMENT, PAGE 1 e

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO:

050-0281 REPORT NO:

80-004/0lT-O EVENT DATE:

5-21-80 TITLE OF REPORT:

OVERPRESSURE MITIGATING SYSTEM

1.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

With the unit at cold shutdown, solid and pressurized to 230 PSIA, PCV-456 was inoperable due to a wiring problem with the controlling pressure transmitter PT-458.

T.S. 3.l.6.2(a) allows pressurized operation in this mode for up to 7 days.

Subsequently, PT 403 was found isolated from system pressure, which made the Overpressure Mitigation system inoperable.

A second valve line-up was per-formed to correct the discrepancies prior to solid plant operation.

However, this second valve line-up was improperly performed, and did not identify the PT 403 isolation valve out of position. It should be noted that PT 403 did indicate some lower pressure than actual system pressure.

2.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF EVENT:

The inoperability of the Overpressure Mitigating system had no effect upon the health or safety of the general public because at no time during the loss of pressure signals to the PORV's was the Overpressure Mitigating system needed.

3.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The inoperability of the Overpressure Mitigating system was due to an improper valve line-up.

4.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

The innnediate corrective action taken was to open PT 403's isolation valve 2-RC-71.

5.

SCHEDULED CORRECTIVE ACTION:

None

6.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The importance of proper valve line up was discussed with the operators involved.

In addition, discussions were held with all shift supervisors and asst. shift supervisors relating to the importance of safe and proper plant operation.

A test matrix has been prepared and issued which delineates an integrated thorough system check-out and start-up following the extended outage of Unit #2.

7.

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None