ML18102A849
| ML18102A849 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1997 |
| From: | Eric Simpson Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18102A851 | List: |
| References | |
| LCR-S97-05, LCR-S97-5, LR-N97087, NUDOCS 9702200102 | |
| Download: ML18102A849 (14) | |
Text
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Public Service Electric and Gas Company E. C. Simpson Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609-339-1700 Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering FEB 111997 LR-N97087 LCR S97-05 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 EXIGENT REQUEST FOR CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHILLED WATER SYSTEM SALEM GENERATING STATION NOS. 1 AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 Gentlemen:
In accordance with 10CFR50.90, Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) Company requests a revision to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Salem Generating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2. In accordance with 1 OCFR50. 91 (b) ( 1) , a copy of this submittal has been sent to the State of New Jersey.
The proposed TS changes contained herein represent the addition of a new Specification 3/4.7.10 "Chilled Water System." This change is being submitted to address the support function this system provides to other necessary safety systems.
The proposed changes have been evaluated in accordance with 10CFR50.91(a) (1), using the criteria in 10CFR50.92(c), and PSE&G has concluded that this request involves no significant hazards considerations.
The basis for the requested change is provided in Attachment 1.
A 10CFR50.92 evaluation with a determination of no significant hazards consideration is provided in Attachment 2. The proposed new TS pages are provided in Attachment 3.
Upon NRC approval of this proposed change, PSE&G requests that the amendment be made effective on the date of issuance, but y
allow an implementation period of 10 days to provide sufficient /
time for associated administrative activities.
9702200102 970211 PDR ADOCK 05000272 p ?DR
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f 'I J Document Control Desk LR-N97087 Because this change was recently identified and the potential failure of the associated equipment at power can impact the supported system operability, PSE&G is requesting that this request be processed on an exigent basis.
Should you have any questions regarding this request, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, Affidavit Attachments (3)
C Mr. H. Miller, Administrator - Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. L. Olshan, Licensing Project Manager - Salem U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 14E21 Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. C. Marschall (X24)
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering 33 Arctic Parkway CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625 95-4933
Document Control Desk LR-N97087 DVH BC Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering (Nl9)
General Manager - Salem Operations (S05)
Director - QA/NSR (XOl)
Manager - Joint Owners/Ext Aff Interface (N28)
Manager - Salem Operations (SOl)
Manager - System Engineering - Salem (S02)
Manager - Nuclear Safety Review (N38)
Manager - Licensing & Regulation (X09)
Principal Engineer Salem Operational Licensing (X09)
Onsite Safety Review Engineer - Salem (X15)
J. Curham, Principal Engineer (N51)
D. Wolverton, Senior Staff Engineer (S02)
H. Druckman, Contractor - EPB Mech (N32)
P. Woods, Senior Engineer (N51)
J. Giessner, Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SOl)
M. Phillips, Principal Engineer (X07)
W. Choromanski, Senior Staff Engineer (S02)
General Solicitor, E. Selover (Newark, 5G)
Perry Robinson, Esq.
Records Management (N21)
Microfilm Copy Files Nos. 1.2.1 (Salem), 2.3 (LCR S97-05)
Page 3 of 5
- REF: LR-N97087 LCR S97-05 STATE OF NEW JERSEY SS.
COUNTY OF SALEM E. C. Simpson, being duly sworn according to law deposes and says:
I am Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and as such, I find the matters set forth in the above referenced letter, concerning Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this~/~/_ _ day of ~ , 1997 ELIZABETH J. KJDD NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY My Commission Expires Aprfl 25, 2000 My Commission expires on
{ . i Document Control Desk Attachment 1
- SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 LR-N97087 LCR S97-05 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHILLED WATER SYSTEM BASIS FOR REQUESTED CHANGE REQUESTED CHANGE AND PURPOSE The proposed change adds Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.10, "Chilled Water System" to the Technical Specifications. The requested change requires that the Chilled Water System be operable in Modes 1-6 with three independent chillers and two chilled water pumps. Also included are the associated actions should this equipment become inoperable, and the appropriate system surveillances. This change is being submitted to address the support function this system provides to other necessary safety systems.
BACKGROUND The Chilled Water System consists of six closed loop cooling subsystems, each of which provides cooling to the designated plant areas and equipment (three chillers and two chilled water pumps for each unit). The closed loop which services the Auxiliary Building is the only portion of the Chilled Water System that is required to support equipment and systems that perform a safety related function.
During normal plant operation, the Auxiliary Building chilled water subsystem provides chilled water to the control room air conditioning unit coils (normal and emergency), Auxiliary Building penetration area coolers and main steam line radiation monitor enclosures. In addition to these loads, the Unit 2 chilled water subsystem also supplies cooling water to the primary and secondary laboratory coolers, counting room cooler, and post accident sampling room cooler.
Recent re-evaluation of the Chilled Water System has determined that three chillers and two chilled water pumps are required for each unit to meet single failure criteria. With less than this configuration, the Chilled Water System may not be able to perform its design support function. An illustration of one scenario is with one chilled water pump inoperable, the loss of the diesel backed electrical bus that supplies power to the operating chilled water pump could lead to a total loss of chilled water for that unit.
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Document Control Desk Attachment 1
- LR-N97087 LCR S97-05 JUSTIFICATION OF REQUESTED CHANGES Heat Loads PSE&G has performed heat load calculations for the areas served by systems that the Chilled Water System supports. These heat load calculations form the basis for ensuring that the design basis temperatures are maintained for the Relay Rooms, the Control Room and the affected Electrical Equipment Rooms. Heat load calculations have determined that the chilled water flow rates are sufficient to maintain the design temperatures with the normal system configuration as well as with the configurations with less than a full complement of equipment (i.e., one chilled water pump, two chillers or one chiller) provided the removal of some loads as identified in the proposed Technical Specification action statements.
System Configurations During normal operation, two chillers and one pump are required to meet the cooling load requirements of the Chilled Water System. This ensures one chiller and circulation pump are available for back-up and allows flexibility for maintenance. In the event of an accident, two chillers and one chilled water circulation pump are required to provide heat removal from the following: Control Room envelope via the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (CREACS), the Electrical and Relay Room via the Control Area Air Conditioning System (CAACS) and the emergency control air compressor.
With one chilled water pump inoperable, the loss of the diesel backed bus that supplies the operating chilled water pump could lead to a loss of chilled water for the unit associated with the inoperable pump. Although the common control envelope will be cooled to some extent by the unaffected unit's CREACS coil, the ambient temperature in the area served by the affected coil could exceed the equipment protection temperature. Equally significant, the temperature in the Electrical Equipment Room and Relay Room will also exceed the equipment protection temperature.
With inoperable chilled water components, the proposed Technical Specification requires that appropriate non-essential heat loads will be removed from the Chilled Water System. With two chillers in Unit 1 available, the heat input from the penetration area unit coolers will be removed, and in Unit 2 the heat input from the penetration area unit coolers and other non-essential coolers Page 2 of 5
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Document Control Desk Attachment 1
- LR-N97087 LCR S97-05 will be removed. With only one chiller available, the heat load from the above coolers will be removed and the emergency control air compressor will be aligned to its backup cooling source (service water).
During Modes 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, chilled water components are not considered to be inoperable solely on the basis that the backup emergency power source, diesel generator, is inoperable. This is consistent with Technical Specification 3.8.1.2 which requires only two operable diesel generators in Modes 5 and 6.
Allowed Outage Times The proposed Allowed Outage Times (AOT) were derived from Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) analyses. The PSA analysis determined the effects on core damage frequency if there was one chiller, two chillers or a chilled water pump inoperable. A Conditional Core Damage Probability was determined for each combination of equipment unavailable. The durations assigned to the AOTs result in the equipment unavailability being considered non-risk significant (less than 1 x 10- 6 ) .
The methodology used in this analysis is consistent with the guidance provided in the EPRI PSA Applications Guide, EPRI TR-105396, August 1995. Conditional Core Damage Probabilities of less than 1 x 10- 6 are considered to be non-risk significant.
Safety/Non-Safety Separation The Chilled Water System is equipped with two 100% capacity chilled water pumps and three 50% capacity chillers. Since the Chilled Water System is comprised of safety related loops and non-safety related loops, PSE&G has evaluated the intra-system interface. PSE&G has determined that adequate separation is provided between the safety related portion of the Chilled Water System and the non-safety related portions of the system as discussed below.
The supply line to the non-safety related portion of the Chilled Water System is separated from the safety related portion of the system by redundant isolation valves. These isolation valves are safety related components, including their controls, and located in safety related seismically supported piping. The return line from the non-safety related portion of the Chilled Water System is separated from the safety related portions in some instances by a single check valve. In these instances, the check valves are safety related components, located in safety related seismically supported piping.
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Document Control Desk Attachment 1 LR-N97087 LCR S97-05 During the initial Salem plant design and licensing check valves were considered as passive components. This is consistent with the guidance in SECY-94-084. SECY 94-084 also states that the failure of checks valve do not have to be assumed in addition to the initiating failure. However, the failure of a passive component, i.e. a check valve, must be assumed as an initiating event.
A single check valve is considered an acceptable application since an initiating failure, such as loss of the non-safety chilled water piping would not impact the safety function of the system. A failure of a check valve on the return side of the Chilled Water System, when the non-safety heat loads are isolated, could potentially cause the draining of the Chilled Water System. In this scenario, loss of chilled water will not impact the ability to shutdown the unit and procedures will be in effect to provide appropriate guidance to the operators to compensate for the loss of chilled water.
For LOCA conditions, failure of the non-safety related chilled water piping is not credible since there are no additional loads induced on the system as a result of the LOCA.
Based on the above, PSE&G has determined that the existing Chilled Water System design has acceptable means for isolating the non-safety portion of the system.
Single Failure Vulnerabilities PSE&G has reviewed the single failure vulnerabilities of the system and has determined that the design had two potential vulnerabilities (valves CH168 and CH74). However, PSE&G is implementing temporary compensatory action to ensure the operability of valve CH168 to support the control room ventilation until a permanent solution is implemented.
Valve CH74 is located in the inlet/outlet/bypass piping to the CAACS cooling coil which (during an accident) serves the Relay Room and the Electrical Equipment Room. The valve has a pneumatically operated actuator to modulate chilled water flow through the CAACS coil or through the bypass line to control the cold deck air temperature. On a loss of air, the valve will spring actuate to direct all flow to the CAACS cooling coil. The control circuitry has redundant solenoid valves that exhaust the air on a loss of power and as a consequence the spring would fail the valve to the full flow to the cooling coil position.
Therefore, the controls for this valve are redundant, enhancing the capability to endure a single failure.
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Document Control Desk LR-N97087 LCR S97-05 A highly unlikely failure scenario is that with the valve aligned in the bypass position during conditions of cold makeup air and little or no heat load on the cooling coil, a mechanical malfunction may bind the valve in the bypass position. With the valve stuck in this position, chilled water flow would bypass the CAACS and temperatures in the Relay Room and Electrical Equipment Room could increase.
PSE&G considers this failure mode to not be credible. Even during periods of cold weather, the heat loading from the control area is high enough to require some cooling water flow. Also, the valve is modulating to control CAACS temperature. This requires valve motion to compensate for the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> day/night cycle. Therefore, the valve does not remain in one position for an extended period of time.
In the unlikely case of the valve binding in an intermediate position, adequate cooling is assured since the CAACS heat load drops during an emergency due to the Control Room envelope load shifting to the CREACS. To provide added assurance of valve operability, this valve is periodically stroke tested as part of the routine surveillance and in-service testing programs.
Testing The proposed surveillances ensure that the manual valves in the chilled water flow path are in their proper alignment.
Additionally, every 18 months each automatic valve that receives a Safeguards Initiation signal will be tested to ensure the automatic valves actuate to correct position.
The chiller availability will be tested every 92 days by verifying that the chiller will start and run thus confirming the chillers ability to operate upon demand.
During maintenance and surveillance testing, preplanned operator actions may take the place of automatic actions.
CONCLUSIONS Based upon the above, PSE&G has determined that the addition of the proposed Technical Specification is consistent with the design basis of the Salem Generating Station's Chilled Water System and ensures that the systems supported by the Chilled Water System maintain their safety function.
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- t. * ~I Attachment 2
- Document Control Desk SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 LR-N97087 LCR S97-05 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHILLED WATER SYSTEM 10CFR50.92 EVALUATION Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) has concluded that the proposed changes to the Salem Generating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS) do not involve a significant hazards consideration. In support of this determination, an evaluation of each of the three standards set forth in 10CFR50.92 is provided below.
REQUESTED CHANGE The proposed change adds an LCO for the Chilled Water System.
BASIS
- 1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The Chilled Water System is a support system providing cooling to the Relay Rooms, the Control Room, and the affected Electrical Equipment Rooms. The Chilled Water System is not an accident initiator of any accident evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report. No physical changes to the Chilled Water System result from the proposed TS. The specified Allowed Outage Times in the TS are commensurate with the safety significance of the Chilled Water System as demonstrated by the PSA analysis.
Therefore, the proposed TS does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
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Document Control Desk Attachment 2 LR-N97087 LCR S97-05 The proposed changes do not involve any modifications to the Chilled Water System or mode of operation of the system. The proposed TS specifies the minimum operable number of chillers and chilled water pumps to assure that the system performs its design function. It does not change the basic way in which the Chilled Water System is operated. The loads that are isolated are non-safety loads. By maintaining the minimum operable number of chillers and chilled water pumps, adequate cooling is assured to the Relay Rooms, the Control Room, the affected Electrical Equipment Rooms.
Therefore, the change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The Chilled Water System is a support system which provides cooling to the Relay Rooms, the Control Room, and the affected Electrical Equipment Rooms. The proposed changes do not involve any modifications to the Chilled Water System or changes to the mode of operation of the system. The proposed TS establishes controls to better ensure that the Chilled Water System will be able to perform its intended design function and ensures that the safety functions of supported systems are maintained.
The proposed changes establish Allowed Outage Times and do not affect the operation of the Chilled Water System, and thus do not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.
CONCLUSION Based on the above, PSE&G has determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
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Document Control Desk
- LR-N97087 LCR S97-05 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHILLED WATER SYSTEM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES WITH PROPOSED CHANGES The following Technical Specifications for Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 are affected by this change request:
Technical Specification Page INDEX VII and XIV 3/4.7.10 3/4 7-32 and 3/4 7-33 B 3/4.7.10 B 3/4 7-8 The following Technical Specifications for Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 are affected by this change request:
Technical Specification Page INDEX VII and XIV 3/4.7.10 3/4 7-28 and 3/4 7-29 B 3/4.7.10 B 3/4 7-8 Page 1 of 1
- INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Safety Valves . . . . . . . .3/4 7-1 Auxiliary Feedwater System .3/4 7-5 Auxiliary Feed Storage Tank .3/4 7-7 Activity ....... . .3/4 7-8 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves .3/4 7-10 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION . . . . . . . . .3/4 7-14 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM .3/4 7-15 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM .3/4 7-16 3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION .3/4 7-17 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM . . . . .3/4 7-18 3/4.7.7 AUXILIARY BUILDING EXHAUST AIR FILTRATION SYSTEM . . . . .3/4 7-22 3/4.7.8 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION .3/4 7-26 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS .3/4 7-28 3/4.7.10 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM -
AUXILIARY BUILDING SUBSYSTEM. .3/4 7-32 SALEM - UNIT 1 VII Amendment No.
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- INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE . . .. . .. . B 3/4 7-1 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM . . . . B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.7 AUXILIARY BUILDING EXHAUST AIR FILTRATION SYSTEM . B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.8 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS . . B 3/4 7-6 3/4.7.10 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM -
AUXILIARY BUILDING SUBSYSTEM. . . . B 3/4 7-8 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A. C. SOURCES and AND 3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS . . . B 3/4 8-1 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES B 3/4 8-1 SALEM - UNIT 1 XIV Amendment No.