ML18101A943

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Discusses Investigation of Licenses DPR-70 & DPR-75 on 921203 & Forwards Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $80,000
ML18101A943
Person / Time
Site: Salem  
Issue date: 04/11/1995
From: Martin T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Eliason L
Public Service Enterprise Group
Shared Package
ML18101A944 List:
References
EA-94-239, NUDOCS 9509010290
Download: ML18101A943 (5)


Text

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-i EA 94-239 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 475 ~LENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA; PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 April 11, 1995 Mr. Leon R. Eliason Chief Nuclear Officer and President Nuclear Business Unit Public Service Electric and Gas Company Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION ANO PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - $80,000

{Office of Investigations {OI) Report l-93-021R)

Dear Mr. Eliason:

This letter refers to the NRC investigation conducted at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station concerning harassment and intimidation {H&I) of two Safety Review Group {SRG) engineers {a Senior Staff Engineer and a Safety Review Engineer) after they attempted to file an incident report {IR) at the facility on December 3, 1992. You conducted an internal investigation of this matter, and found, in part, that certain nuclear department managers engaged in actions of H&I or failed to respond to such actions effectively, as noted in the Executive Su11111ary of your Task Force Report of Investigation, dated April 2, 1993.

In addition to your internal investigation, the NRC's Office of Investigations (OI) performed an investigation into this matter. On-February 8, 1995, an enforcement conference was conducted with you and members of your staff to discuss the H&I activities, its causes, and your corrective actions.

In addition, separate enforcement conferences were held with Messrs. Reiter and Polizzi on February.a, 1995, and with Mr. Vondra on February 24, 1995.

Based on the NRC OI investigation {the investigation synopsis was sent to you on January 11, 1995), as well as a review of your internal investigation and the results of enforcement conferences with you and individuals mentioned in the previous paragraph, the NRC determined that H&I did occur relative to the two SRG engineers. More s*pecifically, the NRC concludes that the former General Mariager-Salem Operations {GM-SO), Mr. Calvin Vondra, and the former Operations Manager (OM), Mr. Vincent Polizzi, engaged in a number of discrete acts, that, taken together, created a hostile work environment for the two. SRG engineers. These actions by the OM and GM-SO against the two SRG engineers constitute a violation of the employee protection provisions set forth in IO CFR 50.7.

Our investigation also initially implicated the former General Manager-Quality Assurance and Nuclear Saf~ty Review (GM-QA/NSR).

However, subsequent review of this individual's performance and the clarification he presented at an enforcement conference on February 8, 1995, indicates he did not violate, or cause you, the licensee, to violate, any regulatory requirement relating to employee protection.

Consequently, we do not intend to take further actions relative to this individual.

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company 2

The specific events which led to the creation of the hostile work environment began on December 3, 1992, when the two.SRG engineers attempted to process a safety issue in accordance with station procedures, via an IR. The IR questioned whether the co11111ercial grade air supply pressure setpoint regulators, which control service water flow to the safety-related containment fan cooling units, were qualified seismically, configured properly, and classified properly as safety-related components. After the engineers raised the issue to the OM, the OM angrily attempted to convince the SRG engineers that either the IR should not be issued, or should include information that the OM believed existed, that would support operability of the components.

When it was evident to the OM that the SRG engineers would not agree to this approach, the OM escalated the matter to the GM-SO.

After the OM and GM-SO met privately for approximately 15 minutes, the two SRG engineers were called into the meeting.

During the meeting, the GM-SO became frustrated as he was unable to convince the SRG engineers to modify, amend, or otherwise revise their proposed IR. When matters reached an impasse, one of the engineers indicated that he (the engineer) could document the matter as a safety concern. The GM-SO took this statement as a thr~at, became more angry, ordered the two SRG engineers to get out of his office, and threatened to have site security officers remove them.

The next day, December 4, 1992, the GM-SO signed a memorandum, that he previously requested the OM to prepare, to the GM-QA/NSR (within whose organization the two SRG engineers reported). The memorandum requested that the two individuals be removed from any direct or indirect involvement with the Salem Station. While the GM-SO signed the memorandum and intended that it be issued immediately, the OM held the memorandum until the GM-SO returned from vacation on December 14, 1992.

Although the GM-SO sought the advice of a peer manager (the General Manager-Hope Creek Operations), who advised against sending the memorandum, and had an opportunity to reconsider his actions in this matter, he did not change his mind. Accordingly, the GM-SO sent the memorandum, dated December 4, 1992, when he returned from vacation on December 14, 1992, and he did not retract it until February 8, 1993, after the Senior Vice President-Electric became aware of the issue and initiated an investigation.

These discrete actions by the former GM-SO and OM created a hostile work environment for the two SRG engineers, as more fully described in the enclosed Notice, and constitute a violation of the employee protection provisions in 10 CFR 50. 7. At the enforcement conference, your Vice Pres i dent-Nuc 1 ear Operations, admitted that a violation of 10 CFR 50.7 occurred. The OM and GM-SO made similar admissions during the enforcement conferences held with them, although they both denied that they deliberately took any action to violate this requirement.

A hostile work environment is not conducive to the raising of safety concerns by individuals, and can potentially have an adverse impact on the safe operation of the facilities.

As such, a hostile work environment at a licensee facility cannot be tolerated.

Public Service Electric and Gas Ce>11pany 3

As a NRC licensee, your organization has the responsibility to ensure all safety concerns raised by staff are addressed in a manner that does not create a hostile work environment for those individuals who bring forth such concerns.

The act ions of the former GM-SO and the former OM in 1 ate 1992 and early 1993 did not adhere to these standards, and did not provide an appropriate example for management, supervisors, or staff within their line organization, nor for the other Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) organizations with which they interfaced. Given the senior level of plant management involved in the creation of this hostile work environment, the related violation is classified at Severity Level II in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, (Enforcement Policy).

In addition to the violation, the NRC is concerned that senior management did not resolve these issues promptly and effectively after becoming aware of them in late December !992 and early January 1993.

As noted in your internal investigation report, the former Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer initially failed to recognize the significance of the issues and to monitor resolution, and the former Vice President-Nuclear Operations exercised poor judgement by abstaining from any involvement in the resolution of the issues.

The NRC recognizes that this violation initially was identified by PSE&G during an investigation initiated at the direction of senior corporate management, after they became aware of the events. The NRC also recognizes that subsequent to the identification of the violation, actions were taken to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, including disciplinary action against the responsible individuals and subsequent removal of the GM-SO and OM from any involvement at the Sa 1 em Station.

These corrective actions, wh i th were described at the enforcement conference, inc 1 uded, but were not 1 i mi ted to:

( 1) prompt in it 1at ion of an investigation in early 1993 after the Senior Vice President-Electric became aware of the events; (2) the then Chief Nuclear Officer meeting with the SRG engineers in February and April 1993, and sending them a letter to assure them that their actions were appropriate; (3) issuance of letters of apology to the SRG engineers from the GM-SO and OM; (4) review of the event with Salem managers; (5) issuance of a letter to all nuclear department personnel regarding raising safety concerns; (6) revision of General Employee Training {GET) regarding employee rights and responsibilities; and (7) revision of appropriate procedures.

However, notwithstanding your investigative efforts and corrective actions, a significant NRC action is warranted, given the senior levels of plant management involved in this case, so as to emphasize the importance of continuously assuring a work environment that is free of any harassment, intimidation, or discrimination against those who raise safety concerns. Accordingly, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount of $80,000 for the Severity Level II violation set forth in the Notice.

Public Service Electric and

&as Company 4

The base chil penalty amount for a Severity Level II violation is $80,000.

Application of the escalation and mitigation factors in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy was considered, and on balance, no adjustment to the penalty is warranted.

NRC determined that there is a basis for 50% mitigation of the civil penalty based on your identification of the violation and an additional 50%

mitigation of the civil penalty as a result of your prompt and comprehensive corrective actions taken after the violation was identified.

However, 100%

escalation of the civil penalty is warranted based on the fact that you had a prior opportunity to preclude continuance of the hostile work environment which existed over a two month duration. This prior opportunity existed because the then Vice President and Ch;ef Nuclear Officer, as well as the then Vice President, Nuclear Operations, were aware, soon after the December 3, 1992 event, that a confrontation had deve 1 oped between the two SRG engineers and senior members of your management staff, yet failed to take action to prevent the violation from continuing.

The other escalation/mitigation factors were considered and no further adjustment was warranted.

You are required to respond to this letter and the enclosed Notice and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response.

In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence.

After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure comp 1 i ance with NRC regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure ( s), and your response will be pl aced in the NRC Pub l i c Document Room {PDR).

To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that *it can be pl aced in the PDR without redaction.

However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public.

The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.

Docket Nos. 50-272; 50-311 License Nos. DPR-70; DPR-75

~?/L~

Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator

Enclosure:

Notice of Violation and Proposed. Imposition of Civil Penalty

Public Service Electric and Gas Company cc w/encl:

J. Hagan, Vice President - Operations 5

S. LaBruna, Vice President - Engineering and Plant Betterment C. Schaefer, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.

R. Burricelli, General Manager - Informations Systems & External Affairs J. Summers, General Manager - Salem Operations J. Benjamin, Director - Quality Assurance & Safety Review F. Thomson, Manager, Licensing and Regulation R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs A. Tapert, Program Administrator R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire M. Wetterhahn, Esquire P. Curham, Manager, Joint Generation Department, Atlantic Electric Company Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate W. Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township Public Service Commission of Maryland State of New Jersey State of Delaware Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

D. Screnci, PAO-RI (2)

NRC Resident Inspector