ML18100B183
| ML18100B183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1994 |
| From: | Labruna S Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GL-89-10, NLR-N94113, NUDOCS 9407070203 | |
| Download: ML18100B183 (18) | |
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Public Service Electric and Gas Company Stanley LaBruna I
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609-339-1700 Vice President - Nuclear Engineering JUN 2 81994.
NLR.:..N94113 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
SALEM MOV PROGRAM STATUS REPORT GENERIC LETTER 89-10 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70.AND DPR-75 SALEM GENERATING STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 The NRC approved a schedule extension for completion of Salem Generating Station Generic Letter 89-10 commitments on March 10, 1993.
The extension was contingent upon a number of conditions including submitting a status report of MOVs within our Generic Letter 89-10 program by June 28, 1994.
The required status report, which is contained in the attachment to this letter, was prepared using Supplement 6 to Generic Letter 89-10 as guidance.
Should there be any questions or comments with regard to this submittal, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
_,,-~-
~---~ ~-----.-......,,
9407070203 940628 PDR ADDCK 05000272 P
Document Control Desk NLR-N94113 2
C Mr. T. T. Martin, Administrator - Region I U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. J. C. Stone, Licensing Project Manager
- u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. c. s. Marschall (S09)
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV NJ Department of Environmental Protection Division of Environmental Quality Bureau of Nuclear Engineering CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625 JUN 2 81994*
REF: NLR-N94113 STATE OF NEW JERSEY SS.
COUNTY OF SALEM
)
S. LaBruna, being duly sworn according to law deposes and says:
I am Vice President - Nuclear Engineering of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and as such, I find the matters set forth in the above referenced letter concerning the Salem Generating Station, are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
Subscribed and sw this-a
~f;}\\
day My Commission expires on me 1994 KIMBERLY JO BROWN NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY My Commission Expires April 21, 1998
e SAUM llCN IKlGRAM S'.m'ltJS REOORI.'
GEmRIC IEl"rER 89-10 SAUM GmmATING S'mTIW
.AT.12\\rnMEN.r F2\\ClLl'lY OPERATING LicmsES DIR-70 AND DIR-75 IXX!KEl' NO. 50-354 I.
mmorIJCl'IW e
NIR-N94113
'lhe NRC approved a schedule extension for completion of salem Generating station Generic letter 89-10 conunitlnents :on March 10, 1993. 'lhe approval was contingent upon several conditions including submitting a status report of mvs within our Generic letter 89-10 program by June 28, 1994.
'!he required status report, which was prepared using SUpplement 6 to Generic letter 89-10 as guidance, is provided below~
II. S'.m'ltJS REfORr
'!he reporting requirements contained in Generic letter 89-10 SUpplement 6 include the following:
A.
Reporting Requirement (1)
NRC Request Provide "the completion status of the licensee's GL 89-10 program."
PSE&G Response All Unit 1 valves within the scope of Generic letter 89-10 have been set up statically in accordance with our mv Program calculational setpoints and diagnostic test procedures. In addition, all Unit 1* valves *that have been detennined to be practicable for in-situ dynamic testing have been satisfactorily tested under dynamic conditions.
Seventy-nine of the ninety-five Unit 2 valves within the scope our Generic letter 89-10 Program have been statically tested and dynamic tests of thirty-one of the forty-eight valves considered practicable for dynamic testing have been perfonned. In accordance with connnitments made in our schedule extension request, the remaining tests will be perfonned during the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage scheduled to begin on October 15, 1994.
All mvs in our Generic letter 89-10 program have been set consistent with our current understanding of the best available infonnation.
For valves for which dynamic testing is not practicable, we have verified capability by alternate means; we anticipate that additional data will be obtained from EPRI and our own testing and will evaluate this infonnation as it is received.
Page 1 of 6
Attachment Salein IDV Status Report B.
Reporting Requirement (2) (a)
NRC Request NIR-N94113 For each valve whose capability has not been verified by dynamic testing, provide "the valve type, size, safety function, design basis differential pressure and flow, and the available valve factor (or similar capability measure), and a discussion of the relative risk significance of the valves involved."
PSE&G Response Info:nnation on the valve type, size, safety function, design basis differential pressure and flow, and the available valve factor for valves not currently verified by dynamic testing is contained in Tables 1, 2, and 3. Table 1 provides the info:nnation for Unit 1 valves for which dynamic testing is not practicable; Table 2 provides the info:nnation for Unit 2 valves for which dynamic testing is not practicable; Table 3 provides the info:nnation for Unit 2 valves for which dynamic testing is practicable and for which dynamic testing will be completed during the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage.
Table 4 contains the relative risk significance for the population of valves included in Table 3.
C.
Reporting Reguireinent (2) (b)
NRC Request For each valve whose capability has not been verified by dynamic testing, provide "confi:nnation that the functionality of these MOVs has been established using the best available info:nnation. 11 PSE&G Resoonse Globe and butterfly valves within the PSE&G IDV program have perfonned consistently with our expectations from a sizing and switch setting perspective and are considered to be predictable. All globe and butterfly valves tested under dynamic conditions have perfonned satisfactorily. '!he progranmatic enhancements that have been i.mpleinented are expected to ensure their continued predictable perfo:rmance.
Globe valves dynamically tested have exhibited no greater than a 1.56 apparent valve factor (this was a single case with all others less than 1.14). Globe valves which have not been tested under dynamic conditions have a valve factor capability of at least 1.19 on the basis of as-left thrust measureinents.
The three testable globe valves which remain to be tested are currently set to achieve a valve factor output equivalent to at least 2. 9 on the basis of as-left tlrrust measureinents.
Based on the alxwe info:nnation, we conclude there is a significant basis to support that globe valves at Salein Generating station have sufficient margin to perform their safety function.
Page 2 of 6
Attachment NIR-N94113 Salem 'IDV status Report
'lhe Salem butterfly valves are all position controlled with switch settings that represent a torque capability margin of at least 42%
between maximum available torque and the torque measured at limit switch trip. 'lhe Salem butterfly valves are limit seated with a torque switch as a parallel, secondary control.
'!he torque switch is set to the maxinn.nn pennissible engineering value. Butterfly valves which have not been tested under dynamic conditions have a thrust margin of at least 49%.
'!he three testable butterfly valves that remain to be tested are currently set to achieve a thrust margin of at least 204%.
Based on the above infonnation, we conclude that there is a significant basis to support that butterfly valves at Salem Generating Station have sufficient margin to perfo:nn their safety function.
'lhe dynamic test results for Salem gate valves has been less predictable than those for globe and butterfly valves.
Diagnostic equipment measurements for thrust required to cause fluid flow isolation have varied from calculated values.
Where thrust requirements exc.eeded calculated target values, adjustments have been made to switch settings and doa.nnented control setpoints, as appropriate.
As a result of this experience, a review of gate valves for which dynamic testing is not practicable or for which testing has not yet been completed has been perfo:nned. '!his review was focused primarily on valve factor capab.i,lity.
For valves with a closing function, a valve factor capability was calculated for each valve based upon the as-left control switch trip thrust value. '!his value was subjected to a 25% reduction of the as-left thrust to account for various uncertainties. Valves that have only an open function or are position controlled using the limit switches have valve factors dete:nnined based upon the most limiting torque output value and a stem coefficient of friction of 0.20. Valves that are required to close under a design basis differential pressure of zero psid were assessed based upon one psid and a 5% reduction of the as-left thrust to account for uncertainties other than load sensitive behavior since this behavior is not a concern for a valve required to operate at zero differential pressure. '!he zero psid valves all have significant capability (all have a valve factor capability of at least 22).
'!he resultant data was compared to a valve factor capability screening criterion of 0.50.
Any valve with an as-left thrust equivalent valve factor of less than 0.50 was subject to further evaluation.
The valve factor screening criterion of 0.50was selected on the combined-basis of our gate valve test experience and the detailed EPRI 'IDV Perfonnance Prediction Program test results currently available. '!he EPRI data was limited to those valves most sllnilar to our valves.
'!he vast majority of our -test data and the available, applicable EPRI test data yielded required valve factors of less than O. 50.
Based upon this data, we have selected this valve factor capabil.i,ty value as the criterion for providing reasonable assuranee of satisfactory valve factor perfonnance.
Page 3 of 6
TABLE 1 SALEM UNIT-1 DP NON-TESTABLE MOV's MOV VALVE VALVE SIZE/
SAFEI'Y DESCRIPrION DBDP DB FLOW AVAIL TYPE OPERATOR STROKE PSID Fv (1) 11BF22 GSC 12/SMB-2-40 CLOSE 11 SG MAIN FEED WTR STP 1550 0
116 (2) 12BF22 GSC 12/SMB-2-40 CLOSE 12 SG MAIN FEED WTR STP 1550 0
83 (2) 13BF22 GSC 12/SMB-2-40 CLOSE 13 SG MAIN FEED WTR STP 1550 0
103 (2) 14BF22 GSC 12/SMB-2-40 CLOSE 14 SG MAIN FEED WTR STP 1550 0
77 (2) lCC17 NFG 12/SMB-00-10 CLOSE CC SUCT HDRX-TIE 0
0 45.753 (3) 1CC18 NFG 12/SMB-00-10 CLOSE CC SUCT HDR X-TIE 0
0 50.335 (3) lCC131 FWG 3/SMB-00-25 CLOSE RCP THERM BARIER CC OUT 2235 175 gpm
.299 (6) lCC190 FWG 3/SMB-00-25 CLOSE
. RCP THERM BARIER CC OUT 2235 175 gpm
.390 (6) 1CS14 SWG 3/SMB-00-10 OPEN SPRY ADD TANK COMM OUT 0
0 373.535 (3) 1CS16 SWG 3/SMB-00-10 OPEN SAT OUTLET ISOLATION 14 38.5 gpm 67.093 (5) 1CS17 SWG 3/SMB-00-10 OPEN SAT OUTLET ISOLATION 14 38.5 gpm 35.565 (5) 1CV116 FWG 4/SMB-00-5 CLOSE RCP SEAL WATER RETURN HEADER STOP 115 93gpm 1.678 1CV284 FWG 4/SMB-00-5 CLOSE RCP SEAL WATER RETURN HEADER STOP 115 93gpm 1.804 11MS168 G3W 4/SMB-00-10 BOTH (7)
MS ISOLATION 3-WAY MOV 1081
<25,000#/hr 1.58 12MS168 G3W 4/SMB-00-10 BOTH (7)
MS ISOLATION 3-WAY MOV 1081
<25,000#/hr 1.58 13MS168 G3W 4/SMB-00-10 BOTH (7)
MS ISOLATION 3-WAY MOV 1081
<25.000#/hr 1.58 14MS168 G3W 4/SMB-00-10 BOTH (7)
MS ISOLATION 3-WAY MOV 1081
<25,000#/hr 1.58 1PR6 FWG 3/SMB-00-15 BOTH PRESSURIZER RELIEF ISOL 2510 210000 #/hr
.352 (6)
IPR?
FWG 3/SMB-00-15 BOTH PRESSURIZER RELIEF ISOL 2510 210000 #/hr
.277 (6) lRHl PDG 14/SMB-1-25 BOTH RHR COMMON SUCT FRM RCS 381 6000 gpm
.853 (4)
PAGE 1 OF3
TABLE 1 SALEM UNIT-1 DP NON-TESTABLE MOV's MOV VALVE VALVE SIZE/
SAFETY DESCRIPl'ION DBDP DB FLOW AVAIL TYPE OPERATOR STROKE PSID Fv (1) 1RH2 PDG l 4/SMB-1-40 BOTH RHR COMMON SUCT FRM RCS 381 6000 gpm
.802 (4) 11RH4 DDG 14/SMB-0-25 CLOSE RHR PUMP 11 SUCT ISOL 0
0 77.562 (3) 12RH4 DDG 14/SMB-0-25 CLOSE RHR PUMP 12 SUCT ISOL 0
0 22.913 (3) lSJl FWG 8/SMB-00-10 BOTH RWST TO CHRG PUMPS ISOL 15 550 gpm 3.063 1SJ2 FWG 8/SMB-00-10 BOTH RWST TO CHRG PUMPS ISOL 15 550 gpm 3.063 1SJ30 FWG 8/SMB-00-10 CLOSE RWST TO SI PUMPS ISOL 18 650 gpm 3.381 1SJ69 FWG 12/SMB-2-40 CLOSE RWST TO RHR PUMPS ISOL 29 4800 gpm 7.171 1SJ135 DDG 4/SMB-0-15 CLOSE SI DISCHARGE TO COLD LEGS STOP 238 650GPM 2.099 11SJ33 SWG 6/SMB-00-15 CLOSE SI PUMP 11 SUCT ISOL 226 50gpm
.370 (6) 12SJ33 SWG 6/SMB-00-15 CLOSE SI PUMP 12 SUCT ISOL 226 50gpm
.447 (6) 11SJ44 DDG 14/SMB-2-60 BOTH RHR PUMP 11 CONT AINMNT 60 6000 gpm 1.291 SUMP SUCT ISOL 12SJ44 DDG 14/SMB-2-60 BOTH RHR PUMP 11 CONT AINMNT 60 6000 gpm
.932 SUMP SUCT ISOL 11SJ45 SWG 8/SMB-1-25 BOTH RHR TO SI PUMPS STOP 228 50gpm
.444 (6) 12SJ45 SWG 8/SMB-1-25 BOTH RHR TO SI/CHARGING PUMPS STOP 228 50gpm
.688 11SJ54 FWG 10/SMB-3-80 OPEN 11 ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 677 8867 gpm 1.185 (5) 12SJ54 FWG 10/SMB-3-80 OPEN 12 ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 677 8867 gpm
.958 (5) 13SJ54 FWG 10/SMB-3-80 OPEN 13 ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 677 8867 gpm 1.185 (5) 14SJ54 FWG 10/SMB-3-80 OPEN 14 ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 677 8867 gpm
.947 (5) 11SJ113 FWG 4/SMB-00-5 BOTH SI/CHARGING PUMPS SUCTION 228 50gpm
.740 X-OVERSTOP PAGE 2 OF 3
---v VALVE TYPE 12SJ113 FWG l1SW21 BFY llSW22 BFY llSW23 BFY 12SW20 BFY 12SW21 BFY 12SW22 BFY 12SW23 BFY 14SW20 BFY KEY TO VAL VE TYPES GSC - Globe Stop Check G3W - Globe 3-Way DOG - Double Disc Gate FWG - Flex Wedge Gate SWG - Split Wedge Gate BFY - Butterfly PDG - Parallel Disc Gate VALVE SIZE/
OPERATOR 4/SMB-00-5 8/SMB-000-3 24/SMB-00-10 24/SMB-00-10 24/SMB-00-10 8/SMB-000-3 24/SMB-00-10 24/SMB-00-10 24/SMB-00-10 NFG - Non-Flexible Gate (Solid Wedge)
TABLE 1 SALEM UNIT-1 DP NON-TESTABLE MOV's SAFETY DF.SCRIPTION DBDP DB FLOW STROKE PSID BOTH SI/CHARGING PUMPS SUCTION 228 50gpm X-OVERSTOP CLOSE 11 NUC HDR TO DG STOP 132 2100 gpm CLOSE 11 NUC HOR INLEI' STOP 134 33000 gpm BOTH NUC HOR X-OVER ISOL 133 23782gpm CLOSE 11 NUC HOR SPLY STOP 131 33000 gpm CLOSE 12 NUC HDR TO DG STOP 133 2100 gpm CLOSE 12 NUC HOR INLEI' STOP 134 33000 gpm BOTH NUC HOR X-OVER ISOL 134 23782 gpm CLOSE 12 NUC HDR SPLY STOP 131 33000 gpm (1) - When calculating "Available Valve Factor (Fv)" the "as-left" thrust value at control switch trip was used unless the valve has an open only function.
(2) - This value represents the % capability in excess of the combined stem ejection force + assumed running load (stuffing box load) due to the valve type. The DBDP represents line pressure used to calculate stem ejection force, but it is not applied to calculate disc forces since the valve is already closed when the motor operator is energized.
(3) - Valve does not function against a DP - a value of 1 psid was used to illustrate valve capability.
(4) - Valve is position controlled using motor operator limit switches. Available Fv is based on maximum AVAIL Fv (1)
.718 229 (8) 105 (8) 71 (8) 49 (8) 229 (8) 85 (8) 122 (8) 51 (8) allowable torque converted to thrust using a stem I stemnut COF
=
0.20.
The torque switch is a parallel, secondary control switch set at its maximum allowed level.
(5) - Valve has an open only function. Available Fv is based on torque converted to thrust using a stem I stemnut COF = 0.20.
(6) - Valve Factor (Fv) is less than 0.50 screening criteria. Further evaluation is required (refer text).
(7) -
Subsequent to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture and closure of the MSIV the 3-Way Globe valve may be repositioned to the opposite vent port in the event of a stuck open vent valve.
(8) - Value is a percent margin between available torque at torque switch maximum allowed setting and mm1mum required torque from the valve manufacturer.
Valve is limit switch seated (position controlled) and the torque switch is a parallel, secondary control switch set at its maximum level.
PAGE3 OF 3
TABLE2 SALEM UNIT-2 DP NON-TESTABLE MOV's MOV VALVE VALVE SIZE/
SAFETY DESCRIPTION DBDP DB FLOW AVAIL TYPE OPERATOR STROKE PSID Fv (1) 21BF22 GSC 12/SMB-2-40 CLOSE 21 SG MAIN FEED WTR STP 1550 0
56 (2) 22BF22 GSC 12/SMB-2-40 CLOSE 22 SG MAIN FEED WTR STP 1550 0
97 (2) 23BF22 GSC 12/SMB-2-40 CLOSE 23 SG MAIN FEED WTR STP 1550 0
94 (2) 24BF22 GSC 12/SMB-2-40 CLOSE 24 SG MAIN FEED WTR STP 1550 0
51 (2) 2CC17 NFG 12/SMB-00-10 CLOSE CC SUCT HDRX-TIE 0
0 40.814 (3) 2CC18 NFG 12/SMB-00-10 CLOSE CC SUCT HDR X-TIE 0
0 40.628 (3) 2CC131 FWG 3/SMB-00-25 CLOSE RCP THERM BARIER CC OUT 2235 175 gpm
.449 (6) 2CC190 FWG 3/SMB-00-25 CLOSE RCP THERM BARIER CC OUT 2235 175 gpm
.384 (6) 2CS14 SWG 3/SMB-00-10 OPEN SPRY ADD TANK COMM OUT 0
0 420.522 (3) 2CS16 SWG 3/SMB-00-10 OPEN SAT OUTLET ISOLATION 14 38.5 gpm 31.325 (5) 2CS17 SWG 3/SMB-00-10 OPEN SAT OUTLET ISOLATION 14 38.5 gpm 31.325 (5) 2CV116 FWG 4/SMB-00-5 CLOSE RCP SEAL WATER RETURN HEADER STOP 115 93 gpm
.618 2CV284 FWG 4/SMB-00-5 CLOSE RCP SEAL WATER RETURN HEADER STOP 115 93 gpm
.593 21MS168 G3W 4/SMB-00-10 BOTH (7)
MS ISOLATION 3-WAY MOV 1081 NIA l.36 (4)(8) 22MS168 G3W 4/SMB-00-10 BOTH (7)
MS ISOLATION 3-WAY MOV 1081 NIA 1.19 (4)(8) 23MS168 G3W 4/SMB-00-10 BOTH (7)
MS ISOLATION 3-W A Y MOV 1081 NIA 1.36 (4)(8) 24MS168 G3W 41SMB-00-10 BOTH (7)
MS ISOLATION 3-WAY MOV 1081 NIA 1.21 (4)(8) 2PR6 FWG 31SMB-00-15 BOTH PRESSURIZER RELIEF ISOL 2510 210000 #/hr
.343 (6) 2PR7 FWG 31SMB-00-15 BOTH PRESSURIZER RELIEF ISOL 2510 210000 #/hr
.293 (6) 2RH1 PDG 141SMB-1-25 BOTH RHR COMMON SUCT FRM RCS 381 6000 gpm
.691 (4)
PAGE 1OF3
TABLE2 SALEM UNIT-2 DP NON-TESTABLE MOV's MOV VALVE VALVE SIZE/
SAFEI'Y DESCRIPTION DBDP DB FLOW AVAIL TYPE OPERATOR STROKE PSID Fv (1) 2RH2 PDG 14/SMB-1-40 BOTH RHR COMMON SUCT FRM RCS 380 6000 gpm
.855 (4) 21RH4 DDG 14/SMB-0-25 CLOSE RHR PUMP 21 SUCT ISOL 25 Ogpm 1.895 22RH4 DDG 14/SMB-0-25 CLOSE RHR PUMP 22 SUCT ISOL 25 Ogpm 2.734 2SJ1 FWG 8/SMB-00-10 BOTH RWST TO CHRG PUMPS ISOL 15 550 gpm 7.214 2SJ2 FWG 8/SMB-00-10 BOTH RWST TO CHRG PUMPS ISOL 15 550 gpm 7.228 2SJ30 FWG 8/SMB-00-10 CLOSE RWST TO SI PUMPS ISOL 16 650 gpm 3.909 2SJ69 FWG 12/SMB-2-40 CLOSE RWST TO RHR PUMPS ISOL 29 4800 gpm 2.228 (8) 2SJ135 DDG 4/SMB-0-15 CLOSE SI DISCHARGE TO COLD LEGS STOP 205 50gpm 3.454 21SJ33 SWG 6/SMB-00-15 CLOSE SI PUMP 21 SUCT ISOL 226 50gpm
.557 22SJ33 SWG 6/SMB-00-15 CLOSE SI PUMP 22 SUCT ISOL 226 50gpm
.741 21SJ44 DDG 14/SMB-2-60 BOTH RHR PUMP 21 CONTAINMNT 60 6000 gpm 2.008 (8)
SUMP SUCT ISOL 22SJ44 DDG 14/SMB-2-60 BOTH RHR PUMP 21 CONTAINMNT 60 6000 gpm
.510 (8)
SUMP SUCT ISOL 21SJ45 SWG 8/SMB-1-40 BOTH RHR TO SI PUMPS STOP 228 50gpm
.992 22SJ45 SWG 8/SMB-1-40 BOTH RHR TO SI/CHARGING PUMPS STOP 228 50gpm
.978 21SJ54 FWG 10/SMB-3-80 OPEN 21 ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 677 8867 gpm
.984(5)(8) 22SJ54 FWG 1 O/SMB-3-80 OPEN 22 ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 677 8867 gpm
.912(5)(8) 23SJ54 FWG 10/SMB-3-80 OPEN 23 ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 677 8867 gpm
.942(5)(8) 24SJ54 FWG 10/SMB-3-80 OPEN 24 ACCUMULATOR OUTLET 677 8867 gpm
.872 (5) 21SJ113
'FWG 4/SMB-00-5 BOTH SI/CHARGING PUMPS SUCTION 227 50gpm
.749 X-OVERSTOP PAGE20F3
MOV VALVE TYPE 22SI113 FWG 21SW21 BFY 21SW22 BFY 21SW23 BFY 22SW20 BFY 22SW21 BFY 22SW22 BFY 22SW23 BFY 24SW20 BFY KEY TO VALVE TYPES GSC - Globe Stop Check G3W - Globe 3-Way DOG - Double Disc Gate FWG - Flex Wedge Gate SWG - Split Wedge Gate BFY - Butterfly PDG - Parallel Disc Gate VALVESIZFJ OPERATOR 4/SMB-00-5 8/SMB~0-3 24/SMB-00-10 24/SMB-00-10 24/SMB-00-10 8/SMB-000-3 24/SMB-00-10 24/SMB~-10 24/SMB-00-10 NFG - Non-Flexible Gate (Solid Wedge)
TABLE2 SALEM UNIT-2 DP NON~TESTABLE MOV's SAFEI'Y DESCRIPTION DBDP DB FLOW STROKE PSID BOTH SI/CHARGING PUMPS SUCTION 228 50gpm X-OVERSTOP CLOSE 21 NUC HDR TO DG STOP 132 2100 gpm CLOSE 21 NUC HDR INLET STOP 135 33000 gpm BOTH NUC HOR X-OVER ISOL 133 23782gpm CLOSE 21 NUC HOR SPLY STOP 131 33000 gpm CLOSE 22 NUC HDR TO DG STOP 132 2100 gpm CLOSE 22 NUC HOR INLET STOP 134 33000 gpm BOTH NUC HOR X-OVER ISOL 133 23782gpm CLOSE 22 NUC HDR SPLY STOP 131 33000 gpm (1) - When calculating "Available Valve Factor (Fv)" the "as-left" thrust value at control switch trip was used unless the valve has an open only function.
(2) - This value represents the % capability in excess of the combined stem ejection force + assumed running load (stuffing box load) due to the valve type. The DBOP represents line pressure used to calculate stem ejection force, but it is not applied to calculate disc forces since the valve is already closed when the motor operator is energized.
(3) - Valve does not function against a DP - a value of 1 psid was used to illustrate valve capability.
AVAIL Fv (1)
.808 230 (9) 85 (9) 118(9) 51 (9) 230(9) 85 (9) 71 (9) 49 (9)
(4) - Valve is position controlled using motor operator limit switches. Available Fv is based on maximum allowable torque converted to thrust using a stem I stemnut COF = 0.20. The torque switch is a parallel, secondary control switch set at its maximum allowed level.
(5) - Valve has an open only function. Available Fv is based on torque converted to thrust using a stem I stemnut COF = 0.20.
(6) - Valve Factor (Fv) is less than 0.50 screening criteria. Further evaluation is required (refer to text).
(7) - Subsequent to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture and closure of the MSIV the 3-Way Globe valve may be repositioned to the opposite vent port in the event of a stuck open vent valve.
(8) - Fv based on post-lE Bulletin 85-03 test data.
(9) - Value is a percent margin between available torque at torque switch maximum allowed setting and minimum required torque from the valve manufacturer. Valve is limit switch seated (position controlled) and the torque switch is a parallel, secondary control switch set at its maximum allowed level.
PAGE3 OF3
MOV VALVE VALVE SIZE/
TYPE OPERATOR 21BF13 FWG 14/SMB-3-100 22BF13 FWG 14/SMB-3-100 23BF13 FWG 14/SMB-3-100 24BF13 FWG l 4/SMB-3-100 2CC30 FWG 16/SMB-0-25 2CC31 FWG 16/SMB-0-25 21CC3 NFG 16/SMB-0-25 2CV139 GLOBE 2/SMB-00-25 2CV140 GLOBE 2/SMB-00-25 21RH29 GLOBE 2/SMB-00-25 21SJ40 DOG 4/SMB-0-15 21SJ49 FWG 8/SMB-3-80 22SJ49 FWG 8/SMB-3-80 2SW26 BFY 30/SMB-0-25 21SW20 BFY 30/SMB-0-25 23SW20 BFY 30/SMB-0-25 FWG - FLEX WEDGE GATE NFG - NON FLEXIBLE GATE (Solid Wedge)
DDG - DOUBLE DISC GATE BFY - BUTTERFLY TABLE3 MOV'S WITH DP TEST REQUIRED BUT NOT YET PERFORMED SAFETY STROKE CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE BOTH BOTH CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE DESCRIPTION DBDP DB FLOW AVAIL PSID Fv (1) 21 SG MAIN FW STOP 631 5200GPM
.773 22 SG MAIN FW STOP 631 5200GPM
.747 23 SG MAIN FW STOP 631 5200GPM
.662 24 SG MAIN FW STOP 631 5200GPM
.562 21 HX TO AUX CC HDR STOP 118 10500 GPM
.426 (3) 22 HX TO AUX CC HDR STOP 118 10500 GPM
.325 (3) 21 CC PUMP DISCH HDR X-TIB 0
13194 GPM 45.804 (2)(4)
CHARGING PUMPS MINIFLOW STP 2508 150 GPM 2.915 CHARGING PUMPS MINIFLOW STP 2508 150GPM 4.719 21 RHR PUMP MINIFLOW STP 194 500GPM 16.069 21 SJ PUMP TO HOT LEGS STP 208 50GPM 3.356 (4) 21 RHR PUMP TO COLD LEG STP 227 50GPM 3.323 i2 RHR PUMP TO COLD LEG STP 227 50GPM 1.295 TURD GEN HDR COMM INLET 134 26084 GPM 226(5)
TURB GEN HDR SUPPLY STP 134 26084 GPM 204(5)
TURB GEN HDR SUPPLY STP 131 26084 GPM 204(5)
(1) - Valve factor determined from "as-left" thrust data.
(2) - Valve is not required to function against DP, value based on 1 psid to illustrate capability.
(3) - Valve factor is less than 0.50 screening criteria. Further evaluation is required (refer to text).
(4) - Fv based on post 1E Bulletin 85-03 test data.
(5)- Value is a percent margin between available torque at torque switch maximum allowed setting and minimum required torque from the manufacturer. Vale is limit switch seated (position controlled)and the torque switch is a parallel, secondary control switch set at its maximum allowed level.
TABIE 4 RISK SIGNIFICANCE FOR DYNAMICALLY TFSTABIE VALVES NO!' YE!' DYNAMICALLY TESTED
- 1.
21BF13. 22BF13. 23BF13. 24BF13
'lhese valves isolate feedwater from each of the Unit 2 steam generators.
'1hese valves are in series with parallel BF40 and BF19 air operated valves which perform the same function. Failure to close these valves does not directly lead to core damage, therefore this failure mode is not modelled. Failure to reopen these valves upon a failure of Auxiliary Feedwater System to allOW' for use of condensate for steam generator cooling has been modelled.
'!he core damage frequency (CDF) increase for this failure mode for each valve increases from 4. SlE-5 per year to 4.82E-5 per year and is considered insignificant.
As noted in Table 3, these valves have valve factor capabilities of 0.773, 0.747, 0.662, and 0.562 (i.e, above the screening criteria of 0.50).
- 2.
2CC30, 2CC31
'1hese valves serve, in part, to isolate each Unit 2 conponent cooling loop from each other as well as isolating nonessential loads during the recirculation phase following a safety injection. These valves are required to be closed during transition to the recirculation phase of safety injection. *Assuming flOW' diversion caused by failure to close these valves prevents adequate decay heat removal, the core damage frequency increases from 4. SlE-5 per year to 3. 32E-4 per year.
See Page 5 of the attachment for a discussion of reasonable assurance for these valves.
- 3.
21CC3
'!his valve provides separation of the conponent cooling loops during the recirculation mode of safety *injection. '!his. valve has not been modelled because the combination of check valve 23CC1 and *rrt:Jv 22CC3 provide the same function~ '!his valve is judged to have a lovi risk significance.
As noted in Table 3, this valve has a valye factor capability of 45.804 (i.e; above the screening criteria of 0.50) ~
- 4.
2CV139, 2CV140
'lhese in-series valves isolate the charging purrps' min-flow line.
Due to their series arrangement and the fact that they are nonnally open, they are not modelled and are judged to have a lOW' risk significance.
As noted in Table 3, these valves have valve factor capabilities of 2.915 and 4. 719 (i.e, above the screening criteria of 0.50).
- 5.
21RH29
'!his single valve isolates the 21 RHR pmap min-flow line. It is nonnally closed and is required to open to perfonn its flmction.
Failure to open is modelled and results in a CDF increase from 4.81E-5 per year to
- 5. 98E-5 per year.
As noted in Table 3, this valve has a valve factor capability of 16.069 (i.e, al:xwe the screening criteria of 0.50).
- 6.
21.SJ40
'!his valve isolates the Unit 2 safety injection recirculation mode pathway to the #23 and #24 RCS hot legs. '!his valve is nonnally closed and is opened to initiate the hot leg recirculation mode approximately 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> subsequent to cold leg recirCulation following a safety injection.
'!his mode of recirculation is perfonned to reduce boiling and boron precipitation.
Because this mode of operation is not required to mitigate c6re.damage, failure to open this valve is not a significant conti.butor to CDF.
As nc;>ted in Table 3, this valve has a valve factor capability of 3.356 (i.e, al:xwe the screening criteria of 0.50).
- 7.
21.SJ49. 22SJ49
'lhese valves are nonnally open for cold leg injection and recirculation.
one valve is required to close as part of switching from its cold leg injection or recirculation pathway to supplying two of the four contai.rnnent spray headers.
'lhe other valve is required to close to switch from cold leg to hot leg recirculation.
For the cold leg to hot leg recirculation switchover, as in the hot leg recirculation discussion for 21.SJ40 above, both 21.SJ49 and 22SJ49 are judged to have a low risk significance with regard to CDF.
However, if neither valve can be closed (outside the design basis) to provide a contai.rnnent spray pathway, there could be an impact on contai.rnnent damage probability.
As noted in Table 3, these valves have valve factor capabilities of 3.323 and 1.295 (i.e, above the screening criteria of 0.50).
- 8.
2SW26
'!his butterfly valve isolates the service water tw:bine generator (non-nuclear) common header. '!his valve is modelled and has a low risk significance because electrical power distribution faults dominate its failure.
As noted in Table 3, this valve has a thrust margin of 226%
(see discussion on butterfly valve perfonnance on Page 3 of the attachment) *
- 9.
21SW20. 23SW20
'lhese butterfly valves isolate each service water bay from the common non-nuclear header. Failure of each of these valves is modelled and results in a CDF increase from 4.81E-5 per year to 1.18E-3 per year for 21SW20 and from 4.81,E-5 per year to 1.68E-4 per year for 23SW20.
As noted in Table 3, these valves have thrust margins of 204% (see discussion on butterfly valve perfonnance on Page 3 of the attachment).
Attachment e
e NIR-N94113 Salem KN status Report Tables 1, 2, and 3 contain the valve factor capability infonnation for valves which have not been dynamically tested as of June 28, 1994.
From this data, it is observed that seven Unit 1 valves and six Unit 2 valves have valve factor capabilities of less than 0.50. Further evaluation has been perfonned on each of these thirteen valves as indicated belOlrl.
- 1.
1CC131. 1CC190, 2CC131. 2CC190 Ccynamic Testing Impracticable)
These are Velan 3 inch flex wedge gate valves.
Four other Velan 3 inch flex wedge gate valves of identical design (1CV68, 1CV69, 2CV68, and 2CV69) have been sucessfully tested umer dynamic conditions in a pressure regime between 2522 psid and 2626 psid with a resulting apparent valve factor of between 0.187 and 0.266.
'!he valve factor capabilities of 1CC131, 1CC190, 2CC131, and 2CC190 are above the worst case measured valve factor for this valve type.
On this basis, these valves are considered to be capable of satisfying their postulated design basis function.
- 2.
1PR6, 1PR7, 2PR6, 2PR7 (Dynamic Testing Impracticable)
These are Velan 3.inch flex wedge gate valves.
Four other Velan 3 inch flex wedge gate valves of identical design (1CV68, 1CV69 ~ 2CV68, and 2CV69) have been sucessfully tested under dynamic conditions in a pressure regime between 2522 psid cind 2626 p'sid with a resulting apparent valve factor of between 0.187 and 0.266.
The valve factor capabilities of 1PR6, 1PR7, 2PR6, and 2PR7. a+e above the worst case measured valve factor for this valve type.
- On.this basis, these valves are considered to be capable of satisfying their.postulated def;ign basis function.
- 3.
11SJ33, 12SJ33 (Dynamic Testing Impracticable)
These are 6 inch split wedge gate valves. Indicated valve factor capability based upon the current switch settings is justified as follows.
These valves isolate the safety injection pumps from the RWST or from the alternate RHR heat exchanger.
These valves are open in all operational modes.
Should a leak (maximum 50 gpm) occur during accident conditions, the leak must be isolable within 30 minutes.
Isolation could be accomplished locally or remotely, and with or withoUt pumps running.
Should the leak occur on the safety injection pl.llllp suction header, the differential pressure across the valve would be essentially zero during closure of the first valve. The maximum valve factor these valves could overcome, based on these conditions -(differential pressw:e of 10 psid conservatively assumed) and their present torque switch settings, is 8.1 for 11SJ33 and 10.2 for 12SJ33.
Should the second suction valve then be stroked closed to further isolate the leak, the potential exists for the torque switch to trip prior to wedging.
'!his is not a C011cen1 because alternate valves (SJ45s and SJ113s) are available to isolate the leak.
Page 4 of 6
Attaclnnent NIR-N94113 Salem MOV Status Report
- 4.
ll.SJ45 *(Dynamic Testing Impracticable)
'!his valve is an 8 inch. split wedge gate valve and is configured such that considerable inertia exists after torque switch trip that causes a maximum thrust output in excess of two times that at switch trip under static comitions. It is therefore detennined that this extra inertial loading will ensure valve closure under dynamic comitions.
- 5.
2CC30. 2CC31 (Dynamic Testing Practicable)
'lhese are 16 inch flex wedge gate valves. Imicated valve. factor capability based upon the current switch settings is justified as follorNS~ Valve actuation is initiated manually from the control roam while in Step 80 of Emergency Operating Procedure (:OOP) IDCA-3 to split the two component cooling nuclear headers into two independent trains during transition to cold leg recirculation. Since the valves isolate parallel lines from the component cooling water heat exchangers to the connnon auxiliary headers, the first of the two valves receiving a close signal will function against essentially no differential pressure. For this valve, the valve factor capability will increase significantly to in excess of 3.8 for 2CC31 assuming 10 psid.
Should a subsequent passive failure occur in the auxiliary component cooling header while in the ECCS
. recirculation phase, the component cooling. surge tank makeup capability is sufficient to maintain level while the leak is isolated locally. 'lhe surge tank is also baffled to divide the tank into two separate surge volmnes. 'lhese volumes provide redundancy for a passive failure during the recirculation phase of a IOCA.
'!he second valve may not fully close prior to torque switch trip if all accounted valve perfonnance uncertainties are in full effect. A lower level of these uncertainties improve the likelihood of full closure under electric powered actuation.
Control roam operators will verify valve closure based upon position imicators at the control panel.
Should a closed imication not be present, an operator would be dispatched to close the affected valve. 'lhe valves are corrpletely accessible during power operation, and within operator reach with a locally available ladder. Timing for operator action is not cri"t:ical
- in the event scenario for this concern, but incomplete closure of.*the second valve may have a long tenn effect on cold leg recirculation efficiency and potentially shorten the intei:val to hot leg recirculation.
Page 5 of 6
"t Attaclnnent NIR-N94113 Salem KN status Report D.
Reporting Regµirement (2) Cc)
NRC Request For each valve whose capability has not been verified by dynamic testing, provide "the schedule for completing both the KN testing and any needed corrective actions."
PSE&G ResJX?nse As indicated in our response to Reporting Requirement (1), 79 of the 95 Unit 2 valves within the scope our Generic Letter 89-10 Program have been statically tested and Ji of the 48 valves considered practicable for dynamic testing have been dynamically tested. '!he remaining tests will be perfo:rmed during the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage scheduled to begin on October 15, 1994.
sixteen Unit 2 valves within the scope of Generic Letter 89-10 have not been statically tested under our Generic Letter 89-10 program. '!heir current switch settings were established during the period after IE Bulletin 85-03. 'lhese sixteen Unit 2 valves will be statically tested during the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage scheduled to begin on October 15, 1994.
Where appropriate, we are considering various alternatives to improve our capability margins.
Page 6 of 6