ML18096A832

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Summary of 920625 Meeting W/Util Re Erosion/Corrosion Program & Results of Feedwater Sys Exam at Plants.Attendance List & Viewgraphs Encl
ML18096A832
Person / Time
Site: Salem  
Issue date: 07/10/1992
From: Stephen Pindale
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-M83761, NUDOCS 9207200260
Download: ML18096A832 (47)
v • d • e


Text

I,...

.J e.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 10, 1992 Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311 LICENSEE:

Public Service Electric and Gas Company FACILITY:

Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF MEETING WITH PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY (PSE&G) ON JUNE 25, 1992, TO DISCUSS THE EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM AND THE RESULTS OF THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM EXAMINATION AT SALEM UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC M83761)

On June 25, 1992, PSE&G met with the NRC staff to provide information concerning the program being applied at Salem 1 and 2 to identify areas within the piping systems that were susceptible to the erosion/corrosion phenomena.

Also, the results of examinations of the main feedwater system at Salem 1 and 2 were discussed.

Background:

Region I performed an inspection of the erosion/corrosion (E/C) program at PSE&G during the week of May 25, 1992.

As a result of that inspection, a question was raised about the pressure being used in the calculation of minimum wall thickness.

PSE&G then determined that the correct*

pressure should be the system design pressure. A re-evaluation of the data identified six areas in the safety-related section of the main feedwater system piping of Salem 2 that either were below minimum wall or were predicted to be below minimum wall at the end of the current operating cycle.

In addition, a number of areas in the non-safety-related portion of the main feedwater, condensate, and heater drain systems were identified as exhibiting E/C and approaching minimum wall in both Salem 1 and 2.

Salem 1 was at the end of a refueling outage and was in Mode 5, Salem 2 was operating at 100%

power.

During the period between June 12, 1992 and June 18, 1992, a series of telephone conference calls between Region I, NRR and PSE&G were held to discuss resolution of the E/C issues.

On June 18, 1992, PSE&G notified NRR and Region I that in their continuing reviews of the ultrasonic test data, one area of the Salem 2 feedwater system did not have sufficient data to provide assurance that the area exhibiting E/C had been fully examined.

Because of the lack of that data, PSE&G elected to take Salem Unit 2 off line. The staff then requested PSE&G to come to the NRC's Rockville, Maryland, office for a presentation of their E/C program, the results of their inspections, and their corrective actions, both programmatic and system upgrade.

Summary:

1.

Erosion/Corrosion Program PSE&G's E/C program is based on NRC Bulletin 87-01, NRC Generic Letter 89-08, and INPO, EPRI and NUMARC guidance.

During their review of the E/C program, PSE&G identified the following deficiencies, and the corrective action as noted was taken:

fl""o~~J~fl**~ -

--==~~f?iI0--------\\1~1

~ ~lj t: IP-tJ:P.~~. r~.. \\\\~,

(

9207200260K 6~8b6212 I

.. ITTi~ ~&.filt&' ~--

1 ~.

PDR ADOC PDR u*1 i

p

~-------------------------

. - A.

The basis for system selection was not documented.

The basis for the system selection was subsequently documented and an independent review by a third party was in progress.

B.

The methodology for component selection and the application of the methodology was not documented.

The methodology for component selection was subsequently documented, and an independent review by a third party had been completed.

The component selection documentation (i.e., the application of the methodology) was completed and an independent third party review was in progress.

C.

There were inconsistencies in the component selection between Unit 1 and Unit 2.

Additional components were selected for inspection to resolve the inconsistencies.

Inspections of the additional components were in progress.

D.

PSE&G was using the EPRI developed CHEC program.

They will convert to CHECMATE before the next refueling outages at both Salem 1 and 2.

2.

Ultrasonic Test (UT)

On reviewing the UT test results, PSE&G found that in some cases where thinning was noted at the grid boundary, the examination had not been extended to establish the full extent of the thinning and the minimum wall thickness in the area. Written directions were issued to extend the grid to two pipe diameters beyond the boundary and until the pipe wall was 75 mils above the calculated minimum wall thickness.

The identified areas were in the process of being reexamined.

3.

Data Evaluation For areas that were within 75 mils of the calculated minimum wall thickness, PSE&G performed calculations to determine the projected wall thickness at the end of the current operating cycle.

However, during their review of the data, they found some areas where the projected minimum wall had not been calculated. Calculations were being performed to predict the minimum wall thickness at the end of the cycle.

In the calcul~tion of minimum acceptable wall thickness, one parameter that is used is the system pressure.* Originally, PSE&G was using the system operating pressure in the calculations.

When the use of operating pressure was questioned by the Region I inspector, PSE&G reexamined the issue and determined that the correct pressure should be the system design pressure. After reanalysis, there were a number of areas that either were below minimum wall thickness or projected to be below minimum wall thickness at the end of the operating cycle.

The minimum wall calculation performed by PSE&G used a design pressure of 1893 psig, but increased the allowable stress in the pipe wall by the factor of 1.2. The design pressure is based on the shut-off head of the

'. main feedwater pump plus the shut-off head of the condensate pump.

The NRC staff objected to the use of the 1.2 factor in calculating the minimum wall thickness. The staff's position was that in calculating the minimum wall thickness, the design pressure and allowable stress is

~sed. The 1.2 factor in allowable stress is only applied for cases where pressure transients above the design pressure occur less than 1%

of the time.

This issue is still open.

For the safety-related portion of the main feedwater system, the licensee argued that using the design pressure was overly conservative because this section is unisolable from the steam generator.

The steam generator has a design pressure of 1085 psig and is protected by five safety valves with settings that range from 1070 psig to 1125 psig.

Because the piping cannot be isolated from the steam generators, the use of 1893 psig for the design pressure was deemed overly conservative by PSE&G.

Based on their evaluation, a reduced design pressure of about 1335 psig was used in calculating the minimum wall.

PSE&G will provide the staff the bases for the 1335 psig design pressure.

4.

Corrective Action A.

PSE&G committed to immediately replace any p1p1ng that was currently or projected to be below minimum wall thickness by the end of the operating cycle. This is applicable to both safety-related piping and balance-of-plant piping.

B.

Areas adjacent to the BF-19 (feedwater regulating valves) valves that have potentially unacceptable thin walls will be repaired using a full circumferential weld buildup.

The wall thinning was determined to be a counterbore machining error, not an E/C issue.

5.

Other Issues PSE&G performed radiography (RT) and UT examinations of the steam generator expanders at both Salem 1 and 2 to determine if cracking had occurred as a result of thermal fatigue.

One, #14 in Unit 1, showed indications, but PSE&G was still evaluating the indication~

6.

Open Issues A.

The bases for re-rating the design pressure of the portion of the feedwater system that is unisolable from the steam generator; B.

Detailed calculation of minimum wall thickness and the application of the 1.2 factor for maximum allowable stress including assumptions and the bases for the assumptions; C.

Details of calculations of *E/C r~tes; and D.

The assurance that the corrosion pattern in the feedwater piping is not in the form of a sine curve.

NOTE:

Information concerning these open issues was provided in a meeting between NRC and PSE&G on July 1, 1992.

There is a separate meeting summary for that meeting. is a list of attendees at the meeting. is the handout that was provided by PSE&G at the meeting.

Before the meeting, PSE&G had provided the NRC with some preliminary information concerning the wall thickness in the areas that were exhibiting E/C.

That information is included as Enclosure 3.

However, that information is superseded by the information in the licensee's handout.

Enclosures:

1.

List of Attendees

2.

Meeting Handout

3.

Preliminary Information cc w/enclosures:

See next page DISTRIBUTION:

Docket File NRC & Local PDRs PDI-2 Reading TMurley/FMiraglia, 12G18 JPartl ow, 12G18

  • SVarga JCalvo CMil l er JStone
  • .MO' Brien OGC EJordan, 3701 BDLiaw FOrr BLeFave MHartzman EBrown JANorberg GJohnson OFFICE p

NAME DATE

/Sf Stephen M. Pindale, Acting Project Manager Project Directorate 1-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation EWenzinger, RGN-1 HGray, RGN-1 SMPindale, RGN-1 JWhite, RGN-1

  • .. DGamberon i RHermann TChan ACRS ( 1.0)

RLobel, 17G21 I I I /

I D.

The assurance that the corrosion pattern in the feedwater piping is not in the form of a sine curve.

NOTE:

Information concerning these open issues was provided in a meeting between NRC and PSE&G on July I, 1992.

There is a separate meeting summary for that meeting.

Enclosure I is a list of attendees at the meeting. is the handout that was provided by PSE&G at the meeting.

Before the meeting, PSE&G had provided the NRC with some preliminary information concerning the wall thickness in the areas that were exhibiting E/C.

That information is included as Enclosure 3.

However, that information is superseded by the information in the licensee's handout.

Enclosures:

I.

List of Attendees

2.

Meeting Handout

3.

Preliminary Information cc w/enclosures:

See next page Stephen M. Pindale, Acting Project Manager Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

-~-

-~----

Public Service Elect~ & Gas

  • Company cc:

Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street NW Washington, DC 20005-3502 Richard Fryling, Jr., Esquire Law Department - Tower SE 80 Park Place Newark, NJ 07101 Mr. Calvin A. Vondra General Manager - Salem Operations Salem Generating Station P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Mr. S. LaBruna Vice President - Nuclear Operations Nuclear Department P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Mr. Thomas P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector Salem Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Drawer I Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Dr. Jill Lipoti, Asst. Director Radiation Protection Programs NJ Department of Environmental Protection CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625-0415 Maryland People's Counsel American Building, 9th Floor 231 East Baltimore Street Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Mr. J. T. Robb, Director Joint Owners Affairs Philadelphia Electric Company 955 Chesterbrook Blvd., 51A-13 Wayne, PA 19087 Salem Nucle~enerating Station, Un"its 1 ana 2 Richard Hartung Electric Service Evaluation Board of Regulatory Commissioners 2 Gateway Center, Tenth Floor Newark, NJ 07102 Regional Administrator, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Lower Alloways Creek Township c/o Mary 0. Henderson, Clerk Municipal Building, P.O. Box 157 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Mr. Frank X. Thomson, Jr., Manager Licensing and Regulation Nuclear Department P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Mr. David Wersan Assistant Consumer Advocate Office of Consumer Advocate 1425 Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 Mr. J. A. Isabella MGR. - Generation Department Atlantic Electric Company P.O. Box 1500 1199 Black Horse Pike Pleasantville, NJ 08232 Carl D. Schaefer External Operations - Nuclear Delmarva Power & Light Company P.O. Box 231 Wilmington, DE 19899 Public Service Commission of Maryland Engineering Division ATTN:

Chief Engineer 231 E. Baltimore Street Baltimore, MD 21202-3486 Steven E. Miltenberger Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Public Service Electric & Gas Company Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

I~

MEETING ATTENDEES EROSION/CORROSION IN FEEDWATER SYSTEM SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 & 2 Steven E. Miltenberger Timothy N. Taylor Donald Longo Jerry Ranalli Charles Williamson Damien LaMastro Michael Morroni Thomas E. Greene Robert Coward Jose A. Calvo B. D. Liaw J. C. Stone Frank Orr Bi 11 LeFave Mark Hartzman Earl J. Brown J. A. Norberg George Johnson Frank Sullivan Bob Brandt Ted Robb Russ Oakes Edward Wenzinger Harold Gray S. M. Pindale John White David Gamberoni Robert Hermann Charles Mi 11 er Terence Chan Richard Swanson Frank Thomson June 25, 1992 ORGANIZATION PSE&G PSE&G PSE&G PSE&G PSE&G PSE&G PSE&G MPR MPR NRR/DRPE NRR/DET NRR/PDI-2 NRR/SRXB NRR/DST/SPLB NRR/DET/EMEB AEOD/DSP/ROAB NRR/DET/EMEB NRR/DET/EMCB PSE&G PSE&G Philadelphia Electric Atlantic Electric NRC/RGN-I NRC/RGN-I NRC/RGN-I NRC/RGN-I NRC/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DET/EMCB NRR/PDI-2 NRR/EMEB PSE&G PSE&G ENCLOSURE 1

l l

E.NC LOS URE 2 Ps~G Public Service v

Electric and Gas Cumpany PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING SALEM GENERATING STATION EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM JUNE 25, 1992 D

I *

  • I 11111
  • 11111 I

[8J I,,,Lil I

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING MEETING OBJECTIVES

  • TO PROVIDE OVERVIEW OF PSE&G EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM
  • TO PROVIDE A

SUMMARY

OF EROSION/CORROSION ISSUES AT SALEM INCLUDING DESCRIPTION OF POTENTIAL DEFICIENCIES.

EVALUATION RESULTS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

  • TO RESTORE NRC CONFIDENCE IN THE EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM AT SALEM

~--,

t PSE&G/NAC MANAGEMENT MEETING INTRODUCTION MEETING OBJECTIVES AGENDA ISSUES EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM BASIS ELEMENTS ISSUES/DISPOSITION CURRENT STATUS FUTURE PLANS AGENDA TECHNICAL EROSION/CORROSION ISSUES ISSUES DISPOSITION CURRENT STATUS THERMAL CRACKING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PRIOR TO RESTART

SUMMARY

/CONCLUSIONS R. N. SWANSON J. A. RANAUI J. A. RANALLI T. N. TAYLOR T. N. TAYLOR R. N. SWANSON

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING ISSUES

  • SAFETY-RELATED PIPE THINNING (SALEM.UNIT 2)
  • NON-SAFETY RELATED PIPE THINNING (SALEM UNITS 1 AND 2)
  • EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM
  • BF19 MANUFACTURING DEFICIENCY

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM BASIS

  • SOER 87-03:

1 PIPE FAILURES IN HIGH ENERGY SYSTEMS DUE TO EROSION/CORROSION'

  • BULLETIN 87-01:

'THINNING OF PIPE WALLS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS'

  • EPRI/NUMARC CHEC METHODOLOGY
  • GENERIC LETTER 89-08:

'EROSION/CORROSION -

INDUCED PIPE WALL THINNING'

  • IE NOTICES

~-

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS

  • SYSTEM SELECTION
  • COMPONENT SELECTION
  • UT INSPECTION
  • DATA EVALUATION
  • REPA I A/REPLACE

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS SYSTEM SELECTION

  • BASED ON E/C PARAMETERS (eg CHEMISTRY, MATERIAL, HYDRODYNAMICS) AND INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE
  • SYSTEMS SELECTED

- CONDENSATE

- FEEDWATER

- HEATER DRAINS

- STEAM GENERA TOR SLOWDOWN

- BLEED STEAM

-MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER DRAIN

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS SYSTEM SELECTION

  • ISSUE

-BASIS FOR SYSTEM SELECTION NOT DOCUMENTED

  • DISPOSITION

-DOCUMENT AND REVIEW BASIS FOR SYSTEM SELECTION

  • STATUS

- SYSTEM SELECTION BASIS DOCUMENTED

- REVIEW BY THIRD PARTY (MPR) IN PROGRESS 92MM3-17

j PSE&G/NAC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS COMPONENT SELECTION 92MM3-i0

  • COMPONENT SELECTION BASED ON EROSION/CORROSION SUSCEPTABILITY PER NUMARC/EPRI GUIDELINES ANO INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE
  • COMPONENTS RANKED BASED ON

-ENGINEERING CRITERIA

-EPRI DEVELOPED CHEC PROGRAM

-RESULTS FROM INDUSTRY

-NEED FOR TRENDING (3 OUTAGES)

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS COMPONENT SELECTION e ISSUE

-METHODOLOGY (AND APPLICATION) NOT DOCUMENTED

  • DISPOSITION

- DOCUMENT AND REVIEW METHODOLOGY

-DOCUMENT AND REVIEW APPLICATION OF METHODOLOGY

  • STATUS

-METHODOLOGY DOCUMENTATION COMPLETE

-REVIEW BY THIRD PARTY (MPR) COMPLETE

-COMPONENT SELECTION DOCUMENTATION COMPLETE

- REVIEW BY THIRD PARTY (S&L) COMPLETE 9211G-11

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS COMPONENT SELECTION

  • ISSUE

-COMPONENT SELECTION BETWEEN UNITS 1 AND 2 APPEARS INCONSISTENT

  • DISPOSITION

-REVIEW COMPONENT SELECTIONS, PERFORM ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS AS NEEDED

  • STATUS

-COMPONENT SELECTION REVIEW COMPLETE

-ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS IN PROGRESS (F/C COMPLETION 6/29)

i PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS UT INSPECTION eINSPECTION PERSONNEL CERTIFIED TO ASNT LEVEL II

  • STANDARD UT TEC~IQUES WITH QUALIFIED PROCEDURES

- CALI BRA TED BEFORE A~ AFTER EACH SHIFT 00 ON AN HOURLY BASIS DURING THE SHIFT

- AUTOMATIC DATA LOGGING

  • GRID SIZE NOMINAL PIPE SIZE s 6 inches a to 12 inches

~ 14 inches SAm SIZE 1 inch 2 inches 4 inches

i J

j..

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS UT INSPECTION 0 ISSUE UT MEASUREMENTS WERE NOT REFINED UPON DISCOVERY OF POTENTIAL WALL THINNING 0

DISPOSITION REFINE GRID IN AREAS SHOWING POTENTIAL WALL THINNING RE-INSPECT PREVIOUS LOCATIONS AS NECESSARY WRITTEN DIRECTION FOR GRID REFINEMENT ISSUE TO ISi GROUP 0

STATUS DATA REVIEW COMPLETE WRITTEN DIRECTION FOR GRID REFINEMENT ISSUED TO ISi GROUP INSPECTIONS IN PROGRESS CF/C COMPLETION 6/29)

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS UT INSPECTION

  • ISSUE

-EXTENSION OF INSPECTION TO ESTABLISH MINIMUM THICKNESS FOR CASES OF LOCAL THINNING AT GRID BOUNDARY WAS NOT CONSISTENTLY PERFORMED.

  • DISPOSITION

-REVIEW PREVIOUS DATA, AND EXTEND INSPECTION AS NECESSARY

-WRITTEN DIRECTION FOR GRID EXTENSION ISSUED TO ISI GROUP

-DATA REVIEW COMPLETE.

INSPECTIONS IN PROGRESS (F/C COMPLETION 6/29)

I i PSE&G/NAC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS DATA EVALUATION

  • ACTUAL WALL THICKNESS BASED ON WORST CASE MEASURED LOCATION
  • COMPONENTS OF SIMILAR CONFIGURATION IN OTHER TRAINS OF MULTI-TRAIN SYSTEMS WERE CONSIDERED FOR INSPECTION 92*3-11

PSE&G/NAC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS DATA EVALUATION 9MG-SI

  • ISSUE

-PROJECTION OF EROSION/CORROSION RATES ON WALL THICKNESS WERE NOT UTILIZED IN DETERMINATIONS OF ACCEPTABILITY IN ALL CASES

  • DISPOSITION

-CALCULATE PREDICTED MINIMUM WALL AT END OF CYCLE FOR LOCATIONS WITHIN 75 MILS OF MINIMUM WALL

  • STATUS

- IN PROGRESS

j PSE&G/NAC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS DATA EVALUATION 92MC3-20

  • ISSUE

-NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS WERE USED IN PLACE OF DESIGN CONDITION FOR T(MIN)

CALCULATIONS

  • DISPOSITION

-RECALCULATE T(MIN) USING DESIGN CONDITIONS

  • STATUS

- RECALCULATIONS COMPLETE

-THIRD PARTY REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY COMPLETE

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS DATA EVALUATION

  • ISSUE

-WHEN CORRECTING T(MIN) CALCULATIONS (IN REPSONSE TO PREVIOUS ISSUE), AN OVERLY CONSERVATIVE STRESS FACTOR WAS USED FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF SYSTEMS

  • DISPOSITION

~21

-RECALCULATE T(MIN) USING CORRECT STRESS FACTOR

  • STATUS

-THIRD PARTY REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY COMPLETE

- RECALCULATION COMPLETE

I PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS REPAIR/REPLACE

  • ASSURE MINIMUM REQUIRED WALL NOT VIOLATED

. BEFORE NEXT OUTAGE

  • REPAIR/REPLACE DECISION
  • REPLACE IN Kitll/UPGRADE
  • ' (.

PSE&G/NAC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM ELEMENTS

  • ISSUE

-DOCUMENTATION OF THE EROSION/CORROSION.

PROGRAM WAS NOT ADEQUATE

  • DISPOSITION

- SHORT TERM

&DOCUMENT THE PROGRAM CRITERIA FOR SYSTEM SELECTION, COMPONENT SELECTION, COMPONENT RANKING, AND CO~PONENT INSPECTION

- LONG TERM

&ISSUE PROGRAMMATIC STANDARD FOR ERROSION/

CORROSION PROGRAM

  • STATUS

- SHORT TERM ACTIONS COMPLETE

-LONG TERM ACTION F/C COMPLETION SEPTEMBER, 1992

~..

~

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAM FUTURE PLANS

  • DEVELOP PROGRAMMATIC STANDARD
  • CONVERT FROM CHEC TO CHECMATE
  • TRAIN PERSONNEL TO PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
  • INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY REVIEW OF PROGRAM
  • CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR MATERIAL REPLACEMENT 92MM3-24

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING TECHNICAL EROSION/CORROSION ISSUES

.. 9211G-as ISSUE

  • POTENTIAL UNACCEPTABLE WALL THINNING -

FEEDWATER SYSTEM - SAFETY RELATED

-SIX LOCATIONS UNIT 2 (TO DATE)

- NO LOCATIONS UNIT 1 CTO DATE)

DISPOSITION

  • REEVALUATION OF UT READINGS UTILIZING RE-RATED DESIGN PRESSURE OF 1335 psig STATUS
  • ALL tp > tm CTO DATE>

J

Cl:llZl I

~.

    • ii**--Fir~-iiii-ii-...- !_

I~

ll.atl -

ll IWCl

PIP! SllQOL Z*SGf *47*L2 Z*SGf *49A*E1 Z*SGF*34*L1 Z*SGf*41*L1 Z*SGf *3l*L2 2*SGF*19*L1 PIPI SPOOL 2*SGf*47*L2 2*SGf*4M*l1 Z*SGF*34*L1 2*SGf*41*L1 2*SGf*3J*LZ 2*SGf*19*L1 NOTH:

9 WALL THINNH'\\JG EVALUA *.JN SAFETY RELATED PIPING SALEM UNIT I 2 IOUTAGE 16RF0)

Actuml ErO.fOf\\/

Lllll Nam. W.ll T IUn.

UTC61FO)

CQCCmllaa SIZI Tti!cknesa Dnfgn

  • "'-llC tp

"°""'

14*

  • 7'50-

.s11*

.661"

.619'1

],lOQ I 10"J

,,. lC 16*

  • 7'50*/

.511*/

.706*

.6919

5. 100 I 10"4 ElCPAMOEl

.843*

.592*

14*

  • 750-

.5118

.6519

.607" J,400 I 10"J 14*

  • 7'50-

.511*

.653*

.519'1 4.500 I 10"J 14*

  • 750-

.511*

.640-

.* 6229 1.200 I 10"J 14*

  • 7'50-

.511*

.594*

2.200 I 10"J f,Ll(WILIS 5'I

  • 1.1...

17,SOO PSI 31,SOG HI 26,250 PSI

-.r1ln I "9rtlft I tWtln I crq. 1~>

Clq. 1Z>

(lq. 13)

STllll CALC P + DW MW+cDllz.w.2> 112 "'--'

5671555 SS 49 a

5671555 62 ao 5671557 53 41 71 5671555 46 52 55 5671557 56 53 62 5671561 so 40 77

1. T *In deslen 11 ti.Md on maxi-pr.uure and *terl1l 1ll0Wlble fot' all caMt.

T K1.lal ta T 11fn.

T rain 1.290

,

  • 195 1.363 1.347 1.270
1. 172 1.261 1.002 1.236 1.201
1. 147 I.Oil Sy

"-r1ln I Hoap Str... /

Yield scr...

ft/a ft/a ft/a n/a ft/a n/a

2. SM II ConHN9tlvely lddad '" primary ltr...... tlON fot' -tafnad
  • OCC89fonal loadl.

SM cen be carwldered In..-tlan 13, I.t. MCOl'dlry 1tr......

3. Str"' valume lho.lft lbow.,.. calcul1tld baed an Tp, the tllfctneu at tM and of tfl* predicted cycle.

4, S.l*lc 1Nl)'9f1.,.. conMrfttfwly based ans* l*I"' Mftll 0.5 I c111p1,,. utfll1f"1 an.-r~

allCMble, I.e. 1.1 s,.

6/24/92 I 1:43 PM

PSE&G/NAC MANAGEMENT MEETING TECHNICAL EROSION/CORROSION ISSUES ISSUE

  • POTENTIAL UNACCEPTABLE WALL THINNING -

FEEDWATER SYSTEM - NON SAFETY RELATED

- EIGHT LOCATIONS UNIT 2 CTO DATE)

- SEVEN LOCATIONS UNIT 1 CTO DATE)

DISPOSITION

  • REEVALUATION OF UT READINGS UTILIZING ORIGINAL 1.2 STRESS FACTOR, OR REPLACING PIPING/COMPONENTS STATUS
  • IF tp < tm REPLACING/REPAIRING

-- I' 31F2Z :

~I

---,i......

....--71-l.I 9G J:41FZ2:

I

-,,....l......

n-c-zw-u SltEU MJCLEM CORATING STATK>N lNT 1 STEMf GEtOATM fIEDWATER NIJ CON>ENSATE PFNG su>t.FED P ' I>

IW:FEl£1C:E P & ID 2911292

&lli

  • 1....... l.....

' B SALEM Mn.EM ~RATN: STATO.

STE~ GEJd:jcl, f'EIOWATER NI> COfl>ENSA TE PA<<;

SU>l.FED P ' I>

R£Fl:RF.NCF P & ID 2W!ll92

ALL THINNING EVALUATIOr9 SALEM UNIT# 1fOUTAGE1'TORF0)

Actual Eroelon/

T LINE No.. Well T Min.

UT(10.FO>

Cacc111f go

~ 1P PlPE S~

IJZE ThickneH Ottlgn h1ult tp Month 1 *In.

T *1n 1S*FWR*P10-P1 611

,432*

.334 11

.3,D*

.!02" 4.500 IC,o*lt

.921

.904 1S*F\\IR*10*12 6*

.43211

.334*

.380*

.37411 3.250 IC 10"4 1.138 1.120 1S*M-10-11 6H

.43211

.334*

.J75*

.317" 3.429 IC 1o*J 1.123

.949 1S-C-216*L1 24*

.56211

.4&CJll

.462"

.451*

6.400 JI 10"'

.963

.940 1S*HD*260*L1 6"

.zeo-

  • 19511

.231 11

.221*

5.TOO.11 10*4 1.115

,,,33 1S*FWR*PZ-P1

.43211

.334 11

,34!1*

.340"

3. 167 JI 10**

1.033 1.018 1S*SGF*71*L1 2011

,.o:n 11

.e10*

.95811

.949" 5.200 JC 10*4 1.101 1.090 ALL C!.1181 ES lh

  • 1.1 Sh
  • Sy
  • 15,000 PSJ 27,000 PSI 22,500 Pll 26,200 PIJ Margin I Nar1ln I icargln I Margin X (Eq, 11>

CEq. 12)

(Eq, 13)

Hoop Stress/

PIPE SPOOl.

STRESS CALC p + DW p.ow+(o8E2+SAM2)1/Z Thenul Yfe\\d StrtH 1S-FWR-P1U*P1 Z671fWll Zl rv*

5' Zl U*F\\IR-10-12 2671791 52 n/*

79 n/a 1S*M*10*11 2671791 31 n/I as 34 1S*C*216*L1 567120-Dll 32 n/I 90 46 1S*HD*260*L1 Hind Cale.

a n/I 41 n/1 1S*F~*PZ*P1 267179A 31 nl*

61 n/1 1S*SGf*71*L1 Z67111C 39*

nl*

74*

n/*

  • 'h
  • 17,500 Pll NOTES&
1. 1 *in detlgn ti based on..xf-pr1uur1 and Mtlrial 1llowabl1 for all CHH *

. 2. Stres1 veluea ahown 8bove are ctlcul1ted beaed on Tp, the thlckne1a at the end of the predleted eyele.

6/24/92. I 8:45 PM

s PIPE SPOOL 2*SC,*81*T21 2*SGF-113*T11 2*SGF*112*L1 2-SGF-108-L 1 2-SGF-113-ll1 2*SG,*113*T21 2-SGF* 113*1l2 21-H0-554-L1 PIPE SPOOL NOTIS:

llLL THINNING EVALUATION-LlllE llZ!

2011x18" rll 24*

24*

24*

24* x 11*

ECC. IED.

1811.x14 11 TEI 24* lC 1811 ECC, RED.

a*

SALEM UNIT I 2"t0UTAGE ICSRFO)

NS tX

~tual NOii!. Wtll T Min, Ul(6UO>

ThfckneH Dttfgn lHUlt tp

.93811

.m*

.936*

.an*

1.219" 1.044*

1.14911 1.14]*

1.219" 1.04411 1.20311

1. 190" 1.219" 1.044*
1. 091*

,,06911 1.219"/

1.044*/

1.009M/

.9401/

,931*

.m*

.763*

.652*

.7'5011

.609*

.657"

.645*

1.219"/

1.044*/

,.07011/

1.oa*

.9~*

.m*

.731..

.63911

.322*

.254*

.297"

.294*

lroafar'\\I CGCCAAllKI Man th 4.300

  • 10*3 5.800
  • 10*4 z.200 x 10*4 1.500 x 10*3 4.57'9 x 1o*J 7.400 x 1o*J 7.750
  • 10*6 J, 105
  • 10*3 6.632.ll 10-:S 1,900. 10*4

&tll!JllUI ITlEll CALC 5673143 Sh

  • 17,500 PIE 1.8 Sh
  • 31,500 Pll I
  • st,
  • 15,000 PSI 26,250 PU 1, T 11fn de1tan 11 be1ed on **I-pre11ure end *tcrhl 1llowebl1 for Ill c11et.

k1J.la1.

1P T 11fn, T 11ln

1. 195

\\.114

1. 101 1.095 1.152 1.140 1.045

,.024

.966

.900

.986

.842 1.07'9 1,059 1.025

.980

.943

.116 1.169 1.157 IV

  • 32,970 Ptl Mtra n Hoop Streu/

Yield Streaa

2. strK1 v1IUH 1hown above are calculated bend on Tp* the thlcltneas 1t the end of the predicted cycle.

6/Z~/92 t 1:45 Pit

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING TECHNICAL EROSION/CORROSION ISSUES

  • ISSUE

- POTENTIALLY UNACCEPTABLE THIN WALL THICKNESS ADJACENT TO BF19 VALVES

  • DISPOSITION

- VISUAL INSPECTION REVEALED MANUFACTURER'S DEFECT (COUNTERBORE MACHINING ERROR). NOT AN EROSION/CORROSION ISSUE. BUT DISCOVERED BY PROGRAM.

  • STATUS FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELD BUILDUP ON

- UNIT 1 COMPLETE FULL CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELD BUILDUP ON

- UNIT 2 IN PROGRESS

PSE&G/NAC MANAGEMENT MEETING THERMAL CRACKING EVALUATION BULLETIN 79-13 EXAMS

  • UNIT 1

- RT (1980)

- UT (1984)

  • UNIT 2

- RT (1983)

- UT (1988)

  • UNIT 2 AUX FEED OPERATION SINCE 1988 N2600 HOURS
  • UT/AT INSPECTIONS IN PROGRESS ON BOTH UNITS
  • CONTINGENCY MATERIAL ON ORDER

PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING

SUMMARY

ROOT CAUSES

  • PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES
  • EVALUATION ERRORS
  • INSUFFICIENT PROGRAMMATIC OVERSIGHT 9i!llG-3S

PSE&G/NAC MANAGEMENT MEETING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PRIOR TO RESTART

  • SHORT TERM PROGRAM ENHANCEMENT
  • VERIFY SYSTEM AND COMPONENT SELECTION
  • ADDITIONAL EVALUATION OF INSPECTION DATA ANO CALCULATION OF PREDICTED T(MIN)
  • REVISION TO UT INSPECTION GRID REQUIREMENTS FOR RETEST
  • ADO IT I ONAL UT MEASUREMENTS

-LOCATIONS BELOW NEW PREDICTED T(MIN)

-SIMILAR LOCATIONS BETWEEN UNITS

- UNBOUNDED LOCATIONS

-SUSQUEHANNA - TYPE LOCATIONS

  • REPLACE COMPONENTS WHERE TP < T (MIN)

IREPAIR BF-19 MANUFACTURING DEFECTS

l

l.

9MG-I PSE&G/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

  • DEVELOP PROGRAMMATIC STANDARD
  • CON.VERT FROM CHEC TO CHECMATE PRIOR TO NEXT SALEM REFUELING OUTAGE
  • TRAIN PERSONNEL TO PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
  • INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY REVIEW

5EN1 BY:

301 504 1137:# 21 7 ENCLOSURE 3 DRAFT DISCUSSION OF SALEM UNIT 2 EROSION EVALUATION June 16, 1992 INTRODUCTION These criteria define the operability requirements for safety related piping a~ Salem Unit 2 for those components that have been found to be below.the minimum thickness required by the piping design code, ANSI/ASME 831.l (1967).

provides the results of utilizing these criteria for the Salem Unit i safety related piping.

The results support operation until the next refueling outage.

Modifications will be made which return the piping system to within the design code criteria by the end of the next refueling outage, or sooner.

CRITERIA sustained :Loads All locations must meet the following requirements for sustained pressure and bending loads:

where:

s' H.

\\

\\

(First column of the "Allowables" table in )

{Fourth colU1llll of the "Allowables" table in Attachment 1) is the pipe longitudinal pressure stress at design pressure for the minimum wall thickness predicted at the

,next refueling outage is the maximum bending stress calculated using a section modulus based on the minimu~ wall thickness predicted at the next refueling outage and the square-root-sum-of-squares combination of the sustained load bending ~nd torsional moments, including appropriate stress intensification effects is the material code allowable stress at the design temperatdre l

.. SENT* BY:

~-Je-ci*!

L.J '---

16:53 301 504 1137:# 3/ 7 DRAFT is the pipe hoop pressure stress at design pressure for the minimum wall thickness predicted at the next refueling outage is the material code-minimum yield stress at the design temperature Occasional Loads For those locations which require seismic analysis, the following requirements for occasional loads apply:

l where SLP + s 88 < l.8SH (Second column of the "Allowable&" table in Attachment 1) is the pipe longitudinal pressure stress at design pressure for the minimum wall thickness predicted at the next refueling outage.

is the maximum bending stress calculated using a section modulus based on the minimum wall thickness predicted at the next refueling outage and the square-root-sum-of-squares combination of the occasional load bending and torsional moments, including appropriate stress intensification effects is the material code allowable at the design temperature I

Thennal. Expansion Loads All identified locatidns meet the following requirements for thermal expansion loads:

where:

(Third colwnn of the "AllowablesN table in )

I is the maximum bending stress calculated using a section modulus based on the minimum wall thickness predicted at the next refueling outage and the square-root-sum-of-squares combination of the thermal expansion load bending and torsional moments, including appropriate stress intensification effects.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~6---16---8-~~~-lb-... J~:~~-P-6:-E-~-G-L~l(-:~~~R=E~G-~~~~3*01 504 1137:# 4/ 7

.. ~* SENT., BY:

W' f

DRAFT is the stress range reduction factor for cyclic conditions (taken from 831.1 based on the nlllllber of full temperature cycles over the plant lifetime) ls the material code allowable at the minimum temperature is the material code allowable at the ~aximum temperature

\\

, ~ sulr,, BY :

6-16-82 e

301 504 1137:~ 5/ 7 BASIS DRAFT Sustained Loads The criterion for longitudinal stresses due to sustained loads is the normal ANSI B31.1 criterion.

Use of this criterion with the minimum wall thickness predicted at the end of the next refueling outage and a section modulus based to this same wall thickness provides the full code safety margins for longitudinal stress.

The criterion foJ hoop stress assures that through-thickness yielding of the thinned section of the pipe will not occur if the pipe were to be pressurized to the design pressure.

rt also assures that the hoop stresses in the thinned section are well below the material code-minimum yield stress for the normal operating preture.

Occasional LO s

The criterion or longitudinal stresses due to occasional loads is the normal ANSI BJ.1.1 criterion.

Use of this criterion with the minimum wall thickness predicted at the end of the next refueling outage and section modulus based to this same wall thickness provides the full code safety' margins for longitudinal stress.

Therinal Expansion Loads\\

The criterion for iJngitudinal stresses due to thermal expansion loads is the normal Bl.l criterion.

Use of this criterion with the minimum wall thickness predicted at the end of the next refueling outage and a section modulus based to this same wall thickness provid~s the full code safety margins for longitudinal stress.

I

'..:liNT... BY:

PRE 30 l -SO.:J. 11.37:; 6/ 7 WALL THINNING EVALUATION SALEM UNIT # 2 (OUTAGE #6RFO)

DRAFT Ac tlJ>J l Erosion/

T PIPE LINE Nom. \\Jal l 1 Hin. UT(6RFO)

\\;orrosi2a Actual

~in SPOOLS S12E Th lclc.n~s11 Oei1ign R1&ult tpl tpz tp Rontfi r;;;;n.-

2*SG,*47*L2 14"

. l'jQ"

. 717"

.66B"

.656"

.662"

.656" 6.67x10"4

.932

.91S

~-SGF*49A*El 11." x 16"

.750"/

. 717"/

. 706"

.699"

.685 11

.685" 1.40x1o*3

.985

.955 EXPANDER

.B4J"

.820 1' 2*SGf*J4*L1 14"

  • T'50"

. 717"

.658

.644"

.642"

.642" 1.067xio* 3.918

.895 2*SGF*48*L1 14"

. 750 11

.717"

.653"

.636"

.636"

.636"

1. 133x10* 3.911

.887

(*SGF*33*L2 14 11

.~0"

  • 71711

.640"

.6<0"

.636~.620" 1.11x10*3

.893

.865 2*SGF-19*L1 14"

.750"

. 717 11

.594"

.571"

.503"

.503" 6.067x1o*l.828

. 702 t

J~~ ;;~ IL

~I'~~'

ALLQWAa~n

~ I SR

  • 1.8 Sh..

Sa a s~

  • 17,500 PSI 31,SOOPSI 26,250 PSI 3<!,9 0 PSI M.argin t Margin %

M1r;ln X Margin :r.

PIPE STRESS CALC/

(!!q. 11)

(fq. 12>

(!q. 13)

Hoop Stress/

SPOOLS OAfA Pr.

p + 01.r P+OIJ+(OSE2~sAH2)1/i Th1n1111l Yield StrHll 2-SG,*47-L2 5671555 I 25-27 42 44 84 42 2-SG,*49A*E1 5671555 I 40*41 40 52

!O 44 2*SGF-34-L1

'5671557 I 16*20 39 36 74 40 2-SGF-48-L1 5671555 I 18*20 39 54 68 40 Z*SGF-33*L2 5671557 I 25*27 J8 44 62 40 2-SC:F-19-1. 1 5671561 I 12* 14 22 It!

n 23 NOTES&

1. T min d.alg~i la baatd on deaign pras11ure arid material allowable for all cases.
2. Coriaervetiv ly tp Csele-cted predicted wall thickness *t thinnest point) ta the small*r of cpl

~, tp2.

tp1 pr~lcti!td ~*It thickn~11s ;, bas9d on 10 y~mrs llnq1r corrosion history from t nom.

with additional 18 months in service before replac.m.nt.

tp2 predicted wall thickn*ss i1 based on loc1l *r** U.T. results at 4RFO, 5RFO and 6RFO with lldditional service from January 1992 to Harch 1993. (15 1110r1th1)

3. f.R. CEro51on rate).* <L VT 6AfO
  • Tp1J when tp
  • tp1 or

\\8 CT UT

~RFO - Tp2) wh*n tp ~ tp2 15

4. SAM i11 conservatively added in primary str*ss &QUatfons for 11ust1inecl
  • occasional loads.

SA/II can be considerlPd In equation 13, i.e. secondary stresses.

5, stress values snown above are calculated based on Tp* th* thickness at th*~ of the prctdicted cycle.

6. Per Salan uFSAA Sci~mic *nalys;s arw conservativ*ly based on SS! loadinv with 1/2 X dulllJing utiliting an.m.rgency allowable.

6/16/Q2

r-r-

~>:

r-C'J

-.r

  • i ID
  • i C'J 1

<.:J w

Ck:

0 u

.....J CJ 0

(LJ

  • './)

0...

<:'I v.i I

  • O I
  • O ca E-1i:i
  • './)

s2-Z9l B tt

~m:soz I

.1

u.

<(

~

c

'-....l<>b----'--1---l..... -+--':J..:....

!t f./tvl/ N0.2

'I:

=j

~

!I

~*....

'!.,r

'r.

  • ~

J

~

~

E!

8*~*,,

-~

I :':

    • r~L"=
  • Pu...;

.::.J.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

~

- "ii"

~~1*,;,l!

~

t=.

,..,.,,,. J

-*~...

~

... 'T

~:

@.1 '

';tJ.('V '..l..C;:LJ:'Cl(~~l!h: ii~

........... --.-~*

I

f'tJ.oi QJ1(lh")l l"..i.f..,:n.vt,.

'.:L.!

---:.~!*.

'.Pl.ll.r ~~.a f!lc G( ~*.:. *Y.,

I

-*~..,.*..

j ::-7".... ::-

~.... '*... *-

~

FEe'Pwrr-tEr< S'(S~_-_j?-l 1?.Lr-),~--- i_~j._o_c41i~~ _ ~;--~~:-:. ' -.

D r.G.w 11\\1 If\\

UF5AW.

[o.4--SA 5"'-e-ek 3,,+.-~:,

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML18096A832&oldid=5004606"