ML18096A661

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Proposed Tech Spec 3/4.5.2 & Surveillance Requirements 4.5.2.f & 4.5.2.h Re ECCS Surveillance Test Acceptance Criteria
ML18096A661
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 04/24/1992
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML18096A660 List:
References
NUDOCS 9205040076
Download: ML18096A661 (10)
v • d • e


Text

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ATTACHMENT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES WITH PEN AND INK CHANGES LICENSE APPLICATION 91-03, NLR-N91025 ECCS SURVEILLANCE RELAXATIONS The following Technical Specifications have been revised to reflect the proposed changes:

Technical Specification 4.5.2.f 4.5.2.h UNIT 1 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 3/4.6.1.4 3/4.6.1.5 3/4.6.1.6 Technical Specification 4.5.2.f 4.5.2.h UNIT 2

  • and ** Footnote 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 3/4.6.1.4 3/4.6.1.5 3/4.6.1.6 3/4 5-5a 3/4 5-5a B 3/4 5-la B 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-2 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-6a B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-2 B 3/4 6-2 9205040076 920424 PDR ADOCK 05000272 P

PDR

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~EGE~CY CCR! CtiOL!~G SY~S

<:lJR't!!LU.NCt ~S:=JU!~~;rn Con~1 nue~)

'fot<Ll Dynamic. ~ead (,..DH)

f.

By v~r-1 fy.trn~~t:iha.ttt~ea~c:Hh~a'fiift:~~e~f~a!!t1~cwi!Ei n~. ~~~~~

i ndi c:a t-0<1'-~

... ~s::~pu~uant t= SQeeification 4.0.5:

la.l the.Us¥ : 1Mf!0:f~~~1 c:~a.;;'1~9 i:~c. :,. ~IZ'CG***iasi;r:-23'36 f>~*, TDl"\\

~~~~~t"

g.

Safe't'/ !nje<:tion i:t=Q i_ll~25 i:isi;i~"?>b9 f~' !DH J.

~esidua.1 heat Mmcval p~.,.£h~s ;is.ii J~\\bS f~' TD\\-\\

By verifying the C:Qrr~: pcs1t1on of eac:~ of t.~e ~o1iC'ifin~

EC:S t.-iro t-: 1 e va l ves :

l.

2..

Within 4. houM falicwi~ c:~ietion of eac:!i *1aive s~!dn~

o~erati on or ma i nunanc:e on t.ie valve wl'le.'1 t.":e ~C:S sucsy!'t!!nS a~ requi~* to ~e OP~al.!.

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~

At t.es~* ones per 18 mcnt.iS***

  • 0 ***. **

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HPS! S"f~

VALIJE. NUM6l~

11 SJ. 16

12. SJ 16 13 SJ 16 14 SJ 16

.*:::1... \\.;;~

L~~I: SY~

VAl.'IE NU~S£.~

.., t.SJ. 1 ia' *" *'.

12. SJ 1JS.

13 SJ 138

'*':~'* ' l 4. 5J' t ~

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11 SJ i43 lZ SJ 143 13 SJ 143

14. SJ 143 lNSERT A

!1.

!y perlcr:ninc; a. f1ow baianc! us-:. durinc; s:tut:c._n, fono-.~~<;

c:~let~cn af rncdifia!icns t= t.":~.ECCS sucsy!':i!!!S :.-:a:: ai:~!"

.~e subsy!ts ftQ4# c.~nc-:a'!'"i st~i:S and veri'f;,dnq :."lat:

~~----

FQr low head safe-ey f l1J ec'-:1 en' l fnes, w~ ':.i a s i nc; i e :t.:mc inc;:

!)

ihe

  • af t.ie fnje-='-:ion t 1ne rt ow r~ ~

xch:C:i ~;

the line *:i t.":a highes-: fl°"" ra~,

s ~ cl5J

i~ ar.c
z.

sir.qi e sum of t.":e fnje~~~cn line ~ic~ !"'l~!, e~c:ucin~

t.~e iine.,.;-:."!:!'le i\\i~nes-: fiC\\tl ~~. ~s > 3 ine........ i ;:**-...."a... r",._'5 *. *i"

      • ~."\\

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s !. ::~ ;;::n.

EMERGENCY CORE.LING SYSTEMS '

BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

',*""'i*"

With the RCS t~erature. below 350°F, one' OPERABLE '*Eccs* s°ubsysten; is acceptable witho~t si~gle failure _consideration -on the basis' of-the stable 1 NSEef B __

r...

,,,._a~ti~ity con4itio~ ~~.~
,~h~ react°,~ -~~d :th'e. -~i~it_~-~; c.~:re c~ol:?a:'requirements.

. Survei.iianca. i(equirements provided to *ensure OPERABILITY of each com ensure at at a minimum, the assumptions used in the. safety anal are met and that suo em OPERABILITY is maintained. *Survelllance r rements for throttle valve pos stops and flow balance testin vide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be "ntained in the even a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resi.stance and pres drop' 'l

. e pipini{ system to each injection point *is *nece*ssary to:

(1

_ vent total plimp* flow_* fro111 exceeding runout *conditions when the syst s in its-*...,~ imum* resistance configurati.on, (2) provide the proper fl plit between* inject

  • oin'ts in accordance with the assumptions use the ECCS-LOCA analyses/' and l3 vide an acceptable level of tota S flow to all injection points equal to or a
  • e that the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

Each ECCS subsystem supplies al satisfy minimum flow requirements.

i I.

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-SALEM - uNt't l B 3/4 S*la

~,;*~-

h*

~.t' Amendment No. 94

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEi\\1S BASES 3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE The maximum peak

~

re expected to be is 44.8 psig. T mit of 0.3 psig for initial pos containment pressure imit the total pressure to 45.1 ps1g which i d

  • pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

/ NSERI C ++--3,-4-.6-.-,-111.S-AIR TEMPERATURE The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial te.~perature coodition assumed in the accident analysis for a LOCA.

+or steO..l'Y\\ \\if\\e. breo..\\<.

3/4. 6.1. 6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the contain-ment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. StrJctural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the!1'ffii~~B~~ifi~g~g~a~

ffiae eyeet ef a LOC~The visual inspec ions of the concrete and and the Type A leakage test are suffici nt to demonstrate this capability.

SALEM - UNIT 1 9 3/4 6-2

~-

EHERGEHCY CORE ~ING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

Toto..~ t>'/Mfi\\\\C. \\-\\0.d (\\0\\-\\)

f.

By verifying that: each of the following pumps devel9J!s.... ~he indicated/idlsel'\\arge press1:1:re ea reelrettlatien_flowlwheritested'-

pursuant to Specification 4. 0. 5:

ale. t:.he..\\:.e.st +loViJ po\\r\\c. ~

1. ___ centrifugal~~~~:~!:~~-~~-~~--:~.:-.~L2,400_p~~g-f~ __ :g:~~§-~:p? TPH
2.

Safety Injection pump

~11425 psntf-:;- l3b9 ps 01 Tl>\\.\\

_;.;_.1;.:,

  • ~.--. *.--
  • .---a,.:..:-.:

3; :* Residual heat removal ~ump

~ 116 § ps ig r ~-, C,S rs\\ T \\) \\-\\

g.

By verifying *the correct' position of.each of the.following ECCS throttle valves:

  • - i..

'Within 4* hour's' following -~ompletion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems a~~ required t~ be OPERABLE.

2.

At least once per 18 months.

HPSI System Valve Number 21 SJ 16 22 SJ 16 23SJ 16 21~> *sJ* 16.

'<"'-0.-

.F*

    • . "ii
11,-*
  • .:?*-~\\,J';.;

~~~{,~~.; t.:-***

LPSI System Valve Number 21 SJ 138 22 SJ 138 23 -SJ 138

--~~ SJ 138...-.

.21 SJ 14.3 22 SJ 143*

23 SJ 143 24 SJ 143

1:;"
h.

By performing a flow balanc*~-test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter

\\~SERT A th_; sub~ystem flow ch8:~ac~~-r~-~~~cs ~nd ~erifying that:*

2.
  • safety injectionaines, with a single pump suni of tile ;"frijection line flow rates, e with the highest flow rate, is

~~-~~}:it:

t*.;> ~ -. --

b)

The For centrifugal running:

a) e injection line flow r s,

the highest flow rate, is ~ 34 pump flow rate is S 550 gpm.

pump 3/4 s:~ 6~,*li~\\.. ~

'-~.

\\.r

..-:... ~*

Amendment '. tJo ! 90,: _;_,~ ~

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p!QCJ!fCX eo1

  • Otr~e SXSit~S

$YIY!I\\t.u!CI 11oyx&L"!V!T! cegneinutdl

1.

'ftl* aucomacic tncerlock f\\&nccion of ch* IHI Sy1c** shall be ver1tied vl&hln ch* seven (7) days prior co placLn1 cha lHI Syacea tn service fer coo11n1 ot ch* R1accor Coolanc Sy1cea.. l'!\\1* 1hall be done by verlty1n1 vLch a c11c 1i1nal corre1pondtn1 co a r1accor coolanc prtu\\&re of 3 75 Plil or 1nacar. chac ch* 21K1 an4 21.H2 valvea

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cannoc be opened.

  • (Footnoc* tro* P*&* 3/4 5*6)

F v balanc* ce*cin& purauanc co Speciflcaeloa 4.5.2.h ahall

  • per med ch* tlrae cl* Che unie 1* 1a COLD S1IUTDOVI deer Dec* er 15, 1911.

co,.,. 3/4 5*6 le** h.2)

Th* max liaie (i.1. $ 550 ga) oa ICCS C.taa 1*1 Charging Pump Flov 1* aived on

  • o~e.clae baai* for period co1111encin Ja~ry 4, 19 and 1ndin1 ufOft lnicial etaeZ! lnco Mode 5 during the Uni e 2 5th fue l1n1 O\\aca1*.
  • CONTROL COPY #

1 0 6 t

be implemented before startup from the fifth refueling tage.

SALF.K

  • UNIT 2.

3/4 5*6*

Allendllene Mo. 84 CORRECTION LETTER DATED MAY 14, 1990

INSERT B EMERGENCY CORE C.!NG SYSTDiS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

(

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, on OPERABLE ECCS subsys'tem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the lim.~t_ed core cooling.~~-~uirements.

~-- -. *- -*

The limitation for"a'maximum of one safety injection pump or one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance R_equirement to verify all safety injection pumps except the allowed OPERABLE safety.injection pump to be inoperable below 312°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient c~ be relieved by the operation of a single POPS re~ief valve.

3/ 4. S. 4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE" TANIC:*,,

,_,,*.)l ***

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The OPERABILITY of the RWST as a part' of the ECCS ensures that a 'sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in,'~the event of a LOCA.

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The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentrations ensure that:

(1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, (2) the reactor will remain stibcritical in the cold condition following a small LOCA assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, and ECCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except-the most reactive control-assembly (ARI-1), and (3) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following a large. break,;_LQCA (bre&k flow -are& > *1:0 _sq.* ft.)

asswi:iin~ c9mp.leta mizing of the RWST~ RCS', anct.!CCS" water** and ~othlt:'~ources* oE water that Jiay eventually reside in the sump following a"LOCA*with all controL rods assumed to be out (ARO).

The limits on contained water volume'and boron concentra~ion also, ensure a pH. value of between 8.S and 11.0 for the**

solution recirculated within containment after.a *J..OCA *. \\: This-pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes.:.the effec:t of.chloride* and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems**and components.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank.

  • discharge* line location or other physical characteristics.

SALEM - UNIT 2

~- 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. *- 70.

.'.-.:.i.\\:...::

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1.*

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES

-...~

3/4.6. 1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

\\NS~RT C 3/4. 6. 1. 5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitations or.i containment average air temperatur~.ensurethat the

. overall containment average "air te111perature does not *e:Xcee'Ci'"tf\\e*"'foitial temperature condition 'assumed i~ ~he -*~~cident analysis f~r... ~JOC~I\\: _

er stea.rvd 1rie. brrx 3/4. 6. 1.-6 ' CONTAINMENT ::STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

' ~ :-. :

This limitation ensures that t~e structural integrity of the containment will. be maintained comparable to the *original design standar~~.. for the life of the facility. Structural*integrity is required to ensure that the con*1nment will withstand the tiRaxjmHm pressijre et 44.4 psig in tAe e~ent ef a LOC~

The visu~l. inspections,of the co~crete a~d. liner ~~~ the T~~'~{~'. leakage t_est are suff1c1ent to demo strate th1s capab1l1ty.

d.e.!.'9" ~rcss1.>r~ * * **

3/4. 6. 1. 7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION* SYSTEM

...~

    • t The containment purge supply a~~ e~haust isolation.~alvesare*required to be closed during plant operation since these valves have* not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA.

Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system.

SALEM - UNIT 2

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~ Attachment 2 LCR 91-03 NLR-N91025 ECCS surveillance Relaxations INSERT A

1)

For safety injection pumps, with a single pump running:

a)

The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 453 gpm, and b)

The total flow rate through all four injection lines is less than or equal to 647 gpm, and c)

The difference between any pair of injection line flow rates is less than or equal to 12.0 gpm, and d)

The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 675 gpm.

2)

For centrifugal charging pumps, with a single pump running:

a)

The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 306 gpm, and b)

The total flow rate through all four injection lines is less than or equal to 444 gpm, and c)

The difference between any pair of injection line flow rates is less than or equal to 10.5 gpm, and d)

The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 560 gpm.

Insert Page 1 of 2

~ Attachment 2 LCR 91-03 NLR-N91025 ECCS surveillance Relaxations INSERT B The surveillance requirements, which are provided to ensure the OPERABILITY of each component,- ensure that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analysis are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

The safety analyses make assumptions with respect to: 1) both the maximum and minimum total system resistance and 2) both the maximum and minimum branch injection line resistance.

These resistances, in conjunction with the ranges of potential pump performance, are used to calculate the maximum and minimum ECCS flow assumed in the safety analyses.

The maximum and minimum flow surveillance requirements in conjunction with the maximum and minimum pump performance curves ensures that the assumptions of total system resistance and the distribution of that system resistance among the various paths are met.

The maximum total pump flow surveillance requirements ensure the pump runout limits of 560 gpm for the centrifugal charging pumps and 675 gpm for the safety injection pumps are not exceeded.

The surveillance requirement for the maximum difference between the maximum and minimum individual injection line flows ensure that the minimum individual injection line resistance assumed for the spilling line following a LOCA is met.

INSERT C 3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that

1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere of 3.5 psig, and 2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 47 psig during the limiting pipe break conditions.

The pipe breaks considered are LOCA and steam line breaks.

The limit of 0.3 psig for initial positive containment pressure is consistent with the accident analyses initial conditions.

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA or steam line break event is less than or equal to 47 psig.

Insert Page 2 of 2

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