ML18096A574
| ML18096A574 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1992 |
| From: | Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Miltenberger S Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18096A575 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-92-007, EA-92-7, NUDOCS 9203240081 | |
| Download: ML18096A574 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000311/1991081
Text
.
Docket Nos.
License Nos.
EA 92-007
50-311
March 17, 1992
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
ATTN:
Steven Miltenberger
Vice President-and Chief Nuclear Officer
Post Office Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
Dear Mr.
Milte~berger:
Subject:
(NRC Inspection Report No. 50-311/91-81)
This letter refers to the NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection
conducted between November 10 through December 3, 1991, at the Salem Nuclear
Generating Station, Hancock~ Bridge, New Jersey.
The insp~ction report was
sent to you on January 7, 1992. The inspection was conducted to review the
circumstances associated with the severe damage to the turbine and generator ~t
Unit 2 as a result of a turbine overspeed event.
During the followup of this
event, you identified that the turbine Overspeed Protection Control (OPC) system
test in October 1991 was not properly performed in that problems encountered
during the attempted performance of the t2st were not resolved ¢rior to
completing a startup of the reactor and turbine.
As a result of the review of
the circumstances surrounding the performance of that test, violations of NRC
requirements were identified.
The apparent violations were .described in the
enclosure to the letter sent to you by the NRC'on January 23, 1992.
On
February 4, 1992, an enforcement conference was conducted with you and members
of your staff to discuss the violations, the causes, and your corrective actions.
The violations, along with several other factors, contributed to the
catastrophic failure of the turbine-generator on November 9, 1991, due,
in part, to failure of the OPC system to control a turbine overspeed condition.
The event was principally caused by the failure of three separate turbine
control solenoid valves (i.e., Overspeed Protection Control valves OPC-20-1,
OPC-20-2, and Emergency Trip valve ET-20) to function due to mechanical
binding of the devices.
As a re~ult, upon a reactor trip, the turbine steam admission valves were not
maintained closed and steam was readmitted to the turbine.
Since the main
generator output breakers opened as a result of the reactor trip, turbine_
speed was no longer restrained.
Consequently, upon steam readmission, the
turbine experienced an overspeed condition that was not arrested, since
the OPC solenoids did not effect the momentary closure of the governor or
interceptor valves.
The resulting turbine overspeed caused severe damage to
the turbine, destruction of the generator, and the initiation o( a hydrogen
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and oil fire involving the generator system.
The overspeed condition also
resulted in missiles (parts of turbine blades) being ejected from one of the
low pressure turbfne assemblies.
A test of the turbine Overspeed Protection Control (OPC) system was conducted
- on October 20, 1991 as part of a reactor and turbine startup.
A successful test
of *the OPC system required verifying that the interceptor valves closed upon
receipt of a test signal.
Upon testing, the valves did not close.
However,
five licensed operations staff personnel, including two reactor operators, a
shift supervisor, a senior shift supervisor, and a senior operations engineer,
d1d not demonstrate a sufficiently questioning and inquisitive attitude
regarding the test result.
In addition, the *senior shift supervisor and the
senior operating en~ineer apparently did not understand that an actual test
failure had occured.
These five individuals did not adequately communitate
among themselves concerning the issue, and proceeded with the turbine startup
without first resolving the test discrepancy.
Furthermore, they did not obtain
a procedural change to support the deviation from the established operational
procedure.
These failures constitute violations of NRC requirements set forth
in the Notice of Violation (Notice).
The NRC recognizes that the turbine, generator, and turbine control systems and
devices are not considered safety related equipment at the facility and the AIT
identified several root causas not all of which involved violation of NRC
requi0ements.
However~ this .event is of regulatory concern to the NRC since
failure of these components could result in reactor transients, as well as the
generation of tu~bine missile/projectiles, which have the potential to adversely
affect safety-related equipment.
Additionally, as discussed above, several
layers of licensed operating personnel were in~olved in the decision of
continuing reactor and turbine startup contrary to the expected conduct of
operations.
If your operations staff had properly resolved the test problem,
the November 9, 1991 event would have likely been prevented because pro~er_
resolution of the test failure should have led tb the discovery of the faulty
Theref~re, in accordance with the
11General Statement of
Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Acti-0ns,
11 (Enforcement Policy) 10 CFR
Part 2, Appendix C (1991), the violations have been categorized ~t Severity
Level III in the aggregate.
The problem is described in the enclosed Notice.
The NRC recognizes that corrective actions have been taken or planned to
prevent recurrence of such violations.
These actions, which were described*
at the enforcement conference, as well as in a Licensee Event Report, included,
but were not limited to: (1) development of a personal corrective action plan
by each of the- five involved licensed individuals; (2) enhanced.training of
operators relative to the expected conduct of operations; (3) issuance of a
letter to all operations personnel regarding procedural compliance; (4) conduct
of shift meetings by management with all staff regarding their roles and
responsibilities; and (5) upgrade of procedures.
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Normally, a civil penalty is issued for a Severity Level III problem in such
cases to emphasize the importance of strict adherence to procedures ~t ihe
facility, as well as prompt and proper resolution of problems encountered during
procedural implementation, to assure that the reactor is operated and maintained
in a safe condition.
However, I have been authorized, after consultation with
the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, to issue the
enclosed Notice of Violation without a civil penalty, after considering the
mitigating factors in this case.
In making this determination to mitigate the civil penalty, the NRC decided
that: (1) since the violation was identified and reported to the NRC by your
staff, 25% mitigation of the base civil penalty for this factor is *wartanted;
however, full mitigation is not warranted because this was a self-disclosing
event~ (2) your correctiv~ actions, as described herein, were considered pro~pt
and extensive, and therefore, 50% mitigation of the base civil penalty on this
factor is warranted; (3) your past performance in the operations area specifi-
cally, reduction in personnel errors and overall control room performance,
warrants 50~ mitigation of the civil penaTty; and (4) although you had prior
notice of potential problems with the mechanical binding of solenoid valves
because of a similar problem at Unit 1 in September 1990, no adjustment of the
civil penalty on this factor is warranted because the primary issue involved in
this case is the pe~formance of t~e operators, -rather than* the mainteriance of
the equipment (solenoids). The other escalation and mitigation factors were
considered, and no adjustment based on theie factors was warranted since the
.violation did not involve multiple examples nor exist for an extended duration.
The NRC is also concerned with your failure to adhere to the commitment
documented in Licensee Event Report No.90-030, dated October 9, 1990, to
replace the solenoid valves at Unit 2 during the.next outage of sufficient
duration due to the problem identified at Unit 1 in September 1990.
These
valves were not replaced during the planned outa~e in May 1991, which was
of sufficient duration to accompli~h the replacement.
Weaknesses in your
commitment tracking process contributed to the valves not being replaced
during the May 1991 outage.
While the NRC has decided not to take enforcement
action for this issue, you should document the actions taken and planned, that
were described at the enforcement conference, to assure that commitments made
to the NRC are properly and ~romptly implemented.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response.
In your
response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional
actions you plan to prevent recurrence.
In your response, you may reference,
as appropriate, your letter dated February 10, 1992, which responded to the AIT
inspection report.
After reviewing your ~esponse to this Notice, including your
proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will
determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure
compliance with NRC regulatory requirements .
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Public Service Electric
and Gas Conipany
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In accordance with-10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC 1 s
11.Rules of Practice,u a copy of
this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject
to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required
by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.
Sincerely,
Or1g1nc.~ S~gr:8:1 ?.y:
. ~li';c:r(:3 To
f/~~i i.~~'
Thomas T. Martin
Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
cc:
S. LaBruna, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
C. Schaefer, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.
C. Vondra, General Manager - Salem Operations
F. Thomson, Manager, Licensing and Regulation
L. Reiter, General Manag~r - Nuclear Safety Review
J. Robb, Director, Joint Owner Affairs
A. Tapert, Program Administrator
R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire
M. Wetterhahn, Esquire
J. Isabella, Director, Generation Projects Department,
Atlantic Electric Company
D. Wersan, Assistant Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate
Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
State of New Jersey
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- JMTayl or, EDD
JSniezek., DEDR
JLieberman, OE
TMartin, RI
JGoldberg, OGC
- TMurley, NRR
JPartlow, NRR
Enforce~ent Coordinators *
RI, RI!, RIII, RIV, RV
Fingram, GPA/PA
BHayes, DI
VMi 11 er, SP
DWi 11 i ams, DIG
EJordan, * AEOD
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- Holody
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2/ib/92
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PROP SALEM 2/10/92 ~ 0005.0.0
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Public Service Electric
and Gas Company
DISTRIBUTION:
SECY
CA
JMTayl or, EDO
-JSniezek, DEDR
Jlieberman, OE
TMartin, RI
_JGo 1 dberg, OGC
TMurley, NRR
JPartlow, NRR
Enforcement Coordinators
.RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV
Fingram, GPA/PA
BHayes, 01
VMi 11 er, SP
DWil 1 i ams, OIG
EJordan, AEOD
- OE: Chron
OE:EA
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