ML18095A867
| ML18095A867 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1991 |
| From: | Crimmins T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NLR-N91056, NUDOCS 9104120278 | |
| Download: ML18095A867 (21) | |
Text
ti" Public Service Electric and Gas Company Thomas M. Crimmins, Jr.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609-339-4700 Vice President - Nuclear Engineering APR o 4 1991 NLR-N91056 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
ONE-HOUR FIRE PROTECTION BARRIERS SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 By letter dated March 22, 1991, the NRC Staff rejected Public Service Electric and Gas Company's (PSE&G) request for extension of the Appendix R compliance schedule set forth in 10CFR50.48.
In its letter, the Staff also requested that PSE&G provide (1) information regarding PSE&G's compensatory measures to provide reasonable assurance of safe operation pending installation of one-hour fire barriers associated with approved exemption requests, and (2) information regarding completion of the associated modifications. The following information is in response to the Staff's requests.
With regard to item 1, above, in PSE&G's request for technical exemptions dated July 15, 1988 (a compilation and clarification of exemption requests dating back to 1983), PSE&G confirmed, and the Staff subsequently accepted without comment, PSE&G's interim compensatory measures to assure the safety of the plant pending action on the exemption requests.
As discussed in greater detail in the Attachment to this letter, the compensatory measures, still in effect, are roving fire watches in all areas impacted by the exemption requests.
PSE&G reaffirms its intent to continue with this commitment for each impacted fire area until the modifications in the respective fire areas related to the exemptions are completed.
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Document Control Desk NLR-N91056 APR O 4 1W1 2
The Attachment also conveys the information verbally requested by the staff regarding the area-by-area description of safe shutdown equipment, fire suppression and detection systems, and the scheduling and status of completing the fire protection work associated with one-hour barriers.
In addition, the Staff had also requested that PSE&G inform the Staff of any special precautions that will be taken regarding transient combustibles.
There are several mechanisms currently in place at Salem Station to control the use of transient combustibles.
These include administrative controls on the amount of combustibles, the u~e of a fire protection Impairment Permit and daily housekeeping inspections by Site Protection personnel.
Any hazard which is judged to be of an immediate concern is promptly reported to the Operating Shift for action.
The compensatory measures noted above, in conjunction with existing fire protection features, are consistent with those which have been accepted previously by the NRC staff at Salem as well as throughout the nuclear industry to justify continued operation of a facility.
PSE&G believes that these compensatory measures are more than adequate to protect the health and safety of the public.
The March 22, 1991 NRC letter conveyed the Staff's intention to review and approve PSE&G's basis for continued operation of the Salem units.
PSE&G requests the Staff's concurrence with this basis as outlined in this*submittal on or before April 12, 1991.
With respect to the Staff's request for information regarding completion of the associated modifications (item 2, above), PSE&G is anxious to meet with Staff management to discuss this information.
PSE&G recognizes and appreciates the driving need to complete all work associated with Appendix R.
Although compensatory fire protection measures are in place to assure the continued safe operation of the plant, PSE&G and the NRC need to work expeditiously to get the remaining fire protection issues at Salem Generating Station behind us!
This is our common goal and will also be a topic for discussion at the management meeting noted above.
I' Document Control Desk NLR-N91056 3
APR o 4 1991 If you have any questions with regard to the information contained in this letter, please contact us immediately.
We are also available to meet with you at your convenience to discuss this submittal.
Attachment c Mr. J. c. Stone Licensing Project Manager Mr. T. Johnson Senior Resident Inspector Mr. T. Martin, Administrator Region I Mr. Kent Tosch, Chief New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Division of Environmental Quality Bureau of Nuclear Engineering CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625
ATTACHMENT 1 APPENDIX R ONE-HOUR FIRE BARRIER MODIFICATIONS SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 & 2 NLR-N91056 This Attachment contains the information requested by the NRC staff on February 21, February 25, and March 22, 1991.
This request for information addressed the Appendix R one-hour fire barrier work remaining to be performed in each fire area, the safe shutdown-related equipment in each area, the fire detection and suppression systems in each area, any compensatory measures being taken, and an outage/non-outage discussion of the remaining work.
Although this information is largely a recapitulation of information provided previously to the Commission, it had never before been consolidated such that the amount of remaining work and its significance could be viewed in perspective.
WORK PRIORITIZATION As a part of the Fire Protection Improvement Program, all of the Appendix R modifications were prioritized according to a hierarchy based on contribution to safety.
This prioritization process resulted in the following order:
MODIFICATIONS PERFORMED PRIOR TO EXEMPTION APPROVAL Modifications associated with Licensee Event Reports (Enhancement to Plant Safety)
Modifications to the Fire Detection System (Greatest increase in Fire Protection Safety)
Modifications to various fire protection features in advance of exemption request approval (low licensing risk, high fire safety gain due to nature of exemption) e.g., Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room sprinkler expansion.
MODIFICATIONS PERFORMED AFTER EXEMPTION APPROVAL Modifications to fire suppression systems associated with approved exemptions (greatest increase in fire protection safety)
Other modifications to support approved exemptions One-hour fire barriers represent one facet of the nuclear plant fire protection concept of "defense in depth".
Salem Units 1 and 2 already have installed approximately 15,000 feet of one-hour barriers in compliance with the previous separation criterion of 20 ft.
The requirement for the remaining 5500 feet (approx.) of one-hour barriers is based on subsequent NRC guidance and clarifications.
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Given these numbers and the fact that acceptable compensatory measures are in place, additional one-hour barrier installation has been properly categorized as "Other Modifications to Support Approved Exemptions".
COMPENSATORY ACTIONS PSE&G has had in place, as part of its Fire Protection Improvement Program, compensatory measures which serve to counterbalance the lack of one-hour barrier installations for the fire areas in question.
These compensatory measures are in the form of hourly fire patrols, an industry accepted practice to address issues of this nature.
The Salem Technical Specifications permit continued plant operation in the event of an inoperable fire barrier where fire watches are provided.
Inoperable fire barriers present a situation similar to the issue at hand.
Fire watch patrols also provide surveillance of affected areas for hazardous conditions not normally detected by installed fire protection systems.
Such conditions include:
Obvious activities by plant personnel that could increase the fire hazard in the area;
- Conditions likely to cause a fire, such as spills of flammable liquids or major malfunctioning of equipment; and
- Conditions likely to adversely affect fire protection, such as blocked access routes.
In addition to the fire watch patrols, these areas are subject to daily walkdowns by members of the onsite fire brigade.
OUTAGE/NON-OUTAGE DISCUSSION One-hour barrier installation may generally be considered non-outage related work.
However, when considering those factors noted below, an outage may be required to perform the work.
The determination of whether outage time will be required depends upon the results of the requisite ampacity and seismic calculations.
This is a requirement of General Design Criterion 3 and is intended to avoid compromising overall plant safety.
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Ampacity All cables whether utilized for safety, non~safety, or safe shutdown functions possess a maximum current carrying capability based upon the size and manufacturing rating, and the installed condition.
This current carrying capability is typically referred to as 11ampacity 11
- The installation of wrap (one-hour barrier) on a cable or tray results in normally radiated heat being trapped within the subject.cables.
The magnitude of heat generated is based upon ~he cable size (resistance) and the square of the current (I ) that the connected load draws.
If the heat generated via this process cannot dissipate to atmosphere and the drawn current now exceeds the cable ampacity, then the qualified life of the subject cable may be reduced or the cable may become physically degraded due to overheating.
Cable ampacity varies with raceway cable population.
This requires each raceway subject to wrapping to be evaluated to assure that ampacity is not reduced to less than that required by safety-related loads. If this occurs, the subject cables must be evaluated in detail to determine the appropriate option among accepting a reduced qualified life, rerouting the cable, or replacing the cable.
Considering that safety-related devices may be involved, including attendant technical specification requirements for operability, an outage could be required to accommodate cable reroute or replacement activities.
Seismicity The raceways subject to installation of one-hour barriers are the same raceways which carry cables associated with post-seismic safe shutdown.
The additional weight of wrap material (approximately 17 pounds per linear foot) must be evaluated in detail to assure that plant safety is not adversely affected.
This evaluation must be performed to assure the static and dynamic loading capability of the raceway system is not compromised.
Any particular raceway which may be adversely impacted by the installation of wrap material, must be evaluated to determine the feasibility of installing additional supports or rerouting cables.
Considering that safety-related raceways and cables are involved in the analysis and potential rework, including technical specification requirements for operability, an outage may be required to reroute cables.
As described in PSE&G's approved exemption requests, the Containment Fan Coil Unit Service Water Valve controls will be modified in lieu of cable wrap.
An outage is required to perform this modification.
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SCHEDULE COMPRESSION Schedule compression is not a feasible option.
The engineering evaluation work is scheduled for completion by October 1, 1991.
PSE&G has 25 engineering personnel dedicated to performing the necessary ampacity and seismic calculations and developing the implementing Design Change Packages (DCP).
In addition, approximately 40,000 man-hours are anticipated for installation, scheduled for completion by August 1, 1992.
PSE&G's schedule reflects a well planned, methodical approach for managing the work.
Given the physical access restraints in the field and span of supervisory control, efforts to shorten the schedule could result in safety concerns or impaired project control.
There is a point of diminishing return associated with an effort such as this beyond which it requires a major increase in effort to achieve a small net gain.
PSE&G feels that the schedule is aggressive when all of the issues are taken into consideration.
On an area-by-area basis, PSE&G will advise the NRC of the completion of the engineering and installation milestones for the balance of the schedule.
AREA DESCRIPTIONS There are a total of 45 fire areas between Units 1 and 2.
Of these, 21 fire areas require no additional one-hour barriers.
Completed Fire Areas All tray and cable wrap commitments have been completed for the following ten fire areas:
1&2FA-AB-45A Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment area - Elevation 45' and 55' A RHR Pump and Heat Exchanger Area 1&2FA-AB-45B Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevation 45' and 55' B RHR Pump and Heat Exchanger Area 1&2FA-DG-84F co2 Equipment Room - Elevation 84' 1&2FA-EP-100G Upper Electrical Penetration Area - Elevation 100' 1&2FA-PP-100H Inner Piping Penetration Area - Elevation 100' and 120' 4
Remainina Modifications For the 14 areas where modifications remain, the following status information is provided:
safe shutdown cables and equipment installed detection installed suppression, and additional fire protection features STATUS NOTE:
DCP's have been developed for 2 of the 14 areas.
For 4 additional areas, the ampacity calculations are sufficiently complete to conclude that cable rerouting will not be required due to ampacity problems in these 4 areas.
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FIRE AREAS 1&2FA-AB-64A 4160V Switchgear Room - Elevation 64' These areas measure a combined total of 10,408 square feet.
SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES AND EQUIPMENT The 4160V Switchgear Room contains electrical cabling and switchgear.
The majority of cabling in the area is power and control cabling entering the 4160V Switchgear Room from the Auxiliary Building and the 460V Switchgear Room.
Two 460V control rod drive motor-generator (MG) sets are also contained in this room.
C-Battery Room 125V, and the Security Battery Room (Unit 1 only) are enclosed separate rooms within the Switchgear Room.
INSTALLED DETECTION Area-wide ionization type fire detectors are provided in the 4160V switchgear Room on the ceiling and in the Switchgear and Penetration Area Ventilation system exhaust ducts. Manual alarm stations are provided in the room.
Detectors and manual fire alarm stations alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
INSTALLED SUPPRESSION Fire suppression is provided in this area by a manually actuated, fixed low pressure co2 total flooding system.
The system can be manually actuated from stations located outside the room.
Actuation of the co2 system is indicated on the fire protection panel in the ControI Room.
Manual fire suppression capability is provided in the form of portable fire extinguishers and a manual hose station.
ADDITIONAL FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES The floor, ceilings and walls in this area are all constructed of reinforced concrete with a nominal fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
The Division A, B and C redundant 4160V switchgear are located in this fire area.
Partial height, partial length Marinite walls are provided for the separation of each switchgear set.
These barriers are approximately 15' in height.
Redundant cables in the Switchgear Room will be enclosed in 1-hour barriers to take advantage of the separation provided by the Marinite walls.
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Cables associated with Division A that are required for shutdown will be enclosed where they pass the Division B and c switchgear areas.
In addition, cables associated with Division B that are required for shutdown will be enclosed where they pass over the Division A and C switchgear areas.
All cables (intervening combustibles) which cross the Marinite barrier between the switchgear sets A and B and switchgear sets B and c will be enclosed with a 1-hour fire rated barrier to eliminate them as an avenue for fire spread.
There are cables that exit the Division A and B cable trays above the switchgear cubicles and are routed through the ceiling.
Any of these cables that are associated with safe shutdown will be enclosed within a 1-hour barrier after they extend above the Marinite barriers.
Bus ducts that pass through the Marinite barriers will be internally sealed to prevent the spread of smoke.
Currently there exists a total of approximately 3315' (total both units) of cable and tray wrap in this fire area.
Per PSE&G's approved exemption request, approximately 650' (total both units) of additional cable and tray wrap is scheduled to be installed.
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FIRE AREAS 1&2FA-AB-64B Reactor Plant Auxiliary Buildinq - Elevation 64' These areas measure a combined total of 32,620 square feet.
SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES AND/OR EQUIPMENT The safe shutdown cables and/or equipment in this area are associated with the followinq systems:
Air Supply Auxiliary Feedwater Boric Acid Supply Charqinq Chilled Water Component Coolinq Containment Ventilation HVAC-Charqinq HVAC-RHR INSTALLED DETECTION Letdown Main Steam Isolation Power Distribution Pressurizer Instrumentation RCP Seal Cooling Reactor Depressurization Residual Heat Removal Service Water Service Water Ventilation A partial fire detection system is installed in the area with the exception of the Holdup Tank Rooms, and the unused space formerly designated as the Gas Analyzer Area.
These rooms are separated from the remainder of the area by concrete walls.
The concrete walls have open doorways for access to the tanks.
The detectors are l.ocated near the major hazards in the area.
Manual fire alarm stations are provided in the area.
Detectors and manual fire alarm stations alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
INSTALLED SUPPRESSION Manual fire suppression capability is provided in the form of portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations.
ADDITIONAL FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES The floor, ceilinq and walls in this area.are all constructed of reinforced concrete with a nominal fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
This fire area consists of many concrete rooms.
Each room contains either a single component or qroups of similar components.
These concrete barriers aid in subdividinq the area and act as radiant enerqy shields.
Protection of redundant* cables will be provided by enclosinq cables associated with one safe shutdown path in a 1-hour barrier throughout the area.
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Currently there exists a total of approximately 780' (total both units) of cable and tray wrap in this fire area.
Per PSE&G's approved exemption request, approximately 2050' (total both units) of additiotjal cable and tray wrap is scheduled to be installed.
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FIRE AREAS 1&2FA-AB-84A 460V Switchgear Room - Elevation 84' These areas measure a combined total of 9,558 square feet.
SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT The 460V Switchgear Room contains the unit's electrical switchgear for safety-related~and nonsafety-related systems. This
- room also contains 4160V feed$ to 4160/460V transformers from the 4160V Switchgear Room below.
In addition, this room contains most of the 460V (and lower) cable routed between the Reactor Containment and Relay Room.
All 4160V cable is routed through conduit.
INSTALLED DETECTION Area-wide early warning fire detection is provided by ionization type detectors mounted at the ceiling and in the exhaust ventilation ducts.
Thermal detectors are provided for automatic actuation of the co system.
Two manual fire alarm stations are also provided.
Det~ctors and the manual fire alarm stations alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
INSTALLED SUPPRESSION Fire suppression is provided by an automatically actuated co2 flooding system.
Actuation of the C02 flooding system is indicated on the fire protection paneI in the Control Room.
Manual fire suppression capability in the form of portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations is readily available to the area.
ADDITIONAL FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES The floor, ceiling, and walls in this area are all constructed of reinforced concrete with a nominal fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
The power cables from the 460/230V switchgear to the equipment exit from the bottom of the switchgear and are routed on elevation 64'.
The cables on elevation 84' provide remote operation of the equipment from the Control Room.
Alternate operating instructions have been developed to permit an orderly shutdown should the control cables be damaged due to a fire in Fire Areas 1&2FA-AB-84A.
The power feeds from the batteries (elevation 100') to the A and B division 125VDC switchgear will be enclosed with a 1-hour fire barrier in this fire area.
The power feed to the c division 125VDC switchgear 10
is routed from below (elevation 64').
In addition, the power feed from the 'C' Diesel to th~ 'C' division 4160V switchgear will also be enclosed in a 1-hour.barrier to provide an additional level of protection*
Cables associated with the A & B division 125VDC power feeds to start the A and B division diesel generators will be completely enclosed with a 1-hour fire barrier in this fire area.
In addition to these cables, redundant switchgear are located in Fire Areas 1&2FA-AB-84A.
The redundant divisions of 460/230V vital switchgear are separated by partial height, partial length Marinite walls.
The 125VDC switchgear are also separated from the 460/230V switchgear and from their redundant divisions by Marinite walls.
These partial height and length walls will prevent a floor based fire from damaging redundant floor mounted equipment before the automatic suppression system can extinguish the fire.
Currently there exists a total of approximately 690' (total both units) of cable and tray wrap in this fire area.
Per PSE&G's approved exemption request, approximately 250' (total both units) of additional cable and tray wrap is scheduled to be installed.
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FIRE AREAS 1&2FA-AB-84B Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area - Elevation 84' These areas measure a combined total of 24,258 square feet.
FIRE AREAS 1&2FA-AB-84C Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area No. 11 (21) Component Cooling Pump Area - Elevation 84' These areas measure a combined total of 1,240 square feet.
SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES AND/OR EQUIPMENT The safe shutdown cables and/or equipment in this area are associated with the following systems:
Air Supply Auxiliary Feedwater Boric Acid Supply Charging Chilled Water Component Cooling Containment Ventilation HVAC-AFW HVAC-CCW HVAC-Charging INSTALLED DETECTION HVAC-RHR Letdown Main Steam Isolation Power Distribution Pressurizer Instrumentation RCP Seal Cooling Reactor Depressurization Residual Heat Removal Service Water Service Water Ventilation Partial area detection is provided consisting of ionization type detectors mounted on the ceiling in the Safety Injection and Component Cooling Pump areas, Charging and Containment Spray areas, Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger areas, as well as various corridor areas.
Detectors are located in the vicinity of the major hazards in the area.
Manual fire alarm stations are also provided.
Detectors and the manual fire alarm stations alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
INSTALLED SUPPRESSION Fire suppression is provided for the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps by automatically actuated, redundant pre-action sprinkler systems.
Each system is actuated by its own detection system.
One sprinkler system is actuated by ionization type fire detectors which are mounted on the ceiling over the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
The other system is actuated by a temperature actuated pneumatic release system consisting of fusible link sprinkler heads.
Fire suppression is provided for the Charging Pump Areas by a wet pipe sprinkler system.
Portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations are provided in the area for manual fire suppression efforts.
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ADDITIONAL FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES The No. 11 (21).component Cooling Water (CCW) pump and the No. 11 (21) Component Cooling Heat Exchanger will be enclosed in a 3-hour rated cubicle (1&2FA-AB-84C) with one exception.
The ventilation duct penetrations will be sealed to the thickness of the barrier.
All piping and cable tray penetrations will be sealed under the Salem Penetration Seal Improvement Program.
The existing non-rated doors leading to the Auxiliary Building corridor have been replaced with doors that are rated for l~-hours.
A l~-hour rated fire door has been installed to separate the Valve Room from the No. 11 {21) Component Cooling loop.
The power cables for all the ccw pumps enter the cubicles from the elevation below.
The floor, ceiling and walls in this area are all constructed of reinforced concrete with a nominal fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
This fire area consists of many concrete rooms.
Each room contains either a single component or groups of similar components.
These concrete barriers serve as radiant energy shields and subdivide the overall fire area to provide protection of equipment as discussed below.
The redundant Charging Pumps are separated by partial length concrete walls.
The walls separate the pumps except for 7'-6" at the south {north) end of the cubicles.
The walls also have an opening 2'-6" high and 6'-3 11 long at the north {south) end of the cubicle approximately 7' above the floor. The opening is located above a concrete sill that extends out from the wall.
Piping passes through the openings from one Charging cubicle to the others.
The wet pipe sprinkler system in the Charging Pump Area has been expanded to provide full coverage around the pump's area.
The three West Valve 230V Vital Control Centers are located in this area.
The A and B control centers are separated by approximately 20' which includes a 90° corner and concrete barrier.
The C control center is located within the sprinkler coverage of the AFW Pump Room.
The Auxiliary Feedwater {AFW) pumps are located in the Auxiliary Building on elevation 84' near Column LL.
There are two motor driven pumps and one steam turbine driven pump. Operation of any one pump satisfies minimum system operability requirements for shutdown.
The power feeds for the motor driven pumps are routed on elevation 64' and through the floor of elevation 84' to the pumps.
The no. 11 {21) and No. 12 {22) motor driven pump flow loops are controlled from Panels 205 and 206, respectively.
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If it is postulated that a fire in this area renders both motor driven AFW pumping loops inoperable, safe shutdown can be achieved with the turbine driven pump.
This pump is enclosed and separated from the motor driven pumps by a 12" thick concrete wall and 3/16" steel missile barrier.
The concrete wall is 6'-5" high, and the remainder of the enclosure is the steel barrier.
In addition to the barrier, a :.redundant detection and suppression system is installed above the.. *'1otor driven pumps and also in the turbine driven pump cubicle. 'Both* suppression systems are the preaction sprinkler type.
One is activated by smoke detectors, and the other is activated by a pneumatic pilot system and fusible links.
The ionization detectors are presently located on the ceiling.
The turbine driven pump-and-flow loop is controlled from Panel 207 which is located outside the No. 13 (23) AFW pump enclosure.
Panel 207 is enclosed with FS-195.
However, the barrier on Panel 207 is not to be misconstrued to be a 1-hour barrier.
This barrier is intended to protect the panel until the suppression system activates to extinguish the fire.
The Hot Shutdown Panel, Panel 213, is also located in this area.
The panel is enclosed with FS-195.
Protection for cables associated with these systems will be provided by 1-hour rated barriers installed in a configuration that allows a minimum of 30' of separation between redundant divisions with limited intervening combustibles.
Currently there exists a total of approximately 2060' (total both units) of cable and tray wrap in this fire area.
Per PSE&G's approved exemption request, approximately 960' (total both units) of additional cable and tray wrap is scheduled to be installed.
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FIRE AREAS 1&2FA-AB-100C Reactor P1ant Auxi1iary Equipment Area - E1evation 100' These areas measure a combined total of 23,240 square feet.
SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES AND/OR EQUIPMENT The safe shutdown cables and/or equipment in this area are associated with the following systems:
Air Supply Auxiliary Feedwater Boric Acid Supply Charging Chilled Water Component Cooling Containment Ventilation HVAC-Charging INSTALLED DETECTION HVAC-RHR Letdown Main Steam Isolation Power Distribution Pressurizer Instrumentation Reactor Depressurization Residual Heat Removal Ionization type fire detectors are provided in the corridor area as well as in the east end of the corridor outside of the Counting Room, the corridor to the Mechanical Penetration Area, the Storage Area behind the Counting Room, the Ventilation Room on elevation 113' over the Counting Room, the Boric Acid Evaporator Room, and the Inservice Inspection (ISI) Calibration Storage Room.
Detectors and manual alarm stations alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
INSTALLED SUPPRESSION Manual fire suppression capability is provided by portable extinguishers and hose stations located in the corridor of the area.
ADDITIONAL FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES The floor, ceiling and walls in this area are all constructed of reinforced concrete with a nominal fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Protection of redundant cables will be provided by enclosing cables associated with one safe shutdown path in a 1-hour rated fire barrier.
The protected cabling is located throughout the areas in various cable trays and conduits.
currently there exists a total of approximately 1490' (total both units) of cable and tray wrap in this fire area.
Per PSE&G's approved exemption request, approximately 1040' (total both units) of additional cable and tray wrap is scheduled to be installed.
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FIRE AREAS 1&2FA-EP-78C Lower Electrical Penetration Area These areas measure a combined total of 7,024 square feet.
SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES AND/OR EQUIPMENT The safe shutdown cables and/or equipment in this area are associated with the following systems:
Air Supply Auxiliary Feedwater Charging Chilled Water Containment Ventilation HVAC-AFW HVAC-CCW HVAC-Charging HVAC-RHR Letdown INSTALLED DETECTION Main Feedwater Isolation Main steam Isolation Power Distribution Pressurizer Instrumentation RCP Seal Cooling Reactor Depressurization Residual Heat Removal Secondary Depressurization Service Water Area-wide early warning detection is provided by ionization type detectors mounted on the ceiling and in the ventilation exhaust ducts.
Thermal detectors are provided for automatic actuation of the co2 system.
A manual fire alarm station is also provided.
Detectors and the manual fire alarm stations alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
INSTALLED SUPPRESSION Fire suppression is provided by an automatically actuated co2 total flooding system.
Portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations are available to the area for manual fire suppression.
ADDITIONAL FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES The floor, ceiling and walls in this area are all constructed of reinforced concrete with a nominal fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Protection for redundant cables will be provided by enclosing cables associated with one safe shutdown path in a 1-hour rated barrier.
As described in the exemption request, protection for cables will be installed to ensure a minimum of 20' separation between redundant cables.
The motor control centers in Fire Areas 1&2FA-EP-78C are redundant to each other.
Partial height, partial length Marinite barriers are installed to separate this redundant equipment.
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Currently there exists a total of approximately 3215' (total both units) of cable and tray wrap in this fire area.
Per PSE&G's approved exemption request, approximately 560' (total both units) of additional cable and tray wrap is scheduled to be installed.
17
FIRE AREAS 1&2FA-MP-78I Mechanical Penetration Areas Elevation 78' and 100' These areas measure a combined total of 12,648 sqliare*feet.
SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES AND/OR EQUIP~NT The safe shutdown cables and/qr eq\\lipment in this area are associated with the following:~ystems:
Air Supply Auxiliary Feedwater Charging Component Cooling Containment Ventilation Letdown INSTALLED DETECTION Main Steam Isolation RCP Seal Cooling Reactor Depressurization Residual Heat Removal Service Water Partial area fire detection is installed for the protection of the major fire hazards on Elevation 78' and 100'. Continuous thermal strip detectors are provided to protect charcoal filters in the Fuel Handling Area Exhaust filter units.
Manual fire alarm stations are provided in the area.
Detectors and the manual fire alarm stations alarm and annunciate in the.Control Room.
INSTALLED SUPPRESSION Automatic fire suppression is provided in the Fuel Handling Area Exhaust filter units by a water deluge.spray system actuated by the continuous thermal strip detectors.
Manual fire suppression equipment capability in the form of portable fire extinguishers and a manual hose station on Elevation 100' is provided.
ADDITIONAL FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES The floor,. ceiling and wall in this area are all constructed of reinforced concrete with a nominal fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Protection of redundant cables will be provided by enclosing cables associated with one safe shutdown path in a 1-hour rated fi~e barrier.
In addition, the redundant valves are separated by 20' and a partial barrier.
Redundant valves for service water and containment ventilation will be modified to fail to the correct position~
Currently there exists a total of approximately 395' (total both units) of cable and tray wrap in this fire area.
Per PSE&G's approved exemption request, approximately 100' (total both units) of additional cable wrap will be installed.
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