ML18092A366
| ML18092A366 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1984 |
| From: | Liden E Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8411140247 | |
| Download: ML18092A366 (3) | |
Text
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Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Nuclear Department November 9, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Attention:
Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operations Reactors Branch l Division of Licensing
Dear Mr. Varga:
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONTINUED OPERATION SALEM GENERATING STATION UNITS NO. l AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 In response to our commitment to Mr. R. Borgan (NRC-EQ Branch) on October 25, 1984, Justifications for Continued Operations (JCO's) are provided below assuming the loss of Neutron Flux Monitors and Component Cooling Water Temperature to ESF Systems.
These variables were identified in the R.G.1.97 compliance review as requiring environmental qualification.
- 1.
Neutron Flux Monitors (XA 5699, 5700, 5705, 5706, 5711 -
5714)
The neutron flux detectors provide inputs to the reactor protection system from all three ranges.
However, only the trips originating from the power range channels are required in the accident.
The source and intermediate ranges also provide indication of core subcriticality and the approach to criticality while the reactor is subcritical.
However, if both ranges are unavailable, this information will be obtained by sampling the Reactor Coolant System for boron concentration and performing a shutdown margin calculation.
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r Mr. Steven 11/9/84 In the event of a loss of the Nuclear Instrumentation System following a reactor trip or safety injection, adequate shutdown margin is available from the installed systems (control rods, BIT, etc.).
Therefore, the NIS is not required to provide irrunediate confirmation of reactor shutdown.
No significant degradation of any safety functions or misleading information to the operator will occur as a result of failure of these monitors under accident environment resulting from a design basis event.
- 2.
Component Cooling Water Temperature to ESF Systems (TA-1564, TA-1576)
Temperature indication of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) supply to the RHR heat exchangers provides a means of determining whether heat removal is being accomplished.
In the event that the primary means of indication (TA-1564, TA-1576) is not available, this information may be obtained by the following:
a)
Pump amperage indicates that Component Cooling Water flow is present.
b)
Valve position for CC-16 (RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet) shows valve is open and flow exists (all other valves in line are manual and locked open).
c)
LOCA emergency procedures require alignment of the non-safeguards header to only one CCW heat exchanger.
Therefore, flow from one CCW heat exchanger is guaranteed to at least one RHR heat exchanger.
Therefore loss of TA-1564 and/or TA-1576 would not cause significant degradation of any safety function or provide misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of these monitors under accident environment resulting from a design basis event.
Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact us.
Sincerely, Liden Manager -
Nuclear Licensing and Regulation
Mr. Steven A. Varga C
Mr. Donald C. Fischer Licensing Project Manager Mr. James Linville Senior Resident Inspector 11/9/84