ML18089A340
| ML18089A340 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 09/02/1983 |
| From: | Liden E Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LCR-82-15, LCR-82-24, NUDOCS 8309090292 | |
| Download: ML18089A340 (5) | |
Text
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Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Nuclear Department September 2, 1983 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Attention:
Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 1 Division of Licensing Gentlemen:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON REQUESTS FOR AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-70 AND DPR-75 NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS SALEM GENERATING STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 Ref:
LCR 82-24 LCR 82-15 This letter is in response to a request by your Mr. D. Fischer for supplemental information pertaining to our requests for amendment and our analyses of the changes to Facility Operating License DPR-70 for Salem Generating Station, Unit No. 1 and DPR-75 for Salem Generating Station, Unit No. 2.
LCR 82-24 This change, originally submitted on December 3, 1982, will modify the fuel enrichment for the reactor core and the new and spent fuel racks to 4.05 weight percent U-235.
LCR 82-15 This change, originally submitted on October 5, 1982 more clearly defines the bounds of automatic actuation logic and places restrictions on operation with one or more Main Steam Isolation Valve solenoid vent valves inoperable.
The Energy People
~Jl, l I 95-21 68 (80 M) 11-82
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9/2/83 These changes each involve a single safety issue and are deemed not to involve a significant safety hazard.
Our supplemental information for each change adds additional supportive material to our Safety Evaluations.
Attachments CC:
Mr. Donald C. Fischer Licensing Project Manager Mr. Leif Norrholm Senior Resident Inspector Manager - Nuclear Licensing and Regulation
PROPOSED CHANGES DESIGN FEATURES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SALEM NO. l AND 2 UNITS DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Ref:
LCR 82-24 Modify the fuel enrichment limit for the reactor core and the new and spent fuel storage racks to 4.05 weight percent U-235.
REASON FOR CHANGE Allow optimization of fuel cycle costs and fuel utilization by employing higher enrichment for use in split feeds and eighteen month cycle operation.
SAFETY EVALUATION The effects of increased fuel enrichment with respect to fuel storage in the new and spent fuel racks have been evaluated.
The analysis for fuel stored in the new fuel storage rack is included as Attachment I, while Attachment II is the analysis for the Salem spent fuel rack.
Evaluation of higher enriched fuel in the reactor will be done on a cycle specific basis.
Each reload safety evaluation compares the cycle specific core peaking factors, kinetics parameters, and other appropriate safety margins to the assumptions and input values used in the current accident analyses thus confirming that the cycle design ensures adherence to the plant operating limitations given in the Safety Limits, Reactivity, and Power Distribution sections of the Technical Specifications.
Ref:
LCR 82-15 PROPOSED CHANGES DESIGN FEATURES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SALEM NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Add the following note to Technical Specification 3.3.2.l Table 3.3.3 Section 4b:
- The automatic actuation logic includes two redundant sole-noid operated vent valves for each Main Steam Isolation Valve.
One vent valve on any one Main Steam Isolation Valve may be isolated without affecting the function of the auto-matic actuation logic provided the remaining seven solenoid vent valves remain operable.
The isolated MSIV vent valve shall be returned to OPERABLE status upon the first entry into MODE 5 following determination that the vent valve is inoperable.
For any condition where more than one of the eight solenoid vent valves are inoperable, entry into ACTION Statement (No. 13 on Unit 1, No. 20 on Unit 2) is required.
REASON FOR CHANGE This change is being submitted to more clearly define the bounds of the automatic actuation logic to include MSIV solenoid vent valves and to delineate restrictions for operating with one solenoid vent valve isolated.
SAFETY EVALUATION
- a.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased.
Eight solenoid valves are provided for four Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's).
The unavailability of one solenoid valve will not render the associated MSIV in-operable.
An independent redundant solenoid valve is provided for control of the affected MSIV.
Given one inoperable solenoid valve and any subsequent single failure including failure of the other (redundant) logic train, a minimum of three of the four MSIV's will close thus providing the safety function.
The Salem accident analyses assume that one MSIV fails to close.
Therefore, the loss of one out of eight solenoid valves will not impact plant safety.
However, an inoperable solenoid valve should be repaired as soon as reasonably
Ref:
LCR 82-15 SAFETY EVALUATION (Continued) possible and in no case should more than one solenoid valve be inoperable at any given time.
If this case exists, plant safety could be impacted resulting in an unreviewed safety question.
- b.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report will not be created.
The subject solenoid valves affect only MSIV operation and interface with no other systems or equipment other than the motive power systems necessary for operation.
This LCR is not related to a plant modification.
- c.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is not reduced.
Each MSIV has two solenoid vent valves, operation of either of which will close the associated MSIV.
Each of the two Solid State Protection System (SSPS) logic trains provides input to a set of four solenoid vent valves (one on each MSIV).
The original technical specification related to this equipment was intended to apply to the two redundant SSPS logic trains such that a loss of one train would require entry into the ACTION statement because each of the four MSIV's would lose one of its two redundant controls.
Since three of the four MSIV's are required to close for safety purposes; the failure of one solenoid vent valve on any MSIV only impairs the redundant control for that single MSIV but does not adversely affect plant safety or exceed the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
Our evaluation of the conditions described herein enable us to determine that this change introduces no Unreviewed Safety Question and involves no Significant Hazards Consideration.