ML18088A866
| ML18088A866 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/2018 |
| From: | Armand M, Bivans E, Coe W Florida Power & Light Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| ALAB 537 | |
| Download: ML18088A866 (71) | |
Text
48 Joint Testimony
.of HICHEL P. ARHAND, ERNEST L. BIVANS AND l<ILFRED E. COE Relating to questions Al and D of 'ALAB 537 Hy name is Ernest L. Bivans. I am the Vice President in charge of 2 System Planning for Florida Power 5 Light Company (FPL). Ply educational background and professional qualifications appear in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's record of the St. Lucie 2 proceeding following Tr. 4896 and are incorporated herein by reference.
Hy name is flichel P. Armand. I am the Supervising Engineer of 7 Reliability and System Security in the System Planning Department of FPL.
8 A resume of my educational and professional qualifications is attached to 9 this testimony and is incorporated herein by reference.
10 The System Planning Department is responsible for:
(a) Forecasting peak loads 'and energy requirements; 12 (b) Planning and recommending to management appropriate expansion 13 for FPL's generation and transmission facilities as needed to meet load and 14 reliability needs; and 15 (c) Coordinating FPL's generation and transmission planning with 16 other utilities through organizations such as the Florida Electric Power 17 Coordinating Group (FCG) and the Southeastern Electric Reliability Council 18 (SERC).
19 Hy name is llilfred E. Coe. I am Director of Power Supply for FPL.
20 A resume of my educational and professional qualifications is attached to 21 . this testimony and is incorporated herein by reference.
The Power Supply Department is responsible for optimizing the 2 quality, reliabi lity and economic supply of electric energy to meet the needs 3 of FPL customers. Power Supply is also responsible for the installation, 4 operation and maintenance of protective relay and power system control 5 equipment associated with generation, transmission and distribution of elec-6 tric .power.
SCOPE OF TESTIMONY 8 The purpose of this testimony is to respond to guestions Al and D 9 as stated in the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Memorandum and 10 Order of April 5, 1979, which are:
21/
ll A. General Desi n Criterion GDC 17 12 1. This criterion, entitled "Electric Power Systems," requires in its 13 third paragraph (emphasis added):
14 Electric power from the transmission network to the onsite 15 electric distribution system shall be supplied by two physically 16 independent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) 17 designed and located so as to minimize to the extent ractical 18 the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and 19 postulated accident and environmental conditions. A switchyard 20 common to both circuits is acceptable. 22/
21 All three transmission lines connecting the St. Lucie station to the 22 applicant's grid originate at the Midway Substation. The May 14, 23 1978 incident, in which all power at that substation was lost despite 24 redundant incoming sources, demonstrates that these circuits are 25 indeed susceptible to simultaneous. failure. 23/ The testimony should 26 address whether the St. Lucie station nonetheless meets this GDC-17 27 requirement.
21/ See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A (" General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" ).
~22 As we now view it, subject to being persuaded otherwise, the "common switchyard" provision refers to the switchyard at the site and not to a distant facility (such as, in this instance, the Midway Substation).
1 23/ See the applicant's May 25, 1978 "Report on System Disturbance, 2 May 14, 1978."
3 D. On oin Im rovement of S stem Reliabilit .
4 The testimony should provide a concise, up-to-date discussion of existing 5 measures, or those planned for the near future, by which the reliability 6 of the applicant's system may be enhanced. Particular attention should 7 be paid to the seemingly excessive number of personnel errors which 8 appear to have led to the May 14, 1978 outage and to have contributed to 9 the May 16, 1977 disturbance.
10 Our testimony will first describe how FPL has provided, consistent 11 with the requirements of GDC-17, a strong grid which is constructed and 12 operated so as to minimize to the extent practical, the likelihood of the 1/
13 loss of all sources of offsite power to St. Lucie. We will then detail those 14 measures which have recently been and are being taken to further enhance the 15 reliability of our system.
16 THE ABILITY OF THE PRESENT FPL GRID 17 TO SUPPLY A RELIABLE SOURCE OF 18 OFFSITE POWER TO ST. LUCIE 19 No electrical system can be designed, constructed, and operated to 2/
20 completely eliminate all outages.
21 In order to reduce the probability of occurrence of the loss of 22 all sources of offsite power at St. Lucie, FPL has designed, constructed and 23 operated its system:
1/ A description of the FPL grid is contained in the affidavit of Ernest L.
Bivans, dated March 31, 1978. See Attachment 81. (System map omitted.)
2/ See IEEE Standard Definitions in Power Operation Terminology, Standard 346, 1973; OUTAGE-FORCED: An outage that results from emergency conditions directly associated with a component requiring that it be taken out of service immediately, either automatically or as soon as switching operations can be performed, or an outage caused by improper operation of equipment or human error.
A. To reduce the probability of occurrence of an outage of any one component on the system, and B. To sustain the simultaneous occurrence of multiple events before resulting in a loss of offsite power at St. Lucie.
In recognition of the changing economi,c and social environment FPL 6 annually updates its long range load forecast. This forecast is then used 7 as the basis for reviewing and modifying long range generation and trans-8 mission plans to meet future requirements. One of the objectives of such 9 planning is to prevent outages from occurring from loss of equipment due to 10 overloads or inadequate generating capacity. In addition, FPL selects and 11 tests all major components of the grid to rigid standards to reduce the 12 probability of outages due to equipment malfunctions. This planning and 13 equipment selection process assures that dependability and redundancy is 14 built into the grid, as well as into the relay and telemetering equipment 15 essential to its monitoring and protection. Following installation, a 16 continuous monitoring and testing program, performed by specially trained 17 personnel, maintains the equipment to specifications.
18 Recognizing that Peninsular Florida has its own unique environment, 19 20 FPL has designed have been taken a system to to prevent outages caused by wind,
'/ it.
function reliably within Special measures lightning, 4/
and various
'5 forms of environmental contamination. In addition to these measures, which g3 FPL's standards for construction of both substations and transmission lines assure their continued availability even during hurricane force winds.
4/ The use of higher insulation levels, lightning arrestors, and overhead ground wires have significantly reduced the susceptibility of our high voltage transmission grid to lightning--reducing its vulnerability to almost zero at 500 kV.
g5 Critical line sections which may be susceptible to salt contamination have been specially designed to eliminate this cause of outages. Example:
portions of the St. Lucie 240 KY line utilize vee-string insulators rated at about 500 kV to prevent outages due to contamination.
4
l have long been a matter of routine practice, efforts have recently been 2 increased to control contamination and a variety of innovative improvements 6/
3 are presently being developed.
Since November 1965 when the Nidway Substation went into service 5 simultaneous events have occurred to interrupt power on only two occasions.
6 The first occasion was Hay 16, 1977, when the automatic scheme at St. Luci.e 7/
7 functioned as designed and twice shifted from offsite to onsite diesel power.
The only other occasion on which a loss of offsite power to St. I.ucie 9 was experienced was on I'lay 14, 1978. At this time, three separate events 8/
10 combined to isolate the Ilidway substation from the rest oI'he FPL grid.
ll During this brief interruption of only eight minutes, the diesel generators'2 responded immediately providing AC power.
6/ Recent experience has shown the need for additional improvements in the area of contamination detection and control: See Attachment ~i2 discussing
. a system disturbance -in April 1979; the protective systems functioned as designed to contain the outage to the affected area. As a result of this experience new inspection procedures have been initiated giving priority to critical circuits so'hat contamination can be detected and removed before it can cause an outage. See Attachment b'3.
7/ The first cl>angeover to onsite power was the result of a voltage trans<<
ient lasting only a few cycles;'i.e., a fraction of a second. Although it is .impor Lant to note that none of the three St. I ucie-Yiidway lines lost power, the instanLaneous dip in voltage was enough to actuate the automatic throwover scheme at the plant starting the diesels immediately.
The plant opera'Lor chose to lemain on diesel power for several minutes although ol'fsite power was available. Th second shift to onsite power occurs ed later in the day, when the.hndytown Orange River 500 I:V 'I'ine relayed incorrectly at a time when the system had not been fully restored f) nm I: he earlier disturbance and multiple outages of major equipment still
'xisted. Although this interruption lasted .17 minutes, the diesels started jnmed'iat:ely, supplying onsite power. 'L ~
g8'ttachment fN (Figures 1-4) illustrate 'these events. Fir'st, the Ranch to 8 Whitney 240 I'V line was out of service for testing. Second, a 'ratt (Footnote continued on next page.)
Consequently, opevating history confirms that the FPL grid can 2 sustain the simultaneous occurrence of multiple events, and that at least 3 three sepavate events had .to occur before losing offsite power to St. Lucie.
The Board has vaised the question of the reliability of the 5 termination of the St. Lucie lines in a common substation at"Hidway, and 6 "whether the St. Lucie station nevertheless meets this (independent civcuit) 7 GDC-17 vequivement."
8 ~ GDC-17 specifically vequires only two independent civcuits, while 9 St. Luoie employs three. GDC-17 provides sufficient flexil>ility to'elect 10 a practical design which m'inimizes, the probability of a simu'Itaneous failure.
,ll This has been done for St. Lucie by tying the plant directly to the gvid 12 thvough the Hidway substation by means of three 240 kV 1'ines. This 13 substation has two independent busses and all lines are tied to both busses 14 through a bveaker-and-a-half scheme thus maintaining both physical and electrical separation.
16 The breaker-and-a-half 'scheme allows isolation of'any major
. 17 component or portion of the substation. This is best illustrated by examining g8 (Footnote continued from previous page..)
I switching errov at Pratt 8 Whitney substation resulted in the failure of a lightning avrestor, whicf> in turn produced a fault on the Hidway-Ranch 240 kV line. Although the Ranch end.relayed correctly, the third event, an improperly connected polarizing circuit at Hidway,'aused the Hidway.
relays looking north to erroneously see the fault and kept the approp-riate velay from tripping the Hidway to Ranch 240 kV line. The resultas was to erroneously trip the two .Hidway-Halabar 240 kV lines, as well the Hidway-Plumosus 138 kV line. The two lines remaining at this time weve rated at 69 i;V. They then tripped, isolating the Hidway substation from all sources of offiste power for eight minutes, six een and one-half seconds. Following this outage, .the'polarizing circuit was'corrected and new procedures were established for testing, this relay scheme.
9/
the impact of the simultaneous loss of both 240 kV busses at Midway. Power continues to flow into the station on all of the three lines from'St,.Lucre through 3 the mid-breakers and then out to the Indiantown, Sherman and Malabar substations.
With the loss of generation at St. Lucie, the reverse will be true and power 5 will flow into St. Lucie over the three 240 kV lines.
6 These three 240 kV circuits are so constructed and separated to assure 7 that each cannot physically interfere with the others. Over the Indian River, 8 the towers supporting the separate lines are spaced 200 feet apart and are 9 designed and insulated to resist the effects of environmental contamination and 10/
10 high wind. They rise 173 feet, holding the conductors 153 feet above the ll river. Tower spacing keeps the conductors at least 90 feet above the Intra-12 coastal Waterway and 61 feet above water elsewhere. Each circuit conductor 13 over water consists of one 3400 kcmil ACSR/AW wire. Over land, the transmission 14 structures for the separate lines are spaced 126 feet apart and rise 60 to 80 15 feet above grade. Tower structures on each line are spaced at 660 foot 16 intervals, except where road or rail crossings require greater clearance.
17 Right-of-way easements are 1200 feet. Each circuit conductor over land consists 18 of two 1691 kcmil wires. Each circuit is sized for 100 percent of one unit 19 output, or 1000 MYA, which is in excess of 100 times the emergency shutdown load 20 of the unit. Electrostatic shield wires and other lightning protection equip-21 ment are provided at each tower as required.
g9 See Attachment 85.
~10 for example, vee-string insulation suitable for 500 kV lines and structures designed for winds in excess of 150 miles per hour are utilized.
The termination of these three circuits into two separate busses 2 at a major strong point in the FPL grid exceeds the requirements of GOC-17.
3 This design configuration is more reliable than a design which only provides 4 for two circuits, each to be terminated at a separate substation. For a two 5 circuit design, the occurrence of only two simultaneous events would result 6 in a loss of all offsite power to St. Lucie. Even if one of the three exist-7 ing lines were terminated at a second point on the system, no significant 8 increase in reliability can be shown. This can be demonstrated by analysis 9 of the impact of terminating one of the three existing St. Lucie lines at 10 Ranch substation. This could be done by rearranging the Malabar bl and St.
ll Lucie 81 transmission lines at Midway substation so that the St. Lucie 81 12 line is in the same bay as the Midway-Ranch line. All three breakers in the 13 bay would then be removed and the two lines connected to result in a St. Lucie 14 to Ranch line which is about 65 miles long. Though this would increase the 15 number of substations tied directly to St. Lucie, it is not electrically 16 di'fferent because the present design configuration provides the same electrical 17 ties to the Ranch substation with the breaker-and-half scheme at Midway.
18 Furthermore, removal of the breakers at Midway would result in decreased 19 operating flexibility by eliminating the ability to sectionalize the Ranch-20 Midway and Midway-St. Lucie lines at Midway. Additionally, the total miles 21 of circuit exposure between St. Lucie and a strong tie into the grid would be 22 increased from 36 miles (three 12-mile lines from St. Lucie to Midway) to 89 23 miles (one 65-mile and two 12-mile circuits). Finally, such a scheme would 24 reduce the number of lines tied into Midway which would decrease the reliability 25 of Midway with no increase in the reliability of the Ranch substation.
ONGOING IMPROVEf)ENT OF SYSTEH RELIABILITY 2 By June 1980 (approximately 3 years before the scheduled operation 3 of St. Lucie 2) several major projects will be completed, which will enhance 11/
4 the rel i abi 1 ity of FPL gri d.
5 Historically, in the event of a major system disturbance within 6 Florida, interconnections to the north (notably Georgia Power) hqve been 7 designed so that the two systems immediately separated. Although this has 8 not significantly affected the reliability of FPL's grid, because it is de-9 signed to function independently, reliability could be improved if the grids 10 remained interconnected. FPL and Georgia Power Company are now nearing 11 completion of construction of an additional 240 kV tie between the Peninsular 12 Florida grid and Southern Company. This tie directly connects FPL to Georgia 13 Power and will assure that the tvio systems remain connected even in the event 14 of the loss of the largest unit on the FPL grid.
Another major system improvement, "
shown on Attachment 86, consists 16 of additions being made to the 500 kV portion of the system. These additions,
]7 all of which are to be completed by the summer of 1980, will triple the size 18 of the 500 kV system and establish it as the backbone of the grid. They will 19 consist of a 15.95 mile, 500 kV circuit from the existing 500 kV station at 20 Andytown to a nevi station in the center of the South Florida load center at 21 Levee; two 83 mile, 500 kV circuits from the new fossil plant site at Hartin
=
22 to Andytown; and a 26 mile, 500 kV cirucit from b1artin Plant to Midway substation.
23 The completion of this network viill further strengthen Midway substation and its 24 ability to provide offsite power to St. Lucie by electrically shortening its
~11 See Attachment 86 which illustrates some of these major additons, all of which should be completed by June 1980.
1 ties via the 500 kV grid to the rest of the system. >Jhen Martin Plant Unit 5'1 2 becomes operational in the spring of 1980, it will provide a direct source of 3 offsite power to St. Lucie through the Martin-Midway 500 kV line. By 1980, 4 there will be one:(1) 500 kV, five (5) 240 kV, and two (2) 138 kV circuits 5 into Midway. As an integral part of the additions mentioned above, the 6 reliability of the relaying scheme at Midway will be improved still further by 7 the installation of additional redundant relays on all existing 240 kV trans-8 mission lines.
Particular emphasis has also'een placed on reducing personnel 10 errors which could result in'system disturbances. Field switching personnel ll and the system dispatcher/operators who monitor and control both the granting 12 of clearances and the sequence of switching are now better equipped to perform 13 their duties. Before granting a switching request, a steady-state loadflow 14 analysis is run to test the impact of such a clearance under contingency 15 conditions. Next, the resulting loadflows are compared against transfer limits 16 which have been established by a series of transient stability studies to assure 17 that no bounding limits will be exceeded. A written switching order is then 18 drawn 'up in accordance with specific procedures and guidelines. This order 19 is checked, and if approved, issued to the party in the field. Finally, the 20 party in the field checks it prior to proceeding in accordance with specific switching procedures in which he has been trained. During any switching sequence, the system dispatcher/operator can monitor the progress of the switching from the System Control Center, both on a dynamic board which depicts the whole system 24 as well as a specific dynamic CRT display of the substation where the switching is taking place. He may intervene at various points if conditions change due to the outage of another section of the grid. This improved monitoring and 1 central control capability is designed to reduce outages which are the 2 result of switching errors.
.3 In addition, the System Control Center, which will, be completely 4 inservice by August 1979, will allow dispatcher/operators at a central 5 location to monitor and control the entire grid, including but not limited 6 to breaker status, transformer and line loading, generator output and tie 7 line flows. This system is displayed on a single dynamic map complete 8 with line flow information and equipment status. Additionally, an operator 9 may display any section, subsection, and status information as well. To 10 assist the operator in monitoring the system, various design limits are 11 programmed into the computer such that alarms are automatically generated I
12 when limits are approached for items such as line and transformer thermal 13 ratings, equipment status change, and reserve margins (spinning, supplemental, 14 etc.). To assure system reliability, a security constrained dispatch has 15 priority over an optimal power flow. To aid the operator in testing the 16 impact of an anticipated action, he may simulate such action and a Security 17 Analysis Program will quickly alert him to any potential problems that may 18 arise by testing his simulation with up to 500 different contingency conditions.
19 The System Control Center will also provide the capability to analyze 20 near term (present through up to seven days) network conditions, allowing 21 dispatcher/operators to improve their operating strategy.
22 In addition to these measures, specific procedures have been adopted
~12 23 which guide the system operator's decisions under potential emergency conditions.
12/ See Attachment b7, Emergency Manual, Section 16521, "Transfer Limits" (describes transfer limits to be followed to assure a reliable power system);
Section 16527, "Emergency Codes" (identifies emergency codes to be established under various power supply conditions and assigns certain personnel action to be followed).
- 11
1 Included among the actions to be taken are the reduction of non-essential 2 loads, notification of customers with curtailable load contracts, and other 3 measures designed to reduce load if deemed necessary to protect the integrity 4 of the transmission grid.
In addition to minimizing the number of outages, it is also 6 important to contain the impact of a fault or malfunction of equipment to 7 that component of the grid. The System Control Center will further augment
/13 8 existing containment efforts such as primary, redundant, and backup relays,
'~14 . '~15 9 underfrequency load shedding schemes, and spinning reserve requirements.
10 As described above, this center, which represents the state-of-the-art, contains 11 a variety of systems that alert the operator to any deteriorating conditions 12 and allow him to immediately-.assess the situation and take corrective action.
13 To fully utilize this capability, FPL operators are being trained, 14 on a newly installed Dispatcher Training Simulator, to respond to crisis 15 situations. With this trainer, the instructor can simulate any major outage
]6 on a training console identical to the one at which the operator will normally 17 work. As a result of this training, operators will be able to respond to 18 crisis situations more rapidly, isolating the outage and restoring the critical lg components of the grid.
13/ These relaying schemes are designed to detect and trip appropriate breakers to isolate a fault in a fraction of a second. Additional redundancy here
.is currently being installed at substations such as Midway to assure prompt and correct action.
~14 Underfrequency load shedding schemes are designed to drop large blocks of load prior to the system becoming unstable due to the loss of generation.
This is done in recognition of the need to protect the grid from an outage.
15/ Spinning reserve enables us to offset the loss of the largest generator on our system by picking up load at various other plants which have maintained a reserve of generation for this purpose.
MICHEL P. ARMAND Resume of Educational and Professional Qualifications My name is Michel P. Armand. My business address is P.O. Box 529100, Miami, Florida. I am Supervising Engineer of the Reliability and System Security Section of the System Planning Department of Florida Power 6 Light Company and I have served in that capacity since July 1, 1977.
I graduated from the City College of The City University of New York in June 1968, with the degree of Bachelor of Electrical Engineering. In June 1971, I graduated from the Bernard M. Baruch College of The City University of New York with a degree of Master of Business Administration.
In 1971, I attended in Schenectady, New York, the General Electric Company's one-year course in "Advanced Power System Engineering." In 1978, I attended the one-month "Public Utility Executive Program" of the Graduate School of Business Administration of the University of Michigan.
I am a registered Professional Engineer in the State of Florida. I am a senior member of the Florida Engineering Society and of the National Society of Professional Engineers.
I am a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers.
In June 1968, I joined the cadet training program of the Consolidated Edison Company of New York, where for two years I was assigned to various departments. In June 1970, I was permanently assigned to the System Planning Department in the Transmission Planning Section. I progressed to Assistant Engineer, then Engineer.
In April 1974, I was employed by Florida Power a Light Company in the System Planning Department. In April 1976, I became a Senior Engineer in charge of the Reliability and System Security Section and I was promoted to Supervising Engineer of the section in July 1977. I am responsible for testing and assessing the dynamic performance of the planned generation and transmission system and making recommendations.
ÃILFRED E. COE Resume of Educational and Professional ualifications My name is Nilfred E. Coe. My business address is P. 0. Box 529100, Miami, Florida. I am the Director of the Power Supply Department of Florida Power P Light Company and I have served in that capacity since October 1, 1973.
I graduated from the Georgia Institute of Technology in 1950 with a degree of Bachelor of Electrical Engineering and in 1951 with a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering Degree. I attended Stanford University Graduate School.
I am a registered Professional Engineer in the State l
of Florida, a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and on the Interconnection Arrangement Committee of the Edison Electric Institute.
I was employed in June 1951 as a Student Engineer. There-after, I worked in the Commercial Department and Engineering Department as various engineer classifications. In 1963 I became Regional Manager of System Protection Department and in 1968 was made Manager of System Protection Department.
In 1973, I became Director of Power Supply Department.
2 As the Director of Power Supply I am responsible for directing the System Protection, System Operations and Power Supply Technical Services Groups. These groups are operating and associated technical support personnel who dispatch the delivery of power to the distribution substations as well as provide for the protection and control of the electrical equip-ment throughout the system.
ATTACHMENT 81 UVi ITED STATES OF Ai~lZRICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP>ISSION BEFORE THE ATOi41ZC SAFE Y A~ D~
ICEVSING APPEAL BOARD In the Hatter of: )
)
FLORlDA POWER AiVD LIGHT CO&1PAiVY ) DOCi(ET NO. 50-389
)
(St. Lucie Viuclear Power )
Plant, Unit No. 2) )
AFFIDAVlT OF ERNEST L. BIVANS I am Ernest L. Bivans, Vice President in 2 charge of System Plann'ng for Florida Power 5 Ligh" 3 Company. ily educat'on and professional qualifications 4 appea" in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's record 5 of the St. Lucie 2 proceeding following Tr. 4896.
6 The purpose of this affidavit is to address 7 cuestions B.l(a) and B.2 in the Appeal Board's Order 8 of March 10, 1978 together within the'r common contex 10 Grid FPL serves approximately 200 municipalities 12 and over 30 counties in the. State of Florida. The 13 Company's existing generation facilities consist of 14 eleven gene ating plants distributed geographically around its service territory. These plants are tied lo into a sys tem-wide transmiss 'n ne twor'<, some t'es refe red to as a gr', the purpose or which is to
1 transport energy from the generat'ng plants to the 2 load areas and to assure system reliability. Flor'da 3 Power & Light .Company operates approximately 4,165 4 circuit miles of transmission lines. A map showing 5 the FPL system and interconnections is attached to 6
1 this affidavit.
Florida Power & Light Company is directly 8 interconnected with nine other Florida utilit'es, 9 both public and .private, which have significant 10 generating capacity. FPL maintains fourteen normally ll closed and two normally open interconnections. Included 12 in the normallv closed interconnections are one 115 kV 13 and two 240 kV interconnections with Florida Power 14 Corporation, which in turn has interconnections outside 15 of Florida: one 230 kV and four 115 kV ties to Georgia 16 Power Company, and one 230 kV tie to Gulf Power Company.
17 Peninsular Florida possesses special geographic 18 and elect ical features. Surrounded bv wate on three 19 sides, opportunities for interconnections with major 20 utilities outside of Florida are restric ed to the north.
21 In addition, Florida has been subject to hurricanes and 22 is one of the most severe lightning storm areas in the 23 United States.
Consequently, Florida Power & Light Company, 25 and the other utilit'es in Florida, have had to take
1 these factors into consideration in designing and 2 building a reliable statewide svstem and thereby 3 lessen'ng the need for strong interconnections 4 outside of Florida.
6 The St. Lucie Plant The Florida Power & Light Company grid 8 and connections to nuclear power plants on it are 9 designed and operated so as to comply with applicable 10 NRC requirements. In particular, GDC-17 requires a 11 system of sufficient capacity and capability "to 12 assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design 13 limits= and design conditions of the reactor coolant 14 pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of 15 anticipated operational occurrences and (2) tne core 16 is cooled and containment integrity and other vital-17 functions are maintained in the event of postulated 18 accidents". With 'respect to offsite power, GDC-17 19 also requires that there must be "two phvsically 20 independent circuits . . . designed and located so 21 as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood 22 of their simultaneous failure under operating and 23 postulated accident and environmental conditions".
24 In addition, there must be provis'ons "to m'nimize 25 the orobabilitv of losing electric power from
1 any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or 2 coincident with, the loss of power generated by the 3 nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the trans-4 mission network, or the loss of power from the onsite
.5 electric oower supplies".
At this time, offsite power is available 7 to St. Lucie Plant from not two but three separate 8 240 kV transmission circuits from Florida Power &
9 Light's midway substation ten miles to the west.
10 The transmission system consists of three separate 11 circuits, placed parallel to each other, which are 12 designed and constructed to assure that each cannot 13 physically interfere with the other. Over the indian 14 River, the towers supporting the separate lines are 15 spaced 200 feet apart. They rise 173 feet, holding 16 the conductors 153 feet above the river. Tower 17 spacing keeps the conductors at least 90 feet above
'18 the intracoastal Waterway and 61 feet above water 19 elsewhere. Each circuit conductor over water consists 20 of- one 3400 kcmil ACSR/W wire. Over land, the trans-21 mission structures for the separa'te lines are spaced 22 126 feet apart and rise 60 to 80 feet above grade.
23 Tower structures on each line are spaced at 660 foot 24 intervals, except where road or rail crossings recui"e 25 greater clearance. Right-of-way easements are 1200 feet.
~~
1 Each circuit conductor over land consists of two 1691 2 kcmil wires. Each circuit is sized for 100 percent 3 of one unit output, or 1000 NVA, wh'cn is in excess of 4 100 times the emergency shutdown load of the unit.
'5 Electrostatic shield wires and other lightning protection 6 ecruipment are provided at each tower as reauired.
The design of St. Lucie Plant also provides 8 for the independence of power supplies so as "to 9 minimize the probability of losing electric powe" from 10 any of the remaining supplies. as a result of, or coin-11 cident with, the loss of" one. Each unit is provided 12 with two start-up transformers. During normal plant 13 operation, AC power .is provided from the main generator 14 through the unit's two auxiliary transformers. Normal 15 transfer of power between the auxiliary and start-up 16 transformers would be initiated by the operator rom 17 the control room. Zf a main generator should trip 18 unexpectedly, the auxiliary AC load trans e from the 19 auxiliary transformers to the start-up ransforzers 20 would be initiated automatically by protective relay 21 action, thereby providing sufficient offsite power to 22 safely shutdown or mitigate the conseauences of a 23 design basis accident. Offsite power, in such case, 24 would be suppl'ed from the transmission system or the 25 other operating St. Lucie unit. Should of=site power
1 not be available from either of these sources, suffi--
2 cient power to accomplish a shutdown would automatically 3 be provided by the onsite diesel generators.
Physical separation of trans ormers and trans-5 mission lines and flexible, automatic switching ar ange-6 ments are utilized to protect against the simultaneous 7 loss of any two sources of power (unit main gene ator, I
8 offsite, and onsite) to safety "elated loads. In 9 addition, the onsite safety related electric power 10 system for each unit is separated into two redundant 11 and independent trains, each with a diesel gene ator.
12 Either train is capable of assuring a, safe unit shutdown.
14 The Midway Substation 15 The Midway 240 kV substation is presently con-16 nected to the north by two 240 kV circuits to iXalabar 17 Substation and from there by two 240 kV circuits to 18 Brevard Substation which provides access to genera"ion 19 at Cape Canaveral Plant, Sanford Plant, and also 'nter-20 connections with Florida Power Corporation, Orlando 21 Utilities Commission, and Jacksonville Electric Authority.
22 Two 240 kV circuits connect Hidway Substation to 23 the south with one circuit go'ng directly to Ranch Sub-24 station and the other going to Ranch Substat'on via 25 Ind'antown and Pratt & Whitney Substations. Ranch
1 Substation provides access to generation at Riviera 2 Plant, Lauderdale Plant, Port Everglades Plant, Turkey 3 Point Plant, all of which are on the east coast, and Fort 4 Myers and Manatee Plants on the west coast. Also included 5 are interconnections to the Lake North municipal 6 system and Tampa Electric Company (which is also 7 . interconnected with Florida Power Corporation).
8 In addition, the 240 kV Midway Substation 9 is connected by two 112 MVA autotransformers to a 10 138 kV substation, also at Midway, which is in turn 11 supplied by one 138 kV line to Plumosus Substation 12 to the south and from there to the Riviera Plant; another 13 138 kV line, temporarily operated at 69 kV, ties 14 the Midway 138 kV substation to the Malabar 138 kV 15 substation to the north. This last line serves as 16 an interconnection with the municipal generating 17 systems of the Cities of Fort Pierce and Vero 18 Beach. In the unlikely event of separation of all 19 the four 240 kV and the two 138 kV lines feeding into 20 Midway Substation at present, the restoration of any 21 one of 'these lines would allow energization of the 22 Midway bus and restoration of offsite power to the 23 St. Lucie Switchyard.
24 25 S stem Im rovements and Modifications
The growth of any dynamic system reauires 2 additions and changes. These changes involve trans-3 mission construction, relaying practices and operating 4 procedures and are designed to minimize the likelihood 5 of an outage.
As a result of outages which occurred on April 7 3 and 4, 1973, FPL contracted with Stone & Webster 8 Engineering Corporation to review the Florida Power 9 & Light Company bulk power system reliab'lity and to 10 provide recommendations designed to improve it. Out ll of such recommendations and other internal studies, 12 Florida Power & Light Company has implemented numerous 13 changes to its system since 1973, includ'ng transmission 14 'dditions which have strengthened the ties between the 15 southern area (south of Ranch Substation) and the rest 16 of Florida; a second tie to Tampa Electric Company; 17 new. transmission lines down the west coast to Ft. ayers; 18 and the new 500 kV circuit across the Everglades from 19 Ft. &buyers to Lauderdale. in addition,'e east coast 20 transmission was strengthened by reinforcing old 21 lines, adding new lines, and rearrang"ng circuits 22 from the Midway Substat'on southerly through Lauderdale 23 and into the Miami area. Two major additional 'nter-24 connections with adjoining ut'lities were also estab-25 lished at Sanford (Florida Power Corporation) and at
1 Bradford (Jacksonville Electric Authority). During this 2 same time frame, additional generation was added at Manatee, 3 Ft. Myers, Putnam, and St. Lucie Plants.
5 Scheduled Im rovements -'978 to 1981 During the period from 1978 to 1981, new lines 7 are scheduled to be installed which will increase reliabil-8 ity and therefore benefit the St. Lucie units.
In 1978, a new 240 kV circuit from Midway Sub-10 station to Martin Plant, which is under construction, will be 11 energized. In 1980, a 500 kV circuit from Midway Sub-12 station to Martin Plant will be energized and two 500 kV 13 circuits from Martin Plant to Andytown Substation will be
/
built, and energized to coincide with the operation of the
~
14 15 first unit at Martin (775 MW). By 1980, there will be one 16 500 kV, five 240 kV, and two 138 kV feeds into Midway Sub-17 station. In addition, at Martin Plant, a second unit (775 MW) 18 is scheduled to go into service in 1981.
In 1980, a 240 kV tie between Georgia Power Company 20 (Kingsland) and Florida Power & Light Company (Yulee) is 21 scheduled for completion. A new System Control Center is 22 scheduled to become operational by December 1978.
23 0 eratin Histor 24 The Midway Substation, originally named St. Lucie 25 Substation, went into service in November 1965.
1 The Floriaa Power & Light Company operating record 2 rezlects tnat until the events oz Nay 16, 1977, no 3 outage or any system disturbance had ever caused a loss 4 of power at the Niaway.Substation.
Two days prior to the events of Nay 16, 1977, 6 the Florida Power & Light Company Andytown - Orange 7 River transmission line had been converted from 240 8 kV to 500 kV operation, as part oz the continuing 9 program to strengthen the svstem. Th's line was out 10 of service on Nay 16, 1977, in order to complete the 11 final tests of its protective relays. Had this 500 kV 12 line been in service, the loss of the Turkey Point Unit 13 No,. 3 at 10:08 a.m. and the outage of tne Ft. Nyers 14 Ranch 240'V line at 10: 24 a.m. would not have resulted 15 in tne loss of any system load.
16 A number oz independent contingencies caused 17 gart of the system to come down. The principal, reasons 18 for the outage were the loss oz Turkey Point Unit 19 No. 3 due to a defective auxiliary 'relay and 16 minutes 20 later, the Ft. Nyers - Ranch 240 kV line zrom an 21 unrelated phase-to-ground fault. The loss of the Ft.
22 Nyers =Ranch 240 kV line caused the system to split 23 south of Nidway, leaving N'dway Subs ation and St. Lucie 24 Plant switchyard energized from the system to the north 25 of Niaway. The split oz the svstem caused tne St. Lucio
1 Unit No. 1 to reject load and it was tripped manually 2 at 10:24 a.m. The Plant continued to receive offsite 3 'ower from Midway until 10:38am, when the system 4 voltage decayed to a level which caused the diesels to 5 start automatically. The Plant continued on onsite 6 power for a period of time after the gxid stabilized, 7 . and at ll:00am, offsite power was reconnected, and 8 the use of diesels was terminated.
Immediately following the system outage south 10 of Midway, the Orange River Andytown 500 kV line ll was put back into service to facilitate the restoration 12 of service. At 12:03pm, an incorrect relay operation 13 at Andytown caused the 500 kV line to trip. The 14 resulting power surges resulted in the interruption 15 of service from Midway south, this time inclusive of 16 Midway Substation, causing a loss of offsite power to 17 St. Lucie. Emergency diesels were again started auto-18 matically. However, 17 minutes later, Midway was re-19 energized from the northern part of the system, offsite 20 power was restored to the St. Lucie switchyard and 21 the use of diesels was terminated. The unit was 22 returned to service in a normal manner, and synchronized 23 to the system at 9:58pm, without incident.
24 Following the May 16 events, the grid status 25 was reexamined, previous studies reviewed, new studies 1 initiated, and a number of, actions taken to further 2 improve reliability. Gas turbine controls were modified to permit automatic synchronizing at lower bus voltages; restoration plans were reviewed and e
updated; maintenance priorities were set and in-6 spection increased for transmission lines; a 7 . "dispatcher training simulator", has been pur-8 chased and is being used to improve dispatcher 9 or power coordinator training; a new type of fault 10 locating equipment was purchased for installation on 11 key transmission lines; the Martin Midway 500 kV 12 circuit was also rescheduled for completion in 1980 13 instead of 1983 as originally planned.
14 The new System Control Center will allow 15 power coordinators to monitor relevant parameters 16 such as megawatts, megavars, volts, amperes, and hertz 17 for transmission lines, generators and substations. The 18 status of all positional devices such as circuit breakers 19 and switches in the transmission system will also be 20 monitored. All information received from the field 21 will be checked against limits and alarms produced if 22 these limits are exceeded. The power coordinator will 23 be capable of assessing system security under
~
~ ~
1 both 'single and double cont'ngency conditions by 2 use oz a computer program which 's capable of 3 simulating automatically up to 500 contingency con-4 ditions every 30'inutes.
The System Control Center will also provide 6 the capability to analyze near term (present through 7 up to seven days) network conditions, allowing the 8 power coordinators to improve their operating strategy.
All these actions, taken since Hay 16, 1977, 10 will make major improvements to the reliability of the 11 system.
12 13 Assurance oz. Electric Power at St. Lucie With specific rezerence to Appeal Board Question 15 B.l(a), Florida Power, 6 Light Company does not possess 16 the data to compare the assurance of power at St. Lucie 17 witn other plants. Nevertheless, based upon the fore-18 going, the is'verall assurance that there will be 19 electr'c power at St. Lucie under both accident and 20 normal conditions:
A. The Florida Power & Light Company 22 system is designed and operated to 23 take into account the uniaue nature 24 of Peninsular Florida and its elec-tr' grid and to'onf orm to all
applicable NRC recuirements.
B. Offsite .ower to St. Lucie is available from three separate 240 kV transmission circuits.
Each circuit has conductors which are sized to carry the entire output of one unit.
C. There are at present six sources of power to the Midway Substation 10 240 kV bus connect'ng the three circuits, to St. Lucie Plant.
12 By 1983, there will be eight sources of power to the midway 14 Substation. This assures that Florida Power & Light Company's ability to supply offsite power 17 to St. Lucie Plant will not be J
18 impaired.
19 D. There are no critically shared systems 20 between the two St. Lucie units.
21 Finally, a variety of significant
'F'.
measures have been and continue to be taken to improve tne reliability-24 of the transmission system.
25 With reference to Appeal Board Ques ion B.2,
1 and the .need to minimize the probab'ility of the co-2 incident loss of power sources, as demonstrated above,
- 3. '1) GDC-17 will be met, (2) the likelihood of the trip 4 of one of the St. Lucie units causing the other to trip 5 is minimal, and (3) the possibility of a reoccurrence 6 of an outage similar to that on May 16, 1977 has 7 been substantially reduced.
Further, FPL's evaluation of the system as 9 projected for 1983 and thereafter indicates that in 10 the event the two St. Lucie units were to trip ll simultaneously, offsite power will not become un-12 . available due to system stability.
ERNEST L. BIVANS Vice President STATE OF FLORIDA )
ss.
COUNTY OF DADE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me this w !-<<'7 day of j'j.4~~ 1978.
lIOTAIIY FIISUC STATE OF FLOAIOA et IAIIQE My commissar.on expires: hlY COhQIISSIOII EXFIIIES AIIOUST'
~
NOTARY PUBLIC ATTACHl"jENT ¹2 FLOmDA PQ'"=A 5 L(Ci'rlT CQl.l?ANY llay 22, 1979 United States Department of Energy Division of Power Supply Reliability f<
- Office of Utility Systems Economic regulatory Administration Nashington, D.C. 20461 Gentlemen:
Attached is a copy of the disturbance analysis rcpo'rt for the po<<er inte'rruption which occurr'ed on the Florida Power F< Light system at ll:57 p..m. on April 1979.
Further analyses o'his disturbance are b'ing done by the Florida Electric Coordinating Group - Op r'atin<
Committee. The findings of their study will be furnished when complc tcd.
S3.11ce'1 ely r
/p'c gag E. Coe Director. - Power Supply NEC/ayg Attachment CC- Florida Public Service Commission - J. D. Jenkins SEPTIC - Grady L. Smith Florida Electric Coordinating Group - N. D. Lang bcc: E. A. Adomat E. L. Bivans G. E. Liebler Paduano A. D. Schmidt R. E. Uhrig G. D. Nhitticr~
C. 0. Noody
4/25/79 Rev. 5/8/79 FLORIDA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY SYSTEM D ISTURBANCE LOSS OF GENERATION AT TURKEY POINT WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 1979 11:57 PM
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE PRE"DISTURBANCE CONDITIONS .................................1 D ISTURBANCE .............................................. ~ 2) 3) 4 TABLES SYSl EI"'I RESPONSE
SUMMARY
5 FPL GENERATING UNIT GOVERNOR RESPONSE 6 TIE LINE RESPONSE- '
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7 CHARTS 6 DIAGRAMS TURKEY POIMt'RANSMISSION LINE TRIPPING SEQUENCE ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 SYSTEM FREQUENCY FROM RANCH OSCILLOGRAPH 9 SYSTEM FREQUENCY AT PORT EVERGLADES ~ 10 FPL SYSTEM LOAD 11 FPL GENERATION ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . 12 FPL NET INTERCHANGE 13 SOUTHERN COMPANY NET INTERCHANGE 14 UNDERFREQUENCY LOAD SHEDD I NG AREAS . 15
IITG/DRH: dep 4/u/79 Rev. 5/8/79 PRE-DISTURBANCE CONDITIONS During the after'noon and evening of Mednesday, April 4, 1.979, the Florida Power, & Light transmission system was experiencing widespread incidents of flashovers resulting in the tripping of major 230 kV transmission lines in its Southern service area. The flashovers were caused by the combination of an accumulation of salt and dust on in-sulators caused by a period of extremely dry weather and strong winds, followed by an increase in the humidity level. By 11:53 P.H. four of seven transmission lines leaving Florida Power and Light's Turkey Point plant were out of service as shown by the system configuration diagram and sequence of events chart on page 8 . These were the Turkey Point-Davis /$1 230 kV line, the Turkey Point-Davis 5'3 230 kV line, the Turkey Point-Flagami Prl 230 kV line, and the Turkey Point-Dade Jl 230 kV line.
The three remaining transmiss ion circuits out of Turkey Point Plant had a combined thermal capacity of 1621 HVA.
Prior to the disturbance Florida Power 6. Light's load was 3870 Hw and the net interchange was 150 Hw, out of FPGL. The system frequency was 60.03 Hertz. FPL was carrying approximately 492 Hw of spinning reserve; while its requirement was 331 Hw. Fur'thermore, there were an additional 49l Hw of on-line steam available and 1778 Hw of quick start gas turbines which could be made available within 30 minutes. At the time of the dis-turbance Florida Power Corporation was importing 200 Hw of power from Southern Company.
>'pinning Reserve as defined by the Florida Coordinating Group.
DISTURBANCE Between 11:53 and 11:57 P.M. the remaining three transmission lines out of Turkey Point plant tripped, and isolated Turkey Point from the
'rest of the system. At the time the lines tripped, three Turkey Point units were on: Turkey Point Unit 1 was carrying 352 Hw net, Turkey Point Unit 2 was carrying 181 Hw net, and Turkey Point Unit 4 was carry-ing 600 Hw net. With the loss of the transmission lines, Turkey, Point Unit 4's instruments detected the loss of connected load, and ran the unit back. Immediately after, the unit tripped on a low steam generator level trip signal. Simultaneously, Turkey Point Unit 2 was tripped by its anti-motoring protection, and Turkey Point Unit 1 reduced its gener-ation but remained on-line carrying the plant auxiliary u es. The combined generation loss within 'FPL was 1133 t@v. 'esultant When the Turkey Point generation was lost, the power flow into Pen-insular Florida increased. This power surge caused Florida Power Corporation's Archer-Ft. White 230 kV line and Ft. White-High Springs 69 kV line to trip, isolating Peninsular Florida from the external systems. At the time of separation FPC's interchange with Southern Company changed from 200 Hw (IN) to 20 Hw into Florida indicating the creation of an additional loss of 180 Hw within the isolated region.
Thus, the loss of this import from Southern Company, coupled with the loss of Turkey Point generation resulted in a total deficiency of 1313 YLw within Peninsular Florida.
-2"
The resulting mismatch of load and generation caused the frequency to decline. Within FPL the system frequency dec) ined to a low 6f 59.01 Hz, and initiated underfrequency relays which shed approximately 470 ttw of load in the areas shown below. Governor 'response and load shedding within Peninsular Florida stabil ized the frequency at 59.85 Hertz t
within 10 seconds.
FPL LOAD SHED BY UNDERFRE UENCY REL'AYS Division Load Southern 240 Northern 95 Eastern 66 Western ~6 TOTAL 470 In addition, other utilities within Peninsular Florida shed the fol lowing amounts of load:
Utility Step Step Total
'1'59.2"59.0 Hz)
'0'59.7 Hz)
FPC 150 76 226 TECO 70 60 130 OUC 0 5 5 JEA 0 ~0 ~0 TOTAL 220 kiss 231 Hw 451 Nw FPL generating units responded by providing 173 Hw (see Governor Response. Table, page 6 ), while the FPL tie lines with other utilities provided an additional 491 Hw (see Tie Line Response, page 7 ),The generating unit and tie line response, coupled with the reduction in load, made up the entire loss of Turkey Point generation. A summary of the response of the FPL system is shown on page 5 .
Prior to the reestabl ishment of the ties with the external systems, FPL's net interchange was 310 Mw (IN) and the frequency had recovered to 59.92 Hertz as a result of an increase in generator output.
Florida Power Corporation's transmission ties with the external system were reestablished approximately two minutes after the start of the disturbance, at which time load restoration was initiated by other affected systems. Once this was completed, FP6L proceeded to restore its own load. Most of the FPL load was picked up within 20 minutes after the disturbance originated.
The FPL net interchange returned to its predisturbance level 11 minutes after the origination of the disturbance.
At 1:02 AM a transmission line was closed in to tie the Turkey Point 230 kV buss to the network, but it separated at 1:05 AN. At 1: 27 AN the buss was once again synchronized to the network, but the line tripped at 2:12 AN. Finally, at 6:ll AN a third and successful attempt was made to tie Turkey Point to the network permanently. A second transmission line was successfully closed in at 7:23 AM. Turkey Point Unit 2 was brought back on-line at 7:43 AM on April 5th after these two transmission circuits had been restored. The remaining transmission circuits were subsequently restored. Turkey Point Unit 4 was intentionally left off-line, as it was scheduled to come off for refueling after the system peak of April 5th.
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT DISTURBANCE RESPONSE SUHMARY FPL SYSTEM DISTURBANCE RESPONSE DATA SHEET P-repared By D. A Date 4/16/79 Disturbance LOSS OF TURKEY POINT UNITS Date Lt/4/79 Time 11'- 57
~6, ~M TRANS M I SS I ON L I NE OUTAGES 5955, .5 G1 N1 L1 4>>
150 OUT 3870 Hwq Hw~
Nl p L2 94 l, *5 66~4 gL
-96 47O Loss- (Load +, Generat ion -) ~66 Scheduted N I1 179 Response(QNI - Loss) 173 Hw Generation Loss 1133 HW; Load Loss ~40 HW Fl FREQUENCY JUST BEFORE DISTURBANCE Fl+ = IAY'HFREQUENCY EXCURS ION F2 = FPEQUENCY AFTER STABILIZATION BUT BEFORE CORRECTIVE CONTROL ACTION TAKES PLACE G1
= GENERATION JUST BEFORE DISTURBANCE Gp = GENERATION IHHEDIATELY AFTER FREQUENCY STABILIZES Nlg = I<ET INTERCHANGE JUST BEFORE DISTURBANCE
'4 Ntp = NET tNTERCHANGE tHHEDIATELY AFTER FREQUENCY STABILIZES L1 = LOAD JUST BEFORE DISTURBANCE L = LOAD IHHEDIATELY AFTER FREQUENCY STABILtZES
FPL GENERATIttG UNIT Dato 4/3 6/
GOVERNOR RESPONSE Prepared By D.A. I'ic Inni" CONT I NUOUS ACTUAL GEN BEFORE EST I t<ATE D
~1H z EXPECTED ACTUAL PLAt<T CAPAC J.TY DISTURBAt<CE / VALV( RES Pot)SE RESPONSE UH IT t'iW ~ t4W OPEt<t NG- ~I1I I ~l'hl TURKEY POINT 1 352 95 0 0 TURKEY POINT 2 185 181 98 TRIPPED TRIPPED TURKEY POINT 3 OF,F OFF OFF OFF TURKEY POINT 4 61O 6OO TRIPPED TRIPPED PORT EVERGLADES 1 190 PORT. EVERGLADES 2 205 391- 99 EVERGLADES 3 'ORT 369 PORT EVERGLADES 4 150 457-:: 8o 26 4O PORT EVERGLADES GT OFF OFF OFF OFF LAUDERDALE 4 138 18O LAUDERDALE 5 138 14 LAUDERDALE GT OFF OFF OFF3 OFF RIVIERA 1 OFF OFF OFF OFF RIVIERA 2 OFF OFF OFF OFF RI V IERA 3 273 207 77 14 5 RIVIERA 4 OFF OFF OFF OFF ST. LUCIE 1 OFF OFF OFF OFF FT. MYERS 1 138 112 81 7 10 FT. AYERS 2 369 345 93 18 4 22 FT. NYERS GT OF,F =
OFF OFF OFF tIAMATEE 1 OFF OFF OFF OFF HAHATEE 2 772 370 38 30 CAPE CANAVERAL 1 369 345 93 18 25 CAPE CANAVERAL 2 OFF OFF OFF OFF SANFORD 3 OFF OFF OFF OFF SANFORD 4 364 230 63 18 15 SANFORD 5 364 250 69 18 10 PUTNAt5 1 OFF OFF OFF OFF PUTHAH 2 OFF OFF OFF OFF TOTALS 5003 4020 175 173 Notes: 1Actual Gen/Continuous Ca).acity (Before Disturbance) 2The smal ler of:
a) Continuous cape.:.y X 167 X HZ/.5 (Max. Hz to be used = .5 or b) Cont inuous capa- i ty - actual gen.
3Ho. of units on line X (37-28) if (Fl +) 459.9 Hz.
4Ho. of units on line X (57-40) if (Fl +) .C59.9 Hz.
Ho. of units on I ine X (23.5 X Hz) if (F1 +)/59. 7 Hz.
5Actual Continuous Capacity Generation for Pt. Everglades Unit 1 and 2 are combined into a single value.
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- 1. Mashing while ene'rgized..
- 2. De-energizing until washed.
- 3. De-energizing until environmental conditions change.
- 4. De-energizing and repair as required.
- 1. Salt spray as a result of wind speed and direction.
- 2. Dust or other contaminants, such as bird droppings.
- 3. Fire or smoke.
- 4. Heavy lightning activity.
- 5. Other conditions which cause unexplained relay actions.
- 1. St. Lucie-Midway-Sherman 230 kV
- 2. Malabar-Midway-St:. Lucie 230 kV
- 3. St. Lucie-Midway-Xndiani.own 230 kV
- 4. Malabar-Midway-Ranch 230 kV Of t:hese four lines, one connects Si=. Lucie to the nort:h, t:wo conneci= St:. Lucie to t: he south, and a fourLh passes by wit:h no connect:ion Lo St. Lucie.
- 1) Loss of largest unit in south and east load areas, immediately followed by,
- 2) Loss of largest east-west line due to a fault (500kV line if- in service).
- 1. Follow the normal dispatching steps until the transfer limit is reached. Area spinning reserve will allow an additional import on a megawatt f'r megawatt basis.
- 2. Maintain. area limit with GT operation. Provide system regulation with generating units north of boundary.
- 3. Purchase schedule "A" or "B" power as appropriate.
- 4. Exceed limit by adding spinning reserve on a megawatt for megawatt basis. Limit to 200 MW step zero.
- 5. Peak GT's in area with additional spinning on step zero.
- 6. Peak steam units in area.
- 7. Voltage reduction.
- 8. Reduce load.
- Restored offsite power to station buss though Plant Operator elected to remain on diesel power.
- 2. Maintain off-site power to the nuclear plants if at all possible.
- 3. In reenergizing system, protect FPL and customer equip-ment from damage.
- 4. !laintain control of system conditions during restoration.
- 5. If possible, restore system from the interconnected system.
- 7. Avoid energizing high voltage cables at the end of a long, lightly loaded system.
- l. At the bulk station that is to be energized:
- a. Open all high voltage line terminals that feed "beyond" the bulk station.
- b. Open all subtransmission line terminals.
- 2. Close the breaker at the station in the "energized" system to energize the high voltage line and the "bulk" station.
- 3. Close the necessary subtransmission terminals to pick up "radial" load to load the high voltage transmission line to more than "surge impedance loading".
- a. An example of a "radial" load could be a 138kV line serving several substations with the far terminal opened.
- 4. Close a second high voltage tie from the original energized system to the "bulk" station.
- 5. Pick up additional "radial" load to load both high voltage lines to'"surge impedance loading", if possible.
- 2. At Lauderdale, close 240';lll46 - energized E. 240kV bus and auto.
- 3. Close 240'll076 - energizes Laudania 240kV line.
- 4. At Laudania, close 240ll43414 energizes Port Everglades line.
- 5. At Port Everglades, close 240':l19058 energizes South 240kV bus and autos
- 6. Synchronize Port Everglades GT's and close 240!l35140, tieing Port Everglades GT's to Lauderdale Site 2 GT's together.
- 7. At Flagami, open all 240! V and 138kV breakers
- 8. At Lauderdale, close 240'/1092 - energizes Flagami 240kV line.
- 9. At Flagami, prepare the 138kV system to pick up approximately 144 tl':l of load in stag s to coordinate with the available GT generation.
- 12. At Turkey Point, open all 240kV breakers.
- 13. At Flagami, proceed by closing 240H28545 - energizes the Turkey Point ;":2 line.
- 14. At Turkey Point, close 240ll26534 energizes the Unit f3 startup, NE bus and Unit 41 and ~2 startup.
- 15. Close 240'i!26522 - energizes Unit ;-4 startup and SE bus.
- 2. Close 240H1080 - energizes the Panch.240kV line.
- 3. At Ranch, close 240H2556 - energizes E 240kV bus.
- 4. Close 240!~2544 - energizes the Pratt &!thitney 240kV line.
- 5. At Pratt 5 Hhitney, close 240H36815 - energizes the Indiantown line.
- 6. Close 240H36819 - picking up the Pratt 5 4'hitney load.
- 7. At Indiantown, close 240H33929 - energizes the Hidway 240kV line.
- 8. At Hidway, close 240H24641 - energizes the,St. Lucie vl 240kV line.
- 9. At St. Lucie, close 240H40333 - energizes the Hest 240kV bus.
- 10. Close 240!t40367 - energizes Hutchison Island Substation.
- 12. Close 240H40361 - energizes the East 240kV bus.
- 13. Close 240!t40323 energizes the startup transformer lA.