ML18087A673

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Proposed Tech Specs Re ESF Actuation Sys Instrumentation & Semiautomatic Switchover from Injection to Recirculation
ML18087A673
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 01/27/1983
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML18087A672 List:
References
NUDOCS 8302180499
Download: ML18087A673 (61)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:r __ - "'O"DCO t:Jt.l

og t:JCO 00 o~
J::g

&m Ot.l oo 0.... "Ol\\ll\\l 0'1'1

Olll IA

§! c: z !:l - w ~ w I 'N a QI -~. (7\\ \\ ji ~, I t, TABLE 3. 3-l (Continued} _ M ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION*SYSTEH INSTRlltEHTATION 11 TOTA!~ HO. FUNCTIONAL. UNIT OF Cttt\\,.NELS CHANNELS TO TRIP HIHUUt CttAHHELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE . tl>PES 8-. AUXILIARY FEEOWATEA a *. i>. Aut011attc Actuatton Logic*" St.. -Gen. Water Level-Low-Low

t.

Start Motor Driven Pumps tt. Start Turblne-Drtven P&111ps

c.

Undervo1tage-RCP Start Turblne-Orlven Pu11p

d.

S.I. ,, w tll. J~ . \\ i*

2.

~' I

  • 1

-3/sta. gen 3/sta. gen. 4-1/bus 1 2 1, 2, 3 2/slll. gen. 2 1ta. gen.

  • 1, 2, 3 any st*. gen.

I. 2/sta. gen. 2 st.. gen. 1, 2, 3 any 2 s l*. gen. 1/2 JC 2 l 1, 2 ACTION 20 14* 19 Start Hotor-Drtven Pumps See 1 above (All 5.1. tnttlaltng functtons and requlr~*ni1)

e.

EIDerqencv Trip of Steam Generator* Feedwater Punu:>s - start Motor Driven Pwnpa 2-1/pwnp 2 2 -1/pump

f.

Station Blackout See 6 and 7 above (SEC and U/V Vital Bus)

    • Applies to items b. and c.
q. S~IA\\Ji"'O~i\\-TIC... --rte.A-f..>Sl=~

\\D. e_trt: l lee U Lfl'Tl 0 liJ o.. Rw.sr L.cw Le 11e_ ~ 4- -

  • 1:,, +\\o-r-o MA.-tic Ac.:tv C'f..-fi~ Loi ( c.. '2.

3 2 1 21 14" i3

)> r M :z c :z -4 ~ w-- w

  • N

°' ~ ID ~ ID

z 0

U1 tr' !'ill Hi h'1 ;i 11 T. i ~ i!. lABI E l. l-4 (Coullnued). t~ I lHGIHlfNfD SAfEIY fl~,IURE ACIUAllDH SYSll~JRllt(HJAllOH !RIP SllPOIHIS . fUHCJIOHAl llfllt b m !RIP SEl.. OIH! AllWAUlE VALUES !a. IUNBIHE lNIP ANO fHDWAJEA ISOLA~:'ION

a. ste.. Gener1tor W*ter Level*- ;F lllutdlluta

\\* /, ~J

6.

SAHGUANUS lQUll'HlNJ tONIROl ~YSILH (SlC) . 'I 7, UHDCRYOLTAGE. Vl1Al DUS

  • . Lo.ss of. Voltaqe
  • I
b. Sustained Degraded Voltaqe
8.

AUXlllANY fllDWAlll Aul11111llc Acludlon logic

b.

Sle* Gene... tor Wdlur level-low-low

c.

Unalervo llilU* - llCP s.1. Eraer9ency Trip of Stea* Generator Fettdwater Pu.. pa

f.

Station Blackout ~. 5 l:M l "itlTOM-t A'T1 c:. -i1e. A-us~e:f... -r~ e.~c1Lc u 1-AllotoJ I tt." fws-r L~ Lev~\\

b. Au-roi.tit o::t ic ttc..."tl.IA-Tt 0.o.., lo9 1 c..

< 611 of narrow r1no* ln,lrumenl *5p111 Heh ilH* - ueiu:r*lor Nol Appl luble "\\.,J, ~70\\ of bus voltage ?91\\ uf bus voltage for ~11 seconds Nol A11pl luble > 10¥ of nurow u11ue 1 n* l rU11enl *IJ*m uch ir.tea* generollur ~ JOI RCP bus voll1ge < 681 of nurow renge Taa5lrmenl 1p11n e1ch

  • lea* genenlor Not Appl lnbl*

~6S\\ of bu1 volta9e ? 90\\ of* bu11 wol ta9e for

! lS Hcond*

Hot Applluble > 111 of narrow range Tnslrmenl 1p*n Hth slH* yeneulor ~ 6~i acP bu* voll*ge See 1 Above (All S. I. utpolnh) -Nol Al*pl iuble Nol Applluble See 6 and l.ti.Jove (SEC and Undervoltage, Vital Bua) ~ 2..5"" -Yt-Ct. b 0 "e.. r '"' -s 'tY'u....e.M.T -re..r.r ~d-t-A-~l1u..bl<. - I.s'. "2.!'° j: I ft-6:- ~e1" e. lkSTrUWle..._"t- -f-4-pJ' , ~o-r l\\ff l*c'"'lol-e. 9.! I I e

TABLE 3.3*5 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES I*, INITIATING SIGNAL ANO FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

10.

Undervoltage RCP Bus

a.

Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pmps ll. Containment Radioactivity - High

a.

Containment Pressure-Vacuum Relief System Isolation

12. Trip of Feedwater PU!!pS
a.

Auxiliary Feedltater Pumps

13.

Undervoltage, Vita1 Bus

a.

Lass of Voltage

14.
  • Station Blackout
a.

Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwa ter Pumps. \\S°, 5£4c.L~IMd°lC. l~~k... +et'

- - --- --~t>- -~e..e.l... e>>Ja:+:r~"" _____ _

A.. cc.cf '/~ ve.S --II S.:f44,-f'2.S":S"l\\.4-. I , ' ~H4-, n... tt.~4-, '1 c.c. u.., n.. cc..1 to, l \\ S.J 11 '3 11.. s J"' 11 J I

  • ot.e:

.. l.sponse ti* for Mato,...dri~tn A&i&xi1iat"')' Feedltater ~s an 111 S.l. si;na1 starts SALEM - UNIT I 3/4 3-30 ! 60.0 < 5.0 (***) Mot App 1i cab 1 e ~ 60.0 - c 50.D Arendment No. 39 I \\ i I I .\\ ( i

Tl\\BLE 4. ]-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM IHSlRl~EtHAHotl unvnm~nrnrrmRmts 1

  • FUNCTIONAL uttll

)

8.

. AUXILIARY FEEDWl\\TER I. Autoaallc.Acluatton logtc

b.

Ste.a Ge1Nr1lor Valer Leve 1-Low-low c. Undervollage - RCP CltAHNEL CllECK 5 5 CUAHHEL Cl\\LIDRATIOH N.A. A A CttAK:GEl Fut4CTIONAL TEST ~1( l) H " (2) MDOES m ~!ltlCH SURVEILLANCE

  • REQUIRED 1, l, l.

'. 2, J 1, 2 w

d.

S.l. See 1 above (1\\11 5.l. iurve111ance rcquircaanls) Dner9ency Trip of StoAlll Gen-H.A. I

e.

w

  • w erotor Feedwoter Pumps

___ f_._ __ s_t_atJgn_ e_iackout -- __ : __

Soo 6b and 1 -*'\\ ---- - ~--*----~--- :.--. --- \\ CJ..SEH 1Avrort-'1T1i+/- 7k4~~/:e~ * * ---- * -- 1 ,

  • _JO 12..E*C.l'll.C.Ut..;,,-r,,10,,,,..J _..
  • ~ '** \\.Ct.. KW~-r Lo...,-lE11t2l.

-.~ ' ~ \\ .. ~ \\. 6.. Aoro;{A~1c:., A~ruAr.-e>AJ

z.-

0 f: LCJ<; h:... I, w . \\0 '! ~ :. .. ~ H. I\\. R l above (SEC and U/V Vltol Due) t1 )J. A. ~- .--\\, \\ \\ ) /

. ~ TOTAL NO. rr l l)~ INBTRUMBHT 'I ( OF CHANNELS REQUIRED NO. OF CHAHNELS ACTION w '° .[ n I 'ij

1. Reactor Coolant outlet Tempermture -

~*J'°'1' \\~~

2. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature -

T~LO

3. Reactor Coolant ProHure (Wide Range).ti,

~1

4. Pre**uriser Water JIAvel
5. Bteaa Line Pre**ure

'I

6. Bteaa Generator Water LeYel (Harrow Range)
1. Bteaa Generator Wmter Level (Wide Range)
8. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water.Level
9. Boric Acid Tank Solution Level
10. AwclllaJ;Y reedwater Flow llate (Wide Range)

(Wide Range)

11. Reactor Coolant Eystea Bubcoollng Margin Monitor
12. PORV Podtlon Iridicator U. PORV Block Val** Poeitlon Indicator
14. Pre**uriser Safety.Val** Po*itlon Indicator 4 U/loop) 2 4 U/loop) 2 2

2 3 (hOtD 2 3/9tea111 Generator 2/Bteam Generator 3/Btelllll Generator 2/Steaa Generator 4 Cl/Steaa Generator) 4 (l/Steaa Generator) 4-~ 2 2 U/tanJt) 2 (l/tanJt) 4 (1/Bteaa *eenerator) 4 (l/Steaa Generator) 2* 2* 2/valveH 2/valnH 2/vall*e** 2/valYeH 2/valveH 2/valveH (*) Total nUlllber of channel* h con*idered to bti two' (2) with one U) of the channel* beln9 iaanuai calculation by. llcenned control r0011 Ptir*onnel using data from OPERltBLE wide range Reactor Coolant Pressure and Temperature along vlth Steam Tabl~s as ~escrlbed In ACTION 5~ 1 1 1 1 e 1 .1 1 1 J l 4 5 le 1 1 (**)Total nu.her of Channel* i. con*idered to.be two (2) with one ClJ of the channel* being any one Cl).of the following .alternate llM!ans of determining PORV, PORV Bl0ck, or Safety Valve positions TallplPe Temperature* for the valves, Pre~* urlzer Relief ~ank Temperature, Preaaur!zer Relief Tank Level OPERABLE. /,.---.. ~.

i TABLE l.l-llb '~ ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION TOTAL NO. INSTRUMENT mi? ~;\\ 1£ OF CHANNELS MINIMUM NO. OF CHANNELS ACTION

1. ~actor Coolant Outlet T~rature -!.~HOT (Wide Range)

'il~

2. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature - TtoLD (Wide Range) 4 Cl/loop) 1 4 (I/loop) 1
l. Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range)1~

~! I

4. Pree*uriser Water Level 2

1 l (hot) l

5. Ste.. Line Preasure
I l/Ste.. Generator l/Ste.. Generator w
6. Steaa Generator ~ater Level (Narrov Range) l/Steaa Generator l/steaa Generator
7. Steaa Generator Water Level (Wide Range) w 4 (l/Ste.. Generator) l (l/Steaa Generator)

I [a. Ut Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level (1'f 4-)( 1 I

9. Boric Acid Tank Solution Level
10. Auxiliary Feedvater Flov Rate
J

~

11. Reactor Coolant Syatea Subcooling Margin Monitor
J r+

2 (1/tankl 1 4 (1/Steaa Generator) l Cl/Ste.. Generator) 2* 1

z
12. PORV Position Indicator 0

2/vailveu l w

u. PORV Block Valvo Position Indicator

\\0 2/v11lveu l

14. Pressurizer Safety Valve Posit.ion Indicator 2/vmlveH 1

(*) Total nUllber of channel* i* conaidered to be two (2) with one Cla of the channelu being aanual calculation by licensed control r0011 personnel using data frOln OPERABLE wide range Re~ctor Coolant Pressure and Te*perature along with Steaa Tablos aa described in ACTION s. 2 2 2 e 2 2 2 2

2) 2 6

6 2-2 2 (**) Total nUllber of Channel* l* c0n*idered to be two (2) with one (1) of the channels being any one (1) of the following alternate means of detenaining PORV, PORV Block, or Safety Valve posit!on1 Tailpipe Te~peraturea for the valves, Press-urizer Relief Tank Tegperature, Preasurizer Relief Tank Level OPERABLE.

_"'*.:..:.~...:.:::...~~,-:.-

I. I A EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the v.alve operators removed: Valve Number Va lv~*, Function Valve Position a

  • 1 SJ.69
a. RHR pump suction
a. open

..,.b~ 1 SJ 30

b. SI pump suction
b. open
c. 11 SJ 40
c. SI discharge.to
c. closed hot legs
d. 12 SJ 40
d. SI discharge to
d. closed hot legs
e.

l RH 26

e. RHR discharge to
e. closed hot legs
f. 11 SJ 4.9
f. RHR discharge to
f. open cold legs
g. 12 SJ 49
g. RHR discharge to g.. open cold legs
h.

1 cs 14

h. Spray additive tank
h. open discharge
i. 1 SJ 135
i. SI discharge to cold f. open legs

--"""':"~_::_-;-~1'~~~Ec'2:~i,,...;;;.SJ_ 67'-.<;~-

j. SI recirc. line
j. open isolation
k.

l SJ 68

k. SI recirc. 1 ine
k. open isolation

[1.

  • 11 SJ 44
l. eo11ta:i11ment samp
l. closed

~sela:ts~efl val Ye

m. 12 SJ 44
m. Senta;nment s~mp RI. eleseel iselatieR valve
b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic} in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position. SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4.5-4

    • ]

( c c . i I I

. c:

z 1-4

-i NI /~* . TABLE 3. 3-3 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATiON FUNCTIONAL UNIT

8.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER

a.

Automatic Actuation Logic**

b.

Stm. Gen. Water Leve 1-Low-Low

i.

Start Motor Driven Pumps ii. Start Turbine-Driven Pumps

c.

Undervoltage-RCP Start Turbine-Driven Pump

d.
s. I.

TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS 2 3/stm. gen 3/stm. gen. 4-1/bus CHANNELS TO TRIP 1: MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE 2 2/stm. gen. 2 stm. gen. any stm. gen. 2/stm. gen.

  • 2 stm. gen.

any 2 stm. gen. 1/2 x 2 3 APPLICABLE MODES 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2 ACTION 20 14* . *19 Start Motor-Driven Pumps* See 1 above (All S.I. initiating functions and requirements)

e.
  • Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps Start Motor-Driven Pumps 2/Pump
    • Applies to items b. and c.

.s E"M I ~uTo M A-ri c.. T£,.i4US r=a TO. ~~ C~C.UL.Al,&t../ Q., 1<WST Low Level 'o. ALJtottt4..Ttc A-~iVQ...-t;o'h Loa,1'(. 1/pump '2.. I 1/pump* 3 '2.. 1, 2 22* I Go 13 .~\\ J

(' TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION'SYSTEH INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT

5.

TURBINE TRIP AND FEEOWATER ISOLATION I

a. Steam Generator Water Level--

High-High

6.

SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM (SEC) w

7.

UNDERVOLTAGE,.VITAL DUS w * ~ ~ C'D

I
0.

3 C'D

I r+

z 0. - 0

8.
    • Lo** of Volta9e
b. Suetalned De9raded Voltage AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
a.
b.

Automatic Actuation Logic Steam Generator Wa~er Level-low-low

c.

Undervoltage - RCP d *. S.I.

e.

Trip oi Main ~eedwater Pumps t). SEMl+ltnbJ..\\A-Ti c.. ~AIJ:S FEJ<. To ~E"C.I e.c.ut..ATloN t:l. '( w ST Lo""' Le.."e' lo. A-t.1+otttA.+.-c Ac..t1J£f-a.~ Loe, i c.. TRIP SETPOINT < 67% of narrow range Tnstrument span each steam generator Not Applicable

  • > 70% of bus voltaqe

~91' of bus voltage for ~ l J seconds Not App 1 icab le- > lBX of~narrow range instrument span each steam generator > 7~ RCP bus voltage ALLOWABLE VALUES

  • < 68% of narrow range Tnstrument span each st.eam generator Not Applicable

~ 651 of bu* volt~qe tCJO\\ of bu* volU9e for !IS second* Not Applicable > 17% of narrow range instrument span each steam generator > 65i RCP bus vo.1 tage See 1 Above (All S.I. setpoints) Hot Applicable*

15. ?..~ +-t c-..bo\\/e..

llllS'1'-"Ul'Mll k.-t- ""tL.pS tJo+- A-ppl1CA.lole Hot App li cab 1 e . l S". 2..!' +/-: I.(:or A. bo".e_ &YlS"-t-rv""'e"'T +4p.r Nor Appl1u.J, le J

(_*_ l TABLE 3:3-5 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

10.

Undervoltage RCP Bus

a.

Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater

  • Pumps
11.

Containment Radioactivity - High

  • a.. Purge and Exhaust Isolation
12.

Trip of Feedwater Pumps

a.

Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

  • 13.

Undervoltage, Vital Bus

a.

Loss of Voltage ~4-..S e.wa 1A..\\J+o1M£h'.c I rti.."1. ~ +e...- -to* ~ e.e..t !"e.vla...+;o~ 4.. r=ccs vo..l v.e.s 2 I s:r 4 2Z SS 4~. I J 11 R 4-f't. J 'Z "2.. e_ H-4. J 't I c.e. l(,.. '2.. '2.C.C.. I ~ J J

2. I Sj 113 2 2. ~.T II '3 I

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-31 < 60.0 < s.0<5>. Not Applicable

  • < 4.0 I i I

I I I I i I I I . i

c:: z 1-4 -I . TABLE 4. 3-2 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS N FUNCTIONAL UNIT .CHANNEL CHECK CHANNEL CALIBRATION CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST

8.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER

a.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2)

b.

Steam Generator Water s R M Leve 1-Low-Low

c.

Undervoltage - RCP s R* M MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 1, 2, 3 l t 2 t 3 l t 2 w d.

s. I.

See 1 above (All S.I. surveillance requirements) ~ w Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps N.A. N.A. S/U(4) 1, 2 I

e.

w C1'I ~. s E"M I *hJTD M A-'rt c:. 'Tf.Pr-rus FEJe TO fE"C,( f.c.u L.a't"ndAJ Cc... ew~r Low Le...1et .s R. M lJ ?...) 3 'o. tTuTo M A-0h~ C. t\\c."tUd;D"' Lo] t'c. N.A. ~LA. MC"t) ,,'-,3,4- -J~.

e EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE.REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a..

b.

At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed: Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position

a.

2 SJ 69

a.

RHR pump suction

a.

open

b.
2 SJ 30
b.

SI pump suction

b.

open

c.

21 SJ 40

c.

SI discharge to

c.

closed hot legs

d.

22 SJ 40

d.

SI discharge to

d.

closed

e.

2 RH 26

e.

hot_ legs RHR discharge to

e. closed f:

hot legs 21 SJ 49

f.

RHR discharge to

f.

open cold legs

g.

22 SJ 49

g.

RHR discharge to*

g.

open cold legs

h.

2 cs 14

h.

Spray additive

h.

open

i.

2 SJ 135

i.

tank discharge SI discharge to

i. open cold. legs
j.

2 SJ 67

j. SI reci re. line
j. open isolation
k.

2 SJ 68

k.

SI recirc. line

k.

open isolation J [ -1. 21 SJ 44

1.

eonta;nment sump

1.

closed iselathA 't'ah*e Ill. 22 SJ 44

m.

6eAta~AmeAt sump

m.

elesed i1elatieA 'tal'le At least once per 31 days by:

l.

Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

2.

Verifying that the ECCS piping, is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and accessible discharge piping high points~ .( \\ I r""-. 1

t. -,

r \\ SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 5-4

\\._ ' /Y) /Y\\ f Y) SI _.2/2 (AJ 5£MIA UTOliA /It:. RE t:.J R~ ut..A TI t:JN ll.SS441 /~.SJ44 II e.e /6 /.2.Ct:./& 11.s::r113 1~s::r11.3 t.R'l <:R) //J(H4/ l.ZRJl-4 ((5) (<S}. ~R) ('R) H*ZOll IOOM 1-01 ~R~ l'.:R\\ BAc Jt. £.1t.:11rs Y-YSLLOW il.- REb <;; - (:j R.EEAJ a - a1..ue I \\

~ i s R 0 OPE.N ll.s::I44 Ci.o.S£ 11.RHi LB 2/-1 OPEN JJCC.J6 L8 LB LJJ ( I OPEN J/.SJJJ3 I J..8- (lWST LEVEL Bl.STABLE S ~ SAFETY IN.:TEt!TIOAJ*..SIGNAL op~,v /~CCI~ s OR OPEN /..2.SJ414 CLOS£ l~RH4 (I)

t 111 111

""I

  • s7V57oo?' 'f '?. -*. - - --..... -- ---..

---.~,,,, °".S ~/'- 7~~n*.37Zb'S'Or>fr. '~Qcrcr;

  • 1 *S-7Y9ooi:"'Y~ :saJa. ?f"J>'fY/:PO'ffP" ~~07

. ':S7VPCJ~5~/ -~i--- -~-- --- ----.. -*S7V~.o:;JS'?L*-** *- - -- **-- -------------*- -- ***- -.- -***---*-------*----.---* --- - -**- ------

  • -* :US0'6

~CYQa'a9.. cY9':5:'.". -~ ___ c*:;;7y~~ ~/"" *- ------*--*---. **---***~------*-*--------. -----* --*-*-- -**---*-*** (~:?*a'~.. ~F~// (Jli~-x:in!TJ?Yb?PT-07'--t--t-- --.--.S7Y!?aP..Sb/*... --- -. - : --** -***-- *-...... -* **--.. **-* - -- -*--* - .... -.... -* -*-*--.... *.:U?'C'Y --Ub?'I-* ""1

/

"J ---t*--t-"--.... *-- ---1 --*~JL"~'J- *- - **------ . I "J..,;T.~-,

_)

e-t--------** -----**-. --------*- -

.---<.t~Ji.?.Y*---*---* -. -J

*--*----~--

-~ j ~-:.:t:t' -J,.(;'y---- -- ---**- ~ -*- -: : **1 ~---------------** --- *-*---*-----: *- :*---- --* J

--. --~---*-----*---;-......;-* --;....---; -~---**--**--*-*-*---*---- *-

l ~tif:Ja-:;-;.~~R~? -

  • 3'12'1'7MY

~t??o~*tyl'H} ~7.,,,, oct7-r£"6/'-*..

*--*--*- ----**--.. **I

-~----* -*.* *- -:t:?.si.*C'?c_ __________.J . -----1--4--""-'-----'------

..--~--- -~=: __ :~=~-~=~~--~-~--~-.. ]

.. --o.--*-**-** --* -- --* --**..... - ~~H¥.#~-¥J~"'7'1--t-~~~~------------ ~S?J-"~~S'O/ *-* *-------------------- - -* *:t:t +-cv-..... --~ - ;*1 .. J

**---*----t---+--*--;s:_?l"'.._~_z

__ ~~~~1,A7-5.?c __ *~-'S,-~Zl.- ___ v_*

  • - ---1--1--****-------* *- -- --** **-
~~F.P,Y---** ** * - -.*j

___,__._.-~-----;~~r~-G;O,, '?z~-~P.:1r* * ------------------** -

*-----*-------~-:-~-------T--------.--1---:-*-** -.. ~--*-- ---------* *--.. -

-"--"-----:--------"'":'"'---4.-------,~~~~::=::-~~~~~---*-....i~--** ---*-****-*--***. --* -*- .: ~rn:m~1:_o_!-~-~-;rrY~-=~?~9~~#_;~r~~-~-frrf/ffrz.:r3<i_* __ -~-~~- ~-~---- -_ -...... *-* I j wva * *--------*---- --:-* - --* -* *-** -* ~/ ---; ;J'(? 1JI ::r**---- - **--- *

U.Ylltl.D -

~.----:z:""'""11*mx::i--...... ------***-----:---*------------*- ****--- **- au ~----:a.&.va--------**- :---* ... - --i;a:aHS "NOJ.1.Y.Lndwo:>**------

;i.:):al'llnS

  • __ __...;.-, --------u"imw.a.w---------.o.----**--***-***---- ***---------**- ---** * *-*---- ******-***- -**

-~b.1.'-M3a111 --:-'--~.:.~ ~o:> SW> aNY*::n~~:a-a ~~:>nsnd* ---- *---:*--.-- -- ____,,____,.._ -r-------*-*----- *- i . I

i ( ( r __ r: r* *~ L: [ I [. I \\.. /.

r.

rL ( 1_ r :- r I.:

    • - *-.....llo-.. *..__

lltEJiER TO. ' PUBl.IC.VICE EL.ECT~IC AND GAS.COM.Y llUllJEC'T'..JZ.w~ J COMPUTATION SHEET PJL,._ ______ ~~-- F/<;u~ St ESTIMATE:....------- 2.. 76 n: /,-f3 Fi. /. ~"/ F/. .22.. 7~-n: /.~J/rt: //..S-~Fr. i i k£rvc~/AJ<j i,JA-rE iZ Sro.KA-'i E MA.J~ /\\le"-' ..Se-r?c1,,,1..JT~ _t/_/~Ld.R.H_.;J_7t_r6-60--6A~* _ _T~ ..S ?~c. rf_IAJ~3E.$ ~00..fi."4~.S.. _ r-------- r-- _f=o=-ALA~ __L.>~5"~o 2f11.£ r-*-- PREPARED llY.------ DATP'-.----- .CHECKED l!IY.*------ DA'A':-..----- 5E O'/f;R-F'<. :..:- I...3o0. --0 f At.S.

l.

_J ~ I. 1,z, /()t)(;4L..S. 19.; Oat::> f A~ H/AJ, Vot... AVAJt..A 8t..E Fol<.AJ.r~I~ ~~Boo t;A '-* .H/A.). VO£... Av'A/UBLE .e-~..e .S kl//CHo\\1£/.. /.~"fFi. _£0 -L..o_d~.4;-c!.._ 31; 7gp a,dL§_ /..l-t rr. ....,__,,;~-r..&:....TAP.S -IJ~OO.!id.~~ --* 0,,t:r, [_ 84 8-1 t;/lt.. = I..&r. L. [ \\ L \\*. 6 ...--.J,/ ..IL~~ABLG..i::_E'l.fi_J....Ls; ~~4'S-Ot.IT~Gr ro (!,$, J'e.JHPS 0UTL£r ro ~HR,.s~)CH'f. PG/~~~---: /A.Al.<.Borr~ l)Se.b A.S ~FE,,c-OC~ /'~..C. /EC/I..S~cc.,A.//AJ,j h'~ °.J J.O -~a A~AJ!..H~ j,tl/,Ul) (.)A.)(..).SA.8L£ t.£v£~ .: '12.X. <-1-4~<:

-~ -*s*. 6).

  • --~-~-

~

=- ~ --- -- -

t11*- r-. S.. __.. __.. _.. ? . :.. - fP* o. ""

~* 0 * (' -

Ci' -O*.. --**.... ~ -.... l':""-** . *---** - 8:* b" tP . ------~- -t* ti'" ----- ~.\\/' l/t.. -

    • -----. l"'.. **- *-... *----.......-.... #

Ill-*-,... *****-- . :**-~-t:~*~l-~ 7. _ _: __

l t. -~:-:*~---
  • ~.
    :f __ -*:* ~~

f r.*. f -~---=:- * ~ ~--: * -~:_ ~ - ~ f : ; r :..f, : _: -=--* -~'I

  • t -r

-~~*.::= 1 ... ~..*. --~------ ........ **-****-**-~. -~-. -~ -*-~

* *- -.. )... - ---- ~

  • ---+---.. *-----

-~-

.. t~*
    • - -*-. -- -----*,_ ---~

.:.::=. -.... -. - --*---* *--.

  • **1
    • -*---------P~ ~I=~-- '. -

~ : ~-~::~=-f,~.J+*->-**-* ---~. .._~ . ----~ ~ -**>--*-t----i-- - *---*----~ *. *--. ~-- ----~-=--~. IU *1 lJ

  • ~.

,..---~ t;;;;r-.:A: -* --- -.- -*--------+---:,,.1--,"U-n ---:-,!\\""' --- : *-,__~-* - -- r---~*,_ ___ --- ~ ---**-------+--6.pl----~ .......... ~--+-~. --;.r-~ - 1\\1\\ / - *----------*-*- **-*.. *-*.t::;..;.J. -* ri

i *-
  • 1

==-~::~~::~::::::~_-_-_-__..... l--_.-+l\\1--.... ~-+\\---~ )-.-.: ~~~

==~.r ____._~*~'-- ___________ -"T",..._ __ '--"""_ . to-- - ~ ~-;.--... ---*_*-------- J ~\\ ~\\ l\\ }\\ r, -~ --~~-'\\.,.-.__ __ _ ~'--~_-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..~:-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..-:..~-:..:.-:..-:..~::::::.-:..-:...... _*-~----_;-_-_-_4-_--1~*.* Kl .... *-_*:~::.:-~* ~_:-_:-_-~f.1 ~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~.. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ri,__::;:;_;1;:=;~~~*~~~-~I~~-~;jj;;~ \\.' - \\f-I~ n o...T...t ..... 1~ I ~ !r:* ~ .....____ ________ ~~::::;;;;~-------------~----.~--"""'--+----- ---~---------1' --lP..~~+- ---------.-----.......,,.._~-=----~--t----~- ( -::. l _ ,_.. --l CJ' \\..*. / I u ._k!

l-\\/~-4*l~'i---;;~.,l-{~-------to--.--------t---riri5~~[...Z"1_~~.~~~*"'""-~----

/\\ - l\\ - 0 J ..J* 'i1 J " ~ . I ~ l . I r-r- ' I _;...,...~..... --T-_..;.-+-_,.-..,....-t--:;;ii~-i---,......,---1--71--.J---1---...... -_,..---::~-------J I I

  • I

,,r l \\ l\\. I ~ I'- I \\. I\\ l\\ l\\ c:. \\ -+--~-.----+--- J __.;__ __________.,.__~ ___ 1_,.\\.___+---+-"""-----t---+---+--~~-----t---l---l---l=---r=:i,----~*~==":::J- ---t-**- .;g-:--- 4-- ...... ~--f--- T~'--,~~--.....__r--t-- -lt----it--wr*--i~---t---t---=ilr..~.,~~---t--- I --i---l-t--................. -f-~-l---~-"-t-':---t-*------+---------t~---+----

r--...+-*'...

~.21-1'---.,........,...iV*-.~ -t--?t.--lH:3--,-:+---Jr-.. _EP.;:~-:r-"a- -~r""'J, J :_-~ - ~~-- r", _ J

+--r\\..-..J+--~->=i

... G" -.-.J...µ;.,.l-+-+--1'~~-+""T'"+-...... -.,.:.,;:,__-".... ___ \\..i-.../-+--*~---\\:. ~ =.:t --~ --~\\_ -. ~ rii .A I .... - -1

+---~'----+-----1-1--

I

~r-----i-T"r---l-~\\~.'~-~* J

\\/;:\\ \\. - '.\\ln. ~ /\\. - --~.-....,~... !:::1------1 / ~ "X r. \\' /' I -;re .,,JC ]:)= . l\\.

e. iC*

-~ izsi ft\\ . I \\ ~ 1 -t~ r_~.. _ ~\\ -:::' \\.,_ .. '-'.;;J J JL-9 J,- 0 I - I -= p j,- I\\ \\ I I .~ I ,._+._-.

~::::~x=~.... :.:_-__ ""*°*

.,..~ *-J ~ ....... <- ---- ---1-*-------...:ex>~_.;__ ___..9-~)-1,;...i=a- **-. - __,~

1--__,,CPftJ11..._,......1 ::;.

--C-. ---16;.:-;..,;*{:**;;* 'i*-~~-Y~:Fu=;----tfirJ- -- Cl\\ -I ~ ~- -* ~..,.".---_*..+---=:......if---1--.. ~ I . 0--- L_ I

+---

  • -r-

. --*. -- ---------------'",------t--i'I I

-.... !!-*"--"'_;.... _____________________...... __,.:....... _.-_~ *----* --

j '-'--------*=:_-_.---. _-_---------~-,___..

f:.> ( I ~. ,C /"' \\

r.

( l l _' APPENDIX A PSE&G LETTER TO NRC JULY 17, 1980

\\ \\ t -~. I

r.

I . I ~-** -* (* r l., \\ \\....

l.

r~,. f j

k.

r l_ I* C~ PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430~7000 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation --u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. c. 20555 July 17, 1980 Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Acting Chief Licensing Branch,3 Division of Licensing Gentlemen: PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL DESIGN ECCS AUTOMATIC SWITCHOVER NO. 2 UNIT SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-311 PSE&G hereby submits its proposed conceptual design for automatic switchover of the ECCS from the injection phase to the recirculation phase of operation. This document is submitted. pursuant to the requirement set forth in Technical Specification 9.2. It.is anticipated-that the final design package for this modification, can be submitted for your review arid* approval by September 1, 1980. The scope of the changes involved in this design modification is such that implementation of the modifications must be performed during a refueling outage. It is therefore anticipated that the modifications described herein can be implemented during the first refueling outage, estimated to be late 1981, provided your approval of this design modification is granted prior to end of 1980.

r } / l '1 I I ~.I_, r* ~. l i l - r L I L i I .Director of Nuclear*Reactor Regulation 7/17/80 Should you have any question in this regard, do not hesitate to contact us. EAL:bm N06 01/02-A Very truly yours, t:fk!)?/ R. L. Mittl General Manager-Licens ing and Environment. Engineering and Cons~ruction

I '* (\\ I ' ( j f :: ~,.... I \\ -.. \\ ( i ( I I'* ( \\

    • ~

CONCEPTUAL DESIGN ECCS SWITCHOVER MODIFICATIONS NO. 2 UNIT SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION M~P80 69 15/1

( i I ( \\ i/ r-.- r !. i., : r** i I J I. i. . J A. Salem Unit 2 ECCS Switchover Evaluation Summary A comprehensive review has been performed-of the Salem Unit 2 ECCS switchover design and procedures with the objective of identifying modifications, if appropriate, to optimize the reliability of achieving a stable long-term recirculation mode of post-LOCA operation. This review focused on those aspects of the ECCS design and procedures that must be accomplished in a timely fashion following receipt of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) low level alarm in*order to ensure continued ECCS pump flow to the reactor coolant system while protecti~g the ECCS pumps from damage as their suction source is being transferred from the RWST to the containment sump. This review was limited to that portion of switchover that is important in ensuring that all ECCS pumps are prote6ted against loss of suction source. This ~valuation addressed the many interdependencies that affect the switchover aspect of the ECCS design.

  • Included in this optimization evaluation were the fol-lowing requirements and guidelines.

a) NRC requirements that accompanied the request. b) Guidelines for RWST sizing as related to optimizing the effectiveness of the RWST transfer allowance. * - c} Guidelines for operator action. d} Guidelines* for accident identification and mitigation. Based on the above, the several switchover steps that are important to protecting the ECCS pumps from loss of suction source were evaluated to identify the advantages and disadvantages of automation. This evaluation, indi-cated that four steps can be automated in order to init-iate switchover and to reduce the number of operator ac-tions required to complete switchover. Such automation ' can be initiated with energize to actuate logic consist-ing of two out of four RWST low level signals concurrent with safety injection signal. To support this level of automation and to optimize the automation benefits, it is necessary to add check valves in each of the RHR pump suction lines froro the RWST and M PSO 69 15/3

(... I j. r** 1 **. r I l / c- .l_ r*

l.

i r': rj r'> l (,' f' r.. .. f '* I. 1.* ,. the containment sump. This level of automation permits the systems to perform their function despite any single postulated instrument or control system single failure. No single failure will a) prevent automatic initiation of switchover or b) prematurely initiate switchover ac-tions that affect both trains in an unacceptable man-ner. Automating beyond this extent makes the switchover design susceptible to unacceptable single failures that. may reduce ECCS flow to the reactor coolant system below. minimum requirements. Reviewing the steps that cannot be automated, it was de-termined that they are few in number and can be struc-tured in a procedure that can be implemented based only on operator veri ficai:ion* that switchover to recircula-. tion is required (i.e. RWST level is low and* sump level is adequate to support residual heat removal pump NPSH

  • re:]ui(-e1nents).

This switchover procedure can be struc-tured to minimize and emphasize the operator actions

  • that must be performed to protect all ECCS puaups from loss of suction source.

The procedure can further be performed independent of prior ECCS single failure or can tolerate an operator error single fdilu~e which re-sults irt a) the fail~re to perform one step, or b) th~ performance of one step out of sequence. This switchover. autcimatio~ evaluation indi~ated that a semiautomatic switchover consisting of automatic initia~ tion and manual completion combined the advantages.of automation with the advantages of an unambiguous proce-dure wherein operator actions are minianii:ed. * 'rhe design modifications required to implement *this semiautomatic switchover design are described in Paragraph B. To ver-ify that this combination of automatic and manual ac-tions constituted an optimized design, the proposed de-sign was evaluated relati~e to e~isting guidelines for RWST sizing, operator action, and accident indentific~ tion and i:ni tiga ti on procedures. A summary of this eval-.. uation follows. The Salem Unit 2 RWST design incorporates leve.l set-points (1) which provide approximately 214,000 gallons for injection phase operation. Asuming all ECCS pumps operate at maximum runout(2) during the injection phase, total naximum RWST outflow is approximately 15,000 gpm. Assuming that all ECCS pumps operate at maximum runout from the initiation of ~1~ L~C~, the earliest time after M P80 69 15/4

r I \\ /1 I I j I f i { 'I *' r- ,r. l. ~. 1! C." [~. ,('

l.

r r \\ l r: c* -- LOCA initiation that switchover will be automatically initiated is approximately 14.3 minutes *. This early switchover initiation requires rapid depressurization of the reactor coolant system to low pressures (i.e. ap-proximately O psig) in order to permit the ECCS pumps to operate at runout conditions from LOCA initiation. Such a rapid depressurization would be characteristic of the hypothetical double ended large LOCA. For smaller post-ulated LOCAs, the depressurization transient is not as rapid andECCS pump flow during the depressurization transient is less than 15,000 gpm. The e'f feet. of this reduced ECCS flow during the depressurization transient results in a longer injection phase. This effect is

  • demonstrated for small LOCAs < 6 inch in diameter which exhibit depressurization transients that stabilize above approximately 200 psig, assuming all ECCS pumps operat-ing.

Throughout such depressurization transients, the RHR pumps will not deliver flow to the reactor coolant syste*m. Assuming that the remaining ECCS pumps (i.e

  • charging and safety injection pumps) and the containment spray pumps operate at maximum runout during the injec-tion phase, total RWST outflow is approximately 7000 gpm.

Based on this RWST outflow, switchover will be automatically initiated at approximately 30~5 minutes after LOCA initiation. This time is conservatively short since the charging and safety injection pumps will not operate at runout for this category of LOCA and the containment spray pumps will not automatically start-- simultaneous with LOCA initiation. The Salem Unit 2 RWST design incorporates level set-points which provide approximately 129,300 gallons for the transfer allowance. The effectiveness of this al-lowance in providing time for the operator to perform any necessary switchover manual actions is also depend-ent on the size of the LOCA and the RWST outflow during switchover. The minimum tim~ available for switchover operations can be conservatively enveloped by comparing the maximum RWST injection phase outflow of 15,000 gpm with the RWST transfer allowanc~ of 129,300 gallons.

  • This comparison indicates that a minimum time of approx-imately 8.5 minutes is available for the operator to perform the necessary switchover manual actions to en-sure a continued suction source to the charging and safety injection pumps.

This time includes conservatism since the switchover automatic actions of opening the containment sump isolation valve and closing the RWST t-1 P80 69 15/S

L I ! r* 'L.. ' (". 'l \\ r-.. ( r \\ r !r~* I r l..

r.

1 c f' l isolation valves function to automatically reduce RWST outflow to approximately 7000 gpm during the entire switchover period since the RHR pumps will not be deliv-ering flow to the reactor coolant system. The plant emergency instructions are structured to identify the type of accident and to direct the operator to the appropriate procedure to mitigate the identified accident. For any accident that is characterized by in-creasing containment radiation,-containment pressure or containment sump level, the operator is directed to the LOCA procedure. The LOCA procedure includes cautions to the operator to prepare for switchover from injection to recirculation. For any LOCA tha*t is characterized by a rapid depressurization to low reactor coolant system pressures, the cautions include go-to steps to skip di-agnostic and verification steps and prepare the operator for a* timely switchover to *recirculation. In this way the emergency instructions are structured to prepare the operator to anticipate the RWST low level alarm and to perform any switchover manual actions in a timely fash-ion. For the smaller more-credible LOCAs (i.e. < 6 inches in diameter), that are characterized by more gradual depressurization transients, the operator will

  • hav~ more time to perform the necessary diagnostic and verification steps required to identify this category of LOCA.

The proposed scmiautom~tic switchover was evaluated rel~ ative to the NRC requirements and determined to comply with these requirements. B. Switchover Modifications The Salem 2 design for manual switchover of the ECCS from the injection phase to the recirculation phase will be modified to minimize required operator actions by automatically initiating selected steps of the proce-dure. The design of this automatic system involves the

  • specific changes identified below which meet the NRC de-sign criteria shown in Attachment 1, except as noted.
1.

RHR Pump Suction P~~'lS. from Containment Sump Each line from the containment sump to the suction of its respective RHR pump will be modified by in-stalling a check valve between the pump suction M P80 69 -15/6

/l-*\\ ,1 r**:, I l ; / I I,.,* r 1 t -s-connection and the containment sump isolation valve (SJ44). These check valves will be designed to Seismic Category 1 criteria and will-be provided with a mechanism to determine the valve position by inspection at the valve location. The purpose of these valves is to preclude draining the RWST into the sump if the sump isolation valves were to be opened inadvertently.

2.

RHR Pump Suction Piping from RWST Each RHR pump suction line from the RWST will be provided with a check valve downstream of the pump suction valve (RH4) and before the connection point of the sump suction piping. These valves will be designed to Seismic Category 1 criteria and will be provided with a mechanism to determine valve posi-tion by inspection at the va~ye location. The purpose of these valves is to preclude both RHR Pumps attempting to take suction from one sump line in the event of a.failure of one sump isolation valve to open.

3.

Automatic Switchover Logic Four RWST level* transmitters will be used to pro-vide input signals to the Solid-State Protection. System (SSPS). These signals, and the 2 out of 4 Low-Level logic, will be designed to the same criteria as the existing protection system function. of safety injection initiation with the following* exceptions:

a.

The level bistables will be normally de-energized. A low-level condition will result iri energization of the bistables to provide inputs to the SSPS. This is essentially identical to the design provided for initiation of containmnt spray.

b.

The switchover sequence signal may be reset in the Control Room at any time on a sing!~ train basis. M P80 69 15/7

r ! I \\. l., j } \\. [ l i J l: I/ 1 L -' c. Manual initiation at the system level is not provided. The remaining features of the system will meet the re-quirements of IEEE 279-1971. 4~ Sump Isolation V~lves Prior licensing considerations required that the sump isolation valves (SJ44) be provided with: ae Lockout of power to prevent spurious opening.

b.

An inte~lock to prevent opening unless the RWST to RHR pump suction valve (RH4) is closed. To facilitate automatic opening of the sump valve~ the power.lockout is to be removed and the opening interlock from RH4 will be bypassed upon receipt of a switchover sequence signal. For normal operating *conditions, the interlock will r~main functional to provide for test-ability of the automatic switchover sequence signal. In addition to the design changes described above, simp-lified emergency operating procedures will be developed to *further enhance the operator's ability to effectively deal with design basis accidents. is an updated version of the information presented* at the meeting with the NRC staff on June 5, 1980. M P80 69 15/8

I ~ \\ . r;*. 1*_; r:' l. r* \\.-' r r i l..

  • 1 l*

1*. L .J ATTACHMENT 1 DESIGN CRITERIA ECCS SWITCHOVER MODIFICATIONS

1.

The minimum flow entering the reactor coolant system during and after the switchover shall be sufficient to remove fission product decay heat assuming any single active failure. 2Q The design of the controls and instrumentation shall permit manual operation of.the* ECC and containment spray systems from the control room at the component level both prior to and after the trahsfer to the recircula-tion mode has been accomplished. 3.. The swi tchove.r: of the ECCS from the injection to the re-cirulation mode of operation shall be automated to the maximum feasible exter1t, such that required operator ac-tions are minimized, and uninterrupted ECCS flow is pro-:' vided to the core.

4.

The systems rnust be able -to per~orm their function de-spite any single postulated ~ingle failure of a fluid s:;stem. No single failure shall:

a.

Prevent automatic transfer to the recirculation mode of operation or

b.

Cause inadvertent automatic tran~fer to the re~ circulation mode of operation of both trains of the ECC or the containment spray systems.

5.

The design of the controls and instrumentation shall. meet IEEE Std. 279-1971..

6.

The ESF switchover system shall use seismically quali-fied components and the switchover shall be to a seis-mically qualified water.supply. *

7. *To reduce the probability of the operator prematurely performing manual actions in the switchover procedure, the procedures shall include provisions for the verif ic-ation of the water storage tank level prior to beginning the manual switchover actions.

M P80 69 15/9

\\. I L l. r : L.. r.* I v ) \\ l r l ( 1 f' I. ATTACHMENT 2 Switchover.Automation Evaluation Switchover Modifications Switchover Sequence Logic Switchover Procedure Switchover Features Switchover Failure Mode Effects Analysis M P80 69 15/10

-:~ Action Auto Open 21 SJ44, 22SJ44 Auto Close 21RH4, 22RH4 Auto Open 21 CC I 6, 2 2 CC I 6 Auto Open 21SJ11J, 22SJ113 Auto Close 21RH19, 22RH19 Aut*o CI ose 2SJ 67, 2SJ 68 Auto Open .2 1 s J 4 5, 2 2 s J 4 5 SWITCHOVER AUIOMATION EVALUATION Advantages (j j o Provides sump suctlon/NPSH for RHR pumps without operator action. o Minimizes RWST outflow following sump valve opening without operator action. o Provides component cool Ing water to RHR Hx without operator action. No operator decision/verification required. o Opens SI/CHG pump suction crossover header without operator action. No operator ~eclslon/verlflcatlo~ requ I red., o Closes RHR discharge crossconnect valves without operator action. o Isolates SI mlnlflow without operator action. o Provides suctlon/NPSH for SI and CHG pumps Jrom RHR p~mp discharge without operator action. Disadvantages o failure of one sump valve to open on deman'd could damage both RHR pumps. (2) . r~ 0 Spurious (early) opening could damage one RHR pump. 0 Opening could permlt 3 ~otentlal backflow from RWST to sump. o Spurious. (early> sequential automatic closure before adequate water exists In sump could damage one RHR pump. o None o None o Spurious <early) sequential automatic closure reduf1l ECCS below minimum safeguards. o Spurious (early> sequential automatlfs> closure could damage both SI pumps.

e.

o Closure of valves RH19 and SJ67, 68 are required to be completed prior to opening valves SJ45. NOTES: (I) All automatic steps have advantage of reducing operator actions *. e (2) (3) ( 4) ( 5) Unacceptable Single Resolution requires failure - Fallure to open bn de*mand could permit two RHR pumps to ~raw suction from one sump llne. addition of a 14 Inch check valve In each RWST line. Affe~ts RWST Sizing.<Transfer Allowance) - Requires (a) modification to RWST sizing basis, (b) addition of 14 Inch check valve In each sump line, or (c) auto clos~re of RWST suction MOY. Modifications b) and c> will prevent and minimize, respectively, potential backflow to t~e sump when the sump MOY* opens. Unacceptable Single Failure - Spurious sequentlal closu:re results In damage to one RHR pump and reduces ECCS flow below minimum safeguards. Resolution requires.additional lo~lc/permlsslve to prevent ipurlous sequential automatic closure. Unacceptable Sln~le Fa11u~e - Spurious sequential closu~e results I~ damage to two SI pumps, reducing ECCS flow below minimum safeguards. Resolution requires modification to locate two MOYs In each SI pump m~nlflow line (one on train A and one on train B to ensure Isolation for reclrculatl~n>. Also requires additional logic/permissive to prevent spurious sequential closing of a valve (9.g ** train A valves) In each SI pump mlnlflow. M P BO 69 I 5 I I / I 2

' I i (. . r". L I; l r* ",\\*

  • r l

(' \\..: 1 L ( f' - [. / J l. ' e SWITCHOVER MODIFICATIONS Design.Modifications o ** Add sump check valves (veri_fy adequate NPSH) o o Add RWST check valves (verify adequate NPSH)o o Automate switchover actions (See Switchover Logic)

  • 0 Open SJ44 (on RWST "S" signal) 0 Close RH4 (on valves 0

Open CC16 (on RWST. signal). 0 Open SJ113 (on RWST signal). o Maintain manual actions o Close SJ67, 68 o Close RH19 o Open SJ45 low level and concurrent_ SJ44 full open signal). - low level and concurrent low level and concurrent

o. Implement simplif ie~ switchover P!Ocedure o

See Switchover Procedure M P80 69 15/13 "S" "S"

f I \\ ~.. r '. 1 *-- r*. \\. {' l © r,, w l ' _.__..-J.-. (S? CLo!,E .S:!'C-7 s::t.e'

r.

CL.ti'.SE oPcN R;/19. S:T.f.5. 1_. L_ Av Tof-1AT1c. /\\c110.Js t-1\\ArJUA~ Ac.1\\oNS TK>A,tJ"'S' --**--* --*----\\

r l L { i. l r I \\; ( °". l. I.: L / t

1.

1 \\. SWITCHOVER PROCEDURE No operato~ action is required prior to 10 minutes after the accident. Prior to the receipt of the RWST low level alarm, the operator is to: CAUTIONS Verify that all safeguard pumps are operating and are delivering flow to the RCS cold legs. (If the SI and RHR pumps are not delivering flow to the RCS, due to the fact that the RCS pressure is higher than pump discharge pressur~, shut off the applicable pumps.) Monitor *RWST and containment sump level in anticipation of switchover initiation. The manual switchover steps listed below are to be performed in an orderly and timely manner and in the proper sequence. These operator actions are not to be interrupted until all of the steps in the table are co"mpleted. If the RWST low-low level alarm is received at any time prior *to completion of Step 3, immediately stop any pumps still taking suction from the RWST, then complete the switchover and restart any pump which was stopped. SWITCgOVER STEPS Upon receipt of the RWST low levei signal, the ope~ator is to immediately verify RWST.low level and containment sump minimum level and to perform the following actionso Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Restore power to and close the safety injection pump miniflow valves (SJ67, 68). Close the two valves in the crossover line downstream of the RHR heat exchangers (RH19)o Open each valve from each RHR pump discharge line to the safety injection pump suction and to the charging pump suction (SJ45). M P80 69 15/14

L r* \\"' r-l(. r** H

  • 1*-..

[.. L** ' l j '1 ~.. Step 4 Step 5 Step6 Step 7 SWITCHOVER PROCEDURE (Cont'd) All ECCS pumps are now aligned with suction flow from the containment sump. Verify proper position of automatically operated valves. a) SJ44 SJ113 CC16 b) RH4 Open - Open Open -Close. Complete the following manual actions to provide redundant isolation of the RWST from th.e recirculation fluid. Restore power to and close the valve in the common line from the RWST to both RHR pumps (SJ69). Close the two parallel valv~s in the line from the RWST to the charging pump suction (SJ1,-sJ2). Restore power to and close the valve in the common line from.the RWST to both safety injection pumps (SJ30). M P80 69 15/15 ~-*.

) ) l I I ) r '\\ I f: L r \\ \\_ SWITCHOVER FEATURES o Flow is uninterrupted from all ECCS pumps during switchover. o The automatic actions can tolerate any postulated instrumentation and control or mechanical single failur~ without (a) preventing automatic transfer to recirculation, or (b) causing inadvertent (spurious) automatic transfer to recirculation. o The complexity of the automatic actuation logic and interlocks is minimized. o. The manual actions can tolerate any postulated single failure without*preventing transfer to recirculation. This includes an operator error single failure which results in (a). the failure t6 perform one step, or (b) the performance of one step out of sequence. o The operator manual actions are minimizedc o The manual switchover steps can be performed independent of single'failure~ Upo~ verific~tion-that switchover is required (i.e., RWST low-low level and minimum sump leve*1), the switchover can be completed without any additional operator decision/ve~ification. . M P80 69 15/16

Component

1. Motor-operated gate valve 21SJ44 (22SJ44 analogous>

M POO 71 07/1 Fal lure Mode a> Fal Is to qlen on demand. b) Opens on spuri-ous demanda ("':'--.. . \\ ,,..-._.~ ~ ... Eccs sw i rcHoVER r A 1 LiJ~E MODE EFFi::crs ANAL vsls

  • ECCS Function Reclrculatlon - sump lsolatlon.

Effect on System Op_~_dtlon a) Fallure reduces redundancy of pro-vi ding fluid fran the containment sump to the RCS durl ng reclrcu la-t Ion. RHR,pump 21 <pump 22 > w 111 not provide recircula-tion flow. Minimum LHSI flow require-ments w 111 be met through qlenl ng *of Isolation valve 22SJ44 and nJcl rcu-latlon of fluid by Rlfl pump 22 (pump 21>. b> Failure prematurely al lgns RHR pump 21 <pump 221 to the-containment sump. Minimum LHSI reclr-cu lat10n "°" re-. qulrements wll I be met through proper qlenlng of Isola-tion valve 22SJ44 and recirculation of flu Id 17)' Rlfl pump 22 (pump 2l)o Fal lure Detect I on Method* Valve position Indi-cation at MCB. Valve qlen position non I tor 11 ght and al arm for group mon I tor I ng of can-ponent s at t-CB. Remarks Valve Is autanatl-cal ly actuoted to open by an S signal In coincidence with two out of four "low-low level" RWST signal.

2.

Component Motor-operated gate valve 21RH4 M PED 71 07/2 Fal lure Mode a> Fal Is to close demond. b) Closes sequen-t! ally on spuri-ous demand.* ECCS SWITCHOVER FAILURE MJDE EFFECTS ANALYSIS ECCS Function Reclrculatlon - RWST lsolatlon. Ef feet on System Operation a> Fal lure reduces redundancy of pro-vi d Ing flow lsola-latlon of contain-ment sump fran RWST. No effect on safety for system operat Ion. ~WST check Isolation valve provides back-up Isolation. b)

  • Fal lure prematurely
  • isolates RHR pump 21 (pump 22> from the RWST.

Minimum LHSI reclrculatlon

  • flow requirements*

w 111 be met through

  • proper c I os I ng of
  • Isolation valve 22RH4 and reclrcu-latlon of fluld by Rl-R pump 22 (pump 21 >.

,/--.* Fa I lure Detect I on Metho<flt .*Valve position Indi-cation at MCB. Valve close position mon I tor 11 ght and 111 arni for group monitoring of can-ponents at ~B. Remarks Valve Is automatl-cal ly actullted to close by ll ful I open signal fran suq> Iso-lation valve 21SJ44.

Component

3. Motor-operated gate valve 21SJl13 M POO 71 07/3 Fal lure Modo a> Fal Is to open on demand.

b> Opens.on spuri-ous demand. ECCS SWITCHOVER FAILURE MOOE EFFECTS ANALYSIS ECCS Function Reclrculatlon - CHG and SI pumps suction cross connect Isola-tion. E f feet on Sys tern Op_e_: ~t I on a> Failure reduce$ redundancy of pro-vi d Ing fluid flow throu !ti cross-t I e between suction of CHG pumps and 5 pumps. No ef feet

  • on safety for system operation.

Alternate Isolation valve 22SJl13 opens to provide back-up flow path through cross-tie 11 ne. b) Fa 11 ure premature I y opens the crosscon-nect between the CHG pump and SI pump suction. No ef feet on safety for system operritlon. NPSh fran RWST to CHG and SI pumps Is not affected. Fal lure Detection Metho~ Sane method of detection as those stated for ltan I.

... -~

Remarks Valve Is automatl-cal ly actuated to open by an S slgnal In coincidence with two out of four "low-low level" RWST slgnal.

e.

Component

4. Motor-operated*

gate valve 21CCl6 M POO 71 07/4 Fal lure Mode a) Falls to open on demand. b) Falls open on spurious demand.

\\*

ECCS SWITCHOVER FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS ECCS Function Recirculation - RHR Hx cool Ing Isola-tion. Ef feet on System Operation a> Failure reduces redundancy of pro-v Id Ing fluid flow for coo 11 ng of RHR Hx 21 <Hx 22) dur-1 ng recirculation. No effect on safety for system opera-tion. Alternate Isolation valve . 22CCI 6 opens to provide cool Ing to redundant RHR Hx 21 rnx 22). b) Failure prematurely provides coollng flow to RHR Hx 21 <Hx 22>. No effect on safety for system. Fal Jure Detection Metho~ Scrne 1116thod of detection as those stated for Item 1. Remarks Valve Is automatl-ca I I y actuated to open by an S slgna.1 In coincidence with two out of four "low-low level" RWST signal.

Component

5. Motor-operated gato valve 21RHl9
6.

Motor-operated glove valve SJ67. M Pa> 71 07/5 Fal lure Mode Falls to close on on demand. Fal Is to close on demand. ~-*') Lees vo... CHOVL*- : *.iLUlk rOV<JE Ef, Lvr5 AN1;L,..;*,s.-..,, ECCS Function Reclrculatlon - RHR pumps d I scharge crossconnect* lsola-tlon. Reclrculatlon - SI pump mlnlf low lsola-tlonc Effect on System Operation Failure reduces re-dundancy of provid-ing RHR pump train separation for reclr-culatlon of fluid to cold legs of RCS.

  • No e f fl3c t-on safety for system operation.

Alternate lsllatlon valve 22RHl9 provides back-up Isolation for Rl-R pu~ train separation. Fa 11 ure reduces re-dundancy of providing Isolation of SI pu~ mlnlf low to the RWST. No ef feet on safety for system operation. Alternate Isolation valve SJ68 In mlnlflow llne provides back-up I so lat Ion. Fal lure Detect I on Method* Sillle method of de-tect Ion as those stated for Item 2. Sama method of de-tect I on as those stated for Item 2. Remarks

  • Valve Is not automatl-'" f cal ly actuated to clos*l*

I> Valve Is not auto-matlcal ly actuated to close.

2) Valve Is electri-cally Interlocked with Isolation valve 21SS45 and may not be remote-1 y opened unless these valves are closed.

\\.

e.

Component

7.

Motor-operated glove valve 21SJ45

8.

Motor-operated gate valve 22SJ45 Fal lure Mode Fal Is to open on demand. Fal Is :to open on demand.

  • --~

'I l:C\\... 0 v .:,~I rc1-,..,,_.. : FAILv..... i"10DE -*I.... crs *.......... (SIS ECCS Function Reel rcu I at Ion - Crossover from RhR 21 discharge to 51 punp suction. Reclrcu lat Ion - Crossover from RHR pump 22 discharge to CHG pump suction. -p-E f feet on S1stem Operation Fa 11 ure reduces ri:r-du ndancy of providing t-PSH to suction *Jf Sl pumps from Rl-R pumps. Uo ef feet of safety for system operation. Minimum NPSH to SI pump suction wlll be met by flow fran RHR pump 22 via cross tie 11 ne and qienl ng of Isolation valve 21SJl13 or 22SJ113 and lsolatlon valve 22SJ45. Fa I I ure reduces re-dundancy of prov Id.I ng NPSH to suction of Cl-G pumps. No effect of safaty for system operation. Minimum NPSH to. Qi punp sue-t Ion wlil be mat by f I ow from Rl-R punp v I a cross-tie llne and opening of Isolation valve 211SJll3 or 22SJl1J and Isolation valve 21SJ45. Fa I lure Detection Method* SiJlle methods of de- -tect Ion as those stated for Item t. Same methods of de-tect I on as those stated for Item t.

  • As part of plant operation, periodic tests, surveillance Inspections, and Instrument callbratlons are made to monitor equipment and performance. Failures miff be datected during such monitoring of equipment In*

addition to detection methods noted. M POO 71 07/6 1>

2)
1)
2)

.l r:.. Remarks I( ~ Valve Is not auto~ matlcal ly actuated... to qien. Valve Is eleetrl-cal ly Interlocked and cannot be remotely opened unless valve SJ68 Is closed and *valve RHI or RH2 Is ~ closed. .Valve Is not auto-matlcal ly actuated to open. Valve Is electrl-caly Interlocked and cannot be rsnotely open8d unless valve SJ68 Is closed and valve RHI or RH2 Is ** closed.}}

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML18087A673&oldid=5009994"