ML18087A561
| ML18087A561 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18087A558 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8211080113 | |
| Download: ML18087A561 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 12 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY,
.PHILADELPHIA.ELECTRIC COMPANY, Introduction DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, AND ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-311 By letter dated October 7, 1982, Public Service Electric and Gas Company (the lic~nsee) requested an amendment to License No. DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2.
This change would defer a surveil-lance test for vacuum relief isolation valves until the first refueling outage.
Discussion There has been recent concern over.the use of containment isolation valves that incorporate resilient seals. Resilient.seals used in containment purge and ventilation valves have been known to crack thus bringing into question their leak tightness and overall containment integrity.
As a result of these concerns, addition~l surveillance requirements have been added to the Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications.
Pressure drop tests (which are conducted by pressurizing the space between the two isolation valves and measuring the pressure decay) are.required to be performed on the purge supply and exhaust isolation valves and the vacuum relief isolation valves.
These tests are required to be performed every six months and three months, respectively.* Although these valves are subject to volumetric leak testing during each refueling outage as required by Appendix J to 10 CFR 50,
- the pressure drop tests are designed to provide additional assurance of the valves integrity between Appendix J leak tests.
Vacuum relief isolation valves 2VC 5 & 6 have their test connections for performing the pressure drop test inside containment.
The test connections are located approximately 20-25 feet above the nearest floor and are only accessible by climbing and walking over safety related cable trays.
After performing. their first pressure drop test for these valves on June 24, 1982, the licensee determined that undue risks were being taken by plant personnel.
Therefore,
.a design change was made to relocate the test connections to a safely accessible area outside containment.
~~11080113 821615 PDR ADOCK 05000311 P
PDR Re~ocation of the vacuum relief valves test connections are scheduled for the refueling outage of January 1983.
Since testing of these valves is required by October 16, 1Q82, the licensee has requested not to perform Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.b for the duration of the first fuel cycle.
Evaluation Vacuum relief isolation valves 2VC 5 & 6 were successfully leak tested during preoperational testing on February 19, 1981.
The pressure drop test of June 24, 1982, showed no increase in leakage thus verifying the integrity of the resilient seals.
Performing the pressure drop test before the refueling outage would require a containment entry. Access to the test connections would require personnel to climb and walk on safety related cable trays.
We concur with the licensee that climbing to the ceiling with a test rig is a hazard to both test person-nel and plant operation.
Performing the test with the plant at power would also increase the dose rate to plant personnel.
(Access by ladder is ruled out because both containment air-lock doors would have to be opened thus violating containment integrity.)
Previous leak tests performed on the vaccum relief isolation valves show that the valves' integrity has been maintained.
We concur with the licensee that undue risks would be taken by plant personnel for the performance of this test. The licensee's request of October 7, 1982, to waive Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.b for the duration of the first fuel cycle would only delete one pressure drop test for these valves.
Installation of the more accessible, outside test connections during the January 1982 refueling outage will allow for the safe resumption of these tests.
The~efore, based on our review of the licensee's submittal; we conclude
'that th*e proposed Technical Specification change is acceptable.
The change is a one-time change to exempt Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.6.b for the duration of the first fuel cycle.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent
_ types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in*
. any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is in~ig nificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declar-
. ation and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection.
with the issuance of this amendment.
, - Canel us ion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the *proba-bility or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date:
October 15, 1982 Principal.Contributor:
Doug Pi_~kett