ML18085A196
| ML18085A196 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Schneider F Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8011060656 | |
| Download: ML18085A196 (4) | |
Text
..
UNITED STATES
- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 Docket No. 50-272 50-311 Public Service Elec.U-ic and Gas Company AITN:
Mr. F. W. Schneider Vice President - Product.ion 80 Park Plaza - ISA Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gentlemen:
October 24, 1980
- D (Tl c;
(/)P'i rq :~-,.;
- .o r.1
~CJ c*;o
~(;;
-*~
c:;;::i
~Em
~;c
-~ =
G The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-37, 11Cont"ainment Cooler Leaks and Reactor Cavity Flooding at Indian Point Unit 2/' is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional i nform.ati on regarding this matter, p 1 ease contact this office.
Sincerely,
~~p Director
Enclosures:
- 1.
IE Information Notice No. 80-37
- 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices CONTACT:
E. G. Greenman (215-337-5267) cc w/encl s:
F. P. Librizzi, General,Manager - Electric Production E. N. Schwal je, Manager** ~ Quality Assurance R. L. Mittl, General Manager - Licensing and Environment H. J. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station R. A. Uderitz, General Manager - Fuel Supply Department 8011060,~,
./
I
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555
-October 24, 1980 SSINS No.:
6835 Accession No.:
8008220249 IN 80-37 IE Information Notice No.
80~37:
CONTAINMENT COOLER LEAKS AND REACTOR CAVITY FLOODING AT INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 Discription of Circumstances:
This *Notice contains information regarding multiple service water leaks i.nto containment with resulting damage to reactor instrumentation and potential damage to the reactor pressure vessel.
Upon containment entry on October 17, 1980 at Indian Point Unit 2, to repair a malfunctioning power range nuclear detector, it was discovered that a significant amount of water was collected (approximately 100,000 gal) on the containment floor, in -the containment sumps, and in the: cavity under the reactor pressure vessel (RPV).
This collected water probably caused the detector malfunction, and the water in the cavity under the RPV is. believed to have been deep enough to wet several feet of the pressure vessel lower head, causing an unanalyzed thermal stress condition of poten~ial safety significance.
This condition resulted from the following combination of conditions:
(1) Both containment sump pumps were inoperable, one due to blown fuses from an unknown cause and the other due to binding of its controlling float; (2) The two containment sump level indicating lights which would indicate increasing water level over the water level range present in the containment were stuck (on) and may have been for several days, leaving the operator with no operable instrumentation to measure water level in the containment; (3) The moisture level indicators in the containment did not indicate high moisture levels, apparently because they are designed to detect pressurized hot water or steam leaks (i.e., a LOCA), and are not sensitive to the lower airborne moisture levels resulting from relatively small cold water leaks; (4) The hold-up tanks which ultimately receive water pumped from the containment sump also receive Unit 1 process water, lab drain water, etc. These other water sources masked the effect
- of cessation of water flows from the Unit 2 sump; (5) There were significant, multiple service.water leaks from the containment fan cooling units directly onto the containment floor.
These coolers have a history of such leakage, ~hich cannot be detected by supply inventorylosses since the supply system (service water system) is not a closed system; (6) The two submersible pumps in the cavity under the Reactor Pressure Vessel were ineffective since they pump onto the con-tainment floor for ultimate removal by the (inoperable) containment sump pumps.
There is no water level instrumentation in the cavity under the RPV, nor was
- there any indication outside the containment when these pumps are running.
The licensee has installed redundant sump level annunciated alarms in the control room and has installed an annunciated alarm in the control room to indicate if either submersible pump in the reactor cavity activates.
The licensee has also repaired the service water leaks, installed guide bushings on the sump pump control floats to prevent their binding, and has repaired the containment sump water level indicators.
IN 80-37 October 24, 1980 Page 2 of.2 The licensee plans in the longer term to replace the containment fan unit coo 1 i ng co i ls.
--=-~
It is anticipated that results of a continuing NRC investigation into this incident will result in issuance of an IE Bulletin and/or an NRR Generic Letter in the near future which will recommend or require specific licensee and applicant actions.
In the interim, we recommend that all licensees ascertain that the pdtential does not exist for undetected water accumulation in the containment.
This Information Notice is provided to inform licensees of a possibly significant matter.
No written response to this Information Notice is required.
IE Information Notice No. 80-37 October 24,.1980 Information Notice No.
80-.36 80-35.
80-34 80-33 80-32 80-31 80-30 80-29 Supplement to 80-06 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Subject
.. -**:*-~
Date Issued Failure.of Steam 10/10/80 Generator Support
- . Bolting Leaking and Dislodged 10/10/80 Iodirie~125 Implant
- Seeds Boron Dilution of 9/26/80 Reactor Coolant During Steam Generator Decontamination Determination of 9/15/80 Teletherapy Timer Accuracy Clarification of 9/12/80 Certain Requirements for Exclusive-use Shipments of Radioactive Materials Maloperation of Gould-8/27/80 Brown Boveri 480V-Type K-6005 and K-Don 6005 Circuit Breakers Potential for Unaccept-8/27/80 able Interaction Between the Control Rod Drive Scram Function
~nd Non-essential Control Air at Certain BWR Facilities Broken Studs on 8/7/80 Terry Turbine Steam Inlet Flange Notification of 7/29/80 Significant Events at Operating Power Reactor Facilities Issued to All holders of a power reactor OL or CP All holders of a Category G or Gl Medical License All holders of a PWR Power Reactor OL All holders of a teletherapy license All holders of an NRC or Agreement State License All holders of a power reactor OL or CP All holders of a BWR power reactor OL or CP All holders of a power reactor OL.or CP All holders of a power reactor OL and near term OL applicants