ML18082A706
| ML18082A706 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1980 |
| From: | Kerrigan J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007110561 | |
| Download: ML18082A706 (21) | |
Text
1i' -*
JUN 2 4 1980 Docket No. 50-311 APPLICANT:*_
FACILITY:
SUBJECT:
PUBL'IC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMP,i\\NY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2 SUMMtl.RY OF MEETING ON AUTOMATIC ECCS SHITCHOVER l\\ w..eeting ~Vas held in Bethesda, Maryland on June 5, 1980 with representatives of tile applic~nt and Westinghouse to discuss the design of an automatic ECCS switchover system*.'.'for Salem, Unit 2.
The meeting was held at the applicant 1s request to discuss with the staff the proposed conceptual design for automatic switchover prior to formal submittal of the design.
The meeting attendees are listed in Enclosure 1.
The meeting is summarized as follov1s.
Tfle proposed design is summarized in *the meeting handout (Enclosure 2).
Basic;;*l-ly, the proposed design ~muld involve automation of four of the seven manual operator actions currr~ntly requ,i-red.
The licensee stated.that the automatic actions could be manually initiated at the component level if desired.
The staff made a commitment to inform the licensee by June 20, 1980 of the.
acceptab i 1 i ty of the basic design_ concept.
Janis _Ker i gan, Project r*1anager Licensin Branch #3 Division-of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated OFFICEi)>
-OURNAM!!~
DATE~
~me.FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240
- u.s. GOVERNMEN,: PRINTING OFFICE: 1970 - ZG5 - 769
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. MEETING srn1MARY DISTRIBUTION l
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Docket File NRC PDR Local PDR TIC NSIC Branch Fi 1 e-.
H. Denton E. Case
- o. Ei senhut R. Purol e T. Novak S. Varga T. lppol i to R. A. Cl ark R. Reid R *.. Tedesco
.J. Youngblood A. Schwencer Chief, Licensing Branch #3 J. R *. Miller G. Lainas D. Crutchfield Chief, Systemic Evaluation Program Branch Chief, Operating Reactors Assessment Branch R. Vollmer R. Bcisnak F. Schauer R. E. Jackson G. Lear V. Noonan S. Pawl1cld V. Benaroya Z.
- Rosztoczv W. Haass D. Mull er R. Ba*11 ard W. Rega*n.
J. o. Sal t.zman D. Ross P. Check R. Satter.ti eld
- 0. Parr F. Rosa W. Butler W. Kreger R. W. Houston T. Murphy' W. Gammill L. Rubenstein T. Speis
- Chi'ef, Core Performance Branch J. Stolz S. Hanauer P. Collins D. Vassallo D. Ziemann
~. Mattson R. Schroeder K. Kni el D. Skovhol t r;. Kn i q hton M. Ernst
- R. Brier C. Berlin9er S. Israel ACRS (16)
Attorney, OELD OIE (3)
OSD ( 7)
Project ~ana9er J. Kerrigan Licensing Assistant J. Lee Receotionist TER.~
J. Le Dou x * -- I & E l&E Headouarteys l&E Region I/
I&E Region II.
l&E Region III l&E Region IV I&E Region v NRC P~rticioants:
R~ Colmar T. Novak M. Srinivasan D. Thatcher
- c. Kramer S. MacKay C. Morris J. Mazeti.s H. Li
- J. Burdoin J. Stewart J. Kerrigan bJ..c
~r:tl 1cant & Service List
i
- 1 JUN 2 4 1980 Docket No. 50-311 APPLI_Cl\\NT:
- FACILITY:.
SUBJECT:
PUBL'IC SERVICE*. ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIONt UNIT ~
SUMMARY
OF MEETING ON AUTOMATIC ECCS SWITCHOVER
~ '\\.,.......
A neeting was held in Bethesda~ Maryland on June 5, 1980 with representatives of the applic~nt and Westinghouse to discuss the design of an automatic ECCS switchover systenrffor Salem, Unit 2.
The meeting was held at the applicant's request to discuss with the staff the proposed conceptual design for.-automatic swi.tchover prior to formal submittal of the desf~n.. The meeting attendees are
. listed in Enclosure L The meeting 1s summarized as follows.
s UJllTla r.Y..*
- The proposed design is summarized in the meeting handout (Enclosure 2). Basitally, t~e proposed design would inv9lve automat1on of four of the seven manual: oper~tor actions currently requ,1-red.
The licensee stated.that the automatic actions could be manually initiated at the component level if desired.
- The staff made a commitment to infonn the license~ by June 20, 1980 of the.
- .acceptability of the basic des1.gn concept.
Enc1osures:
As stated Janis Ker 1gan, Project Manager Licensin Branch #3 Division of L1cens1ng
- N11C PORM 318 (51*76) NRCM 02.CO u *** GoV*R.NM*NT..... lli,ITING OP'... 1c*: *' 171 -.181 - 71D
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 JUN 2 4 1980 Docket No. 50-311 APPLICANT:
FACILITY:.
SUBJECT:
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2
SUMMARY
OF MEETING ON AUTOMATIC ECCS SWITCHOVER A meeting was held in Bethesda, Maryland on June 5, 1980 with representatives of the applicant and Westinghouse to discuss the design of an automatic ECCS switchover system for Salem, Unit 2.
The meeting was held at the applicant's request to discuss with the staff the proposed conceptual design for automatic switchover prior to formal submittal of the design.
The meeting attendees are
- listed in Enclosure l. The meeting is summarized as follows.
Sunmary The proposed design is summarized in the meeting handout (Enclosure 2). Basically, the proposed design would involve automation of four of the seven manual operator actions currently required.
The licensee stated that the automatic actions could be manually initiated at the component level if desired.
The staff made a commitment to inform the licensee by June 20, 1980 of the acceptability of the basic design concept.
Enclosures:
As stated attt.0. /dvwjc~
6is Kerrigan, Pro'.:iect Manager Licensing Branch #3
- Division of Licensing *
~.*
Mr. R. L. Mittl, General Manager Licensing & Environment Engineering & Construct iOn Department Public Service Electric*& Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 cc: Richard Fryling, Jr., Esq~
Assistant-General Counsel Public Service Electric & Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07100 Mark Wetterhahn, Esq.
Conner, Moore & Cober Suite 1050 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.* W.
Washington, o. c.
20006 Mr. Leif J. Norrholm c/o u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission
- Re~ion I, Drawer I Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 0803.8
I Name Janis Kerrigan Jeff Stewart
- John F. Burdoin Hulbert C. Li J. J. Wroblewski R. L. Hofer L. W. Spence R. C. Sunnan R. R. Oft R. W. Beckwith R. W. Skwarek J. Mazet1s C. Morris S. MacKay Cynthia Kramer John B. Hoch Ron Ke lmenson Tom Novak Dale Thatcher M. Srinivasan R. Colmar ATTENDANCE LIST 9Enclosure 1 Affi 1 i at ion Project Manager ICSB - Intern ICSB - NRC ICSB/NRC PSEG Westinghouse Westinghouse Westinghouse Westinghouse PSE&G Nuclear Operations PSE&G Licensing NRCJRSB NRC/RSSB NRC/PTRB ICSB/NRC - intern Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
PG&E DL (part time)
DSI/ICSB DSI/ICSB NRC
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6nclosure 2 SALEM #2 ECCS SWITCHOVER AGENDA Introduction Switchover Automation Evaluation 1
Switchover Modifications Switchover Logic Switchover Procedure Switchover Criteria/Features Evaluation Switchover Failure Modes & Effects Analyses Summary
Action Auto Open 8982 A/B Auto Close 8700 A/B Auto Open 8704 A/B Auto Open 8807 A/B Auto Close
-~
8716 A/B Auto Close 8974 A/B
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SALEM UNIT 2 SWITCHOVER-AUTOMATION EVALUATION Advantages(l)
_ pumps without operator action..
- Provides component cooling water to RHR Hx without operator action.
No operator decision/verification required.
1 Opens SI/CHG pump.suction crossover header without operator action.
No operator decision/verification required.
1 Closes RHR discharge crossconnect valves without operator action.
- Isolates SI miniflow without operator action.
Disadvantages
- Spurious (early) opening could damage one RHR pump.
- Spurious {early) sequential automatic closure before adequate water exists in sump could damage one RHR pump.
- Spurious (early) sequential automatic closure reduces ECCS below minimum safeguards.(4) -_
- Spurious (early) sequential automatic closu~e could damage both SI pumps:(S)
Action Auto Open 8804 A/B NOTES SALEM UNIT 2 SWITCHOVER AUTOMATlON EVALUATlON Advantages(l) 1 Provides suction/NPSH for SI and CHG pumps from RHR pump di~charge without operator action.
Disadvantages 1
Closure of valves 8716 A/B and 8974 A/B are required to be completed prior to opening valves 8804 A/B.
(1) All automatic steps have advantage of reducing operato~ actions.
(2)
Unacceptable Single Failure - Failure to open on demand could permit two RHR pumps to draw suction from one sump line. Resolution requires addition of a 14 inch check valve in each RWST line.
(3) Affects RWST Sizing (Transfer Allowance) - Requires (a) modification to RWST sizing basis, (b) addition of 14 inch check valve in each sump line, or (c) auto closure of RWST suction MOV.
Modifications b) *and c) will prevent an~ minimize, respectively, potential backflow to the sump when the sump MOV opens.
(4) *Unacceptable Single Failure - Spurious sequential closure result~ in damage to one RHR pump and reduces ECCS flow below minimum safeguards. Resolution requires additional logic/permissive to prevent spurious sequential automatic closure.
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(5) Unacceptable Single Failure - Spurious sequential closure results in damage to two SI pumps, reducing ECCS
- flow below minimum safeguards.
Resolution requires modification to locate two MOVs in each SI pump miniflow line (one on train A and one on train B to ensure isolation for recirculation). Also requires additional
. logic/permissive to prevent spurious sequential closing of a valve (e.g.; train A valves) in each SI pump miniflow.
Design Modifications SALEM UNIT 2 SWITCHOVER MODIFICATIONS
- Add sump check valves (verify adequate NPSH).
- Add RWST check valves (verify adequate NPSH).
- Automate switchover actions (See Switchover Logic)
- Open 8982 A/B (-on RWST low-low level and concurrent "S"
- *Close 8700 A/B (on valves 8982 A/B full open signal).
Open* 8704 A/B (on.RWST low-low level and concurrent "S"*
- Open 8807 A/B (on RWST low-low level and concurrent* "S"
.
- Maintain manual actions Close 8974 A/B Close 8716 A/B Open 8804 A/B
- "Highlight" and number (i.e.,.Step l~ Step 2', and Step 3) valve switches that the operator must reposition during switchover.
- Implement simplified switchover procedure
- . See Switchover* Procedure*
signal).
signal).
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.,°I SALEM UNIT 2 SWITCHOVER PROCEDURE No operator action is required prior to 10 minutes after the accident.
Prior to the receipt of the. RWST low~ level alarm, the operator is to:
- Verify that a 11 safeguards pumps are operating and are delivering flow to the RCS cold legs *. (If the SI and RHR pumps are not delivering flow to the RCS, due to the fact that the RCS pressure is higher than pump discharge pres-sure, shut off the.applicable pumps.)
- Monitor RWST and containment sump level in anticipation of switchover initiation.
CAUTIONS
- The manual switchover steps listed below are to be performed in an orderly and timely manner and in the proper sequence.
These operator actions are not to be interrupted until all of the steps in the table are completed.
lo w-/ot.Q
- If the RWST ~
level alarm is received at any time prior to completion of Ste'p 3, immediately stop any pumps still taking suction from'the RWST, then complete the. switchover.
and restart any pump which was stopped.
SWITCHG'iER STEPS Upon receipt of the RWST low-4ililw level signal, the operator is to immediately verify RWST low411it level and containment sump minimum level and to perform the following actions.
- step l Step 2 Step 3 Restore power to and close the safety injection pump miniflow valves (8974 A & B).
Close the two valves in the crossover line downstream of the RHR heat*exchangers (8716 A & B).
Open each valve from each RHR pump discharge line to the safety injection pump suction and to the charging pump suction (8804 A & B, respectively).
SALEM UNIT 2 SWITCHOVER PROCEDURE Step 4 All ECCS pumps are now aligned with suction flow from the Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 containment sump.
Verify proper position of automatically operated valves.
a) 8982 A & B -
Open 8807 A & B -
Open 8704 A & B -
Open b) 8700 A & B
~ Close Complete the following manual actions to provide redundant isolation of the RWST from the recirculation fluid.
Restore power to and close the valve in the common line from the RWST to both RHR pumps (8980).
Close the two parallel valves in the line from the RWST to the charging pump suction (8805 A & B).
Restore power to and close the valve in the common line from
- the-RWST to. both safety injection pumps ( 8976).
- . 1
SALEM UNIT 2 SWITCHOVER FEATURES Flow is uninterrupted from all ECCS pumps during switchover.
The automatic actions can tolerate any postulated instrumentation and control or mechanical single failure without (a) preventing auto-
. matic transfer to recirculation, or (b) causing inadvertent (spurious) automatic transfer to recirculation.
1 The complexity of the automatic actuation logic and interlocks is minimized.
1 The manual actions can tolerate any postulated single failure without preventing transfer to recirculation. This includes an operator error single failure which results in (a) the failure to perform one step, or (b) the performance of one step out of sequence.
The operator manual actions are minimized.
The manual switchover steps can be performed independent of single failure.
Upon verification that switchover is required (i.e., RWST
- low-low level and minimum sump level), the switchover can be completed without any additional operator decision/verification.
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- Component
- 1. Motor-operated gate valve 8982A (89828 analogous)
Failure Mode a) Fans to open on
- demand.
b} Opens on.~puri ous demand.
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f CCS S~JlC~OVf~ fHEA ECCS Function :
Recirculation - sump isolation.
Effect on System Operation a) Failure reduces redundancy of pro-viding fluid from the containment sump to the RCS
. during recircula~
tion.
RHR pump 11 (pump 12) wi 11 not provide recircula-
.tion flow.
Minimt111 LHSI flow require-ments will be met through opening of isolation valve 89828 (8982A) and recirculation of fluid by RHR pump 12 (pwnp l1).
b} Faflure prema~urely aligns RHR pump 11 *
(pump 12) to the containment sump.
Minimum LHSI recir-culation flow require-ments will be met through proper opening of isolation
- valve 89828 (8982A) and* recirculation of fluid by RHR pump 12 (pump 11).
Failure Detection Method*
Valve position i.ndi-cation at MC8.
Valve open position monitor light.and alarm for group monitoring of components at MC8.
- Remarks Valve is automati-cally actuated to open by an S signal in coincidence with two out of four *1ow-low levelu RWST sig-nal.
Component
- 2. Motor-operated gate valve 8700A*
(87008 analogous)
Failure Mode a) Fails to close on demand.
b) Closes sequen-tially on spuri-ous demand.
SALEM UNIT 2 ECCS SWITCHOVER FMEA ECl.S Function Recirculation - RWST isolation.
Effect on System Operation a) Failure reduces redundancy of pro-viding flow iso-lation of contain-ment sump from RWST.
No effect on safety for sys-tem operation.
RWST check isola-t10n valve pro-vides back-up *iso-lation.
b) Failure prematurely isolates RHR pump 11 (pump 12) from the RWST.
Minimum LHSI recirculation flow requirements will will be met through proper closing of isolation valve 87008 (8700A) and recirculation of fluid by RHR pump 12 (pump 11).
Failure Detection Method*
Valve position indica-tion at MCB. Valve
- close position monitor light and alarm for group monitoring of components at MCB.
Remarks Valve is automati-cally actuated to clos~ by a full open signal from sump isolation valve 8982A ( 89828).
a
Comp0nent
- 3. Motor-operated gate valve 8807A (88078 analogous)
Failure Mode a) Fails to open on demand.
b) Opens on a spurt~
ous demand.
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. SALEM UNIT 2
-3~
ECCS Function Recirculation - CHG and SI pumps suction cross connect isolation.
Effect on System Operation a) Failure. reduces
- redundancy of pro-viding fluid flow through cross-tie between.suction of CHG pumps and*s1 pumps.
No effect on safety for sys-tem operation.
Alternate isolation valve 88078 (8807A) opens to provide back-up flow path through cross-tie line.
b) Failure prematurely opens the crosscon-nect between the CHG pump and SI pump suction.
No effect on safety for system operation.
Failure
- Detection Method*
Same method of detec-tion as those stated for item 1.
Remarks Valve is automati-*
ca 1 ly actuated to
- open by an S signal in coincidence with two out of four "low-low level" RWST
- signal.
Component
- 4. Motor-operated 9ate valve 8704A (87048 analogous).
Failure Mode a) Fails to open on demand b) Fails open on a spurious demand.
. SALEM UNIT 2 ECCS SWITCHOVER FHEA ECC~ Function Recirculation - RHR Hx cooling isolation.
Effect on System *operation a) Failure reduces redundancy of pro-viding fluid flow for cooling of RHR Hx 11 (Hx 12) during recircula-tion.
No effect on safety for sys-tem opel'ation.
Alternate isolation valve 87048 (8704A) opens to provide cooling to redun-dant RHR Hx 12 (Hx 11).
b} Failure prematurely provides cooling flow to RHR Hx 11 (Hx 12).
No effect on safety for system.
Failure Detection Method*
a) Same methods of detection as those stated for Item 1.
Remarks Valve is automatf~
cally actuated to open by an S signal in coincidence with two out of four "low-low level" RWST signal.
Component
- 5. Motor-operated
~ate valve 8716A (87168 analogous).
- 6. Motor-operated globe valve 8974A (89748 analogous}.
- 7. Motor-operated gate valve 8804A.
.. ~
Failure Mode Fails to close on d~nd.
Fails to close on demand.
Fails to open on demand.
SALEM UNIT 2 ECCS SWITCHOVER FHEA Ef:CS Function Recirculation - RHR pumps discharge cross-connect isolation.
Recirculation - SI pump mtniflow isola-t1on.
.Recirculation - Cross-
Effect on System Operation Failure reduces redun-dancy of providing RHR pump train sepa-ration for.recircula-.
tton of fluid to cold legs of RCS.
No effect on safety for system operation.
Alternate isolation valve 87168 (8716A}
provides back-up.iso-lation for RHR pump train separation.
Failure reduces redun-dancy of providing isolation of SI pump miniflow to the RWST.
No effect on safety for system operation.
Alternate isolation valve 89748 (8974A)
- in miniflow line pro-
.vides back-up isolation.
Failure reduces redun-dancy of providing NPSH to suction of SI pumps from*RHR pumps.
No effect on safety for system. operation.
Minimum NPSH to SI pump suction will be met by flow from RHR pump 12.via cross-tie line and opening of*
isolation valve 8807A or 88078 and isolation valve 88048.
Failure Detection Method*
- same methods of detec-tt on as those stated for Item 2.
Same methods of detec-tion as those stated for Item 2.
Same methods of*detec-tton as*those stated for Item 1.
Remarks Vahe ts not auto-matically actuated to close.
- 1) Valve ts not automatically actuated to close.
- 2) Valve is electri~
cally interlocked with isolation valves 8804A (88048) and may not be remotely opened unless these valves are closed. -
- 1) Valve is not auto-matically actuated to open.
- 2) Valve is electri-cally interlocked and cannot be remotely opened unless valve 8974A or 89748 is closed and valve 8701 or 8702 ts closed.
Component
- 8. Motor-operated gate valve 88040.
Faflure Mode Fails to open on demand.
SALEH UNIT 2 ECCS SWITCHOVER FHEA EClS Function Recirculation ~ Cross-over from RHR pump 12 discharge* to CHG pump suction.
Effect on System Operation Failure reduces redun-dancy of providing NPSH to suction of CHG pumps from RHR pumps.
No effect on safety for system operation.
Minimum NPSH to CHG pump suction will be met by fl ow from RHR.
pump via cross-tie line and opening of isolation valve 8807A or 88070 and isolation valve 8804A.
FailUre Detection Method*
Same methods of detec-tion as those stated for Item l.
- As part of plant operation, periodic tests, surveillance inspections, and instrument calibrations are made to monitor equipment and perfonnance. Failures may be detected during* such monitoring of equipment 1n addition to detection methods noted.
Remarks
- 1) Valve is not auto-matically actuated to open.
- 2) Valve* is electri-
~*
-cally interlocked and cannot be remotely opened..illllil unless valve 8979' or 89740 is closed and valve8701-or 8702 is closed.
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